<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
    <title>EconTalk</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/" />
    <link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.econtalk.org/atom.xml" />
    <id>tag:,2008-09-28:/2</id>
    <updated>2012-05-14T13:35:08Z</updated>
    
    <generator uri="http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/">Movable Type Pro 4.21-en</generator>

<entry>
    <title>Owen on Parenting, Money, and the First National Bank of Dad</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/05/owen_on_parenti.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9869</id>

    <published>2012-05-14T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-05-14T13:35:08Z</updated>

    <summary> David Owen, author of The First National Bank of Dad, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about how to educate our children about money and finance. Owen explains how he created his own savings accounts for his kids that...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="David Owen" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Education" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Family" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Finance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Money, Banking, Monetary Policy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
<a href="http://davidowen.typepad.com/david_owen/biography.html" target="new">David Owen</a>, author of <i>The First National Bank of Dad</i>, talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about how to educate our children about money and finance. Owen explains how he created his own savings accounts for his kids that gave them an incentive to save and other ways to teach them about postponing gratification, investing, keeping money in perspective and other life lessons. The conversation closes with a discussion of the value of reading to your kids. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Owenparenting.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Owen on Parenting, Money, and the First National Bank of Dad','Russ Roberts and David Owen',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:03:46</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Owenparenting.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 29.3 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.davidowen.net" target="new">David Owen's</a> Home page
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-First-National-Bank-Dad/dp/1416534253//" target="new"><i>The First National Bank of Dad: A Foolproof Method for Teaching Your Kids About the Value of Money</i></a>, by David Owen at Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.bartleby.com/104/88.html" target="new">"The Rich Man,"</a> by Franklin P. Adams ("F.P.A.", 1881-1960). Poem reprinted from <i>Modern American Poetry</i>, Louis Untermeyer, ed., 1919. Bartleby.com.

</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2006/03/the_economics_o.html" target="new">The Economics of Parenting with Don Cox</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/12/mcardle_on_debt.html" target="new">McArdle on Debt and Self-Restraint</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/02/viviana_zelizer.html" target="new">Viviana Zelizer on Money and Intimacy</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/david_owen_on_t.html" target="new">David Owen on the Environment, Unintended Consequences, and The Conundrum</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: May 1, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> To discuss: Owen's book, <i>First National Bank of Dad</i>. People tend to think about economics as being about money.  It's something that frustrates me as an economist, that people on an airplane if I tell them I'm an economist will ask me for advice about the stock market or tell me that must be handy during tax time.  And of course, I don't know a lot about the stock market; and I pay someone to do my taxes. But there is a part of economics that is about money. Obviously transactions and investing and saving are also about money, and those have to do with economics. What I also like about money, and about your book, is that it reminds me of what a student told me, that she had heard from a former professor: that economics is the study of how to get the most out of life. And this book, while about money, is really about helping our children get the most out of life. And that would help us, too, as parents.  The <i>National Bank of Dad</i>, which the title of your book comes from, is your way to encourage your children postpone pleasure and to learn about savings, which is a very valuable skill.  So, how does the National Bank of Dad work? <b>Guest:</b> Well, what happened, the story was that when my daughter was very little, I did the thing that parents always do, and when she was about 3 I took her down to the bank and made a big show of opening a savings account for her, with a check for $100 and then explained how the banking system worked. And, uh, essentially explaining that if you leave this $100 there for a year, but basically until you are in kindergarten, it will yield enough interest for you to buy a pack of gum. She wasn't very interested. <b>Russ:</b> Blew her away. <b>Guest:</b> And she was even less interested when she discovered that though this $100 was technically hers, I wasn't going to let her put her hands on it. And I attributed her lack of interest to, you know, to youthful immaturity and irresponsibility and all the things that parents usually accuse our children of.  It was only later--unfortunately it was only several years later--that I realized that her disappointment was not about her ignorance about money but about her acute understanding of it.  And that she was getting a raw deal; and it didn't make any sense. <b>Russ:</b> And that was because the interest rate was remarkably low? <b>Guest:</b> Remarkably low, even if you are a grown-up. If you are three years old, and a year is a thousand years away; and most of the things we tell our kids: you have to save money so that you can go to college when you are older. So that you can leave your mother and father and live in a faraway place with people you don't know and go and study very hard things, much harder than kindergarten. None of these things-- <b>Russ:</b> It's a real turn-on <b>Guest:</b> --work for children like an incentive.  I think the underlying lesson economics is that people are rewarded for doing, even if we want to use economics for doing things, there have to be rewards. Seem like rewarding them, even rewards for them. I think that was the insight that I ultimately had after years of thinking about it: The reason my kids weren't interested in the banking system as I presented it was that there was nothing in it for them. And where that led me was to think: How would I do this in a way--how would I give them incentives that would seem like incentives to them? What I ultimately decided was that their money had to grow at a rate that they noticed it growing.  Things had to happen on a time scale that seemed reasonable to them. And what I ultimately did was create a bank account in my house, a savings bank, in my house, in which I paid them an interest rate of 5% a month on their deposits.  That works out to an annual percentage rate of something like 70%. And, I sat them down; they were 6 and 10, and roughly explained this idea.  My son was 6. He wasn't even doing arithmetic really yet, and yet he immediately grasped the idea of interest, and compound interest.  He gathered up all his change and put it on my desk and said he wanted me to credit him today.  Because what I had explained to them-- <b>Russ:</b> Get it working. <b>Guest:</b> Get it working. Money in there.  What he called charging up. He wanted to leave his money in his account for a while because he spent any of it. And, the basic idea was that if we give children incentives that seem like incentives to them, they will do what human nature tells them to do. I think the general lesson is that it's better to harness human nature than to change it; and I think most of what parents do when they try to teach their kids about money has to do with changing, thwarting human nature, bending our children to our will rather than doing what we claim we are doing, which is just to teach them about how money works.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">6:31</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> And how did the Bank of Dad work out? <b>Guest:</b> It worked extremely well. They both caught on.  And what I would do was put both their allowances in in Quicken each month. And then at the end of the month I would apply my 5% interest rate. And their balances would increase. <b>Russ:</b> As long as they didn't withdraw. <b>Guest:</b> Whatever the balance was--the 5% would apply to whatever it was at the end of the month. And they understood that if they left that money or some of that money in, that the 5% the next month would apply to that as well. This was my son's intuitive understanding of compound interest.  He decided that what he would do is he drew a picture in which he said that he was going to invent a potion, a great-flavored potion that would make him live for a very, very long time, and he would deposit his money, and then after the end of this very long time he would have a trillion dollars or something like that. He had a line of trucks hauling off his fortune. It had built up over that time. And, uh, they                                                                     understood it; and immediately they both became savers. I think what we usually do with kids--I know my kids felt this way--that if a kid gets $5 in a Christmas stocking, say--they view that as real money.  If they get a check for $100, they know their parents are going to grab it and stick it in some account someplace that they won't have any access to. So, $5 is real money; $100 is not. To receive cash, you either have to hide it from your parents, or do what my kids used to do, which is to say: I want to be taken to the mall right now. I want to  convert this into something you can't confiscate. <b>Russ:</b> Get it into hard form. <b>Guest:</b> And once the Bank of Dad was in place, their feelings changed about it. The other element in addition to the high percentage rate, was that they had to have control over their money. So, when they came to me and said, I want to take $20 out of my account in your bank, there was no question to ask. I would give it to them. That didn't mean that the rules of the family had been suspended; they couldn't go out and spend it on firearms or drugs, and they couldn't, just because they could afford it, eat candy whenever they wanted to. All the family rules still applied. But if they wanted to spend their money on something foolish, as they sometimes did, that was their decision. And I think that was an important part of it, too, because I think we learn about money the way we learn about anything, which is by making a series of gradually less catastrophic mistakes, and eventually by trial and error seeing what works and what doesn't. In families where kids really don't have their own money or where they have to beg for every dollar they spend and ask for it, they have no incentive to think about the consequences of buying something dumb, because they have no control. Money magically appears and disappears; when they have it, they should get rid of it, because the only way to get more is to be out of it. And so, I think once my children had their own money-- <b>Russ:</b> Like running a government agency. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. <b>Russ:</b> Don't leave any for next year. <b>Guest:</b> Or being the CEO of a public corporation where if you just skim a tiny bit off the shareholders' equity, nobody will notice; you can fly around to your golf game in a corporate jet. We tend to be very careful when we spend our own money; we're much less careful when we spend other people's money. And that applies to kids too. My kids, when they were young, couldn't have been more reckless when they were spending my money, but when they were spending theirs, they were very thoughtful. When we went on vacation, I used to give the kids souvenir money--here's some extra money for the vacation; here's $20--but I would give it to them before we left, and I would just add it to their bank account. And I would say: Here's $20; it's your extra vacation money; you can spend it on anything you like--souvenirs. Or you can spend it now; you can save it till later, anything, whatever you want. But while we are on vacation, I don't want you to ask me for money for junky tee-shirts or anything like that. And then, because it was theirs, they were far less likely than the average kid to want to do something dumb with it. There was a situation where we went with some friends to a souvenir store and one of the other children, who was a close friend of my son, made a big scene. There was a rubber tomahawk. <b>Russ:</b> Some hideous thing that they had to have. Until they have to pay for it. Then it's-- <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. And he got it. He made enough of a scene that his father decided that the simplest thing would be to cave; the thrill of the hunt was over and the child lost interest in the tomahawk, which then immediately broke. But my son knew that it was futile to get into that sort of conversation with me because he had his own money, and he slowly and carefully studied the very unpromising merchandise in this store, and then he actually decided that he wanted to buy an unopened geode for $.33. <b>Russ:</b> A stone. <b>Guest:</b> Right. So he could crack it open. A stone with jewel-like crystals inside it. The geodes were actually selling 3 for a dollar, but he actually negotiated with the woman who ran the store; he wanted her to break up a set and sell him just one of them for $.33, because he thought the two extras were superfluous. And I didn't take any part in that negotiation. And he succeeded. She sold him one geode for $.33, and that was what he spent. I'm sure that if I'd been willing to buy him a tomahawk he would have been happy to have one of those, too. But because it was his money he was much more thoughtful. I think the interesting thing about that was we didn't have to have any discussion about this. We didn't have to talk about the value or the lack of value of cheesy merchandise or the importance of judging your purchases.  It's obvious. Kids understand it intuitively, from a very young age. They understand how money works. That's why they don't like the systems we put in place for them. And left on his own he did very well, even though he was extremely young.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">13:54</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> The part I like about it especially is the lack of debating. One of the things that distresses me sometimes when I am watching people is they are negotiating with their children; and they start off saying no and then end up saying yes.  You are better off saying yes right away, it seems to me; or no the whole time; but the no-yes encourages the future debating session. Maybe the parents like it. I dislike it; I think most parents do. Our very first podcast episode that we did on EconTalk was with my friend Don Cox at Boston College on the economics of parenting; it may amuse some of you who haven't heard it to go back and hear, Number 1, Don, who is a great, insightful parent; but also my interviewing style, which has changed over the years. But he had a similar insight about letting children do what they want when it wasn't very harmful; and they learned lessons and he didn't have to negotiate constantly. So, I think that's one of the great advantages of this approach. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah; and you still have to be careful.  I think if you know that disaster lies ahead--if I 5-year-old wants to buy something that is really beyond her ability to care for. <b>Russ:</b> Enjoy. <b>Guest:</b> I think you have to step in. But I think it's better if we resist our urge, to spare our children these educational experiences. My son at one point bought--he was interested in trading cards and he bought a big box of basketball cards, like $50 or something like that. It was crazy. But he didn't realize it was crazy until after he'd done it, and sort of weighed the satisfaction he had received from opening these umpteen packages of basketball cards. Which is a very short-lived little thrill compared to what he could have done with the $50 if he still had it. But you can't teach that lesson in the abstract. It's something you have to do yourself. And then it sticks with you for a long time. I remember when my kids got their drivers' licenses. I hoped, the way parents always do--you want your kids to have a frightening but not dangerous accident of some kind, because they don't pay attention until they have some kind of a fender-bender.  You don't want anybody to get hurt. But you need to--it was certainly true in the case of both my kids that they didn't understand the complexity of driving until they had screwed up. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I try to contain that by the screaming and the clutching of the dashboard and the writhing to suggest they are in the wrong lane.  It's a subtle signal. The body language I think is particularly effective, you are screwing around in the seat to suggest that maybe you shouldn't be driving on the curb, as you are yelling. <b>Guest:</b> Check the mirror before you change lanes. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">17:05</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I'm going to give a counterpoint to your position. I want to say, before I do: This is a lovely book. It's beautifully written; it's amusing; and it's full of insight about parenting and money. I had the privilege or lack of privilege of reading it after--I have four kids, all now 12 and older, 12, 14, 17, and 19--so many of them, their attitudes toward money have been set in place in some dimension, at least. Although I think when you go out and work for the first time, earn a real paycheck, pay taxes, other educational lessons do kick in.  My wife and I treat money and our children very differently than you did.  What I'm going to say now, even though we do it differently, I think what you did was glorious. I would have been happy to have done it with my children; I'm not sure my wife would have gone along with it. In a way, the fact that we did something radically different and got similar results, or results we're happy with--could be confirmation bias; I'm just fooling myself--but I think the more important point is: You have to have a consistent attitude at a minimum toward how you treat money with your children.  This attitude of negotiating is really the single worst thing you can do. So, in our house, our kids had very little control over their money. We did squirrel away, as you said; we lectured them a lot about how money worked, or I did, being the econ teacher, and told them a lot of things that probably didn't sink in because they weren't experienced. Just told them about diversification and other issues we might talk about in a few minutes. But what I found interesting was that when we proposed that we might go see <i>Wicked</i> as a family, my kids said: Well, how much do the tickets cost? And I said it's expensive. But I'm thinking to myself: Well, they're not paying for it. Some of my children have a lot of interest in the level of things; I thought they were just curious. They wanted to find out about the world. I said: They're about $90 apiece. Well, let's not go.  And I said: You're going to really like it; it's a great musical, and I think it's worth it. Oh, but if we go, then the next thing you're going to say: No, we just went to <i>Wicked</i>. So, they understood it was our money and they would pay some price. In fact sometimes when we give our kids money to go buy stuff--they go out to a baseball game with their friends, they come home and return <i>our</i> money and say it just wasn't worth it; the soda was too expensive or whatever it was. So, maybe I'm lucky, but we've had a consistent attitude toward money, and our kids are not spendthrifts. And they like to squirrel their money away, too.  Makes me wonder whether it's all genetic. <b>Guest:</b> It may very well be.  And I think you are right that consistency is critical. And also that, I'm sure there is a genetic component, a luck component, and there's also, if you love your children, you can screw up in all kinds of ways. Or you can do things differently in lots of ways and end up in the same boat. And I know that if you have a dysfunctional household, no matter what you do, it's not clear that anything is going to work. There are issues that are deep below. <b>Russ:</b> And I think your method of an artificially high rate of  interest to teach the value of saving really teaches the deeper message I mentioned at the start, which is delaying of pleasure, gratification--the urge to take your money, which adults have as well, and buy something pretty and shiny and satisfying for a brief period of time that may not last as a true source of satisfaction, is very important. <b>Guest:</b> I think when we tell kids about saving we tend to stress the deprivation side of it and not really explain that there's something on the other end, too, and not really explain to the kids that behind that high rate of return, was something they could see--that if they delayed that gratification they could actually increase their satisfaction. And that's the way you and I think about it. We're not saving for retirement--assuming that we are--just because we want to make things hard on ourselves now. We're doing it  because we think that in the long run we'll have more net pleasure from our lives than if we didn't. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah; it's not only about building character. Elusive value that is not so obvious, certainly when you are 13 or 14. This is good for you. I don't like it! This is good for you. I don't like it                                                                                ! So, if you say: Because you are going to like it even more later, you have a shot, at least. <b>Guest:</b> There's a downside to success, too, which is as my kids got older and became successful savers, and especially as my daughter got to be babysitting age, 5% a month became unrealistic, and I had to explain to them that the law of supply and demand applied to the law of supply of money as well. And announced that I was reducing my monthly interest rate to 3%. They squawked at first, but then they understood the need for it. <b>Russ:</b> They didn't have a better alternative, either. <b>Guest:</b> No, they did not. And by that time they had seen how it worked, and they had accumulated significant balances. I think it should be said that it's easiest to teach kids about money obviously when there's money in the family, but not when there's too much and not when there's too little. I think money is the hardest where money is very tight; and in situations where money is essentially boundless. I think it's hardest for the poor and the rich to teach their kids about money. The first because poverty is not much of a teacher. There's not much to learn; it's all necessity. And at the rich end, it's hard to create the kind of artificial scarcity that you need to make decisions seem as though they mean anything. It's easier in the middle. <b>Russ:</b> Where most of us are. <b>Guest:</b> Even if we dream about winning the lottery.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">23:45</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about the stock market. You did an interesting--there are many pages of the book that I found more inspiring and moving than the one I'm going to mention, but my favorite intellectual part of the book was the critique of  the way that modern schools teach their students about the stock market.  Tell us what's wrong with that--which I confess to agree with about 173%--and then talk about what you did instead. <b>Guest:</b> Well, remind me if I forget anything, but at the time I wrote the book, the stock market was all that anybody talked about, because the stock market was raging.  Everybody was getting rich.  And what schools tended to do was have a pretend stock market, where kids would make imaginary investments and then you would gauge it a month later or at the end of the marking period and see who was ahead. <b>Russ:</b> A contest. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. And that kind of contest teaches everything wrong about investing.  It is not the way Warren Buffett does it.  And it encourages a sort of all-or-nothing gamble, where you want extreme volatility; you are only worried about a month from now; it encourages you to roll the dice. I guess if you have the right set of nerves for it, there are people who make a living doing that. But it's not really a very good lesson to teach children about life skills, investing in the stock market. <b>Russ:</b> It's the worst lesson. <b>Guest:</b> The worst possible lesson.  I think the other difficulty is when you try to do it a different way, and say: Make a real investment in the stock market, but have $10. And I don't know what fraction of a share of Apple that is today, but it's a very small one, and it leads to complexity. So, I was thinking: How do I talk to my children about the stock market and let them take part in this without either creating a worthless fantasy, and counterproductive game, or annihilating any possible returns. Even a $5 commission on the purchase of a single share of stock would wipe out any gain they could expect over a reasonable period of time. And so  what I did was create a kind of shadow market, where you used real stock prices but converted dollars into pennies.  So, if a share of stock on the NY Stock Exchange was selling for $40, it sold for $.40 on my stock exchange. And the kids could invest what they wanted to.  I took the other side of every transaction.  There were no actual orders going in to the desk at Charles Schwab.  It was all just a paper stock market. But it was all based on actual prices. It seemed like a simple way to let them get involved in buying stocks or mutual funds or whatever they wanted to buy. <b>Russ:</b> I like the way you said--describe how you started it, which was kind of cool.  You had a $250 seed fund from grandparents, right? <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> Tell us what you did with it. <b>Guest:</b> I have to see if I can remember, but I thought they really had to be pushed into doing this. You may need to tell the story, because it's been a while.  Then I'll give you a caveat at the end. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. So, you went out, if I remember, and you took 6 stocks you thought they'd have some awareness of--one was Intel, because that was inside their computer; one was Microsoft; the Gap, where some of their clothes were from; McDonald's where they'd eaten a hamburger. So, they had some familiarity with the companies.  And you endowed them with $250 worth of those six companies.  That was interesting; you could have just given them a free start--it was kind of a free lunch--but you realized that there are so many stocks, so many bonds, that it would be overwhelming.  So, you start with these six. And then you said: You can exchange among the six or if you want, sell them all back, start anew if you want. But you gave them something  that they                                                                                     had some connection to. <b>Guest:</b> Good memory. The sort of psychological barrier to entry would be too high. It was easier to have something that they had to react to. And if they were not going to do it, they had to actively sell these things. Now, as it turned out--and this is a real caveat--they never really were real interested in it. I think the reason was it's too complex, and in a way, even though this brought it down to their scale, for them at least it didn't really work. And we didn't keep that going for very long. When they got to be old enough, where they were no longer interested in having their savings monitored on my computer and wanted their own debit cards and accounts at the bank, which happened when they turned 12, what I did was I started a money market fund that paid 6% a year, and let them keep excess money in that. So, they had a better return than they could get at the bank, so they still had an incentive to save; but it  was a little closer to what the market rate was then; and that they were okay with. The stock market never really appealed to them. <b>Russ:</b> It probably varies by kids. <b>Guest:</b> I think it does. <b>Russ:</b> Some kids would find it very interesting. And I think, going back to your earlier discussion of what's wrong with the current system, you made some reference to doing it for a living or investing as a grownup; but of course a lot  of these stock market competitions are sponsored by brokerage houses who profit from having people buy individual shares of stock. And so what these competitions do is encourage people to put all their eggs in one basket--the opposite of what you want. It encourages individual stock purchases.  I don't think you can buy a mutual fund and if you did you are unlikely to win because somebody's going to take a shot at the one-month--there's no downside--so you might as well take a shot at the high flyer and hope you can win.  That's your best shot of winning.  Anything that gets them away from that. Your scheme was a little bit elaborate, and though I think some kids would be more interested than your kids were, it's still a lot of work for the parent to keep track of dividends and capital gains and all that. But anything that teaches them the value--and to me, there's only one thing you want to teach your children about the stock market, that you don't put all your eggs in one basket. Actually, I'd say two things: Don't put all your eggs in one basket and don't listen to Uncle Ned who's got a great stock that he thinks is going to go through the roof.  That you can lose money. Those are the two, really, I think, crucial lessons. And you really don't want to learn those as an adult with lots of money. You want to learn them when you are younger. And so I think whether you do it through a mock stock exchange like you did, even if they weren't so interested, or if you lecture them relentlessly, as I  do, about the virtues of diversification and indexed mutual funds, which I think on average do pretty well, although this is not investment advice. Returns can vary, and consult your investment advisor before making any decisions. This is not an investment show. But I do think diversification is a really good idea. I think the other key lesson, which unfortunately our children are learning, is humility. That things don't just keep going up.  I always think about my parents who grew up--my Dad was born in 1930 and my Mom was born in 1932, so they were children of the Great Depression.  Their parents struggled, as did their relatives, most of them. Some people moved in with the one relative who was doing pretty well.  And my Dad got a lifelong aversion to equities, to stocks, that I don't think was particularly healthy.  But that's what he learned, and it stuck with him. Because he heard his parents and uncles and aunts moaning their stock losses.  And our kids right now are growing up in the time of this so-called Great Recession, and they are learning a lesson that markets don't always go up. Now, whether they remember that 40 years from now after 15 years of golden returns, who knows. But I think if I had to teach my kids one important lesson it would be the dangers of hubris--oh, I know what's going to happen and this portfolio has always done well so it will continue to do well.  Those kind of lessons, being aware of the dangers of that I think are the most important things. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">33:12</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> Exactly. And the place where my son learned the most valuable lesson about the stock market didn't involve the stock market at all.  It involved beanie babies. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, tell that story.  It's a great story. <b>Guest:</b> Little collectable toys became an extraordinary fad when my son was in about 4th grade.  And the boys and girls were collecting them.  The girls collected them sort of as adorable things.  The boys all were very market oriented in their beanie baby collecting. <b>Russ:</b> They were evil speculators. <b>Guest:</b> They were. And they had these investors' guides to the market value, beanie babies, could calculate their net worth from day to day. And I would give them the standard lecture, saying: These are not scarce; they are making more of them every second. And there's no intrinsic value here; this is all mania and you are not, they are not even worth the $6 or $7 dollars that you paid for each one, and so forth. All on deaf ears, because they had these books and they were looking at them. And then a day came when my son felt he needed some money and he told me he was going to sell a couple of his more valuable beanie babies on e-bay; and I thought: Ah, this is perfect. He will learn now what I've been telling him; hypothetically he'll see for himself how foolish this is. And so he put a pair of beanie baby bears for sale on e-bay. And these are ones he'd been throwing around the house and the yard even. He described their condition as "mint."                                                                                         <b>Russ:</b> Fraud. <b>Guest:</b> Fraud. And put them for sale on e-bay. Seven days later they sold for $120.50. To my horror.  But I was still thinking there's a lesson here that we are going to learn very soon, and I helped him box them up, warning him not to be disappointed if the buyer angrily demanded her money back, which was what I was pretty sure was going to happen. <b>Russ:</b> Because of their condition. <b>Guest:</b> And just buyer's remorse; their condition. I would have by then thought that. But a few days later the buyer sent my son an effusive email saying she was thrilled with her purchase. So, I said to him I wasn't going to give you any more financial advice. I'm going to give you one more, and that is: Sell your entire collection immediately. And he didn't because they were too valuable and markets can go only up. And he's 24 now; he still regrets this thi                                                                                 ng that happened when he was 8, that he hadn't sold his entire collection. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. He's still waiting. <b>Guest:</b> He's still waiting for them to be worth $.05. But I think that's a--he learned the same lesson that grownups did in the late 1990s, which is that the stock market doesn't always go up.  But he learned it at a very low cost.  He saw both ends of a bubble that had basically no effect on his life except to make this permanent lesson that this doesn't happen. In fact, one of my favorite lines in "The Onion" a number of years later was something like: Americans Demand New Bubble to Invest In. But that was an enduring lesson that came from this sort of, evolved all by itself, and came from what I initially thought was a foolish activity. And was a good example of why kids should have some flak to do things that you think are stupid, not only because they might turn out in the end not to be as stupid as you think it is, and then fortunately turn out after that to be every bit as stupid as you thought it was.  It gives them the responsibility of, the possibility of seeing this.  E-bay was useful, I think, and it still is a useful teaching tool for kids, because one of the things our kids can learn is their possessions have value.  They have capital. They have this bicycle. These toys have value.  They didn't really have them before.  On e-bay, though, you can sell something.  Here's this game I had that was given to me; but if I take good care of it, I may be able to get some money back by selling it on e-bay. I think that was a valuable lesson, too.  It changed my kids' ideas about their possessions.  Suddenly their things began to look like assets to them rather than just sort of the litter in their room.  And they were more careful with their stuff. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">38:17</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Yeah; that's very cool.  You mentioned how they would take the packaging and instead of just trashing it they'd save it in case they wanted to sell later.  Not a bad lesson in life.  Although it does require a larger house as you get older. The first part of that story, to your horror--your son received a check for over $100--reminds me of a really wonderful Somerset Maugham short story called "The Facts of Life." If you haven't read it out there, go Google it or find it. The second part reminds me, along with the first part, about the role of supply and demand.  It seems that supply and demand are very useful things for children to understand; in particular, about the supply and demand of labor and how wages get determined. As I was reading your book I was thinking of a story I read recently, where a woman, tired of being a waitress, decides she's sick of people demanding stuff of her; she wasn't making a lot of money, she wanted to be a writer, it wasn't happening. And she decided she didn't want to be in the service business any more.  So, she's taken yoga all her adult or semi-adult life, and so she decides: Well, she looks at the yoga instructor and thinks, Well, this is a good job. You get to come to work in your pajamas. It's not that hard. And it's kind of spiritual, and you probably make good money. And so she went and took a training class in being a yoga instructor, only to find that after finishing the class she couldn't find much work. And when she did, it didn't pay very well. And that she was still in the service business; and she was still catering to people. And those lessons really are important lessons to learn about how the world works. If something is relatively easy to do and pleasant, it's not going to pay very much. It's just the way of the world.  If you want to make a lot of money, which is                                                                                      by itself maybe not the best of all, but if you want a certain level of comfort, you've got to have a skill, and it has to be acquired with some effort. Otherwise lots of other people will acquire it and they won't pay very well.  And if you are like a lot of other people, you have to stand out. You have to cater better than the other ones, do something extra, a way to deliver the yoga class other than the way people just do it like everybody else.  Otherwise you'll just earn what everybody else earns.  So, those kind of lessons seem to me--those are pretty useful. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, those are very useful. If I could have become an introduction to economists, I would have.  I took Introductory Economics in college when I was a freshman.  I just felt as though it explained everything.  Introductory Economics is really psychology.  It's a course in psychology. <b>Russ:</b> The way people behave. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. Human behavior.  Unfortunately, economics goes beyond introductory economics, in that as soon as it got to the statistics part I realized that I wasn't cut out for it.  In fact, I wouldn't mind majoring in the introductory level of almost anything. Those were always my favorite courses in college.  But I think that a good beginning, a good college economics textbook explains much of what you need to know about human nature.  Geopolitics, and everything.  It seems, I thought--I still think that was the most valuable course I took and the one that made the most dramatic change in the way I thought about things.  And I ended up as an English major. <b>Russ:</b> The late, great Paul Heyne, a wonderful teacher, writer, and economist, made a distinction between the poetry and prose of economy.  The principles is the poetry.  That's what makes you fall in love with economics.  It's the art of it, the magic of it, the way of looking at the world in the way you haven't thought about it before. It hooks you.  Th                                                                                     en you get into the prose, you get into the math, you get into the graphs; and I think most of the value is in the poetry, myself. What I find interesting is how many introductory classes I took in college that didn't have any poetry.  They were just dumbed-down versions of the most prosaic graduate level stuff, then spoon-fed to us as undergraduates.  But the stuff that changed your life, the stuff that changed your world--those classes, yeah, take that introductory philosophy class, poetry class, economics class.  Those were phenomenal.  And they are well taught. But they can be badly taught, too.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">42:35</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's move to the last part of the book, which is a discussion of what gives life its meaning, and what's of true value, and where does true wealth come from. What role does money play in those things? You have some interesting ideas about what children should start to think about. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think the main thing is that money is not unimportant, as people sometimes say when they talk about enjoyment of life, or about what's meaningful about life.  Money is extraordinarily useful.  It's a tool you can use to finance your wonderful life. Money leaves people and their problems--there isn't enough of it, you spend time in a panic when you buy medicine for your children, whether there is too little to allow you to think about anything else. And then also when it becomes an end in itself, when it becomes all-consuming.  Greed is not good. Greed is like an addiction; it's like a drug. Because you can never satisfy it.  So, I think that the healthy attitude about money is that it's a tool, it's a necessary tool, that you use to make yourself happy.  And I began thinking about the difference, an idea different from net worth--which is the way we usually think about ourselves or often think about ourselves--and something that I think I called true net value, or something like that. True net worth.  Which has to do with your satisfaction in life.  And the thought that occurred to me was: We're never going to have as much money as Bill Gates does, but on an hour-for-hour basis it's entirely possible to take as much satisfaction from life as Bill Gates does. If you think of your life in that way. <b>Russ:</b> And maybe a lot more. <b>Guest:</b> And maybe a lot more.  Certainly when he's being grilled by government officials or angry shareholders or just involved in all the challenges he gets stuck in.  If we can be sort of clear-eyed about what we get stuck in in our lives, that makes us satisfied, makes us happy, and figure out what it takes to do those things, it's a much simpler problem. You see it when this rational behavior takes place, whenever there is a huge national lottery--I don't know what the threshold is that makes people think they should be driving across state lines to buy a lottery ticket. $500 million or $300 million. I think that's the crazy way to think about money. Even though I think we'd all be happy if we had our own jet, there are different ways to think about it and to make our lives better for ourselves. <b>Russ:</b> And you talk about the different skills and attributes that we think are also true, and our connections to other people--those are our true measures of wealth and happiness, and where we get our deepest satisfactions that endure, that are not short-lived, that don't just vanish when the tomahawk breaks or when your latest device doesn't sink.  Or whatever it is. <b>Guest:</b> One way to think about that is what you would imagine a fire or some other disaster destroying the kind of physical manifestations of your life.  What would you save if you could save a boxful? And not just objects, but what would you put in your box from your life, what makes you happy?  And my own is not very imaginative: it's probably that life is things that make you the happiest.  Aside from family, the obligatory children, life, dog, etc., it's playing golf; when I think about staying healthy it's because I want to keep playing golf as long as I can. When I think about earning money, it's often because I can do this; then I can take this golf trip with my friends. If you think of things that way, it's a very simple thing, but it's a useful way to think about your life and to focus on what's actually important. I think for me it was this idea of how do I maximize my satisfaction not on an hourly basis, on an income basis. <b>Russ:</b> I would say it's the scarcest thing we own, is our time. We often use it so badly.  No one on his deathbed wishes he'd spent more time at the office.  And it's just very hard to do that balance.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">47:50</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I'm going to interrupt for a second; I'm going to read a very short poem. Which, you don't allude to the poem, but you allude to the sentiment. It's by Franklin P. A                                                                                             dams; it's called "The Rich Man". Franklin P. Adams wrote I think two poems that were noteworthy. One was one that immortalized Tinkers to Evers to Chance, double-play combination; but the other was this poem, "The Rich Man." It's short. <blockquote>The rich man has his motor-car,<br/>
His country and his town estate.<br/>
He smokes a fifty-cent cigar<br/>
And jeers at Fate.
<br/><br/>
He frivols through the livelong day,<br/>
He knows not Poverty, her pinch.<br/>
His lot seems light, his heart seems gay;<br/>
He has a cinch.
<br/><br/>
Yet though my lamp burns low and dim,<br/>
Though I must slave for livelihood--<br/>
Think you that I would change with him?<br/>
You bet I would!</blockquote> Yeah, so, we have that urge to swap.  We wish, we think if we were like Bill Gates we'd be happy all the time. And most of us do try to acquire more money rather than less.  But we do also find out that it's not the source of happiness. But without it, it's tough.  And I think that balance is really what you talk about in the book and that we are talking about right now. <b>Guest:</b> Right. It's, uh, somehow making yourself have an understanding, a clear understanding, of sufficiency.  And I think that sufficiency is often the key to maximizing happiness. I don't think, you don't want to be, well, over my life and my family's life up to the time I'm 65. People get struck down at the age of 64.  And so you don't necessarily want to put all your chips on a square that you may not get to.  It's better to think about these things as you go along.  It's an impossible balance no matter how much you think about it. It's hard to do the right thing; and then life has a way of throwing things at you that you didn't count on and that you didn't calculate. <b>Russ:</b> But certainly we treat our own careers, and how we talk about them, and how we treat money in our families, affects our kids.  Our kids are watching all the time. And that's how we talk and what we do, are the two things that educate them. <b>Guest:</b> Very true.  We talk about teaching our kids about money constantly.  And not necessarily the lessons we want them to learn.  When you sweat over credit card balances; when you are afraid to answer the phone because you think it might be a collection card agency; when you come home from work and you are angry or pour yourself a big drink or complain about what happens--all these things, we are teaching kids about money. And so, it's worth it--valuable to ourselves to step outside and look at these things and think about how we are doing. There was an interesting study recently--I'll probably get it wrong, but people made more intelligent decisions about their retirement savings when they were looking at a picture of themselves, artificially aged--looked like they were retirement age.  It became tangible to them.  It's probably not a bad way to think about all kinds of things in your life, if you can really force yourself to suspend your disbelief in immortality and realize that time eventually runs out and think that is this the way to allocate my time during this extraordinary gift of being alive. <b>Russ:</b> Couldn't agree with you more.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">51:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> The book ends with a rather, what seems to be a little bit of a change of pace, a little bit off the topic; but I saw it as you did, very much in the same theme.  I would describe it as the best investment you can make in your kids and for your kids.  I think modern parents are obsessed with their kids' getting into college, and the best college.  As someone who works in the kitchen I'm not as enamored as brand names as some of my friends are.  But, we spend, modern parents who are financially comfortable, spend a lot of time and those who aren't even spend a lot of time: How am I going to get my kids to have as good a life as I have, ideally better? We love our children; we want them to do well; and we've been talking about what we might do to help them understand money.  Which is a very useful thing to do.  But at the end of the book, you talk about a very different investment, which is reading to your kids. This was one part of the book which I agreed with 100 or more percent. About practice and ideals.  So, talk about why you think that's important and how to do it. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think it's important because the easiest way to give kids a solid intellectual education in school is to help them become good readers, and the easiest way to help them become good readers from when they are very young and as long as they can stand it.  It gets them--you get them addicted to books. And I think it lasts for the whole life. <b>Russ:</b> Now, I like this especially, "as long as they can stand it." Because I think most people feel you read them a few picture books when they are 3 or 4 and you've done your time; but some of the most satisfying reading I've done to my kids was when they were 10 and 12 and older. I love reading to my kids.  They don't always want to hear it. <b>Guest:</b> If you start young, I think they tolerate it for longer than if you suddenly started when they were 12 or 13.  But if you started when they were                                                                                                               very little, before they had any comprehension of what you were saying to them, they see it. And actually nowadays we are much better at understanding the value just because audio books have become a part of our lives.  Anybody who commutes in the car--we enjoy being read to.  And it's valuable, I think, for this practical reason. You turn kids, it helps them become good readers on their own. But I think it also, it's just an easy, kind of satisfying kind of family glue, reading to kids. It's therapeutic.  I saw this with friends of my children when they were young, who were unmanageable until you started reading to them.  They calmed down, they put their thumb in their mouth. Kids like being read to.  And if you do it, you create this sort of very strong bond that they respond.  That you respond to.  It's one of the things I loved about kids.  I discovered that here was this opportunity to re-read these books that I had loved as a child, and also discover new ones that I hadn't.  That children's literature, especially as you get older, beats almost anything on the adult shelf.  There are huge benefits to the parents, too.  And what my wife and found was it becomes a family  activity. Going off hitting all the libraries in our region so that we could, once we'd exhausted all the nearest libraries.  There's always something you could do.  And then when we traveled, our kids were always well-behaved on the plane, big canvas bean bags full of books. People were always asking us: Are you teachers?  There could be no other explanation for doing this. And you see, I just came back from Scotland and from Ireland, and I'm always amazed to see parents get on a plane with a 4-year-old with nothing, expecting the child to entertain himself, in his mind, I guess, for a six or seven hour flight. It's not possible.  They are not going to be happy looking at the SkyMall catalog. Reading is better. <b>Russ:</b> The other you did mention, that I'd encourage people who are listening is to read your kids hard books. Not just easy ones. When they are little you read them easy ones and they learn them by heart. They are the most glorious and sometimes the most frustrating parts of being a parent, is the 700th reading of <i>The Dot and the Line</i> or <i>Harold and the Purple Crayon</i>, my kids loved <i>Curious George</i>, which my wife didn't, and I always ended up being the                                                                                                               Curious George reader. And it's funny I mentioned <i>The Dot and the Line</i>--it's not really a children's book, but I thought of it when I was trying to think of <i>Harold and the Purple Crayon</i>. But when they get older, I would read them harder books that they couldn't always understand. And sometimes I would explain them, and sometimes I wouldn't. We read, I think I probably mentioned before--we read P. G. Wodehouse, <i>Joy in the Morning</i>, which I think is an entertaining book that I would recommend. I read it to my  9, 11, and 10-year old sons before we went to bed every night.  It shocked me that we got through it. It held their attention.  We talked about it.  The characters became vivid. And I also read my kids sometimes Homer's <i>The Odyssey</i>, in the Fagles translation, which is very hard.  But if you pick the juicy parts, where they poke his eye out with a burning log or the scene where Ulysses returns home confronted by Penelope's suitors and unmasks himself and reveals he's Ulysses, and they are scared out their minds; and he takes this bow that no one in the room could bend and he bends it, strings it, fires away--it's straight out of a modern movie.  And my kids just ate it up.  They didn't understand every word.  I'm sure I didn't understand every word.  But the cadence was good.  And while I'm on this soapbox, poetry is just a really great thing to read to kids. Especially poets like Kipling, and Robert Service, who had great rhythms and rhymes. Kids wouldn't remember those poems otherwise. <b>Guest:</b> Extremely. Very true.  I a million percent agree with reading hard books.  Even when 2 or 3.  Maybe not quite that young.  Three or four, say. I read <i>Treasure Island,</i> Robert Louis Stevenson.  It's very hard. Seemingly confusing.  But I could see, he was playing. Kids often need to be doing something while you are reading to them.  And if you say: Get back over here on the couch!--they can't necessarily always do that.  Some of my favorite times with the kids were when they were doing something else.  When he was building something with Lego.  And I remember reading him <i>Treasure Island</i> when he was seemingly completely too young to understand it.  And I would see him pause, Lego pieces in the air, as he was listening to some tense moment.  And so, he was listening all the time.  My daughter used to--she began reading very early.  I was reading a book to my son, and she was lying in the bed reading a different book herself but was listening and would comment occasionally. <b>Russ:</b> Stevenson's prose style. <b>Guest:</b> I think that's another value of reading to kids--they become good listeners. And I think the reason your kids could understand books that were way over reading level for them is that they learnt to--by listening all along.  I think it's a huge skill.  It makes them better readers and better writers.  We learn to write by absorbing the language by listening.  Writing is a huge skill. I've sure you've seen it in economics.  It's huge and not necessarily a common skill.  And it underlies almost everything.  One of my early books had to do with a sort of an expose of a testing service--SAT and other standardized tests. One of the little-known facts was the math SAT is very much a verbal test, too, because you have to be able to read.  It's a language test, a vocabulary test, in addition. And that's true in every subject.  You don't get a pass on reading just because you are going to go into the sciences. All the same literary skills are just as important there.  <b>Russ:</b> Reading is everything. I don't really think of it anymore as reading.  The world has changed so much it's really a--growth as a human being is about absorbing new information and learning, and reading is the most common way it's been done in the past. People used to tell stories.  Now we tell stories--for a while we called them through the printed page, and then it's became the audio book and now it's the Internet; and iPad, and everything is exploding. But it's all about slowing your life down so you can absorb information.  And if you can't do that, your life is going to be hard.  It's really important. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. Your most important software is your language ability, what distinguishes us from who knows what.  It's very true.  There are lots of different ways to cultivate that.  If we think of: How do I invest in my children, things like that, it's more important to do something like that than to think about building your estate so they can go off and squander it somewhere. You want to-- <b>Russ:</b> Teach them how to learn. <b>Guest:</b> Teach them how to learn. How to enjoy.  How to be content within themselves, to entertain themselves. A powerful tool, especially if you have young children.  I remember when there was this great breakthrough--it just felt like the most extraordinary thing.  My wife and I were driving on a trip with our kids, and our daughter, in our back seat, was reading to her brother. It was like we had invented a perpetual motion machine.  After an investment of a few years, now they could read to each other.  There we were in the front seat quietly having a conversation to ourselves.
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>                        
                             
             
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Schmidtz on Rawls, Nozick, and Justice</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/05/schmidtz_on_raw.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9841</id>

    <published>2012-05-07T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-05-12T11:31:27Z</updated>

    <summary> David Schmidtz of the University of Arizona talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. The conversation covers the basic ideas of Rawls and Nozick on inequality and justice and the appropriate...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="David Schmidtz" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Income Inequality" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Law and Institutions" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Philosophy and Methodology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www.davidschmidtz.com" target="new">David Schmidtz</a> of the University of Arizona talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. The conversation covers the basic ideas of Rawls and Nozick on inequality and justice and the appropriate role of the state in taxation and property rights. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/SchmidtzRawls.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Schmidtz on Rawls, Nozick, and Justice','Russ Roberts and David Schmidtz',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:15:18</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/SchmidtzRawls.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 34.6 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div>]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="                      http://www.davidschmidtz.com" target="new">David Schmidtz's Home page</a>
<li>"The Meanings of Life," by David Schmidtz. First presented at the Boston University Institute for Philosophy and Religion in December, 1999.
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/A-Theory-Justice-Original-Edition/dp/0674017722/" target="new"><i>A Theory of Justice</i></a>, by John Rawls at Amazon.com.

<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465097200/" target="new"><i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia</i></a>, by Robert Nozick at Amazon.com.

<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226061515/ref=olp_product_details?ie=UTF8&me=&seller=" target="new"><i>The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation</i></a>, by Walter Blum and Harry Kalven. Used copies at Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/LtrLbrty/bryRF1.html" target="new">"Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence,"</a> by <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Buchanan.html" target="new">James Buchanan</a> from Literature of Liberty. vol. v, no. 4, pp. 5-18. Arlington, VA: Institute for Humane Studies. Free online at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

<li><a href="http://www.duke.edu/web/philsociety/taleofslave.html" target="new">The Tale of the Slave,</a> from <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia,</i> pp. 290-292.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GameTheory.html" target="new">Game Theory</a>, by Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html" target="new">Rent Control</a>, by Walter Block. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Harsanyi.html" target="new">John C. Harsanyi</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Buchanan.html" target="new">James M. Buchanan</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Locke.html" target="new">John Locke</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Arrow.html" target="new">Kenneth Arrow</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Sen.html" target="new">Amartya Sen</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. 

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hicks.html" target="new">John R. Hicks</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>. Compensation test.

</ul>
<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ressentiment" target="new" rel="nofollow">"Ressentiment"</a>. Wikipedia.

</ul>
<b>Podcasts, Videos, and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=lsSC2vx7zFQ" target="new">"How Bad Do You Want It (Success)"</a> a video created by GreysKale Multimedia.


<li><a href="http://www.juliansanchez.com/2003/04/08/nozicks-apartment/" target="new">"Nozick's Apartment,"</a> from Julian Sanchez's blog, April 8, 2003. 

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/04/klein_on_the_th_3.html" target="new">Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 4--A Discussion of Part III</a>. EconTalk podcast, part of 6-part series on <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html" target="new"><i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i></a>, by <a href=http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Smith.html" target="new">Adam Smith</a>. Impartial spectator.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/11/robert_frank_on_1.html" target="new">Robert Frank on Inequality</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="                                                                 http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2006/08/the_political_e.html" target="new">The Political Economy of Power</a>, with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="                                                                 http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/08/satz_on_markets.html" target="new">Satz on Markets</a>. EconTalk podcast. Debra Satz argues that some markets are noxious and should not be allowed to operate freely. Topics discussed include organ sales.

<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: April 25, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Economic justice: We are going to talk about John Rawls, Robert Nozick and the notion of economic justice generally. Let's start with John Rawls. His book, <i>Theory of Justice</i>, was published in 1971. Talk about that book.  <b>Guest:</b> It begins with Rawls trying to set out a theory of justice, and he sees theorizing about justice as a project of modeling a kind of fairness, like different things can be fair, and evaluation can be fair or not, and shares can be fair or not. So, Rawls is giving us a theory about what would make shares fair. And the obvious first thing to say, which is the first thing he says is that the fair way to divide a pie would be into equal shares. But he said, there is in some theoretical way another alternative; so suppose that the pie's size is variable and that how large the pie would be, would be in part a function of how we decided to divide it. So, different ways of dividing it, possibly unequal ways of dividing it, would lead to a larger pie. And could conceivably lead to larger or smaller shares, but a pie so large that even the smallest share is something that is a larger slice than an equal share would have been of the smaller pie. And so that's the original driving motivation of that theory. So, he comes up with a principle of maximizing, maximum equal liberties for all; but there's also a principle for distributing--it's interpreted as a principle for distributing goods.  But  that's not literally what it says.  It says you distribute inequalities in such a way that even the least advantaged ends up more advantaged than would be possible under a more egalitarian scheme. That principle is called the difference principle--distribute inequalities so as to be to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged. <b>Russ:</b> So, the idea would be, if it didn't affect the size of the pie, equal shares. But we are willing to tolerate inequality as long as it improves the well-being of the worst off. <b>Guest:</b> Improves the well-being of everyone, including the worst off. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, including. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. Well, interestingly, the first two statements of that difference principle, before 1971, actually said it in that open-ended way: make sure that the inequalities are to everyone's advantage, including the least-advantaged. Now, by 1971, he's actually changing his story, in a seemingly subtle but in fact momentous way. He says: Well, actually there are indefinitely numerous solutions out on that frontier of welfare that would be compatible with that principle, innumerously different, unequal distributions that would be good for everyone; so he said: So, what we've got here at best is an incomplete ordering principle, and we need something that's complete. And so we have to define a principle that picks out a definite spot on that frontier. So he says: Well, let's pick the spot on the frontier that is to the greatest advantage of the least advantage, so that the smallest share is as large as it possibly can be. Now, that is an intuitively obviously principle to pick. <b>Russ:</b> If you thought it was crucial to have <i>a</i> solution. It's not clear that that is ideal, per se. <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's a good point. And in fact, what I would say is, it isn't the job of a--this is a basic structure we are talking about defining, and it isn't a basic structure's job to pick out a particular outcome. I mean, the reason we want a set of traffic-management tools and policies, the reason we want to agree that red means stop and green means go, is that we want to minimize the cost for everyone, including the least advantaged, of getting to their destinations. So, the point isn't to be maximally advantageous; the point isn't to get everyone to the same destination. And you'd think Rawls would not have said that either; he would agree with that.  But yet this idea that we need to pick a specific outcome is, I think, a subtle but major turn in a wrong direction, I have to say; that the point of basic structures is to put us in a position where we can pursue our own plans in a way that isn't threatening to each other. But to do this, it put, as Nozick is going to come along and say, in 1974--that puts people in a position where the rest of us are supposed to think our job in life as people committed to justice, or the job of our basic structure, anyway, is to make sure that those other folks out there are made so well off that if the system tried to do anything better for them, tried to do more for them, it would end up being less. <b>Russ:</b> Couldn't do it. <b>Guest:</b> Nozick says that is just an amazing thing to expect of a system of justice in forming basic structure that is supposed to respect us all as reciprocators and is supposed to treat us all as inviolate separate persons who come to the community with hopes and dreams of our own. <b>Russ:</b> Of course, not everyone accepts that; but I happen to like that one. And obviously Nozick thought that was crucial. <b>Guest:</b> Rawls did, too. <b>Russ:</b> We'll come to Nozick in more detail in a little bit, but let's still stick with Rawls. Tell us a little bit about Rawls--his background and interests.  You mentioned before we started the interview that he hung out with a lot of economists.  Which I didn't realize. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. Among his friends were James Buchanan, Ken Arrow, William Riker, Amartya Sen. And these folks were different generations, too. But that was a group of people that formed--these were Rawls's friends and mentors, his discussion group. These were the people that he bounced ideas off of.  And so the young Rawls was very much conversant with this developing field, rapidly developing at the time, field of political economy. Very much versed in the game theory and the welfare economics of the time. Very much educated in this and very sensitive to it; and very keen to bring the insights of that field to philosophy. And very successful at bringing those insights to philosophy. He lifted the profession out of a state--I think single-handed would be, well, historically inaccurate, I suppose--but I think it would be fair to say that Rawls more than anyone else kind of broke the equilibrium in which moral and political philosophers were basically saying: Well, there's some kind of dialectic of historical materialism and it doesn't really matter; we can't do much about that anyway as philosophers; it's not our job. Our job is to define terms. Or better yet, get somebody else to define terms and then we can poke holes in their definitions.  He who defines a term first loses the game, basically. That was the game at the time, to just think about consistency; not worry about truth                                                                                       , not worry about empirical correlation. So, in effect, not worry about practicality. So, philosophy had almost proudly come to a state where it had nothing to say about politics. Or ethics, for that matter.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">                                                                               10:00</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, one idea that I think people have heard of from Rawls--I'm looking, I'm sitting in my office doing this interview face to face--and I can't quite see the full section of the Rs on my bookshelf, but I once owned a copy of <i>The Theory of Justice</i>. I may still own it. I have read maybe half of it.  It's a hard, fat book. It's not easy going, so I appreciate the help. But one idea that I remember, and I think many people have heard of, is the Veil of Ignorance. Describe what that is and how it entered Rawls's formulation of justice. <b>Guest:</b> It's a hard book for anyone. It's a long book, and it's a very sophisticated book.  He's pulling together a very large number of threads of philosophy and political economy, trying to pull them in and weave a fabric out of them. So, it's not your fault.  Everybody who takes the book seriously has trouble with it.  It's just full of insight. But if you think about how we get to that task of dividing the pie and really the prior task of getting the pie to the table in the first place--which I don't think he does enough to talk about that.  He's talking about people as separate agents, separate persons, separate producers, and respecting their separateness in a way that utilitarianism fails to do. And part of my problem is--he goes on later, as he's divorcing himself from the political economists that formed his early discussion group--he's going on to talk about, say, the distribution of talent, and saying: Well, here's why we would originally go for that semi-egalitarian distribution that we'd only want to depart from egalitarianism--strictly equal sha                                                                                       res--if we could do so in a mutually advantageous direction; the obvious answer would be: well, I've got talent. I've got something in me; I've got something I want to bring to the table and I want to bring to society. But I want to be the first person who makes money from it.  I want to--Adam Smith would say--I want to be esteemed for this. And I want to make money for it.  But the point is, some people say, actually, I have premium talent. As a matter of respecting me as a separate person, I want to be paid a premium price for my premium talent. And Rawls would say: Well, that's a problem; I understand the intuition that people deserve to be paid what they are worth. They deserve the marginal product of their creative output and so on. But Rawls says: That's not the direction we are going to go in. We are going to go in the direction of this difference principle that starts with equality and only departs from it for the sake of giving everyone a larger bundle of primary goods. So, it's not about giving people what they deserve.  It's about giving people somewhat better than an equal share. So, he says, this would be more intuitive if we imagine ourselves in a fair situation, where we don't come with our biases about how talented we are and how much more we should get paid than the Joneses and so on, so the thing to think about is to imagine ourselves bargaining in a situation where we don't really know where our personal interests lie.  So, for example, we may think: Shouldn't someone who can throw a baseball 100 miles an hour get paid more than someone who can't?  Shouldn't they in fact be paid millions of dollars? And you say: That isn't obvious. But however we decide that question, let's not let the pitchers decide it, and let's not let even the fans decide it. Let's have people decide it without knowing whether they are pitchers or people completely indifferent to the whole sport and would not watch an inning of that game to save their lives. So, get everybody in the room, get all the people representing, anyway, every perspective in the room; and have them make that decision in a truly impartial way. So the point of the Veil of Ignorance is to say to people what you are supposed to be imagining is, if you don't know who you are. So, there's x, y, and z; there's some guy out there named Russ Roberts, but you don't know that you are Russ Roberts. How much do you think Russ Roberts should get? And if you decide here's what Russ Roberts should get and you don't know that you are Russ Roberts, well then the answer you come up with will be a lot more impartial than if you do know that you are Russ Roberts.  So pretend you don't know who you are. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah; it's actually--using the word impartial reminds me of Adam Smith's <i>Theory of Moral Sentiments,</i> where he often invokes the impartial spectator, a person who is impartial in, say, a dispute where two parties are angry at each other, or one who is seeking vengeance or one who has been offended. And since that impartial spectator doesn't have the emotional baggage and the bias of the participants, that's the exemplar we should turn to for how to behave in that situation.  There's something of that in Rawls, right? <b>Guest:</b> Uh, yeah, absolutely. These are certainly fellow travelers in a tradition. Rawls belongs in more than one tradition; but the contract carrying tradition is something he has links to, and the moral sympathy tradition is something that he has links to. <b>Russ:</b> Now, of course, one of the problems with the Veil of Ignorance--your mentioning James Buchanan brings it to mind--is that there's no such thing as Russ Roberts when you are behind the Veil of Ignorance. There's no such thing as baseball behind the Veil of Ignorance. It's an interesting, perhaps, intellectual experiment to say how much should a bricklayer or a blacksmith or an auto worker earn if I don't know if I'm going to be that person. We take those as given in the exercise, but of course they emerge through the choices people make and the skills they have; and they all depend on the skills of the other people.  So you can't even say how much should a bricklayer earn. How much should a blacksmith earn? Well, there aren't any blacksmiths any more.  How does that affect our calculus? Or, we could ask the question: Well, how much a blacksmith might earn might depend on a thousand, millions of other people in the society in 1850, and what their skills are.  It's an interesting suspension of disbelief, I guess, and requirement of knowledge you can't have. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. I guess, so James Buchanan would say we start from here. <b>Russ:</b> Where's here? <b>Guest:</b> Well, here is in the world of Russ Roberts and baseball. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. <b>Guest:</b> And in a way I think Rawls would say: That's my theory, too; I don't disagree with that.  But he would say: We don't want to start off with our epistemology situated in that world.  We still want to come out of this with conclusions that are relevant to the world of people actually living.  But in a way we don't start our theorizing from here.  We say: Suppose we were starting from nothing; what would we build? Now, if you think about the kind of theorizing we are doing there, that will not have had at any point at the end of the day, it will just have been an idle exercise, if we don't come out of it with stuff that applies to the real world of baseball and Russ Roberts.  So, when we say we are behind a Veil of Ignorance, we are not supposed to be imagining that nothing exists, that we are making a decision in a void. <b>Russ:</b> We are in some kind of shrouds, or togas. <b>Guest:</b> But at the end of the day I'm going to walk out of the door being Dave Schmidtz.  But I'm trying to say to myself: If I didn't know that I was who I am and I didn't know that talents were getting rewarded like that, or I didn't know that I would have talents like that, or I didn't even know that I was particularly willing to take on risk--I knew the general facts of human society, I knew principles of economics and sociology and psychology. But I wouldn't really know anything that had a bearing on making my payoff, the particular payoff that it did. So, it really is a thought-experiment. It's not meant to be theorizing about a different world.  It's meant to be theorizing about our world, but meant to make us kind of envision what it would be like to be looking at our world impartially.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">19:37</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I think it's a powerful, really thought-provoking idea. <b>Guest:</b> Probably in philosophy it was the most provocative idea of the 20th century. <b>Russ:</b> And the book itself, the rest of the ideas, what were its impact? One of its impacts was that it encouraged Robert Nozick to write a different book than Rawls had written. But before we talk about Nozick specifically, what's been the impact of <i>The Theory of Justice,</i> Rawls's book? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it's hard to say.  It's certainly changed the profession of philosophy. It probably changed the Academy--the social sciences--quite generally. As to what has had a larger impact outside of the Academy, there probably hasn't been anything more influential than Peter Singer's conversations about animal welfare, and so on, animal experimentation and factory farming. Whereas Singer has had relatively little influence within the Academy.  But Rawls has been much more influential inside the Academy, I think, by far, than any other philosopher in the 20th century. But I think he's really shaped thinking. I mean, the thinking was going to really change anyway, to what we don't know, but he's taken a profession that had really gone into navel-gazing mode and started talking about: We're going to define terms and come up with consistent definitions of terms.  And he took that and dragged it into, instead, a state where philosophers were talking hard about what to do about practical affairs. What's the right thing to do? What can we at least single out as what can be condemned or something like that? So, Rawls, had, in a way, relatively little to say about global justice, for example; but he's had many, many students who have gone on to say: Well, given that this idea is as striking, intuitive, compelling as it is, that we should be trying to do as much as possible for the least advantaged, given that the least advantaged are actually on the other side of the world, like do they count? Are they part of this equation? Are they part of the group we are talking about? Are their advantages on a par with the disadvantages and advantages of the poor in New York? Peoria? Tucson? <b>Russ:</b> Yeah.  It's a good question. <b>Guest:</b> Some people are working on that now.  They are working on it to some degree because of Rawls.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">22:46</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's turn to Nozick. 1974, he's a colleague of Rawls at Harvard, and he publishes <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia</i>. A book I also once owned.  I don't see it on my shelf.  You see it? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that's a relief.  It's still here. And I have read the whole thing.  I read it I think when I was 20--or 21?--20. <b>Guest:</b> The kind of person who would steal that book probably has an inordinate respect for property rights. <b>Russ:</b> Why do you mention that? <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's why it's still there. <b>Russ:</b> I'm not sure what you mean.  You are wondering why no one has wandered in and stolen it. I don't think anyone stole my <i>Theory of Justice</i>. It may have, I don't know--hang on; let me just eyeball it. I get your joke now. Slow on the uptake, being the non-philosopher in the room. So, you are suggesting my copy of Rawls has walked.  I suspect I lent it foolishly. And there is some moral complication to that issue. <b>Guest:</b> It was assisted walking. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. Anyway, I was electrified by Nozick, when I read it.  Of course, I wanted to be. <b>Guest:</b> It's a great book. <b>Russ:</b> I was on his side.  It bristles with creative and interesting ideas. And it is not, in my view, as systematic as Rawls. Which makes it a more entertaining read, but a harder take-away sometimes, as a whole. So, what did Nozick try to do in that book, and how does it relate to Rawls? <b>Guest:</b> I think it's a little bit unclear, might have been a little unclear even to Nozick, what he was trying to do.  But there are three parts of it.  And the biggest second part of the book was more than anything else a response to Rawls.  And so there he is setting out an alternative perspective on justice and distributive justice.  People say that Nozick didn't have any premises or foundations, and that's just not true.  But what is true is that he borrowed his foundations from Rawls, to a large degree. He said: Well, suppose Rawls is right, that people are separate persons with lives of their own to live and that their utility, it isn't up to somebody else to decide how their utility trades off against someone else's. They have rights. And the aggregate isn't a trump.  So, maybe that's question-begging. But if that's question-begging, then Rawls is question-begging, because that's Rawls's premise; and Nozick said: Suppose that's right. Suppose we took that on board and really believed it.  I don't think we are going to get Rawls's conclusions if we do that.  I think if we take that premise on board, what we are going to actually end up with is a puzzle about how to justify the emergence and enforcement of a state-imposed rule of law in the first place; but also in an ongoing way. So, he comes up with different categorizations of principles of justice and with the tasks of forming an order out of principles of justice. He distinguishes between historical and patterned principles, and he says that Rawls's theory is actually a patterned principle, based on a patterned principle, the difference principle, and that is, Nozick wants us to consider an historical alternative. <b>Russ:</b> Which is? <b>Guest:</b> Well, let me set out the distinction from the ground, then. So, you might say, a principle, say--he distinguishes between the idea of current time-slice principles, where he says you would evaluate the justice of a situation by looking at a snapshot of the situation and saying: Are the shares the right size in that situation? You don't care how the shares got to be that way. You don't care who produced what. You just look at the shares and you say, for example: Well, if the shares are unequal size, then that's that.  That determines that the distribution is unjust, is illegitimate. <b>Russ:</b> That's Nozick describing Rawls. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. In effect. <b>Russ:</b> Because Rawls ignores how they got there.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">28:06</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> But he's [Nozick's] saying: Here are the possibilities, basically. So, the two basic categories he wants to talk about are historical and time-slice.  But it's actually a little bit harder and more complicated than that.  So, you could also distinguish between a more time-sensitive or context-sensitive principle, which, call it an end-state principle--that's what Nozick calls it--where you might not exactly take a snapshot and say unequal shares entails injustice                                                                                                 ; you might say: Actually we should be looking at lifetime income, say. And if the Joneses and Smiths have the same lifetime income, then that is equal in the way that justice requires the outcome to be equal. And so even if the Joneses and Smiths have different incomes at a particular time or different net wealth at a particular time--because, after all, Jones is 20 and Smith is 50 and Smith has been accumulating both talents and skills and connections and wealth for 30 more years than the other has--then that would be inequality and injustice by the lights of current time-slice principle, but the end-state principle says: No, that's not the point.  The snapshot isn't the point.  The whole picture is the point. Now, pattern principles, then, are principles that say we have to look we have to look at a particular pattern.  And the pattern might not actually be like slices of a pie.  It might be a pattern of treatment.  So, you might say: Are those people doing worse than others because there is a prejudice against hiring people of their minority group or their religious group or people of their sex? And so you might say: That might be where we'd locate injustice. You'd say there's a systematic pattern of inequality here.  Even if people actually had the same income, you might say: Well, those people had to work twice as hard for it; or, those people had to wait twice as long for it. So there can be a pattern of justice that's a more subtle thing.  And Nozick says: Okay, that's more plausible; but it's still not my theory. It's still not a historical theory. Historical theory: there are rules about how you come to own something. And the main question is going to be: Did you acquire that by using force? Or did you acquire it by voluntary consent? If anybody who had a claim to that baseball ticket said: Hey, give that to Russ. For whatever reason. Maybe he paid for it; maybe he's just more of a baseball fan or something like that. Maybe it's your birthday. Something like that. <b>Russ:</b> Or the current holder is not a nice person. <b>Guest:</b> Well, could be. Lots of different transfer principles we could talk about, too.  But basically, Nozick said: No matter what the result is, the result isn't where the rubber hits the road.  The result isn't where the justice question gets resolved.  The justice question gets resolved when we look at how the transfer actually occurred; and did the transfer occur legitimately. And Nozick says the pre-eminent principle of legitimate transfer is consent. <b>Russ:</b> So, if you have the ticket and I ask you for it and you give it to me voluntarily, versus I hold you up at gunpoint for the ticket, the second case even if I'm the bigger baseball fan, is irrelevant because, is unjust because I used force. And the first case, even if I'm the smaller baseball fan, is just because you gave it to me.  <b>Guest:</b> Yep. <b>Russ:</b> Or I bought it from you. But it was voluntary. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">32:15</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, the problem with that, which I'm sure people--I can't remember, Nozick talks about it in the book--is that many of our advantages in life, and of course this has become a huge study in economics recently                                                                                                         , are given to us.  We don't earn them.  My children are born in the United States. They are born in the United States of a certain parental endowment of genetics and environment. The odds are good they are going to be above the median in material well-being. They may not. They may choose a path that's less rewarding materially.  But it's certainly open to them to be well above the median if they choose to be. Is that fair? Just because it's voluntary--they didn't steal it from anybody? What's Nozick's answer to that? Put the stress on voluntary exchange, versus expropriation. <b>Guest:</b> Let me kind of start at the start, if  you don't mind. Nozick is working in a Lockean tradition, trying to develop an alternative to Rawls's theory. And so Locke is starting out responding to a fellow named Lord Filmer, who basically said all the earth was given to mankind in common. But, no, that can't be right; because if it were the case that we all were common owners, then nobody could do anything. We'd all be paralyzed. We wouldn't have the right to take a breath or to stand, even just to simply stand our ground without getting the permission of everybody else in the human race to stand there. So, Filmer says that can't be right, and therefore it can't be the case that God gave the world to all mankind; God gave the world to Adam and then Adam passed it on to his children. And that's how it ended up in the hands of Adam's distant descendants--namely today's kings. <b>Russ:</b> Us. <b>Guest:</b> No, the kings. <b>Russ:</b> Not us. <b>Guest:</b> So, Locke made fun of that; he mocked that. But he also came up with a pretty sustained argument against that. Now, Locke didn't talk about us appropriating our talents, per se.  What he talked about is appropriating land. But Nozick comes in understanding that we need to have some kind of theory about how we originally become the owners of anything at all. Now, there's this principle which we already talked about, a principle of just transfer; so if that ticket belongs to me, the way you acquire property in that ticket is by doing justice to the claim that I have prior to yours; and so you do justice to my claim by asking me if you can have it. And I say: Well, what are you proposing? And then you make an offer of some kind; and I say: Yeah, that'll work for me; and then we make an exchange. And now you are the owner of the ticket. I've relinquished ownership. But if we suppose then that my talents--either my talents came into the world as my property or my talents came into the world as the world's property as it were--the human race's property--which actually is more or less like Rawls's theory in the end; but that's what Nozick wants to repudiate. <b>Russ:</b> Rawls's being that it's the world's property. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. So, Nozick basically says: What Locke says there's got to be some way in which we can do things with the world. That is, if this is supposed to be a theory that has something to do with respecting separate persons, then it's got to have something to do with separate persons having the right to sustain themselves, to feed themselves--with the emphasis on themselves, that if they can't even put food in their mouths, well then there's nothing respectful about that. Nothing individualistic about that. That's taking a theory to an extreme that prevents it from ever having anything to do with our world. And so Nozick says we do want our theory to have something do to with helping people solve problems and live lives in this world. So, he says the way we acquire land is by mixing our labor with something to which nobody else has a claim. And that latter part is not a throwaway. That's a really important part of the theory. He's not saying: If I can run out onto your lawn with a shovel and turn over a few scoops then I come to own your lawn. It's like the only way for me to come to own your lawn is by coming up with a mutually agreeable arrangement with you. But if nobody has a claim--if you don't have a claim--then the thing that I do when I dig up a mushroom or plant a row of carrots is, I am investing, I am mixing myself with that land, with that product, in a way that nobody else is. And it's not that that has to be some extremely strong claim being created. The point is it's a unique and exclusive claim. The only way for somebody else to come along, the only way for you to come along later and say, I'll take some of those carrots, thank you, or, I think I'll share that mushroom with you, is by ignoring the similar claim that I've made previously. When nobody else has a claim to it then I'm not ignoring anybody, I'm not mistreating anybody, I'm not failing to respect anyone's separateness.  But the person whom comes along second needs to get my permission then, in order to not be disrespecting me as a person. So, it doesn't have to be that strong a claim for it to matter that it was the first claim, and there really would be a disrespect involved, in the same way that any bear understands that if you get to the territory second, that first bear is going to stand there and even if the bear is smaller than you, that bear is going to say: I'm going to fight to the death for this, because otherwise I lose my identity. So, even bears understand that it matters who gets there first. And people understand that, as well. So, the thing about your talents is--in a way, it's very implicit in Nozick, but implicitly the idea is this: I can exploit my talents; I can make use of my talents without making anybody else worse off, without putting anybody else in a worse position; but nobody else can come along and commandeer my talents, can enslave me for example without mixing their labor with something I do think of as mine and I quite reliably and predictably will think of as mine; and that nobody can really avoid thinking of as mine. If we talk about it at all, we will talk about it as mine. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">39:52</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Nozick of course gets into the appropriate role of the state, and he comes down, if I remember correctly, arguing that--and I have to confess, although I found it exhilarating at the time, thinking back on it I find it a little less exhilarating in terms of its elegance--but his argument is, because of economies of scale, that the state has the authority or justness of performing a police function. But I want to step aside from the many things we might argue and discuss what the state could do, and just focus on the one, which is redistribution. So, if the state raises taxes, not for revenue purposes--that's what I want to put to the side--but merely to redistribute income. So, we've got these baseball players who can throw  a baseball 100 miles an hour; we've got people with great voices who can entertain and make millions of dollars a year as a result, like the baseball players, actors and actresses with good looks.  And I'm going to accept the fact--obviously Nozick thought it was important--that all these people work very, very hard. When you talk about your talents, there is a tendency to talk about your talents as an endowed gift. Some part of  it is, obviously. But what a modern athlete has to do to be a successful earner of those high returns is unimaginable, I think, to most casual sports fans. I don't think they realize the amount of work that gets put in, the relentless effort. I'll put a clip up attached to this of one very moving and informative about this.  Taking that as a fact, that some people can throw a baseball faster or sing better, are in demand for whatever reason, and that they've combined hard work to get there, is it unjust then to take a share from them and give it to others, against their will, merely to push the distribution of income toward that egalitarian, equal share outcome? I know what Nozick's answer is: Nozick's answer is No. But the average American, when confronted with the veil of ignorance--what do you think that person would say? It seems to me they are just two orthogonal theories. Rawls--would most people, not you and I, say: Well, behind a veil of ignorance I don't know if I'm going to be one of the gifted ones who works hard or one of the gifted ones who squanders talent; I might end up being one of the non-gifted ones; I might have an IQ of a low number and be endowed with a lazy temperament and I am not going to live very well; and I might be a gifted person with tremendous drive, a Michael Jordan or Steve Jobs, and I might end up with multi-millions. Where would justice lie there in the mind of an average thoughtful person? Would they find redistributive taxation offensive or admirable? <b>Guest:</b> So, two perspectives on this. One perspective would be that on the one hand, that pitcher who is excelling now who did something to make something of himself, make something of his talent. So, like you say, the labor is really there. And even some folks on the left, like David Miller, will say: the point wasn't whether the pitcher or Wilt Chamberlain worked extremely hard or took extreme risks. The point is there was a certain amount of work that went into it, and work that, after all, Wilt did, not that somebody else did. And so that is the thing that establishes Wilt's presumptive claim. It doesn't mean that he shouldn't be taxed for various purposes mainly but it does mean Wilt is the one that has such claim of justice that has anything to do with being deserving or merit or investing in creating the talent, bringing the talent to the table. So, that's one perspective. Now the counterpoint to that is a person who will say: Yeah, but in a way you are failing to understand the way in which the community's involvement goes all the way down. So, it isn't just you that worked. It's your parents that worked and your grandparents that worked and actually your parents' employers, your parents' teachers, your parents' grocers, cabdrivers. So, all of  society worked to put you in the situation that you are in. Okay, so that's one perspective; that leaves us with a real understanding why people would disagree about this, why it would seem quite intuitive. Both sides of that debate would seem quite intuitive. Now the only thing that I would want to add to that is I would say: Okay, but let's remind ourselves, are we talking about a liberal society-- <b>Russ:</b> When you use the  word liberal, you mean classically liberal or modern liberal? <b>Guest:</b> Ambiguous between them. Just a theory that believes that an individual is a real thing. It's not a scholarly, fictitious construct or something like that.  There really are people in the world, and people really do have their own hopes and dreams, and people aren't mere pawns; they actually are agents taking responsibility and making decisions. Now, you can say that at the end of the day, society owns people.  People don't own themselves. You can say that, and probably say that consistently; but you are not saying something liberal when you say that. So at the end of the day, for a liberal, you have to make sure you are on the right side of this question. When somebody says: Okay, I got it; I wouldn't be where I am today without my teachers and cab drivers and parents and all kinds of other people; but I don't like this deal                                                                                                               ; I'm going go home now; I'm going to leave the country, perhaps, if you don't mind. Who gets to say: Sorry, you aren't enough of a self-owner that you don't have a right to say no? Maybe we want your kidney, maybe we want your blood, maybe we just want your labor, maybe we want to restrict what you can do by laboring for yourself and your family. And at some point we say: Well, let's be reasonable and let's go along with this to some extent. But still, there's a fundamental matter of principle, a question that needs an answer at the end of the day, which is: Do I have the right to say No? Do I have the right to walk? Do I own myself? So, the fact that you can think of other people who helped me, or you just imagine--how do you know that I'm not an orphan? Maybe in your imagination all kinds of people helped me.  Tell me at what point other people helping me made me your property. Because if there was no point at which I became your property, then excuse me, but I'm going to go home, and I'm going to take all of my toys with me.  If you want some of my toys, if you want me to share my toys, treat me like an adult, treat me like a self-owner, and make me an offer. And you might make me an offer that I'm perfectly willing to accept.  I might say--and this was the thing you were excluding--yeah, I want to be part of a community, I want a community that has a real infrastructure; in fact, I want to be part of a community where the roads are free. Not that I think that anything is really free; I realize that I as a taxpayer will be paying for the free roads. But the point is, I want to  minimize transactions costs because I want it to be as cheap as possible for my customers to get to my store. And so I would rather pay for that in part of my taxes than have to put up a toll road and have my customers have to pay to get to me. So, yeah, I want public goods, even things that aren't inherently public. <b>Russ:</b> Many goods aren't public goods that are provided. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. So, I'm willing to pay for it; I regard my paying my share for it as a way of respecting me as a separate person; I'm in. You want me to fight for my country and maybe get killed in the process? I hate the thought, but I'm in; I realize that sometimes my share is going to be big.  I'm in for my share. Now, you say I should also be willing to regard myself basically as somebody else's property. I should regard my talent as belonging to somebody other than me. I say, No. If we've gotten to that point, I want to get on a plane with a couple of my suitcases and my talent, and I want to go someplace where I'm treated with more respect. And if you are going to stop me, then we've stopped being a liberal society. If we are still a liberal society, then you realize this package of talents is mine. No matter where it came from, no matter how many friends I had or teachers I had, this is my package of goods. <b>Russ:</b> No matter how many public schools you attended. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">50:34</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I'm fighting off the urge to end the podcast here because that was so eloquent. But I want to continue. Let me take a different approach to the question. We could make a different set of arguments against progressive taxation.  There was a wonderful book--I'm also looking at my shelf; these comments about my bookshelf are a testament to my eyesight, the clutter of my room, and the height of my bookshelves--but, Blum and Kalven, two law professors, wrote a wonderful little book a long time ago called <i>The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,</i> where they tried to lay out an argument in favor of progressive taxation. They made a bunch of different ones and they shot them all down, most of them; and I think the book concludes that the case remains uneasy.  They are sort of pro-progressive taxation, but with qualms, is how I might describe it. So, let me make three arguments, if I can remember them--not from their book but from me sitting here talking to you--against progressive taxation.  One would be: It's unjust.  It's immoral.  That's a Nozickian argument akin to what you just made: that you own yourself, you own your property, and taxation, especially for the purpose of redistribution is theft.  The second argument would be: it's inefficient.  It makes the pie smaller. And this would  be a Rawlsian argument.  So, Rawls, while in favor of progressive taxation, would say eventually: Well, I'm in favor of progressive taxation, but not to the point where it makes the pie so much smaller that people get smaller shares.  The third argument against progressive taxation I would call practical--different kind of practical. And I guess deep down, it's the third argument that I find most compelling, both intellectually and in terms of persuasiveness, as I think about an impartial spectator thinking about our arguments, conversations here.  The third argument would be: Well, if I give the state the power to tax people, that power will be abused, because John Rawls is not going to be the commissioner of taxation in this society. And if he is, he's going to end up being somebody different than a Harvard philosopher.  He's going to be  a commissioner of taxation, and he will be subject to the imperfections of humanity and the special interests that will try to sway him.  So when I think about, to speak more generally, about limiting the power of the state, these three arguments work for so many issues. Think about minimum wages, can argue it's immoral--the state has no right to talk about what I can earn or pay. Can argue it's ineffective--it doesn't do a good job in helping the people it's intended to help. Or you could argue, well, when you give the state the power to set wages it's going to do more than that; we're going to be on the road to tyranny.  So, when I think about those three arguments, going back to redistribution; I find myself strongestly drawn to the fear of tyranny. Maybe because I'm not behind a veil of ignorance. I'm sitting here earning well above the median; I live a good life; I live in the United States which puts me way ahead to start with; many gifts and blessings, many of them I've worked for, but many of them, as we said earlier, came to me.  When I think about it--I have kind of a conflict of interest; in thinking about this, put myself behind the veil of ignorance, my biggest argument against taxation for purely redistributive purposes is that I think that puts you on a road to a very destructive political system.  What's your reaction to that? <b>Guest:</b> It's a rich question. Gave me a chance to think for a minute.  Well, first of all, your last thing: bias is a real issue.  We are scholars and academics, so we both have a moral obligation to be as impartial as we can be, and to be lovers of truth. And it's really hard.  We're only human. There are lots of ways that our minds work and gather information.  They are inescapable and we wouldn't be better off if we could escape from them--we process bits of information one at a time, and the first bits of information we acquire are going to become the defaults, and it's going to take more energy and so on, and evidence to overturn those defaults. And that results in bias. We can't do anything about that. So, yeah, it's an issue.  Two-thirds of my salary comes from the state, so there's a built-in dynamic leading me in the direction of being a statist. <b>Russ:</b> And instead you bite the hand that feeds you. As do I, so oft. <b>Guest:</b> Well, yeah, I guess. <b>Russ:</b> That hand that's doing the feeding doesn't realize it's being bitten. That's part of the problem. But that's another issue. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, Freud would have an explanation--he'd say, yeah, I'm getting back at my parents or something like that. So, I'm sympathetic to all of these arguments. Certainly there becomes a point where either the amount of taxation or the form and rationale for taxation becomes so egregiously insulting--and threatening--that you are pretty much willing to go to war, to start a revolution, create a new country if that's what it takes in order to make a stand to correct that injustice.  I'm sympathetic to that. I'm an immigrant; I'm a naturalized American citizen now and I believe in the principles of the Revolution. But at the end of the day, there's still an issue for me that as a philosopher, that's more like a premise than it is like a conclusion.  I can say: Here's where I make my stand, and my colleagues can say: Me, not so much. I don't blame you; there's no particular reason why you have to agree with me on this.  We can all be brothers--until you come around to collect your share of my paycheck. But I can see why reasonable people would disagree with this. So, these table-thumping, deeply compelling emotional beliefs about justice and injustice--they don't make great premises for arguments.  They are better as conclusions. If you can get them to come out of your arguments, that's interesting.  But if you just insist on them, not so interesting. The efficiency thing, I think we're on your turf when we talk about that; I believe that's a really important issue as well.  Rawls, as you say, that is a Rawlsian argument; there are people in the world, not to name names, but who would say it would be worth making the 99% worse off if we could just nail the 1% to the wall and finally get our revenge on all those hoarders and greedy, the people who hog most of the nation's wealth. It's not that they produce anything; the way they acquired their wealth was by hogging it, not by creating it. <b>Russ:</b> That's Nietzsche and Ressentiment, which I don't get to say very often at EconTalk, so I thought I'd just throw that in; my college philosophy class pays off finally. <b>Guest:</b> I've read about that; I don't think I've ever attempted to pronounce that word before, certainly not on the radio. <b>Russ:</b> It's about a six and a half, maybe a seven. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, you get points for Nietsche. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">59:23</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> Now, the practical thing, your third alternative--actually I think that is the main concern that I have, too.  In a way, maybe we are all children now of James Buchanan to some extent.  I look back and I see it in Hayek; you can see it in Adam Smith; you can even see glimpses of it in Aristotle. But I think that concern and that awareness that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely--that has been with us, we've been aware of that concern for many, many centuries. And the idea that absolute power corrupts absolutely--that isn't just a kind of cute way of taking a point to its logical extreme.  It actually is, I think a relevant dynamic of real world corruption, that the more power there is available, the more that that power is worth; the more it's worth to acquire that power; and so the more people will invest and the more unscrupulous they will be in doing whatever it takes to acquire that power--the more they will be spend as well as to lie in order to acquire that power.  So, I think there really is a powerful reason to take, as Hayek would have said, to take the reasons every step of the way. There's always a reason, even a good reason, to create more power. There's always a problem coming up that hasn't been solved where we think we need a Czar or a committee or an agency--somebody--we need a Cabinet, to solve that problem. Like the reasons for doing it will probably never be without weight, without merit; and yet the result of creating more power in order to solve that problem is you create more power that gets bought and sold and auctioned off to the highest bidder, in effect, and used for whatever purposes that high bidder has in acquiring that power. So, you end up, the                                                                                                                    Bills come out with nice-sounding names on them, and then you actually read the bill and it will be 4000 pages that have nothing to do with the thing that forms the title of the bill; and nobody--literally nobody--has ever read the whole thing.  Even the people who wrote it. There's 435 members of Congress; each threw in a few pages. So even the authors of the bill don't know what's in the bill. They just know: well, I've got something I can take back to my primary donors and my constituents.  I can say: see, I've done what will warrant you in re-electing me, or in putting me on your Board of Directors so I can get $100 million payoff after I retire from the Congress or the Senate.  So, you've got that kind of dynamic going. And so even good purposes give rise to corruption, well-meaning purposes give rise to an increasing level of corruption; and as a country gets older, as its bureaucracy gets bigger, I'm sorry, but it escalates.  It starts growing, if not  exactly exponentially, but at least episodically there will be periods of exponential growth, growth and emergence of new forms of power that wouldn't have been imaginable a generation ago will be accepted as just the next little step--if we didn't object to the previous step it doesn't make sense to pick this as the place. <b>Russ:</b> Boiling the frog. <b>Guest:</b> I guess that's the metaphor.  That is my main concern as well, just that power is not going to be used for the purpose for which it was ostensibly created. It's going to be used for the purposes that the person holding that power currently has. <b>Russ:</b> I think back to a podcast a few years back with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita where he talked about King Leopold of Belgium, who was pretty popular among the Belgian people at the time for some of his social policies and legislation, where he was constrained by a Parliament. In the Congo, he was unrestrained; and he murdered millions of people--I think millions, certainly hundreds of thousands--and took booty and plunder. And I think Bruce very eloquently asked the question: Which was the real King Leopold? And we know the answer: the one who was unconstrained. Not a pretty picture. So, I think it's a real issue. What it brings to mind, though, which fascinates me--I haven't thought about it enough--is that interaction between the political system and the economic system. And Rawls kind of abstracts from it. Nozick--cynical is not the right word--he's not romantic about democracy. He has that extraordinary passage of the parable of the slave, which I recommend to everybody.  I don't know if I can legally put a link up to it, but I'll try to; and you can certainly google tale of the slave Nozick. The foundation for libertarian ideas and policies.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:05:30</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But Nozick himself changed his mind to some extent at the end of his life, correct? <b>Guest:</b> That is correct. I actually can explain that.  I only met Nozick once, so I was not really familiar with him as a person.  But in December of 1999, Boston University invited me out to give an end-of-millennium talk. And I talked about the meaning of life, because it seemed like, what else are you going to talk about at the end of a millennium? <b>Russ:</b> That talk is in print, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, it is. <b>Russ:</b> It's a beautiful essay. <b>Guest:</b> Thank you.  It's on my website. So, I was coming out to give that talk, and Nozick sent me a note and said: That's interesting. Would you be interested in having dinner afterwards? And I said: Well, absolutely. What else would I rather do?  This would be a dream of a lifetime for me.  I knew that he had had a recurrence of his stomach cancer. I did say my wife will be with me, who is a biochemist.  There weren't search engines back then. <b>Russ:</b> Or they weren't very good. <b>Guest:</b> But he had somebody track down her articles on insect biochemistry. And he said: Well, please bring her along, too.  So, we showed up for dinner and he had all kinds of questions about insect biochemistry. And they were                                                                                                                              smart, cutting edge questions.  So, people talk about Nozick and they say, well, he was the smartest person I ever met. And me, I'm not sure I know enough about him to say that, but he was really stunningly impressive, I have to say, and it wasn't because he was trying to make an impression. He was just interested in everything. And he had good questions about everything. But then he turned to me, and well, I wish he had had all kinds of questions about my work, but he didn't.  He said: I want you to know that my departure from libertarianism has been greatly exaggerated. And I said: You know, you don't have to prove anything to me; that isn't on my mind; I'm not worried about that; so whatever you were or whatever you are, I don't care; I'm just enjoying dinner. And he said: No, I want to explain. And I said: No, if you want to explain, please explain. And he said: Okay; so I published this book, <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia,</i> and then I started thinking about symbolic value and I started thinking about what countries stand for, what they symbolize. And I started thinking that this thing that I had said in <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia,</i> like if someone wants to sell himself into slavery and it really is his rational, best option, like he can save his daughter's life by selling a kidney, well then why not let him sell a kidney? And maybe it takes more than that. He has to sell himself, his person, into slavery and he says: If that's what it takes to save my daughter-- <b>Russ:</b> I'm in-- <b>Guest:</b> There's no questions on my part, no even sense of self-sacrifice on my part. It's just there's nothing I'd rather do in my life than save my daughter with it; so, I want to sell myself into slavery.  Nozick said: If somebody is in that position and wants to do it, who are we to interfere with that person? So, Nozick said: I said that in <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia</i>. Now fast forward, and I'm thinking about symbolic value. And I'm thinking: countries don't just do things, like defend freedom or not, or secure freedom or not, secure freedom of contract or not.  They also stand for things.  And at some point, America's supposed to be the country that doesn't just defend freedom.  It stands for freedom.  And I thought, if this is going to be the country that stands for freedom, allowing the emergence of a class of slaves, that's not a really impressive way of standing for freedom.  In fact, it's not a really successful way of standing for freedom. And so he thought, he said: I came to the conclusion that it matters what a country stands for. And so, even though this is, in a truncation of freedom of contract and the sacrosanct status, individual status, of contractors--he said--I came to think there's an importance of standing for freedom; and in view of that I gave up on the idea that people should be allowed to sell themselves into slavery, even voluntary slavery. Just isn't a way of standing for freedom.  So, it's out, even when it's the only way for a father to save his daughter's life. Period. It's an unconscionable contract, cannot be enforced. Of course people can say: Well, I'll do whatever you want to, to save my daughter.  Of course, they can say that.  But that guy can't go to court and sue and say he said he'd do whatever he wants.  I want him to be my serf, do these degrading things, whatever.  So, that's what Nozick said. That was my conclusion. But then he said: Then this other thing happened: My landlord was Erich Segal, author of <i>Love Story</i>, so I found out that my apartment was rent-controlled. And he'd been raising my rent every year--reasonable, but significant, but my rent had gone up. And then I found out that those rate hikes were illegal.  So, I went to them--I said--I realized that I am rent-controlled, so it actually wasn't legitimate.  And he said, Erich Segal actually waived a copy of <i>Anarchy, State, and Utopia</i> in my face, and said: You've abdicated the right to complain. And Nozick said: No, I haven't! Segal said: Yes, you have. And Nozick said: You know, I can prove that I haven't abdicated that right.  I'll see you in court.  He sued him and won.  And Erich Segal had to repay the back rent from the rate hike. <b>Russ:</b> And then he got publicity about this. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. And my colleagues were slapping me on the back and saying: Way to go. And then your stuff came out saying serious reservations about libertarianism.  People were saying: You are so smart; I knew you'd come around, grow up; it was just a phase you were going through. And Nozick said: You know, it was a moment of weakness on my part, but it was so nice for people to be slapping me on the back and telling me that they had faith in me and they believed in me. Because they hadn't been saying that for years. And they started welcoming me back into the fold.  And you know, God help me, but I just liked to not be vilified for a change.  I liked to not be not a pariah in my own department. And so I went along with it.  I could have done the snarky thing and said, No, your approval of me is based on a misunderstanding.  I could have said that, but I just didn't. I was tired and I just let it go. But he said in fact it was just about slavery. That was my genuine, serious departure from my youthful libertarianism; but, he said, that's about it. Other than that, I haven't changed much. That was my conversation with Bob Nozick.  He was delightful, I have to say.  We talked about other things as well.  I mean, that guy, he could talk. But he was also very interested in everything.  He was a great listener as well.  He was a delightfully gracious human being. <b>Russ:</b> Well, we were going to talk about Rawls about for about 20 minutes in my mind, and then Nozick for 20, and then the last 20 starting to explore some other ideas related to justice; but I see we've managed to go over an hour; and there's still plenty more we could talk about with regard to Rawls and Nozick. I think we'll stop here.  Hope we can come back and address some other issues related to justice and inequality another time.
</td></tr>

</tbody>
</table>

 ]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Taylor on Rules, Discretion, and First Principles</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/taylor_on_rules.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9824</id>

    <published>2012-04-30T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-04-30T15:19:21Z</updated>

    <summary> John Taylor of Stanford University&apos;s Hoover Institution talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about his new book, First Principles: Five Keys to Restoring America&apos;s Prosperity. Taylor argues that when economic policy adhere to the right basic principles such as keeping...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Financial Crisis of 2008" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="History" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="John Taylor" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Money, Banking, Monetary Policy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
<a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/" target="new">John Taylor</a> of Stanford University's Hoover Institution talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about his new book, <i>First Principles: Five Keys to Restoring America's Prosperity</i>. Taylor argues that when economic policy adhere to the right basic principles such as keeping rules rather than using discretion, then the economy thrives. Ignoring these principles, Taylor argues, leads to bad economic outcomes such as recessions, inflation, or high unemployment. Taylor illustrates these ideas with a whirlwind tour of the last half century of American economic policy and history. The focus is on monetary and fiscal policy but Taylor also discusses health care reform and other policy areas. The conversation closes with a look at the likelihood that economic policy will change dramatically after 2012. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Taylorrules.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Taylor on Rules, Discretion, and First Principles','Russ Roberts and John Taylor',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:02:34</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Taylorrules.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 28.4 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> ]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/" target="new">John Taylor's Home page</a>
<li><a href="http://www.johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/" target="new">John Taylor's blog</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/First-Principles-Restoring-Americas-Prosperity/dp/0393073394/" target="new"><i>First Principles: Five Keys to Restoring America's Prosperity</i></a>, by John Taylor at Amazon.com.
</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html" target="new">Price Controls</a>, by Hugh Rockoff. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PhillipsCurve.html" target="new">Phillips Curve</a>, by Kevin D. Hoover. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MoneySupply.html" target="new">Money Supply</a>, by Anna J. Schwartz. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MonetaryPolicy.html" target="new">Monetary Policy</a>, by James Tobin. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html" target="new">Milton Friedman</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html" target="new">Milton Friedman</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Burns.html" target="new">Arthur Burns</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Heller.html" target="new">Walter Heller</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Tobin.html" target="new">James Tobin</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Lucas.html" target="new">Robert Lucas</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Lucas.html" target="new">Robert Lucas</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>
<b>Podcasts, Blogs, and Video:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb8dO_D2b60" target="new">Larry Summers and John Taylor Debate</a>. April 4, 2012. Video, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/05/meltzer_on_the.html" target="new">Meltzer on the Fed, Money, and Gold</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2006/09/friedman_on_cap_1.html" target="new">Friedman on Capitalism and Freedom</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/09/george_shultz_o.html" target="new">George Shultz on Economics, Human Rights and the Fall of the Soviet Union</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/_featuring/john_taylor/" target="new">Other EconTalk episodes with John Taylor</a>. EconTalk podcast.



<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: April 17, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Our topic today is the ideas in your new book, <i>First Principles</i>. Let's start with the 5 keys that you identify as being important for prosperity. <b>Guest:</b> They all center around the idea of economic freedom, which is by definition a situation where people can buy what they want, sell what they want, work where they want, help people in the way they think is best. But that's within a framework that includes these five keys. One is that the policy be predictable: that it remain within a predictable policy framework. Second is that there is an emphasis on the rule of law, so you know what the law is actually stating.  Third is that the emphasis is on markets. And from an economist's perspective, markets are a wonderful way to get decisions made in an efficient way. They also provide the fourth idea, which is incentives. Incentives should be the focus of any economic freedom framework. And then finally, the fifth is a limited role for government, a specified role for government, which delineates what government should do and what markets should do. <b>Russ:</b> Your book traces the history of various periods of relative intervention and relative freedom. And we'll get into that in a minute.  But I want to start by asking you a question about those 5 principles. Do you think that any of your ideological or interventionist opponents--people who are more interventionist than you are--would disagree with any of those five? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. I think, for example, maybe predictability is not that important when there is an emergency; you've just got to do what you've got to do; anything goes.  There's clearly differences on scope of government and what the role of government should be. So, I think there's quite a difference.  And it's just been the last few weeks I've had some, I think, good debates with Larry Summers, who has a more interventionist approach. You can see that in these discussions. So, he would put less emphasis on them, I believe. That's a way to put it.  Not that you wouldn't think the rule of law is important, or predictability is important.  It's how much emphasis you put on those. <b>Russ:</b> One of the ones you mention, the temporary versus permanent, strikes me as, in principle at least, an idea that could be somewhat immune from ideological or philosophical differences. You'd think that most economists would favor permanent interventions versus temporary ones simply because planning takes place over more than tomorrow.  The future matters a lot and if you know what the rules of the game are and you think that they are going to be the same for a while,  you are more likely to act than if you are uncertain about what the rules of the game are going to be. And yet it seems that despite that seemingly obvious fact of human nature and decision-making, I see a big difference between interventionists' willingness to impose temporary, short-run interventions of unknown duration. Is that a fair assessment of people who disagree with you? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> And why? <b>Guest:</b> The idea here is we all know from economics that people like to have more certainty about what policy will be.  They can do their planning themselves. But I think people who emphasize that, well, that's maybe not that important, are going to stress the emergency. I mean, take the bailouts, for example. You've got to go in and do the bailout even though you are setting up a situation with less predictability and more moral hazard.  They would say: We can deal with that later. A lot of it has to do with that kind of thinking.  And there is a difference of opinion about that. For me, one of the reasons to do this book is just to go through history and realize how harmful a lot of those interventions have been. Not everyone, of course, but the deviations from the predictability--we've seen it in the past and it didn't work, and when policy has been more predictable, things have been much better.  So, to me the evidence is just so clear.  And it can be explained to people using just history; it doesn't have to be a lot of economics.  But the reason, to go back to your question, is that some people think you just have to go in and do it, and not worry about the implications of that for next year or the following year. <b>Russ:</b> There is definitely political pressure, which we'll talk about.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">6:05</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's turn to that history, because I think it's a fascinating part of the book. I should mention to listeners: the book is short.  I think it's about 200 pages.  But it's a short 200 pages.  It's a wonderful sketch of recent economic history plus some policy recommendations, as well as a laying out of the principles.  And I found the history part to be fascinating because you were either in Washington at the time in some role, not always as the decisive role, but certainly in some role, so you had contact with the people who were making the decisions; or you have as colleagues now people who are very much involved in making these decisions.  And one of your themes is the virtue of rules over discretion; and then the political forces that sometimes intervene.  So, I thought we'd go through some of the episodes you talked about in the book and talk about that mix of rules versus discretion, which is a big underlying theme of the book, and also the political influence that sometimes affected policy instead of the economics. So, let's go back, well before some of our listeners were born--but not all--to the Nixon Administration. Which was in some dimensions a market oriented, free market oriented set of policy makers in that administration. And yet Nixon imposed probably the most obviously awful policy change for years around that time, which was the example of wage and price controls. How did that happen? Talk about what actually did happen and why it was important and how it happened. <b>Guest:</b> Well, Nixon came in with a more market-oriented philosophy. He had people like Milton Friedman and George Schultz advising him. And they were quite excited that this was going to get away from the more Keynesian, less market-oriented things that began in the late 1960s and really took the form of wage- and price-guidelines, temporary interventions; monetary policy got quite active. And the hope was that this would be a change.  And Milton Friedman, for example, wrote in <i>Newsweek</i> in early 1971 that this is going to be great; we are moving away from all the excessive fine-tuning; we're going to rely more on markets; and it's going to be a good decade. And then what happened is Nixon was persuaded that it was going to take too long. And Schultz would later talk about it as the economist's lag is the politician's nightmare. And so the politics really got in the way; and Nixon said: I'm not going to wait.  I'm not going to just let monetary policy get inflation down; I'm not going to just sit back. I'm going to do the kind of things that got popular in the 1960s with the more Keynesian approach. And then in August 1971 imposed the wage and price freeze.  And of course it led people like Milton Friedman to really withdraw that article he wrote earlier in the year and say this is the worst  piece I've ever written. Which he did; and came back in the way someone who was candidly assessing it would have to do. And so, as a result we continued with this, I would call it, interventionist policy--less focus on markets and unpredictability, less rule of law. All of those things. Which took a long time to get rid of it.  It was another decade. <b>Russ:</b> And the wage-price controls, how did those manage to get approved, despite the quality of some of Nixon's advisers? <b>Guest:</b> Well, Nixon had other advisers who were less concerned about the principles.  John Connally, for example over at the Treasury. You asked earlier: Does everyone believe in the principles? And I think you were asking about economists.  But clearly some people don't think these principles are important.  They don't think about economics that much; they don't think markets are that important. And so as a result they went away from that direction. But I think that it was political; the idea that it was going to take some time to get inflation down. And they didn't want to wait. They were worried about the election coming up. And so they went this more shortcut route, which was popular at the time, by the way. When the Freeze was announced, business liked it; labor liked it. It didn't take too long before people realized what a bad idea it was; but at the time, it was remarkably popular. <b>Russ:</b> So, the 1970s didn't turn out quite as cheery as Friedman had hoped, if Nixon had stayed on the path. Although we have to mention that the 1960s had very good growth rates.  The mid-1960s, which were the time of the Kennedy Administration and the Johnson Administration, before Nixon came in--those 8 years, the economic advisers were very Keynesian in flavor.  They were fine-tuners.  They also were big spenders--not as economists; but Johnson clearly expanded the size of government through the Great Society was transfer payments, not so much spending on real resources; but still it increased the tax burden. And the economy did very well.  You would argue, though, that that laid the seeds for the problems that came later. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. And also there were things in that period. The tax cut was a permanent reduction in marginal rates; that was a good thing. <b>Russ:</b> You are talking about the Kennedy tax cut. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts.  They basically were good. They were permanent. They were like a counterexample to all the other interventionism that began. And by the way, of course, you did have monetary policy at that point, at the urging of the Administration, became much more active.  And William Martin, the Chairman of the Fed at the time, began to have a more inflationary policy. In fact, inflation began to pick up around 1965, 1966; you can see that noticeably in the data.  And so that was a change which is related. To me, what is remarkable as  you go through this history is all policies tend to move together. You got more interventionist on the fiscal side; you'd argue that you needed discretion on the monetary side. And then you mentioned the intervention of the government in the health care system expanded quite a bit at that point in time. And so all these things moved together; and I find that's one of the most remarkable things about the history. It's not just fiscal policy; not just monetary policy. They move together. <b>Russ:</b> Well, certainly a lot of the people in power at that time were optimistic and enjoyed intervening, so it would be beyond just one area. <b>Guest:</b> There's an important question about when you are in a position of responsibility in government the urge to intervene is there. There is a  tendency to do something. And it's very real. The hardest, the right thing, is not to take a specific action; but you've got a good policy in place and you stick with it. One of the most difficult things in implementing these principles, even the people that believe in them firmly is: There's so many pressures, temptations, political and otherwise, to do something and intervene in ways that are inconsistent with the principles; and various reasons and excuses to do it. Sometimes they are a compromise, you know--you do have to run a government and people might disagree with you, so there will be decisions made which look like they are deviating from the principles but maybe for other reasons.  And I go through a number of those examples.  There was a temporary tax rebate in the Ford Administration. Not the kind of thing that his Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Alan Greenspan, would have liked, but he went along with that idea; hopefully in exchange would be reduced spending. But it didn't quite work out that way. I like the examples you give of Greenspan--mainly because of his intellectual past and his relationship with Ayn Rand, he's viewed as this near-anarchist.  But when he got near Washington, D.C., his rhetoric didn't quite match his actions. And I have talked in the past about his support, say, of the Mexican rescue of 1995, which he testified in front of Congress that that was a bad idea, but had to be done anyway. And similarly, many, many times he deviated from what we would call free market principles. In this case he was more of a Keynesian than he perhaps felt in his heart, endorsing a temporary rebate.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">16:20</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But that was not the low point of the Ford Administration's economic policy.  That would have to be the Whip Inflation Now Campaign. And you discuss the speech that Ford made to announce that program. Talk about the program and the speech and the economic policy behind the scenes. <b>Guest:</b> This is a case where the Economic Advisers were not enthusiastic, including Greenspan, because it was harking back to wage and price guidelines and controls. But the  program was called Whip Inflation Now. It was really a hope that somehow people would cooperatively, voluntarily reduce inflation, as a matter of just a national mission. <b>Russ:</b> Patriotism. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. In retrospect it just sounds so strange.  But President Ford went before a joint session of Congress, with his pin, his Whip Inflation Now pin-- <b>Russ:</b> on his lapel-- <b>Guest:</b> and pleaded with people. And in retrospect it is a very unusual kind of policy. It's certainly an example of how policy had moved in a direction way against, in this case, sensible rules-based monetary policy, less reliance on markets, less faith in markets. And you can see it so clearly. There are so many examples of this. Actually, you didn't ask about this, but Arthur Burns is another one, a person who--good economist.  He's the mentor of Milton Friedman. If you asked who influenced you, he'll say: Arthur Burns who was my first teacher as an undergraduate. And here's a guy who, under Nixon, and then as Fed Chairman under Nixon, went around saying markets don't work, we need wage and price controls. So, amazing things happen.  That's why these principles are so important. People should demand that their public officials should understand them and then follow them. Because there's temptations to move away from them. <b>Russ:</b> Burns, at the time, was Chair of the Fed, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> How long was he Chair? <b>Guest:</b> About 8 years, through the 1970s. Burns replaced Martin. Appointed by Nixon to the Fed, and then continued until G. William Miller was appointed by Carter; and then he didn't last very long, until Paul Volker came in. The Volker appointment is really moving back to sensible policy; and that gets close to the Reagan Administration, which is a whole other enormous period of interest. <b>Russ:</b> We'll come to that in a second. But I want to stick with Martin and Burns.  Martin was the Chair under Johnson. And if I remember correctly, when I interviewed Allan Meltzer about his history at the Fed, and you certainly second this point, Martin was very eager to keep President Johnson happy and liberalize the monetary expansion at Johnson's request in trying to finance the war in Vietnam rather than raising taxes. Is that correct? He did definitely move to an easier monetary policy compared to the 1950s when he was Chairman, and the early 1960s. It was partly because he liked the idea of cooperating with the Administration; his view of monetary independence did not preclude that. And you are right--Allan Meltzer writes about that quite persuasively in his book. What I observed here is that if you looked at the numbers you definitely see the impact of monetary policy, inflation starting to pick up. And also, if you go back and read, there's a very interesting document, the 1962 Economic Report of the President--that was the first Report with President Kennedy, and Walter Heller was Chairman; Jim Tobin was on the Council. It's a beautifully written, persuasive document of why you needed to have a discretionary monetary policy. So, that was part of the persuasion, I believe. It wasn't purely political; it was making an argument on economic grounds. An incorrect argument, I believe. But that was what was affecting policy. Interestingly enough, in 1962 was the same year that Milton Friedman wrote <i>Capitalism and Freedom</i>, which is a completely different philosophy than was being put forth by the 1962 Economic Report of the President. But of course the Economic Report of the President was what prevailed in terms of policy. <b>Russ:</b> And <i>Capitalism and Freedom</i> of course was at that point, and Milton's voice, was very much a voice in the wilderness. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> One of the things I think is so admirable and inspirational about Milton is that he wrote that book; it didn't make very much of a splash in the academic world; it was published by the U. of Chicago at a time when academic presses were not even as mainstream as they are now. So it was sort of a philosophical book in some dimension. And it just sat there. People read it. And over time, many of the ideas in that book became, instead of being viewed as crazy or kooky or bizarre, became mainstream; and many of them were adopted. Although when I interviewed Milton he was distressed to think how many weren't adopted. But that's his perspective. Good will. <b>Guest:</b> It took a while, but eventually it caught on. Actually, my view, we've gone back again a little bit at this point, which is distressing. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, but I think the good news is there's always hope.  Think how distressing it must have been to be Milton Friedman in 1963, 1964, and 1965 and see people not paying attention to your ideas; and in policy, ignoring them totally, seemingly on a very unhealthy path. And yet, the pendulum swings back now. <b>Guest:</b> And then also, being positive because you've got someone in--Nixon--who you think is going to change things and then completely disappointing you. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">23:01</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, we get to--Nixon leaves office in disgrace in 1973, I think. We get Ford. Ford's policy is inept. And then he's followed by equally or perhaps more inept policy, which is the Carter Administration. What did the  Carter Administration do that was so unhealthy economically? <b>Guest:</b> They now continued with enthusiasm the fiscal interventions; there was a program to give grants to the states for infrastructure, so that that would stimulate the economy. First-time home-buyers' policy, temporary thing to stimulate the economy; jobs credit of some kind. It was very interventionist-Keynesian, if you like the word; more so than Ford. At least the Ford advisers were uncomfortable with it. Charlie Schultz came in and replaced Greenspan as Chairman of the CEA, a very fine man, but he had, in my view, thought about this intervention too much.  I was there at the CEA on the staff. Both Greenspan and Schultz supported Carter, and you could see the change coming in. So, they continued with it, and it didn't work; also continued with the monetary policy, which even got worse at this point. Burns was staying on at the Fed. And that continued for four years; now you really had a terrible economy. Confidence was dropping, unemployment rising, inflation rising. Eventually people saw it wasn't working.  Carter's own advisers would write pieces later saying those policies didn't work.  Annette G-- [?] analyzed the grants to the states and shows that they didn't work. So, we got away from those things. And fortunately things got better. <b>Russ:</b> And of course those assessments turned out to be temporary, not permanent, about the effectiveness of state intervention or temporary tax rebates or special credits for home-buying. <b>Guest:</b> We came back to them. In a sense people forgot. Or just the pressures of something else took over. It's disappointing from an economist's perspective that these studies were there and people just forgot about them or ignored them 30 years later. <b>Russ:</b> When you talk about monetary policy getting worse in the mid- to late 1970s, under Burns in the Carter Administration, how would you quantify that? What would be the measure you would use? If I said to you: Show me why that wasn't so good, what would be the--how would you tell that story? <b>Guest:</b> It was a go-stop policy. The Fed would try to reduce unemployment by stimulating money growth. Other ways to measure--you can look at interest rate rules. Interest rate rules were way off in terms of what was a sensible policy. Too low, if you like. And then they'd see inflation was picking up, and so they'd step on the brakes and you'd have a recession. Very frequent recessions, and at each step, inflation would rise. By the end of this period and going into the early 1980s, because it took some while to undo it, unemployment was in double digits, inflation was in double digits, interest rates were in double digits; and economic growth--productivity growth--had by that time begun to slow substantially. So, there's a lot of evidence of bad times and I think a lot of evidence that monetary policy was not rules-based. It was short-run oriented, highly discretionary. And in terms of monetary policy, there's many indicators to show that, including these interest rate rules. Which I talk about in the book. And we get to the end of the 1970s, where we have stagflation--we have simultaneous inflation and stagnation; the economy is either in recession but even when it's growing, inflation stays high. And this was of course deemed to be impossible by some variations of Keynesianism. There was supposed to be a negative relationship between inflation and unemployment. In fact, I still hear people tell me that it's obvious that when the government prints money, it has to create jobs, because people spend it and we know spending creates jobs. And yet both Zimbabwe, and the United States at the end of the 1970s, managed to have both high inflation and high unemployment. And this became a big challenge in the academic literature, to the Keynesian model. <b>Guest:</b> Interestingly, in  1968, Milton Friedman in his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association outlined why it is not going to reduce unemployment in any sustained way to have higher inflation or higher money growth. That's also a really beautiful paper, speech. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, it's a classic. <b>Guest:</b> And by the way, there's only 3 pages of that talk which are on the inflation-unemployment issue.  The major part of that talk is to urge a steady-as-you-go monetary policy. Because Milton had shown how powerful monetary policy can be, in terms of causing good and bad, and he was concerned that as people realized that, we were going move to one of these go-stop discretionary policies. So the main point of that speech was: Don't do that.  Do this more steady as you go. And it's exactly the opposite of what happened. It took a decade, 12 years, to get to the right approach, that he recommended.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">29:05</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, Volker, who is appointed by Carter--and you have to point out also that even though the Carter Administration was very interventionist in many ways, it also did, under Alfred Kahn, sow the seeds of deregulation, which continued under Reagan.  But it started under Carter.  In all these stories there's a mix of good and bad, depending on your philosophy.  But Volker is Chair of the Fed under Carter; stays on under Reagan; and follows what is a very politically challenging monetary policy. What was your Schultz quote--now we are back to George Schultz--an economist's lag is a politician's nightmare. So, that took place in the 1980s. Reagan had to endure--the 1982 midterm elections an extremely unhealthy economy, partly created by Volker's attempt to ring inflation out of the system. Correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  Absolutely. The times then, and when Reagan came in--you are right to point out that some of these decisions were made under President Carter.  He appointed Volker, after all.  But I think here, the fact that Reagan supported Volker during these very tough times is very significant. Very unusual for a President to do that. He basically didn't try to encourage the Fed to work to get unemployment down. He knew that they were going to do the right thing by reducing inflation. And so I think here's a case where the philosophy of the Administration helped monetary policy. Unlike back in Johnson-Nixon, where it hurt the policy. It's really monetary policy in this case following, I think, a much better rules-based policy under Volker, focused on inflation; that was what he needed to do, and it was tough. But he had support from the White House. <b>Russ:</b> Now, I'm pretty sure that the LBJ-Martin confrontations took place in the White House.  That LBJ had Martin in his office, and berated him. That's my memory. Maybe it's wrong. Do you know how much Volker and Reagan talked face-to-face during this time period, say 1980-1983, when there would normally be political pressure on Volker to ease up a little bit? <b>Guest:</b> Very little, in the sense of--certainly no sense of telling him to ease up. It was just the opposite. If not now, when, would be the kind of things Reagan would be talking about. And also, remember, here you have some very important advisers with Reagan, including Friedman, including Schultz, and including Tom Sowell and Arthur Laffer.  All these people who had strong market sense. And what you really do to get the economy moving again. And he also appointed some Chicago Ph.D.s over to the Treasury--Beryl Sprinkel, for example, had that more of a monetarist approach to him, and the CEA had Murray Weidenbaum; and Bill Poole came later. Niskanen. People who were quite strong on what needed to be done. And if you stuck with it. And Reagan had outside advisers through this whole period which encouraged him to stick to this. So it's an example where the principles that were held by Reagan--he came in that way; he would give many radio addresses and speeches with down-home stories describing why these same principles that I've tried to articulate with these five points, basically Reagan talked about those kinds of things in his own way and was firmly committed to them; and surrounded himself by people who had the same basic orientation. And that's what it took. <b>Russ:</b> I have a feeling--this is just pop psychology--but it may have been beneficial that Reagan, like Milton Friedman, had spent a lot of time in the wilderness.  It was a different wilderness, a political wilderness. But had come to the Presidency later in his life and after a long time of trying to uphold what he thought was the right thing; and as you say, writing and speaking on it. And I think it was both harder for him to walk away from those principles and less appealing to give in to the short run. Though, having said that, of course he did many things that were not particularly free market.  He expanded the size of government; he didn't cut spending successfully; he put voluntary quotas on Japanese cars.  So he had his own deviations as well. <b>Guest:</b> When you look at the history, you've got to make some judgment calls about what are the important things; and so here I would say: he did remove the last vestiges of the wage and price controls on energy. He did not have stimulus packages.  He encouraged the Fed to focus on monetary policy which I would call more rules-based. And certainly in terms of emphasizing markets and less regulation, he certainly continued with the things that Carter began with. So, it is a judgment. And the Reagan tax cuts, although sometimes they are advertised as being based on a Keynesian idea, was not Keynesian. It was permanent. It was not temporary-targeted stuff. And that was, I think, large in assessing it. But  you are right--it's not perfect. You have to get your principles in there as best you can. But in this case there's such a contrast with the 1970s that it seems to me--and it went beyond Reagan. I think it went into President Bush 41, and I think in many respects until Clinton. Until recently.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">35:31</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, I'd love to keep talking about the history; I'd like to get to some of the policy recommendations.  Just one closing point: I want to come back to this issue of temporary versus permanent you've alluded to. When you trace the whole history of these last three and a half decades or so, going back to either Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon, starting from there and coming forward, there's a striking number of temporary interventions--tax breaks, tax rebates rather than rate cuts, that are by definition one-time; ad hoc programs such as the home-buying program, cash-for-clunkers in recent years. And the academic support for these programs--as you say, many times there was enthusiasm for these programs, sometimes from economists of various stripes.  But there's really remarkably little academic support for these programs, especially when we take them one by one. So, these principles you are talking about--there's a lot of general agreement but a lot of particular disagreement.  And they are complicated, so there are judgment calls; it's sometimes hard to assess; inevitably there are going to be issues of confirmation bias and cherry-picking; you can't measure these things precisely.  But we are better at measuring individual programs with a little more precision. And it seems to me--and maybe it's just my bias--but there's remarkably little evidence to support any of these programs, from left or right. And yet they keep happening. <b>Guest:</b> You're right. That's the thing--you have these broad trends; you compare the 1970s and the 1980s and 1990s; compare the 1990s and now; that is all consistent with these principles. But then in addition you have, when you look individually--cask-for-clunkers or whatever it happens to be--you see that at least it's controversial. I think they don't work, but there's huge controversy about it, and we're still doing it. Amazing to me--a very famous paper I refer to in my book is by Tom Sargent and Bob Lucas, who later won Nobel Prizes. In 1978 they wrote this paper, "After Keynesian Macroeconomics." It was a devastating critique of those kinds of policies. And it made a difference; and at least we moved away from them. And then here we come back now and we're doing it all again as if we completely forgot. So, there's something else going on here besides the economics research. That's for sure. And maybe what you need to do is just to have a broader understanding of this beyond the equations and the econometrics, just to look at the history. Which is what I'm trying to do here. <b>Russ:</b> You mention a paper I think by Alan Blinder, that was--do you remember that paper? <b>Guest:</b> Sure. First of all, he showed that the wage-price freeze and those controls just didn't do anything lasting; maybe made things worse. So that intervention didn't work. And he also worked on the small effects of these temporary rebates. So there's two things that he looked at. And even after that--it's small but at least it's something, would be the kind of thing you would hear later; he certainly has been supportive of the Keynesian interventions of recent years. <b>Russ:</b> For sure. Before we move on to policy recommendations, I have to raise a question that crosses my mind from time to time. I don't have strong empirical evidence for it, but there's some casual empirical evidence.  And that is the temptation to say: It's all monetary policy.  All of this other discussion about fiscal mistakes or fiscal stimulus or various interventions: If you get the monetary policy right, things go well; if you don't, it's over. I'm a big fan of the argument that moral hazard created by past bailouts created the current mess we are in; but I am open to the possibility--and I probably asked you this question before--that the whole thing is bad monetary policy. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I certainly emphasize that a lot. It's I think a major factor leading to the financial crisis and also the slow recovery now. Obviously it was a big factor of the problems in the 1970s.  It's actually interesting--it is probably the most difficult, arcane part of the whole discussion to explain and talk about. People--regulation, temporary tax cuts, things like that, you can talk about and explain, but monetary policy, you suddenly get into an area where, I think, it becomes more difficult to explain to people.  Politicians tend to get a little less interested in it. But it is probably the most important of all. <b>Russ:</b> I think it's not only more difficult to explain; I think it's more difficult to understand. I think that's part of the reason it's more difficult to explain. It is somewhat mysterious. We are in this strange time now where we have this unprecedented Fed intervention, and yet despite the enormous creation of reserves through the Fed on the balance sheet in the banks--and you talk about this in the book--it hasn't done very much. Partly because they've encouraged it somewhat to sit on the books via paying interest on it. I ask this every time--it continues to mystify me--and I'll ask you again: Why do you think the Fed carried out this unprecedented intervention and yet watched and encouraged, if anything, its lack of impact? <b>Guest:</b> Well, they think it's had impact on the purchasing of the mortgages or the medium-term Treasuries.  They focused more on what they did with the money rather than creation of the money. So they would argue that it would lower mortgage rates, it would lower medium-term Treasury rates other than what they would be otherwise.  That is the rationale for it, I think, for the most part on their side. And they think that the money side of the equation, the balance sheet, that they'll be able to undo that in time, before it causes problems. And many people, including me, have doubts about that. <b>Russ:</b> Today is April 17, 2012, and I just got an email about a news article in the <i>Wall Street Journal</i> and MSNBC's coverage of this issue, that the Fed has finally released its transcripts from the 2008 key meetings, of which--I think it's a 5,208 page transcript--and virtually all policy discussion has been, as they say, redacted.  Which is a fancy word for blacked out and unreadable to the general public. What's left is: How are you today? Okay; I'm doing fine. So that part, they didn't black out. It will be interesting; I assume some day we will get to hear at least what they said were the justifications for some of the policies. <b>Guest:</b> It's going to be very important for people to go through that, and I think investigative reporting can start a little earlier than that.  But it's so important to get that straight. <b>Russ:</b> I would encourage members of the Federal Reserve to talk publically off the record.  But that's not really my area.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">43:34</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's move on. We've talked on this show before about the Taylor Rule and your particular study and recommendations for getting discretion out of monetary policy and having it be more rule-based. What you talk about in the book that I think is novel, besides going over some of the basics of that, which are important, is you try to give an idea of how one might actually implement a more rule-based monetary policy. So, talk about--other than the idea that certainly less discretion is a good idea, how could you hold the Fed's feet to the fire? <b>Guest:</b> What I think is most important is that the Congress ask the Fed to describe its strategy.  And then, if the Fed decides to deviate from it, they must explain why. Those are the two parts. Explaining what it is, and then if they decide to deviate, to explain why. I think that would go an enormous way toward having a more rules-based policy. There is very little information about what really the strategy is that's being used now, for example. The quantitative easings are very hard to describe. But even interest rate policy. So, those are the two steps.  In the past the Fed had to do that with respect to money growth--it had to describe its plans and then describe if it deviated.  That was taken out of the Federal Reserve Act in the year 2000.  So, my proposal is to reinsert that, but in a more modern way, where the Fed itself would have--it would have, as of course it should have--itself, the decision to make about what the policy is, what the strategy is for setting interest rates, what they are actually going to do under certain circumstances. It's their responsibility to do that. You don't want the Congress to micromanage along those lines. But you do want them to work it out and describe what it is. That's my main proposal. I hope something along those lines happens. <b>Russ:</b> Given the political temptations we've talked about, one way to look at this change would be just to introduce just a very modest amount of accountability that was lost in 2000. You talk in the book, and it's quite interesting because you of course have a personal relationship with Alan Greenspan. You know him, you talk to him. You talk in the book about his deviation from past steady-as-you-go monetary policy, and his ventures of the 2001-2003 period, 2003-2005. And one has to wonder, what role that 2000 change in accountability had in giving him the freedom to do that. <b>Guest:</b> It certainly could have been a factor. I think another thing that I would point out, and talk about in the book, is: The record was quite good for the 1980s and 1990s, until this period. And Greenspan succeeded Volker; and I think it was a situation where he had to find out how to run monetary policy in this low-inflation environment. And he made the 1994-1995 interest rate increase, that was very well-timed. And other things.  So, I think what happened in this 2003, 2004, 2005 period is, they actually tried to do better. Perfect, innovate; becomes a good problem. And they deviated from what was working in order, I think, to try to make it work even better. They thought that keeping rates low extra-long would reduce some downside risks; there's various ways to put it.  I think that's what happened. And perhaps it would have been harder if there were these procedures in place where they had to report their strategy. I think it would have been. But the motivations for doing it are complex. And also if you talk to different members [of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors] around at the time, they have different views about what happened.  Ben Bernanke was an influential member of the Board of Governors at the time. He has different views about why they made these decisions. <b>Russ:</b> Have you heard or read anything about why that 2000 change happened? <b>Guest:</b> Oh, it's very simple. They had focused on money growth. And money growth itself had become harder to measure, because of the different ways to define money.  There had been alternatives, with the credit card development and other ways to make payments. And so they just felt that they were spending so much time stating what the growth rates would be and then they'd find out they were off and had to explain why.  So, I think it made sense to at least change them.  They just removed them. I think in retrospect it would have been better to replace them with a better way to describe the strategy. But the reason they took them out was pretty clear. I don't think there was really very much complaining about that at the time. I certainly didn't complain about it. <b>Russ:</b> Well, it seems--on one level it seems reasonable.  On another level it seems kind of shocking. Well, it's really hard for me to tell you, it's really hard for me to set my policy and then to be accountable. So, let's not have to describe what I'm doing. That does make it easier.  It does solve the difficulty problem. It's strange. <b>Guest:</b> It's a good point. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">49:20</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's move on to some specifics, moving forward. You have a famous chart in the book, which I think you reprint from a <i>Wall Street Journal</i> op ed that you wrote, that has an ominous picture of the ratio of the national debt to GDP. Where it's basically relatively flat.  A few bumps, and it takes off like a rocket. Unfortunately, much of which is forecasted debt, because of entitlement promises. Talk about that.  Is the national debt, the level of it, a threat to our prosperity? And why? <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. Especially if it goes along the lines of that chart, which is the GDP ratio going above 100, going above 200, above 300.  So interest rate payments become the whole budget.  So, that is not sustainable.  But that's what current law is.  So, it is a real threat. And it's got to be fixed.  I think in terms of fiscal policy, that should be the main focus at this point.  And what I try to do is say: Well, you can fix this, in some sense, in a very simple way: Just bring spending as a share of GDP back to where it was before the crisis of 2007.  That would be 19.5% of GDP. You do that in a gradual way.  I kind of outline how that could occur.  It's not austerity by any stretch of the imagination. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, come on, John. <b>Guest:</b> Undo this explosion. <b>Russ:</b> John, 19%, there would be people starving in the street. People dying. Mass starvation of poor people. Children in rags. Nineteen and a half percent--you remember? 2007 was like the Middle Ages. <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's what we are led to believe.  But I think common sense, Russ, which you are espousing here sensibly, suggests that can't be true.  2007. That's what I try to explain.  And people--I think people understand that.  They just say: Hey, why is this so hard? Why aren't we getting to this, even faster than what I propose? <b>Russ:</b> So, the big debate we are going to hear about this summer, I suspect--we are already hearing it now--is, yes, we have a budgetary problem, and the common sense view is, well, we have two tools to close the gap.  We have spending cuts and tax increases.  So, a wise, middle-of-the-road approach is to use both. Why not? Why not use both?  You argue for much larger spending cuts rather than tax revenue increases.  Why? <b>Guest:</b> Well, actually, remember, I want to bring spending to, as a whole, to 2007 levels as a share of GDP. And by the way, that's growth, of course, since GDP has been higher. So, I use the word "cut" in a way that the growth rate is slower than it otherwise would be.  But the reason is, we've now been exploding.  Government spending is expected to explode on entitlements--largely the health care. <b>Russ:</b> For purely demographic reasons.  It's not ideological reasons. <b>Guest:</b> I think it's not just demographic, because some of these entitlements are growing in real terms for beneficiary.  Like Social Security is growing in real terms for beneficiary. A 45-year old now is projected to get a lot more under current law under real terms, inflation-adjusted real terms, than a 55-year old. So, it's more than the demographics.  And that's why it shouldn't be that hard to fix.  Health care is not just demographics.  It's projections of rising costs of health care.  So, that's why I think it's mainly on the spending side.  And I argue it's completely on the spending side, because as a matter of just arithmetic, so much of it is that way.  And so if you could just hold the growth rate down so we don't expand as a share of GDP, you can do without increasing taxes.  And of course that's better, for going back to some of my principles, for incentives for the role of government, all these things, to keep tax rates at a level at they were roughly, in 2007 or even 2000. <b>Russ:</b> I don't think we can measure it, but the uncertainty--and we've talked already about uncertainty, the temporary versus the permanent--but certainty about how we are going to resolve this issue is a political reality. Because there is going to be a debate. We don't know how that debate is going to turn out. That certainly has to affect the state of the economy now. <b>Guest:</b> I think it is.  I think it is a real drag.  We do not know how this exploding debt is going to get resolved.  And I believe if it is massive tax increases--I don't think that's likely, quite frankly--I just think we are kind of debating at the edges here at how much the tax increase will be.  I think the right thing is to focus on the spending growth, stopping the explosion. And I think that will also, by the way if that's done well, will make people's lives better. The health care reforms' using markets more, decentralizing decisions to the states on Medicaid for example, will make those programs work better. So that should be a positive, not a negative.  Not austerity. <b>Russ:</b> One man's austerity is another man's growing government. No one is actually--maybe other than Ron Paul--I don't think anyone has proposed anything like austerity. And we certainly haven't practiced it.  And yet certainly austerity is the fault of, is causing the slow recovery.  Just the thought of it is enough to discourage economic activity.  Which could be true, of course.  Future expectations do matter.  But I don't think there is any much of a prospect of it actually happening.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">55:38</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about health care reform.  We don't know what's going to happen to Obamacare.  It may survive its judicial Supreme Court test; and it may survive the next election.  But, it may not.  If it did not, and if there was an opportunity for an alternative, what kind of alternatives do you think could be put in place that would slow the growth of health care spending, keep the size of government down? Personally, I'd like to see Medicaid, Medicare phased out. But you are more of a centrist than I am on that.  So, how would you move toward an improved budgetary picture? <b>Guest:</b> On Medicare, both sides want to keep the growth rate from exploding.  One side, and this would be more the House Republicans at this point, want to do that by providing a certain amount of funds over time and then having people decide what kind of health care insurance they buy, in Medicare. So it decentralizes the decisions; they are not made in Washington, but a total amount of money is clear.  The other side is the decisions about how spendings are made are controlled in Washington, but effectively price controls and decisions on what are appropriate care.  And so I think, in this case, again going back to these principles, again going back to markets and incentives, the first approach is going to work better. On Medicaid, moving the decisions to the states makes a lot of sense.  You get better performing, lower costs, as a result of that. Then on the private sector side, or sort of non-Medicare, non-Medicaid, which is a big part of Obamacare, you certainly could save a lot by allowing insurance to be purchased across state lines.  I thought there is still a lot to do in reform, on the malpractice, legal side of things. I think also providing deductibility for insurance or other medical expenses outside of the employer would help the coverage quite a bit. So, I think there's quite a bit to do to keep costs down and to provide better medical care without putting 16 million more people on Medicaid, which is what the current proposal is doing. A lot of people will think you do better uninsured than on current Medicaid. So there are a lot of problems with it.  But the kind of thing I just outlined is an alternative which could be quite workable.  But this is going to depend on the election, of course.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">58:26</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> In your book, I want to go back to an historical episode you mentioned that we've not talked about, which was, in advance of Reagan becoming President, a number of economists got together and wrote a document encouraging various policies.  It's hard to be optimistic about such an effort today, mainly because the likely Republican front runner, the likely nominee, Mitt Romney, does not have a history of adherence to these principles the way Ronald Reagan did, at least on paper, through his own speeches.  What's your feeling about where we are headed? And my view, by the way, is: I'm not sure how important it is who wins the next election. It will matter, but it seems to me that whoever wins, Democrat or Republican, will face some of these constraints regardless of their professed philosophy. <b>Guest:</b> I think the memo you are referring to was written just after the election in 1980. Reagan's advisers wrote him a relatively short memo, about 20 pages, outlining what they thought would be good for policy--tax policy, budget, regulation, and monetary for big issues. And they did stress a lot of these principles that Reagan had before, which I'm trying to articulate in this book.  It was a very well done piece of work. I don't see why that couldn't happen again.  I don't see why a platform along those lines couldn't happen.  I think it's very promising to me at least from this perspective that there is this House budget out there that has some of these principles in it, and so that could be part of the debate. To the extent that the nominee, Governor Romney, is close to those and articulates those and has already begun to do that--he recently gave a good speech along these lines on so-called economic freedom.  So, I think that the message here--by the way, I think the message I outline in this book is not partisan. These principles, they work. And regardless of party, you should be trying to elect people that adhere to the principles and know how to deliver them.  And it's not partisan in a political sense of the word; and in fact historically, you just go back to what we talked about in this show.  In the late 1960s and 1970s you had Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter--both political parties.  More recently, in this middle period, you had Reagan, Bush 41, and Clinton.  And now, toward the end of the Bush 43 Administration and Obama, you have--don't know exactly when it happened, but it's certainly different.  So, I think if people recognize this is so important to get right and just get the right people in there, that we can make these changes. So, I'm a little more optimistic than I think I hear you are in your question that we'll be able to do it. But obviously we'll have to step away from it to make the assessments.
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>

]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Cowen on Food</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/cowen_on_food.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9796</id>

    <published>2012-04-23T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-04-27T11:05:48Z</updated>

    <summary> Tyler Cowen of George Mason U. and author of An Economist Gets Lunch, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about food, the economics of food, and his new book. In this wide-ranging conversation, Cowen explains why American food was...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Family" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Information and Technology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Tyler Cowen" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 Tyler Cowen of George Mason U. and author of <i>An Economist Gets Lunch</i>, talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about food, the economics of food, and his new book. In this wide-ranging conversation, Cowen explains why American food was once a wasteland, the environmental impacts of plastic and buying local, why to stay away from fancy restaurants in the central city, and why he spent a month shopping only at an Asian supermarket while living in Northern Virginia. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Cowenfood.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Cowen on Food','Russ Roberts and Tyler Cowen',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:01:48</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Cowenfood.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 28.4 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="                      http://tylercowen.com/biocontact/" target="new">Tyler Cowen's Home page</a>
<li><a href="http://marginalrevolution.com/" target="new">Marginal Revolution</a>, Tyler Cowen and co-blogger Alex Tabarrok.

<li><a href="http://tylercowensethnicdiningguide.com/" target="new">Tyler Cowen's Ethnic Dining Guide</a>. Cowen's blog on food.

</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/An-Economist-Gets-Lunch-Everyday/dp/0525952667//" target="new"><i>An Economist Gets Lunch: New Rules for Everyday Foodies</i></a>.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5542" target="new">"Is Food the New Sex,"</a> by Mary Eberstadt. <i>Policy Review</i>. January 27, 2009.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2011/LuskNorwoodlocavore.html" target="new">"The Locavore's Dilemma: Why Pineapples Shouldn't Be Grown in North Dakota,"</a> by Jayson L. Lusk and F. Bailey Norwood. Library of Economics and Liberty. Jan. 3, 2011.
 
</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/david_owen_on_t.html" target="new">David Owen on the Environment, Unintended Consequences, and the Conundrum</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/11/taubes_on_fat_s.html" target="new">Taubes on Fat, Sugar and Scientific Discovery</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2006/09/the_economics_o_5.html" target="new">The Economics of Obesity</a>, with guest Darius Lakdawalla. Econtalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/03/townsend_on_dev.html" target="new">Townsend on Development, Poverty, and Financial Institutions</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/08/barro_on_disast.html" target="new">Barro on Disasters</a>. Growing corn for ethanol. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/12/munger_on_fair.html" target="new">Munger on Fair Trade and Free Trade</a>. Agricultural programs and subsidies. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/08/odonohoe_on_pot.html" target="new">O'Donohoe on Potato Chips and Salty Snacks</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/07/banerjee_on_pov.html" target="new">Banerjee on Poverty and Poor Economics</a>. When you get a windfall, you don't just spend it on chickpeas. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/09/grab_bag_munger.html" target="new">Grab Bag: Munger and Roberts on Recycling, Peak Oil and Steroids</a>. Slow food versus carbon footprints from transportation. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: April 16, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> I kind of felt like saying, when I introduced this podcast, was this past week was on disability insurance; before that was on inequality; we've done a lot on the financial crisis: I felt like saying: "And now for saying something completely different." We're going to talk about today the economics of food and your love of food; and I want to start by asking you to talk about what a foodie is to you and what role food plays in your life. <b>Guest:</b> Well, let's start with economics. Early economics <i>is</i> the economics of food. If you read Adam Smith, if you read David Ricardo, so a lot of the early economics I read was classical economics.  So, for me economics has always been economics of food. But as a foodie, I'd say I started in my early 20s. My food upbringing was quite conservative. Decent quality, but nothing unusual; no real diversity. And I was living in Germany, a completely foreign food environment; and I started trying to make sense of it using economics. <b>Russ:</b> And the rest is history.  So, what would you say? You have a food blog? <b>Guest:</b> That's right. <b>Russ:</b> And you spend a lot of time--it seems to me, which is maybe not possible given how much time you spend on other things, but you seem to spend a reasonable amount of time trying to find good food and eat it.  Is that accurate? <b>Guest:</b> I enjoy traveling around.  I think it's very important if you live in Northern Virginia to be an anthropologist of suburbia, and to focus on food and to learn that one area very well. It's a good way of doing that.  So I feel I'm doing social science.  And the notion of taking small things and studying them in great detail--food for me is a window onto that perspective.  Plus, it tastes good. <b>Russ:</b> And, do you think you are unusual in how much you enjoy food? Or would you say it's an intellectual experience, this combination of social science and gustatory habit? <b>Guest:</b> I'm not sure I would accept a distinction between the intellectual and the emotional side.  But if you think of food, sex, and sleep as three primeval pleasures that virtually all human beings enjoy, I take the simple view that we should regard those things quite seriously. And the book is about one of them.  Why should we not? It's in a sense the higher realms of culture, which are maybe a bit phony in some ways compared to food, sex, and sleep. <b>Russ:</b> Is finishing this book going to change anything for you, food-wise? <b>Guest:</b> I've eaten more vegetarian food as a result of having written the book.  And that's a good thing.  That's the main change. <b>Russ:</b> But is, going forward, is your interest in food going to change now that you've finished a book about this phenomenon? <b>Guest:</b> Uh, less of my research will be about the history of food, by quite a bit. But other than that I don't think my life will change very much. <b>Russ:</b> You're still going to be interested in finding a really good barbecue place in North Carolina. <b>Guest:</b> Whatever it may be. Absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> I don't want to lose this.  Why have you become more vegetarian since writing the book? <b>Guest:</b> I think it's unethical how we treat animals in factory farms.  By eating less meat, you cut back on that, however minimally. It's also good for the environment to eat less meat. <b>Russ:</b> Because? <b>Guest:</b> There's a climate change problem resulting from a lot of animals, which emit methane. The impolite word is fart. If you have a vegetarian diet, to a greater extent you make some minimal inroads on that problem. <b>Russ:</b> By reducing the size of the cow herds of the world. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. <b>Russ:</b> I understand you are not solving the problem, but you are not participating and you are making a small, incremental--marginal, as we might say-change toward the different level of methane emission. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  I don't feel it's ethically wrong to kill and eat animals per se. But I do feel how we treat animals before killing and eating them is wrong. <b>Russ:</b> Sometimes. <b>Guest:</b> Sometimes.  But in this country quite often. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">4:58</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> And on the palate side, how have you found this change? <b>Guest:</b> Vegetarian food makes much more sense when you eat spicy food. So, one good way to become more vegetarian is simply to cultivate your own taste for spicy food. To just eat vegetables straight up, unless they are very good, as you might find in Italy or France--in an American supermarket they're mediocre.  It's not going to stick with you. So, for a greater vegetarian diet to stick, it has to be somewhat incentive compatible. So, think in terms of how you can spice your lentils or season your cauliflower. <b>Russ:</b> Are you a student at all of this paleodiet [?] literature that suggests that we all have to eat meat and that overconsumption of carbohydrates, for example, is not good for us? In fact any consumption of carbohydrates, maybe sugar, is not good for us? Do you give any credence to that literature?  <b>Guest:</b> I read about it.  I agree with some of it.  I'm not convinced by a lot of it. Refined sugar, I think there's a lot of evidence it's bad for us. A lot of the paleo people are fairly ant-vegetable along some margins. I don't see the evidence they are right there.  I think they underestimate how quickly some parts of human evolution can occur; and the notion that we have had agriculture and have lived in cities for quite a while now, I think they under-rate.  So, I think if your diet has a lot of vegetables, even vegetables with carbohydrates, that's probably fine.  I think, say, bread in moderation is fine.  So the notion that you should just eat fruit, nuts, meat, cheese, for the most part--I don't see that there's been a strong case backed by data made there. <b>Russ:</b> Saying that you should or shouldn't eat fruit, nuts, and cheese? <b>Guest:</b> The notion that you should only eat fruit, nuts, meat, cheese and some number of other things--basically low carb diet--I've never seen any well-done statistical study showing that has a serious payoff. <b>Russ:</b> But for many viewing Gary Taubes's--I've become skeptical of this argument, that fat is bad for you.  And you do a couple of times in the book allude to the health effects of that.  Do you have a position on fat? <b>Guest:</b> I haven't seen serious evidence that fat in moderation is bad for you. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I don't think it is. <b>Guest:</b> I agree.  <b>Russ:</b> Interesting question.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">7:16</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, the book opens with a sort of a defense and a state of the American cuisine. We don't have a great reputation--Americans don't--of a great place to eat.  So, talk about that.  Some of that is true.  Some of that, you suggest, is not true. For the part that's true, you have some interesting explanations. So talk about that. <b>Guest:</b> Well, some of our bad reputation is an illusion, precisely because America shifts so many of its culinary products overseas. So, if you are at a McDonald's in Europe, it's not necessarily the case that the raw materials come from the United States, but the idea of McDonald's does.  And it's not very good. So, in essence foreigners are getting a lot of the worst of our food; and they overgeneralize somewhat.  To actually live here and eat here is quite pleasant, I find.  You have a lot of choice. And a lot of it's very tasty. And there is a lot of healthy food available pretty readily. So the overall picture has gotten much better in the last 30-40 years. But American food for a lot of the 20th century was quite grim.  I think a few of the culprits are that the child is given too much authority in the American family. Prohibition and WWII, which combined had very long lag effects actually--America doesn't become among its elites a wine-drinking culture comparable to Western Europe until the 1970s.  And that helps support a notion of quality food. And I think also cutting off most immigration in the 1920s had disastrous effects for American food. So the typical narrative is: We had bad food because of big business and capitalism; and I want to say, to the extent it's true we had bad food, a lot of it was the fault of the law.  Prohibition and also immigration restrictions. <b>Russ:</b> And then a cultural preference for children, which you explain in the book: but the idea that children like bland food in general, don't like exotic food. <b>Guest:</b> They want soft and sweet, and that's [?] for really good food for the most part.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">9:12</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> You travel an immense amount, relative to me anyway.  When you were abroad--you go to Latin America, you go to Asia--are there American restaurants other than McDonald's?  Are there places, is there anything identifiable as American cuisine to foreigners other than fast food? <b>Guest:</b> Depends what you count as an American restaurant.  So, if you go to the Caribbean, say, Central America, you can find Pizza Hut; but it's not like Pizza Hut here.  It's generally quite good. And people might go out for a special meal to Pizza Hut there. Is it American food?  They've made it their own cuisine. And as pizza American to begin with, you can debate these points at length. But I would say Europeans have crystalized this notion of American food which a. doesn't exist as American, and it becomes a sort of whipping boy for American mass society. But I think food here right now is quite creative.  If I fly to Western Europe I don't necessarily think I'm going to eat better there than here right now. <b>Russ:</b> But this question of American cuisine: You make one reference to the fact that it's a little bit like English cuisine.  It's got a bad reputation.  Not particularly well deserved.  But I think when people think of American cuisine they think of either these sort of Americanish foods--not really American.  A hamburger. Hamburgers and frankfurters are I think named after German cities. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> And pizza again, seems to be another import.  We've made them our own in some dimension.  But I think that's what Americans think of when they are living in an exotic or foreign cuisine and they come back to America.  What they miss, or what they long for is hot dogs, hamburgers, pizza--things that, for better or for worse have become American.  In a little bit we'll talk about barbecue which certainly has a distinctive American set of versions. But there isn't a cuisine quite that's American per se other than it's enriched by that immigrant population or event. <b>Guest:</b> I would define it by the diversity, and not by particular foodstuffs. So, American cuisine is the ability to choose Indian or Szechuan or Mexican-American or whatever else. That's American cuisine. <b>Russ:</b> Which again obviously is a result of that immigrant population. <b>Guest:</b> And it's strongest in the suburbs, so Europeans that come to visit America, they think they are going to try to real American food. They are walking around in the center of Boston--which is okay for food--but it's not necessarily the best stuff.  They never see the glories of the ethnic foods in the suburbs; and they go home rather disappointed and they decide they are critics of McDonalds were maybe right all along.  That's a mistake. <b>Russ:</b> And you talk in the book about role of the center-city restaurants, which is where many tourists are going to spend a lot of their time, versus the suburbs.  Why are the suburbs a decent place or great place to eat in America? <b>Guest:</b> The suburbs often have better schools.  Asians are attracted by better schools.  So most of the best Asian restaurants in the United States are in suburbs.  That's one big reason.  But another big reason is you have lower rents; there is more space; there is more room for experimentation.  You have more strip malls.  And you get a richer mix. I wouldn't say it's richer than what's in Los Angeles, but the cities that do best actually do well by being suburb-like, such as parts of Los Angeles, or Queens and Brooklyn in NY. <b>Russ:</b> And as you point out, if you are paying a high rent you've got to generate a lot of volume. <b>Guest:</b> Hard Rock Café. <b>Russ:</b> You can't cater to a niche clientele.  You have to cater to a group that is fairly large. <b>Guest:</b> Or be very expensive, like the wonderful places on the upper East side of Manhattan.  But you can't go to those very often, if at all. <b>Russ:</b> And you would argue the food experience there is merely okay for the money, and not great. <b>Guest:</b> Well, for the money the food often tastes quite good.  But is it worth $300, is it worth getting dressed up, is it worth the hassle of getting a reservation?  Not obvious to me. <b>Russ:</b> Or not to Tyler.  But obviously there are people who are purchasing other than the food at those places. <b>Guest:</b> No one can make it their daily food lives.  So you are still left with the other question of what to do. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">13:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, you detail in the book a rather interesting experiment, shopping for a month in an Asian supermarket.  I'd like you to talk about why you did that and how it affected you. <b>Guest:</b> First, I think as human beings we all have status quo biases.  So, we have our ruts.  We have our food ruts, we have our supermarket ruts.  I thought by shopping at this Chinese market for a full month, I could just get out of my ruts and see everything fresh.  To me it was also an experiment in information processing.  The notion that I could walk into  a store not know how to find anything, and not be very good at figuring out how to find it--this was exciting.  It's a way of discovering the world anew.  And so I did it.  And it was great. <b>Russ:</b> A little bit like being a tourist, but close to home, too. <b>Guest:</b> A little more radical than being a tourist. <b>Russ:</b> So, what was that like? I think the average person--when I started that chapter, I thought: How interesting is this going to be?  But it turned out to be quite interesting. Talk about some of the experiences you had in that supermarket. <b>Guest:</b> I found myself gravitating very quickly to foods I could see and touch. Because I knew how to find them. <b>Russ:</b> A lot of jars you mention that had labels that didn't always have English and if they did, weren't easy to find the English. <b>Guest:</b> Jars; it was like Borges's Library of Babble.  You knew it was there but you weren't going to find it.  The greens were there; you grabbed them; much better selection, greens you wouldn't get elsewhere, anywhere else.  All fresh, all delicious, completely changed how I eat, immediately. <b>Russ:</b> Six types of bok choy. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. I didn't even have to keep track of which was which.  Just grabbed one, buy, it bring it home.  It always worked. <b>Russ:</b> Always interesting and tasty. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. <b>Russ:</b> And talk about the seafood. <b>Guest:</b> There were dozens of kinds of seafood. A lot of it I didn't recognize.  Not all of it smelled fresh to me. But there was just far more choice than in a Giant or Safeway.  And it was cheaper. And again, you would just see what looked good and ask for some, bring it home saute it, put on some garlic, some ginger, some olive oil, whatever--it was almost certain to taste good. <b>Russ:</b> Did that not turn out so well, that seafood? <b>Guest:</b> No, it was fine, actually.  I'm careful in what I buy. <b>Russ:</b> A number of times in the book you refer to the virtues of cultures and cuisines that have different standards, say, of preservation and health, safety, than America's, which is of course quite high for a variety of reasons, some admirable, some maybe not so admirable. And you often talk about eating, especially abroad, as an adventure; and you praise the virtues of it.  Have there been any dark times in those adventures? You don't mention any of them in the book. Have you ever had some experiences abroad where you ended up prone for extended periods of time? <b>Guest:</b> Two times I've gotten very sick.  The last was eating a breakfast buffet in Zurich, Switzerland; and that was right before I was supposed to debate Jeff Sachs. <b>Russ:</b> Not a third-world country. <b>Guest:</b> I believe it was from the raw fish. I don't know. But it went very badly. <b>Russ:</b> The debate or the meal? <b>Guest:</b> The meal. The debate, I won. In the mid-1980s, the first time I was in Mexico, eating restaurant food I got very sick. Since then I've eaten street food and I've done fine. <b>Russ:</b> Any advice for those in exotic places for safety, who want to be adventurous but are a little bit anxious about what they are doing? <b>Guest:</b> Well, cooked food is best; if you can see it, even better.  I think street food is safer on average in most parts of the world. If you know a little bit about municipal water supply you'll be able to figure out a lot of things. I wouldn't eat a lot of street food in India, for instance. But in Mexico, I think it's the safest food. <b>Russ:</b> Going back to the supermarket--so, you stuck with a lot of greens. There were a lot of other things; you didn't just go greens and seafood. You did venture into the jars and other parts of the store, right? <b>Guest:</b> Sure. If you are willing to spend the time, you can find what you want. Delicious sauces and spices. <b>Russ:</b> And how did it end up? You talk about some of the longer term impacts of that one-month experience. How has it changed you? <b>Guest:</b> I think I have a better understanding now. If people are to eat more greens, it has to make sense for them economically and it has to taste good; and lecturing people about it is probably not going to work. And it worked for me immediately. I was a convert within an hour upon arrival. So, I  think there are some broader food lessons we could take from that supermarket, that we also could take from India. If you go to a public function in India, the  food is typically automatically vegetarian. And if you want meat, you can ask; they might be able to bring it. But you simply assume that tasty vegetarian food  will be served. When you are in India, your inclination is to want to eat more vegetables. So, we could be more like that. <b>Russ:</b> Either for health or for policy reasons. <b>Guest:</b> For both, yeah. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">18:45</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Who else shopped in that supermarket? <b>Guest:</b> It's mostly Asian and Chinese shoppers. There's a pretty decent contingent of Latinos who shop there, because it's cheap; and there's a whole aisle with Latino goods.  So I also picked up Latino goods when I was there because a. it was there, and b. that was something I understood much better to begin with. You could always ask in Spanish because the staff in the store spoke Spanish, not Chinese. <b>Russ:</b> And you did a little research on how  reliably different or similar this store was compared to its counterpart in China. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. I interviewed some people from China. <b>Russ:</b> And what did you find? <b>Guest:</b> They thought it was remarkably similar in terms of what it offered, to the extent that they were surprised. But they thought the quality of the fresh items was not quite up to China.  Here there's a longer supply chain. In China, more of the food comes from right nearby. <b>Russ:</b> While we're on the subject of Asian food, we talked earlier about how American tastes, income change; imported food styles when they come to America.  You've presumably--I know you've eaten a lot of  Mexican food both in Mexico and the United States; and you have a very interesting chapter we'll get to later about why they are different and how they are different. But in general, with Asian cuisine, a lot of Americans love Chinese food. They love sushi, Japanese food; they love Thai food.  What do Americans find when they go and eat authentic Japanese and Thai food? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it's a big surprise to them. So, a lot of the food in Thailand tastes quite bad, because of the ingredients. Your median Thai meal might be better here. But that said, the peaks of Thai food in Thailand are greater than here. Most so-called Chinese food in this country isn't Chinese at all--some strange hybrid; it's closer to American food. I think Szechuan cuisine translates the best because it's based on spices which can be dried and shipped to some extent. But Cantonese food doesn't really exist here at all. It relies too much on fresh seafood and good vegetables. <b>Russ:</b> But through most of the middle of the 20th century, Chinese food in the United States was Cantonese in some sense of origin.  Why was it so bad? <b>Guest:</b> In some hybrid sense--a lot of carbohydrates, a lot of goo, no sharp flavors.  I grew up eating some of this.  It just wasn't very inspiring. I guess it was okay. You could do worse. <b>Russ:</b> But a Chinese person eating that food would not have recognized it, presumably. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. And if you would have gone simply to an American seafood restaurant, say in 1970, and ordered a plain piece of fish, you would be getting something closer to Chinese food than going to a so-called Chinese restaurant in New Jersey. <b>Russ:</b> What about the meat-vegetable ratio? <b>Guest:</b> You mean how it's changed over time? <b>Russ:</b> No, about the United States versus China.  Americans like meat. <b>Guest:</b> Far more meat here. Absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> But seafood you say would not be that different. <b>Guest:</b> Depends which part of China, of course. But if  you think of relying more on seafood and vegetables, you'll have gentler flavors, sauces and spices will matter more, subtleties will matter more. Meat is more overwhelming. American places serve meat--beef with broccoli, maybe with some sweet sauce. <b>Russ:</b> Brown. <b>Guest:</b> There you go. Brown. <b>Russ:</b> As you call it; you talk about the ubiquitous brown sauce. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">22:21</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about Mexico for a minute. You've spent a lot of time there, and you highlight how distinctive Mexican cuisine is from American Mexican food, even in American cities that have large populations of Mexican residents. I think you focus on El Paso. A lot of interesting things there.  Talk about some of those differences and why they are there. <b>Guest:</b> I made a number of trips to Mexico with the deliberate purpose of tracking down the Mexican food supply chain and actually visiting it as it works; and then as a cook I tried replicating the dishes. And the thing I found--it surprised me--is how many of the differences spring from the meats and the cheeses.  Mexican meats tend to be richer in flavor, and the beef will be dry aged. And it's very hard to get that at a reasonable price in the United States. The Mexican cheese are gooier and richer. So, if you can replicate for your own cooking, Mexican meats and Mexican cheeses, you can actually come fairly close to a lot of Mexican dishes. But for legal and regulatory reasons, to do it the Mexican way in the United States simply doesn't work. And our Mexican food is very different, and typically it's worse. <b>Russ:</b> Talk about the labor intensity of dry-aged beef. I didn't know anything about how dry-aged beef is actually created. But as you point out it's created differently in Mexico than in the United States. <b>Guest:</b> The way it's done in Mexico, at a small scale, is you simply put it out and wait till it starts turning green. And you have people monitor it and shake off the flies. And it's not just labor intensive; it wouldn't pass Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection standards. Yet I've eaten it many times; I'm perfectly fine with it. I'd love to get it here.  U.S. dry-aged beef is done in a more systematic, better-regulated way, inside of large institutions. And it costs a lot more. It can be several times more than beef which is not dry-aged. So, you can get it here; it's just expensive. And most supermarkets won't carry it. <b>Russ:</b> The demand's not there. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. <b>Russ:</b> So, the meat is different; the cheese is different. Anything else that's important? <b>Guest:</b> Well, fresh fruit. In Mexico typically it's seasonal. So, when something's in season, it's fantastic. Otherwise you don't get it. So, here you have more choice, but it's choice among mediocrities.  There you are more likely to get things which are special. But you can't just walk into a Mexican Walmart and have all the fruits and vegetables you want year round the way you almost can do in the United States. <b>Russ:</b>  Let's talk about that general issue. It intrigues me. I'd say, somewhere in the 1980s and 1990s it became a common belief that American produce--fruit and vegetables--was second rate. And part of the reason was this idea that it had a lot of preservatives; it was available maybe year round even, but not very good. It seems to me--maybe it's an illusion--the choices we have now, I'm assuming that that supply chain has gotten more efficient. But to me, the quality of fruit in the United States compared to 25 years ago seems greatly improved to me. In the following ways. First of all, it's perfect. Which consumers demand. You don't get a bag of apples of which half of them are kind of rotten and bruised and full of problems.  They are all gorgeous. And if you don't like the bag you can pick them out yourself and leave the rotten ones behind.  There's plenty to choose from in your average supermarket. The variety of apples: when I was younger it was Delicious, maybe Macintosh. Maybe something else. Now the profusion of apple selection and the relative flavor in them seems much greater than when I was younger. Citrus seems much better.  A Costco navel orange is a magnificent thing. A red grapefruit there is spectacular. Has it gotten better? Am I imagining it? <b>Guest:</b> It's gotten better. But I think it's one area that still lags behind.  If you go, say, to Chile, which is now quite a developed country, and you get a fresh fig when it's in season, or strawberries, I think they are a full order of magnitude better than what you get here. Even from the farmers' market. So, we have a ways to go. California is much better than most of the rest of this country. The West is better than the East. We're getting there. But I'd say it's where we lag the most, fruits and vegetables. Even at Whole Foods. I'm a big Whole Foods fan, but I don't think that much of their produce. <b>Russ:</b> What would it take to make it better? Do you have any idea why it's not as good? <b>Guest:</b> Distance and freezing and transport and the desire to have it year round are all problems to me. They are not problems to everyone. <b>Russ:</b> People are happy to have it. <b>Guest:</b> But I'd rather have less choice, higher quality, and pay a higher price.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">27:27</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> You have a chapter on barbecue. One of your favorite foods.  You have three rules for good barbecue, which are: a barbecue restaurant should open early, should be in a small town, and go for the ribs, not the brisket.  Why are those good rules? <b>Guest:</b> If it's in a small town, the chance that they are skirting laws and regulations, or maybe the laws aren't there, are much higher. So, you want some kind of classic barbecue pit. This creates a problem with smoke. It potentially creates a problem with fire. In small towns there's more likely somewhere you can put it. Harder to do in midtown Manhattan. And more likely there's a special deal with the fire chief, where he overlooks some irregularities. Places that open early basically run out of meat, and that's great. You eat barbecue in Mexico, the food is gone by 1 p.m. or sooner. They don't reheat a new batch of it. That's it. Start eating at 10 a.m., maybe earlier; they bring it in from the countryside where it's been cooked underground. It's completely fresh; it's ready to go. Then it runs out. The stand closes up. End of story. That's the best barbecue. <b>Russ:</b> So, the issue is the--I think you describe it as the cooking process begins the night before. <b>Guest:</b> And it's not sitting around all day. So, foodstuffs that are served very rapidly at very particular points in time and then go away, they tend to be better. <b>Russ:</b> You mention for example fish tacos in Tijuana versus San Diego. Same thing.  Why? <b>Guest:</b> Fish tacos in Tijuana, most likely something pulled out of the water. Capacity for refrigeration--it's better now, but most small taco stands are used to just getting in fresh supplies and serving them basically, more or less, right away. And it will taste very good. San Diego, you are part of this longer food supply chain where everything is regularized and you get  a shipment, and it's more likely it's been frozen, and it's handled by more people. It still can be good. But it's not going to taste the same. <b>Russ:</b> You ever wonder whether you have any romance about these issues that cloud your palate and assessment? The sort of fresh-out-of-the-water, the fisherman himself is making the taco. Does that ever cross your mind? <b>Guest:</b> I would gladly volunteer to do a blind taste test. <b>Russ:</b> You're not worried about confirmation bias. <b>Guest:</b> Well, it would be a blind taste test. <b>Russ:</b> I mean in general. In a way it doesn't matter, whether you are fooling yourself or not. <b>Guest:</b> That it would be hard to run the test is an important point. To take the Mexican food and try to cross the border with it is not legal. And that to me says a lot. <b>Russ:</b> And it's not legal because? For health reasons? It's regulatory. <b>Guest:</b> Supposedly. There's a trade issue and a protection issue. But that fact to me suggests there is something to the difference. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">30:22</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What's our biggest food problem? <b>Guest:</b> Agricultural productivity in the last 20 years is going up at much slower rates than it used to. In the longer run, this means higher prices for food; and it means more starvation. It means more malnutrition. This still afflicts many hundreds of millions of people in the world, very often young children. Half of the children in India below age 5 have malnutrition. That's awful. <b>Russ:</b> How do we fix that? <b>Guest:</b> There's not a single silver bullet, but having better local institutions. India itself needs more agribusiness.  They need more economies of scale and agriculture. They need better roads so crops don't spoil as they are being brought to market.  They need better fertilizer.  They just need overall better governance, less corruption. Some idea of local attention to detail and monitoring and accountability and quality control, which is  pretty good in a lot of countries and highly variable in India, and to solve problems like malnutrition in India or cholera in Haiti--there's many examples.  It's a kind of slow building of institutions and trust and decentralization and market incentives, brick by brick, that's just hard to do overnight but can be done. <b>Russ:</b> And in America, malnutrition is not our main problem. Our main problem is obesity. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. In terms of health. <b>Russ:</b> If you want to call it a problem. <b>Guest:</b> But it is to some extent.  Some people are voluntarily obese, but I think there are people who want to be thinner and find it hard to get there. <b>Russ:</b> We need to cut our carbohydrates, Tyler. As I did. Works like a charm. Kind of a joke but kind of true. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think any diet in economic terms--it's not a joke. Draw a map with indifference curves. And impose any restriction on what you eat, whether it be due to religion or due to a diet. Any restriction will limit your optimal choice bundles, and you'll consume less food.  So there's a way in which any strict diet can have some positive effects, right? <b>Russ:</b> I'm not sure that's true. <b>Guest:</b> Not literally any. Not any diet that said: Eat all junk food. But a lot of reasonable-sounding diets work just by limiting your choice and then you want to eat less. <b>Russ:</b> As a kosher consumer, I'm not sure eating kosher keeps you thin. Just because I can't have the pork and shellfish that other people can eat. <b>Guest:</b> Those are more restrictions. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. I need to get stricter. So, what might improve? Well, I guess there are two issues here.  I don't believe, I don't like to view obesity as a public policy problem. It's viewed that way I think by people who like to meddle in other people's lives. I understand the argument for it; I don't find it convincing as a policy issue. But there are, as you say, many people who prefer to be thinner than they are.  Or at least that's what they say. <b>Guest:</b> But some of them really mean it. <b>Russ:</b> I think so. So, you have some creative ideas on that other than just restricting eating white foods or not eating white foods or whatever those kinds of restrictions that some people suggest--eat grapefruits. You have some ideas about using the price system to encourage us to do better. <b>Guest:</b> Well, let's start with some simple empirics.  The groups of people in the United States least likely to be obese are people who are quite wealthy, people who are quite well-educated, and Asians. Those are rough generalizations.  Of course there are many exceptions. So, the more people become foodies and the wealthier society becomes, in the longer run we are aimed in a good direction overall.  And obesity rates seem to have leveled out. So I think there's grounds for cautious optimism about the future.  And people becoming foodies probably will make this issue better rather than worse. I don't think there's a single cure overall.  I don't think taxes on junk food has a big enough effect to make people less obese in a significant way.  I think innovation from consumers, people deciding they want to be less obese and doing things like shopping at Great Wall--we will make some gains. <b>Russ:</b> That's your Chinese supermarket. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. I don't think there is a silver bullet solution. And again, I think a lot of people will actually end up willing to remain somewhat heavier, to be able to eat what they want. <b>Russ:</b> Do you think being a foodie makes you thinner? <b>Guest:</b> There's a causal question, and there's a question of what we see in the data in terms of the correlation.  But if you look at people--say, drive out to West Virginia, a rural area--you'll see much more obesity than you'll see around here, and you'll see fewer foodies. I understand causality is tricky. But I think as we move more in the direction of high education, wealthier, more interest in food in a serious way, this will be correlated with other good food and weight outcomes. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">35:28</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's turn to some of the environmental issues you talk about in the book, which are very interesting. I'm reminded of an article by Mary Eberstadt in the <i>Hoover Review</i> where she talked about how we used to have a lot of taboos and strong feelings of stigma and other attitudes toward sex, but at some point food became the way we express our taboos and our preferences. And we are much less tolerant of people's food choices than we used to be. Which is fascinating to me.  And food of course is a way--and your book is an example of it--that we often express our identity: through what we don't eat.  We mentioned kosher; we could talk about vegetarians. That's just scratching the surface. Within those two there's all kinds of gradations and choices people make to identify in certain ways. Vegan being an obvious way on the vegetarian side. And it's a moral issue, not just a health issue; not just a "that's what I like," or what I choose.  And the environment being an area where people's food choices are increasingly, I think, part of their identity and their worries about the impact of what they are choosing for other people in the world. You start your discussion of this in a really provocative way, by asking the question: Who is the greenest man alive? And you give us three choices.  So what are your three--there are obviously more than three--but three interesting choices for the greenest man alive?  <b>Guest:</b> Well, one is this fellow named Edward Begley who tries to burn as little fossil fuel energy as he can in his life.  And he buys his carbon offsets for everything.  There are then some references to the Wal-Mart Corporation, and people who have worked for that.  And they have done a lot to make their supply chain more efficient.  <b>Russ:</b> Shockingly more efficient. <b>Guest:</b> A big difference.  That saved a lot of fossil fuel energy. And of course, that's been driven by their self-interest. And I cite the example of a man who is trying to make a new kind of cement which is more carbon-friendly. And then finally an African pygmy, who lives largely in the rain forest and hunts elephants and lives some kind of hunter-gatherer lifestyle, at least part of the year. And may have a shorter life expectancy, and is much shorter and have a lower rate.  Those are all candidates for the greenest man on Planet Earth. <b>Russ:</b> And the winner is? <b>Guest:</b> Probably the African pygmy. Actually. Ed Begley consumes a lot more fossil fuel and energy than he thinks, just by being here and living in a house. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. <b>Guest:</b> So, I don't think the ideal of being completely green really makes any sense. Resources are here to be used in some way.  They should be used responsibly, and efficiently. And we don't always do that. And I think in terms of property rights and internalizing externalities is the way to go.  Not some kind of absolute minimization of impact on Planet Earth. <b>Russ:</b> I remember an essay that Edward Wilson wrote on--a line I'll never forget. He said: Darwin's dice rolled badly for the earth. What he meant by that was that we became the dominant creature of the earth. It could have been the cockroach.  The cockroach thrives, but not the way we do.  There don't have to be 7 billion human beings. He was saying that evolution could have taken a different turn. Then the earth would be spared parking lots, fossil fuel.  Fossil fuel would just stay safely pooled in the ground, not turned into gasoline, kerosene, natural gas, all the things that we do to change the climate of the earth. And his argument was the earth would be better off.  And I always thought: How does the earth feel about that?  I don't know--the earth, to me, is not a sentient creature. I never understood that argument.  So, I'm in the human side of asking the question: What can we do? Like killing ourselves, mass suicide, would have some impact presumably on the environment. But if you are not going to go that way, it's hard.  You stuck either becoming a Pygmy, or sitting around in our loincloths.  Not over fires--we'd have to do what? Strange focus, perspective. <b>Guest:</b> Modern agriculture can support so many billions of people.  It's the single biggest breakthrough in human history.  Most lives are good lives. Even in  a lot of the poorer countries. <b>Russ:</b> If you think people are important. <b>Guest:</b> Sure. <b>Russ:</b> You do have to take that step.  Which, I do. I think you do, too. But, as you say, we have to be responsible. We don't particularly want to degrade the planet or destroy the planet or whatever that might mean. Make it hard for future people to enjoy the planet, or even our children or grandchildren to enjoy the planet. So, you take on some of the ways that some people presume are good for the planet, and sometimes that's true. You have some good things to say about plastic, for example. <b>Guest:</b> Plastic is often more environmentally friendly than having a paper bag, for instance. <b>Russ:</b> Because? <b>Guest:</b> Because it takes less energy to make it and to dispose of it. Studies seem to show pretty clearly plastic is better for the world.  Plastic can even be better than having those reusable cloth bags.  If you re-use those cloth bags, say, 200 times and up, and don't lose the bag, don't have to buy a new one if the bag gets torn, don't misplace the bag--then the reusable cloth bag does seem to be better. But that's hard to do; and even then you are just at the break-even point. So, the environmental virtues of plastic relative to a lot of alternatives are somewhat under-rated. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. My county, Montgomery County, has recently put a nickel charge on plastic bags. If you want a plastic bag, you have to pay a nickel. And it's been fascinating to watch what people have done in response to that.  My view is I like to pay the nickel.  I kind of enjoy paying the nickel, even though I don't like where the nickel goes--which is to fund my county's activities. I kind of like the idea that I am not going to change my bag habit for a nickel.  There is some pride left in me. My wife's very different. My wife has cluttered the back of her car with cloth bags and various other mechanisms.  I think she usually remembers to bring them in. But, I talk to the cashiers; some people forget to bring them in. Other people, their protest, is to clutch all of the groceries to their bosom and carry them out to the car and sacrifice their time, loading them one by one into the back of their car; and then when they get home--something akin to Costco, by the way.  They don't make it easy for you to get the goods en masse into your car.  You've got to box them up in difficult ways.  But I find that--it's a fascinating thing. You are suggesting that you'd have to use the cloth bag a great number of times. <b>Guest:</b> That's right.  The more effective way to help Planet Earth is just to take fewer trips to the supermarket. Buy more when you are there.  Save up; your car will burn less gas; you are more likely to have some beneficial impact that way than trying to clutch it all to your chest and then eventually making more trips to the store. <b>Russ:</b> And you also tout the virtues of stopping on the way to someplace you are going. That's obviously another way. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. We are programmed to reject plastic, to think it's corporate. The adjective "plastic" is negative: He's a plastic personality. So, you feel good rejecting plastic.  It's a way in which we pursue what I call mood affiliation rather than actually trying to be effective.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">43:39</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What about eating local--the locavore movement, the idea that we should eat locally grown foods, fruits, vegetables--is gaining in popularity quite a bit. What's your take on that? <b>Guest:</b> Local food often tastes better, as I mentioned before.  But transporting food is 10-15% of the energy cost of food. So to think that by making a stand on eating local, you are addressing the main problem--you are not.  A lot of the environmental impacts, the negative ones from food, come from eating meat. A lot of local farmers aren't very efficient.  They make a lot of trips in their truck.  They don't have economies of scale. Imagine you live in Albuquerque. Try eating local food there and think through your local water policy, and that's an environmental disaster.  So, eating local food can be environmentally better, but lots of times it's environmentally worse.  And it's in any case not the biggest issue. <b>Russ:</b> And you talk quite eloquently about the challenge of trying to parse out, for every product, its transportation costs.  It reminds me a little bit of Hayek, in his understanding of the role of prices and steering things. Except for externalities--which are not trivial in these examples--the beauty of the price system is that the price captures the costs plus a little bit more, where the little bit more is the profit margin.  So, in general, prices tell you which things are produced most efficiently. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. <b>Russ:</b> But there are these externality issues.  So, your suggestion is that rather than becoming expert at how your shirt is produced or how your apple is grown, you are better off buying the cheapest one. And then, policy-wise, we should solve that externality problem through carbon taxation. Seems to me, one of the major externalities today is from climate change. And both fossil fuels and eating of meat--basically cows' farting--are areas we could to some extent remedy with a carbon tax. A methane tax, as the case may be. <b>Russ:</b> How would we do that? <b>Guest:</b> A carbon tax would be applied to fossil fuels.  They would become more expensive, there would be an incentive to substitute.  I think there's a very good chance carbon tax would not solve the problem of climate change. But I view it this way: The way the American budget is running, we <i>will</i> need more revenue from some sources. So, we have the choice of taxing people's entrepreneurship or taxing something at the margin which has some negative externalities. So, I prefer to put the taxes on those things that have the negative externalities. <b>Russ:</b> My worry, among many--I mean, you have some very subtle and interesting arguments for how the tax might be shaped. In general, the political system is not so good at subtlety. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, I agree. <b>Russ:</b> And it's just going to add on this carbon tax to everything else; it's not going to substitute for anything. <b>Guest:</b> But just to have a string of zeroes as the estimate of the externality, that's politics too.  That's not exactly where we are now, but that seems wrong to me. <b>Russ:</b> Well, we do have a carbon tax, though. <b>Guest:</b> Partly, yes.  There's a tax on gasoline. Various regulations.  So there's a carbon tax. <b>Russ:</b> You talk about 6 ways to be more effective.  It's on p. 183 of the book. Could you talk about each of them briefly? Personal things people can do if they want to have an impact instead of eschewing plastic and buying local--maybe they could do some other things? Talk about those. <b>Guest:</b> Well, one of them is to just make virtuous behavior more fun. So, if you want to eat better, eat greener, whatever it is you are trying to do: lecturing yourself is of  limited value.  It has to fit into your self-interest. Simple economics point. If there is something you like and it's environmentally dangerous, I say: Try eating the very best of that.  It may spoil your taste for the inferior product. <b>Russ:</b> Because it's expensive; it will slow you down. <b>Guest:</b> So, say you feel guilty about foie gras, a reasonable point of view, I would think.  Just have the very best foie gras once. <b>Russ:</b> Which is how much roughly? <b>Guest:</b> A lot. Go to Paris, have it; you won't crave American foie gras as much. Just give up refined sugar; it will also help the environment. It's in a lot of different processed foods; but you can eat an awful lot and avoid refined sugar. It's good for you. Limit food waste: the notion that you buy things and they decompose, that also has a problem with regard to climate change. So, just be more careful there.  Don't buy things you are not going to eat. Minimize the number of car trips. There's one thing they asked me to cut out of the book, but in many ways it's the most important one: and that is, spend a lot of money educating your daughter. <b>Russ:</b> Why? <b>Guest:</b> Women who are educated are likely to have fewer children. Now you might think this is good or you might think this is bad. I'm not convinced it's good.  As I said before, I'm happy for there to be more people.  I'm just saying that if you have a single-minded obsession with making the world greener, what you can do that actually works is to either have fewer children or treat your children in such a way where they will have fewer children. <b>Russ:</b> Interesting. <b>Guest:</b> So, as a man who has no biological children, I actually think of myself as much, much greener than a lot of environmental advocates.  This doesn't have to be a good thing, all margins considered. But again, if you are just looking at: How green are you?, I don't actually feel that guilty. For that reason. <b>Russ:</b> It opens up a lot more plane trips. Because you don't have biological offspring--they are going to be taking plane trips? <b>Guest:</b> And if you apply a zero discount rate to environmental evaluations, or a very low discount rate, if you are having no children or fewer children, then there are no children of yours to have children, and so on. And the net impact over time of having time of having children is quite substantial. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. I don't believe you should apply a zero discount rate, but that's another topic. <b>Guest:</b> But within the framework of what's being discussed, if you are worried about the very distant future as being something very real. Again, I'm not saying one should do that. But if you want to start with effectiveness, go there. <b>Russ:</b> Interesting. Big shift of gears. That was fun, and I'd be interested.  Did you try to put up a fight for that one? <b>Guest:</b> No. I think my editor was right.  But it would have been viewed as a distraction.  And people would have read it in a variety of different ways that I didn't intend, like thinking that I'm blaming them for having kids or that they are wrong to want kids; and that's not at all my view.  I have long been pro-population, agreeing with Julius Simon, and so on. But if you are just going to obsess over green cost, start there.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">50:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, to shift gears, you give some advice on cookbooks; and you have some interesting things to say about cookbooks generally. I'm a big fan of cookbooks.  I have a lot. And you point out many people who buy cookbooks don't use them. So, I have a handful that I use; and I have four or five handfuls I never look at more than one or two times.  What's your advice on cookbook purchases and consumption? <b>Guest:</b> Like most things in life, it's common we buy books for their symbolic values, including cookbook books, as a kind of memorial for having visited a restaurant or thought about a particular cuisine or gone on a trip.  If you want it for that reason, fine, but don't fool yourself into thinking it's about the food.  For most people you should have, say, a half dozen cookbooks that you know quite well, and they present cooking in a conceptual manner; and you use the book to learn how to think about food. A cookbook should be more like an economics book, actually, explaining how things work and how to put things together.  And then you'll be able to create your own recipes with much greater facility. <b>Russ:</b> And some of your favorites are? <b>Guest:</b> Oh, Diana Kennedy's books are very good; Rick Bayless's books are very good; Fuchsia Dunlop--her books on Szechuan cooking are fantastic. Again, those are relative to my taste, but I can vouch, relatively speaking, they are conceptual cookbooks that try to teach you how to think about the food. <b>Russ:</b> I like what you had to say about cookbooks from famous restaurants and authors.  I know you just mentioned earlier that you might be fooling yourself.  But there's a particular aspect of it that you were critical of. <b>Guest:</b> You can't duplicate the recipes.  And you can't get on a learning curve. <b>Russ:</b> And that's the goal, I think. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. There's 37 things to do.  The first time you try you won't get it right. Which is okay, but then there's no trial and error.  Like, which one  of the 37 did I get wrong?  When there's a simpler, more conceptual recipe, you may screw it up, but then you know how to improve.  And getting on that dynamic learning curve is a very economics idea. <b>Russ:</b> I can't remember which cookbook I have which had this characteristic.  But there were always somewhat complicated things to do, and things would inevitably go wrong the first time.  Certainly. Maybe every time. For a long time. And I remember the first step of a recipe was: Build a brazier. And I thought: Trouble. I don't know what a brazier is exactly--I think maybe it's a hole in the ground with fire. But it's not going to turn out well, this recipe. Close the book, turn the page, find something simpler. <b>Guest:</b> And it has to do with our theory of how market competition works.  In a Hayekian way, it's about local competition over particular margins, trial and error, and learning.  That's how competition works. Not that two totally different firms doing 4000 things somehow slug it out in this big arena and then at the end of it all someone is left standing.  There are small, gradual improvements based on learning, seeing what works and what doesn't.  <b>Russ:</b> You're saying--I don't understand the role of how competition entered into this cookbook discussion. <b>Guest:</b> If you think about how market competition works, it's that you have people competing doing relatively similar things, but with some variation on the margin; and there's something a bit akin to controlled experimentation and the ability to evaluate and compare rather than en masse evaluating one  big thing with all its processes against another big thing. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, okay, so you are saying that the best strategy for improving your home cooking is to-- <b>Guest:</b> Take a lesson from Hayek on how markets work, local competition, trial and error. <b>Russ:</b> And get a little bit better, and hope you are moving in a good direction. Do you watch cooking shows? <b>Guest:</b> Usually I don't have time, so no. When I do turn them on, which I do periodically out of a sense of duty, I end up frustrated almost immediately. <b>Russ:</b> Because? <b>Guest:</b> They are not informationally dense enough for me. There's endless shots of things being put into pans and chopped up. And they feel to me like a kind of drug administered to people to keep them in like a stupor. I don't know. <b>Russ:</b> Why do you say that? The stupor part?  The drug part? You think the educational component is so small? <b>Guest:</b> There's variation in quality. But I think people turn on the TV for a few reasons.  They turn it on to relax. And they turn it on to have something to talk about with the person they are with. Which is fine.  But again, that means in some ways, TV is not a great medium for food. Some of the cooking shows with competitions, I find those much more useful than the cooking shows. So, something like "Top Chef," where people dissect the food, I find that somewhat useful. <b>Russ:</b> To me, as someone who used to do a lot of fly fishing--and I watched some cooking shows; I don't have cable, which greatly limits my TV-- <b>Guest:</b> TV diet.  You watch less TV. <b>Russ:</b> That's why I do it, and I want my kids to watch less TV.  But I do have regular TV; and with our current regular TV package, which has like 8 channels, one of the channels is a PBS food channel. So, I get Jacques Pepin and Julia Child, reruns of this glorious, entertaining show where they banter back and forth in their peculiar personalities. That I enjoy just for itself.  But I do watch occasionally, and to me it reminds me of--and cookbooks as well remind me of--fly fishing. So, fly fishing is something that you do sometimes.  It's an expensive habit, it has a lot of technique, it has a lot of equipment.  Like cooking. And when I'm not doing the actual act of fly fishing, the two closest things are to watch someone else fly fishing on TV--in a place I'll never go, which is again akin to the cooking show; I'm not going to use, make some of these dishes--or to read about it. So, cookbooks--of course cookbooks are more than just collections of recipes. As you point out in the book, there are tales and stories and childhood memories. I think people who like food--I think you are maybe an exception--people like consuming those either with their food, alongside their food, or when they are not cooking. Or when they are not eating.  So, if you are not fly fishing, you read about fly fishing, you leaf through the catalogs of the waders you might get next year, the fly you might acquire. Similarly, I think for foodies there's this obsession with equipment.  I don't know if you ever watch "America's Test Kitchen," but they have a whole segment every show where they go through what's the best mandolin or the best grill-top this or that. The best cheap knife. That doesn't appeal to you? <b>Guest:</b> Not that much.  I think I really am an exception, and I deliberately wrote this book to, in a kind of bracing way, give people an alternative perspective on how to process information about the world of food. Through a more analytic lens. <b>Russ:</b> And you eat out a lot. How much time do you spend cooking at home? You cooking. Because I know you cook a lot. <b>Guest:</b> My wife doesn't cook much. If I'm not traveling the chance that I'm cooking at home is 60%. Since I'm traveling a lot, then it's hard to cook. So, I enjoy cooking; I like to read cookbooks if they are good; and I like to go shopping for food ingredients. Time is the constraint.  <b>Russ:</b> The shopping for the food ingredients is a little like tying the flies. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. It's my version of that. <b>Russ:</b> There's an emotional, intellectual mix of anticipation. <b>Guest:</b> And I feel like I'm getting something done, but maybe I'm just postponing getting things done. It's my way of achieving some balance. <b>Russ:</b> It's a very high quality form of procrastination. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. <b>Russ:</b> You can delude yourself into thinking you are making progress sometimes, doing those activities.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">58:39</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> You mention Mexican cuisine.  Is that the dominant cuisine of your home cooking? <b>Guest:</b> Indian, Mexican, Chinese--almost all ethnic. And just simple dishes, like fish with lemon and sea salt; lentils. <b>Russ:</b> I think you said you have four woks.  Is that correct? That puts you above the median. <b>Guest:</b> One of them went bad, so I guess now it's down to three. <b>Russ:</b> What happened to it? <b>Guest:</b> Just too much use. It's still there, but I'm not sure I would use it.  It feels past its best days. <b>Russ:</b> Probably needs an overhaul. Probably salvageable. Why do you have four woks? <b>Guest:</b> Sometimes you need woks to store things.  They are great for storage. Sometimes you need two of them on the stove at once.  If one is being used for storage and two of them are on the stove at once, and then you need a backup just in case one of those goes bad, you need four.  They don't cost that much. <b>Russ:</b> Do you have a big stove? Sometimes it's hard to put two woks on at the same time. <b>Guest:</b> Not enough. We can manage, but it's not that easy. <b>Russ:</b> Have you been tempted to redo your kitchen and go super-industrial? Do you have a fetish for equipment? <b>Guest:</b> I've been tempted, but ultimately I believe it's a distraction. <b>Russ:</b> It is definitely a distraction. It's a form of consumption. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. I have no fetish for equipment at all. Totally practical perspective on equipment. The joy I get from a really good, sharp knife--it's there, but I view it as an expense, not a toy for purchase. <b>Russ:</b> Anything closing you want to say about what you might suggest people might do more to get into the kitchen or out of the kitchen, into better food? Any closing inspiration? <b>Guest:</b> In general, I would say this: again, going back to the linkage between food and economics, the notion that economists should, at the micro level, become extreme anthropologists about <i>something</i>--it doesn't have to be food--I'm a big advocate of. If you make it food, one nice thing about that is it ties in with the rest of your life. You have to eat. There's some kind of economy of scope there.  It helps you bridge cultures.  There's a production angle, there's a consumption angle, there's a mass media angle, there's a literary angle; of course, there's an economics angle. And you get all of those things at once. So, I would recommend it to more people. <b>Russ:</b> And then after that, maybe a book on sleep.  Or something else.
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>

]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Autor on Disability</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/autor_on_disabi.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9769</id>

    <published>2012-04-16T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-05-11T08:36:21Z</updated>

    <summary> David Autor of MIT talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. SSDI has grown dramatically in recent years and now costs about $200 billion a year. Autor explains how the program works,...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="David Autor" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Government Budgets and Taxation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Health" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Income Inequality" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Labor" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/index.htm" target="new">David Autor</a> of MIT talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. SSDI has grown dramatically in recent years and now costs about $200 billion a year. Autor explains how the program works, why the growth has been so dramatic, and the consequences for the stability of the program in the future. This is an illuminated look at the interaction between politics and economics and reveals an activity of government that is relatively ignored today but will not be able to be ignored in the future. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Autordisability.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Autor on Disability','Russ Roberts and David Autor',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:01:45</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Autordisability.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 28.4 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/index.htm" target="new">David Autor's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://economics.mit.edu/files/7388" target="new">"The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options,"</a> by David Autor. Working Paper, MIT, November 2011.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SocialSecurity.html" target="new">Social Security</a>, by Thomas R. Saving. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RiskandSafety.html" target="new">Risk and Safety</a>, by Aaron Wildavsky and Adam Wildavsky. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/JobSafety.html" target="new">Job Safety</a>, by W. Kip Viscusi. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>

<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/ListeningGuides/y2012/Autordisability.html" target="new">Listening Guide</a> for this podcast. On Econlib.
</ul>

<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>


<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/01/bruce_yandle_on.html" target="new">Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/07/hennessey_on_th.html" target="new">Hennessey on the Debt Ceiling and the Budget Process</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: April 2, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Lift a veil covering a phenomenon that is extremely important and very little known: what is going on with the government-run disability insurance program here in the United States. It's part of the Social Security program.  Today's discussion will draw on a recent working paper of David's. Let's start with some basics.  What's the idea behind the insurance program; when did it start; how is it funded? <b>Guest:</b> The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program was started in 1956.  Its intention is to insure workers against loss of income and access to health care in the event of a work-limiting disability that ends their careers prior to their reaching full retirement age.  It's paid for by a part of the payroll tax; essentially 1.6% of earnings up to a certain amount annually is devoted to the SSDI program. So, after you work approximately 5 years at a fairly high level of participation--so pretty much full time--you will be insured under this program. And then, if you are insured, should you become disabled you can apply for and qualify for SSDI benefits. <b>Russ:</b> And if you are approved, if your application is accepted, what is the benefit level? <b>Guest:</b> A typical recipient will at this point receive benefits of about $1100 a month in cash benefits and that is indexed to inflation, so it rises over time in nominal terms to keep pace with the growth of prices.  In addition, two years after the onset of a disability you would get access to the government's Medicare program, which is the same health insurance program that retired Americans get and that's quite a generous program. So, at this point probably the value of the medical benefit for many individuals is as high as the value of the cash benefit. And I should say, this is not a huge amount of money, and it's not a great lifestyle by any stretch of the imagination. However, the $1100/month figure probably understates the value of that benefit because you need to remember that that's guaranteed income for the rest of your life, or until you reach retirement age and continue to receive the same benefit. It's guaranteed income indexed to inflation with the government behind it, so the closest financial product presumably would be an annuity, which would be a guaranteed stipend until such time that you no longer have financial needs. <b>Russ:</b> You said the benefit is on average $1100 a month. Is it tied to your earnings history, in the same way as Social Security is? <b>Guest:</b> It is. It's calculated exactly the same way your Social Security retirement benefit would be calculated, except using a shorter earnings history. So, the first small amount of income is replaced as 90%, then at 32%, then at 15%. So the benefits can get reasonably high; for someone with very high earnings you might have a Social Security Disability benefit as high as $2500-$3000 a month.  I don't think it can go higher than that at present. <b>Russ:</b> So as much as $30,000 a year at the high end. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. For someone who is getting that, that would be a small percentage of their prior earnings. So the replacement is actually higher for lower income earners. <b>Russ:</b> There is a redistributive kick in the system. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. It's meant to be progressive. On the other hand the taxation is regressive.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">4:46</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about the taxation of your disability insurance benefit.  So, if you are disabled--and we are going to talk in a minute about what that literally means, but let's leave it vague for now. If you are disabled and you are not working, and you are getting this benefit, what if you work a little bit? Does the benefit go down, stay the same? Or are you not allowed to work at all because you are disabled? <b>Guest:</b> So, there is what is called a Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold, which a couple of years ago was $1000/month. Now rises at approximately at the rate of inflation. And essentially what it means is that if you earn more than SGA, you are in theory not disabled from the perspective of the Social Security Administration. They typically will reduce your benefits.  You may lose your benefits for a month if you work above SGA.  If you do it frequently,  your benefits will be reviewed and you may lose access to the program.  You can be viewed as having recovered. <b>Russ:</b> And how do they--of course, if you could make some money on the side, you wouldn't want to advertise it. <b>Guest:</b> Sure. So, you have to basically be making money under the table. The thing is not by intention but the program creates a very strong incentive against meaningfully participating in the formal labor market.  Because once you receive the benefit, as I said, it's an annuity; so the kind of present value of someone of a disability award for someone in their mid-to-late-40s is something like $275,000. So, it's the equivalent of someone giving you $275,000 in cash all at once and allowing you to invest it, allowing you to live on the returns to that investment. You don't want to, let's say you have a work limitation, you receive SS Disability, and then you say, now that I look at it I could work maybe half time at a low wage job, and I would probably make $1500 a month and I am pretty confident I could go on with that for a while. Well, that's a pretty risky proposition relative to continuing to receive guaranteed cash income in medical care, in indexed income inflation. So you might be extremely reluctant to forgo that for the workforce, to face marginal living relative to the marginal secure living you would have on the SSDI program. <b>Russ:</b> But the bottom line is that if I am receiving those disability insurance payments and I take a job that's part of the payroll system--that is, if I am going to be paying payroll taxes with the same social security number--then the Social Security Administration (SSA) would recognize that, and that would put my benefits in jeopardy. <b>Guest:</b> Correct. <b>Russ:</b> So if I want to supplement my payments, and I'm physically capable of doing it in some way, I'm going to have a strong incentive to do it under the table, cash business. <b>Guest:</b> Sure, absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> But we don't have any idea how big that is. <b>Guest:</b> We don't know how much of that goes on. It's very difficult to measure.  Understandably. <b>Russ:</b> By definition. But the reason we might think that could happen is the definition of disability is not necessarily what we think of. I think some of us have in mind disabled means bedridden or unable to work. But of course that's not literally how it works in practice. How does it work in practice? <b>Guest:</b> Good question. So, the definition of disability used by the SSA adopted by Congress in 1956 is one based on employment more than health. The substance of the definition is that you are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity in the U.S. economy for a reason of health or disability. But what it really means is that you are not able to work; and you have to demonstrate to the SSA that you are unable to work; and the reason you are unable to work has to have something to do with your health. It could be your physical health or your mental health. So, it's a very elastic definition. For example, when the unemployment rate is high, there are very few jobs; you may be unable to work because the type of health limitation you have means that the type of job you would be able to do is not available at present. And that would qualify as a disability. Disability is not a medical term; there is no medical diagnosis called disability. There are medical diagnoses for a variety of illnesses, but disability is just a broad category that is a societal definition: What do we want to deem as unable to work? Because that definition is very elastic--and Congress has made it much more so over time--it makes it possible for many people who have been out of the labor force for a while and are motivated to receive benefits to potentially qualify for the program. One thing that's very telling about that is 25-30 years ago the predominant source of new claims for people going onto the SSDI program were cancers and heart disease; and those comprised more than half of all of the claims. That was the early 1990s. At present more than half of all awards are for mental disorders and musculoskeletal disorders. Mental disorders are things like nervous disorders, schizophrenia, and musculoskeletal disorders are basically back disorders. <b>Russ:</b> Carpal tunnel. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. And those disorders are very difficult to verify. So, soft-tissue pain is difficult to prove or disprove; not observable. Obviously if you have a damaged disc in your back, that's observable. Soft tissue pain is not.  Mental disorders--we don't really have a way to objectively verify most mental disorders. So it means that a motivated claimant can attempt to establish that they in fact do have those disorders and they stand in the way of their working; and the SSA doesn't really have the right to say: We don't believe you. Unless they can produce some direct evidence that you are engaging in fraud or deceit. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">11:29</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let me take an example. I'm a stevedore--a word I don't get to use very often--meaning a person who works through physical labor, say on a loading dock in a port.  And I hurt my back. I really do hurt my back; there's no fake or fraud here; and I can't be a stevedore any more. I just physically can't do it. But of course there are lots of other jobs I can do, maybe not as pleasantly, not as well, won't pay as much. But in that case, can I get Disability? Just because I can't be a stevedore? <b>Guest:</b> It depends on whether there's another job the SSA thinks that you can do. And partly that depends on how trainable they think you are. So, typically, the criteria actually change as a function of your age and education. Say that happened to you when you were 45 and you were a stevedore but you had some college education, they'd say: There's a lot of sedentary work you could do that would use your numeracy and literary skills. So, we might be unlikely to deem you disabled.  Let's say instead you were 55 and you had no more than a high school education.  Then they'd say: Well, you are getting on in years and you are not highly educated so you are difficult to retrain; so we would essentially say if you can't do your old job, you can't do any job, and you would receive Disability. It's sort of like you have a car insurance policy and you have an accident in an old car and you bring it into the body shop and the body shop says: Well, that could be fixed but it's going to cost $7000; insurance company says, yes, it can be fixed but it's not worth the money so we'll just call it totaled. That's sort of what the SSA does with people who are over 55 and have low education. <b>Russ:</b> So, the other aspect of this is if technology changes on the dock and stevedores are no longer employable and everybody's fine physically, that there is a temptation of course to feel that your back hurts.  Because, as you said, in the other case with unemployment and during a recession, here's a case of technological change, structural change in the economy, it's going to be hard to find work. Presumably some stevedores will find something, maybe doesn't pay as well as it did before; but others find that their back hurts. Is that what's going on, do we think? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, absolutely.  And it's not as nefarious as it sounds. There are many people who apply for disability when they've been unemployed for a considerable period of time, and it's often because they've exhausted all their other options. As I said, it's not a lifestyle that any of us would want to choose, however it's better than unemployment without benefits and no prospect of work in the near future.  There's a classic study by Kermit Daniel, Seth Sanders, and Dan Black that looks at coal workers in Appalachia and essentially shows that when coal prices plummet, disability applications and disability awards from the Appalachia region rise very rapidly. And it's not because people become disabled when the price of coal or the price of energy declines. It's because they lose jobs. And if you've lost work and don't have other options and have some underlying health conditions, it makes it much easier to make the claim that you are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity in the U.S. economy, because the type of job you did is no longer available and your health is in the way of your doing some other job.  So, disability claims rise very rapidly when the unemployment rate rises. And we've seen a dramatic increase. So, for example in 2011 there were 2.9 million applications for SSDI; that compares, let's say, to  2005 when there were 2.1 million applications; or in 1999, when the economy was actually doing quite well, when there were 1.2 million. So from 1999 to 2011 the number of applications rose by 1.6 million. More than doubled. <b>Russ:</b> From 1.2 to 2.9 million. <b>Guest:</b> Right. So, currently there are 8.6 million disabled adults receiving SSDI benefits, about 4.7% of all adults aged 25-64 in the United States. So, it's roughly 1 in 20, a substantial number. And the cost of the program is also very substantial. So, approximately $130 billion a year in cash payments are made through SSDI, and then the Medicare component adds another $70 billion to that. So you are talking about basically a $200 billion dollar program at this point. So if you even just divide that by the number of U.S. households, it's over $1500 in expenditure per U.S. household; if you think about it, that's ultimately coming from taxpayers. It's not at all a negligible program; in fact, it's a very large government program. <b>Russ:</b> So, let's again put this in perspective over time.  You told us that from 1999 to 2011 there was a more than doubling of applications. Now you just gave us a number--was this for 2009, the 8.6 million number? <b>Guest:</b> That is for 2011. <b>Russ:</b> So, in the most recent data, 1 in 20 Americans of age 25-64, one measure of working age, are receiving disability. Give me a number in the past that I can compare that to. <b>Guest:</b> Sure. So in 1981, let's say, about 2.2%, 2.3% of adults ages 25-64 were receiving SSDI. So the fraction of the population receiving it has doubled. <b>Russ:</b> And it's more than doubled in terms of the actual number on the rolls, because the workforce was smaller and the population was smaller in 1981. So we've had at least a 4 million person increase in the number of people classified as disabled, certainly receiving disability. <b>Guest:</b> There's been a 4 million increase just since 1997. <b>Russ:</b> Whoa.  So, that's a nontrivial portion of the entire workforce. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. It's a very large number; and it's a very enormous expenditure. And I should say that the program is growing in a way that even at a point in time one would understate the actual size it's sort of tending towards, because as I mentioned earlier, the population who go on the disability program are increasingly likely to be awarded benefits due to back pain or mental illness; those are diseases with relatively early onset. They could easily start in your 40s. And they have very low mortality. Which means that people will be on the program for many years.  It used to be that, and typically when people go on with dread diseases like cancer or heart disease, they don't tend to live very long. And so they are on the rolls and off the rolls a couple of years later. For very unfortunate reasons.  The more recent crop of impairments for which people are receiving benefits, they may be on the program for 15 or 20 years prior to reaching full retirement age.  At which point they transfer to the SS retirement system. So the kind of net benefit they will receive over their lifetime is much, much greater than previous generations of disability benefit receivers.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">19:21</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> This raises the obvious question: The U.S. workforce, job distribution in the United States over the last 30, 40, 50, 60 years has gotten safer in two dimensions. People are doing less dangerous things in general, and the things that are dangerous are getting safer. So, it raises the puzzle, which is how could the work environment seem more disabling? It appears to be, or there could be something else going on.  There appears to be an epidemic of disability, and enormous increase, which if we didn't know anything we'd say: Well, I guess people are getting hurt more on the job. But as you point out these impairments are not what we think of as disability traditionally, people losing an arm in an agricultural accident or a mining accident, or as you point out, heart disease. <b>Guest:</b> Actually, there are two dimensions to this that are counterintuitive.  One is actually there is a very small percentage of people who go on SSDI actually transition from Worker's Compensation (Worker's Comp) or acute workplace injury.  It's certainly not, it was never the case and even less the case now that people are getting hurt on the job and going on disability. That's definitely not occurring. And the other thing, is jobs have gotten safer. They are more sedentary. Medical care has greatly improved.  And of course ability to provide so-called workplace accommodations--technology that allows people with work limitations to still be productive on the job. Those things have all improved dramatically in the 50 years since the SSDI program was introduced. Even if population health were holding constant, there ought to be fewer and fewer people who are effectively disabled because of course the types of jobs they need to do require less and less physical capability. So, it is indeed quite surprising from that perspective that we should see an epidemic of disability. And I should say there really is no evidence that there is an overall downward trend in population health. In fact, quite the reverse. Lifespans have increased considerably in the last 50 years. <b>Russ:</b> And quality of life. People have artificial knees, hips. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. So the rate of disability in people over age 65 has declined by some estimates by as much as a quarter in the last 30 years.  Most evidence points to the fact that people are generally getting healthier. There are some countervailing indicators, so obesity and diabetes are the two sort of adverse population trends that are working against the health of the U.S. population. <b>Russ:</b> They don't limit your job effectiveness that much. <b>Guest:</b> I'm sure they do somewhat.  Certainly diabetes if it's not managed well can be a major hindrance. And obesity limits people's--interferes with health on a variety of levels.  But I don't think this is by any stretch of the imagination the major factor behind the rise in the disability rolls.  The major factor is the disability system itself. That it's become more accessible; the definition of disability has actually been made considerably more elastic over time.  And then the other factor that should not be neglected is that the labor market has gotten to be a much more difficult place for people without moderate to high levels of education. Most people who are on the disability system, the vast majority or a substantial majority, are people without education beyond high school. And typically they are mid-career or older workers who have limited formal education and they get displaced from the workforce and they turn to disability as a last resort.  And that's why the program grows so rapidly when the unemployment rate spikes, as it has done over the last several years. So, the combination of a program that is essentially becoming more valuable due to the rising value of medical care, and more accessible due to the liberalizations made by Congress, with a labor market that is becoming less and less forgiving--lower real wages for low-skilled workers, fewer opportunities, and in fact less likelihood of getting health insurance--all of that makes the disability program look a lot more of a good option for many people. <b>Russ:</b> Before I go on, I want to ask one more technical question.  A friend of mine, a doctor in the St. Louis area, works in a hospital in a relatively low income area, and he would tell me that a lot of people come in complaining of back pain and other disorders "hoping to get on disability." What role does a doctor have in that process? <b>Guest:</b> Well, quite an important role actually, because the SSA is bound by law--again, this is Congress's decision in 1984--to give sort of first weight to the evidence provided by the disability claimant's own medical counsel. So, if the SSA does contract with what's called a consultative examination for each applicant, it is required by law to take seriously the evidence provided by a claimant more than by its own consultants. And only in cases where it has reason to believe the applicant is distorting the information can it have the right to ignore it.  So, there's a very powerful kind of for-profit advocacy component to getting people onto SSDI. So, there are many law firms that specialize just in this practice. And they work with counselors and physicians to build a strong case to support an individual's application. So there's a well-known legal firm in New York called Binder and Binder that alone I think received more than $20 million in 2010 in payments from the SSDI for claims brought against it by plaintiffs, claimants. So, just to clarify how  that works--if you apply for disability benefits, if you are denied, you appeal either once or twice. And eventually your case goes up to an Administrative Law Judge; and at that point if you win the case, you get your back benefits.  If you are represented by counsel, your counsel gets 25% of those back benefits, up to about $6000. <b>Russ:</b> By law? <b>Guest:</b> By law. I should say that contract is structured to protect claimants from paying higher amounts. <b>Russ:</b> More than 25%. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  In other words, they don't want them saying you can have 90% of my benefits if you just get me something. <b>Russ:</b> I don't know how to react to that.  That's special. <b>Guest:</b> So, the SSA each year pays more than a billion dollars directly to attorneys that prevail against it on behalf of claimants. <b>Russ:</b> It's a wonderful world. I'm just going to let that alone. It's a part of the world I didn't know anything about.  It's fascinating.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">26:49</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Your comment about recessions raises a question.  It's well known that the recoveries from recession in recent years have been "disappointing" in both magnitude of GDP growth and certainly in employment growth. Certainly <i>this</i> recession has been extremely disappointing.  But it's not a new phenomenon. It's a recent phenomenon. The 2001 recession had a similar pattern. I think the 1991 recession had a similar pattern. And by that I mean that the job growth, once the economy was deemed to be in recovery, was not of the magnitude that it had been in the past. <b>Guest:</b> Jobless recovery--the rate of employment growth per output was slower than had traditionally been seen. <b>Russ:</b> So, what possible contribution has the liberalization of SSDI played in what we measure as the employment recovery? It's hard to know, obviously. <b>Guest:</b> What it's done typically is it has actually masked the depth of the job market problems; that basically it has absorbed a lot of individuals who would otherwise appear on the rolls as long-term unemployed. I don't think it has contributed to the jobless recovery; it has actually contributed to the illusion of a lower employment rate than we might-- <b>Russ:</b> It's hard to know. One thing we also notice with these recessions, especially since 2001, is a decline in labor force participation. Especially among men. The employment rate among men has been falling relatively steeply since 2001. There was a slight uptick, one piece of that recovery. How much of  this SSDI--first of all, how much of the rolls are male versus female? And does that maybe play a role, maybe not in changing the employment numbers but in changing the labor force participation numbers? <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  So, it is the case now that the disability program is almost half women.  That wasn't true 30 years ago. And an important reason why that wasn't true was that women wouldn't qualify for SSDI because they didn't have enough labor force history. There has been much more rapid growth among women than among men, although there has been substantial growth among both.  It certainly does contribute to the declining labor force participation rate, particularly among low-education males.  I do think it's significant.  I don't think it contributes to the sort of slow rate of job growth, because I tend to think these individuals, many of them would not necessarily be employed. If it were really making the labor market tighter, such that the employment weren't growing because labor weren't available, then we would tend to see wage increases. And we have not seen that. <b>Russ:</b> Maybe they are just smaller than they otherwise would have been. <b>Guest:</b> But yes, I think they are targeting. <b>Russ:</b> Now, you talked about liberalization by Congress. How does that take place? Does the act get revised? Definitions change? <b>Guest:</b> Really interesting story. In the last years of the Carter Administration they were very concerned that the SSDI program was growing too rapidly.  And they started a clampdown on applications, you know, trying to slow the rate of inflows by trying to tighten up the eligibility criteria.  The Reagan Administration came in and then they liked that idea and they kind of redoubled efforts on that; and they simultaneously trying to aggressively continue doing disability reviews, where you do a review of a claimant's case and terminate them if you determine it's not meritorious. And these two actions--the Reagan Administration was pursuing them with considerable zeal--during the early 1980s, during the deep recession, the deepest post-war recession we had had up until the current one--and they were terminating a lot of people.  Both many fewer people were actually being awarded; both many more applications declined, so people stopped applying; and then about 40% of the cases that were reviewed by the SSDI process were summarily terminated.  Which, whether you felt that was meritorious or not, that was pretty unfortunate timing if this was coming in the middle of this very deep recession with the unemployment rate about 9%. And so this kind of created almost a civil war. And I believe it was 21 U.S. State Supreme Courts ordered their Social Security Field Offices to stop complying with the continuing disability review process. So the States kind of went into revolt against this clampdown of benefits that was occurring during this very unfortunate time. And eventually Congress reacted to that. It stopped the continuing disability review process; it stopped the clampdown; and it made a number of really substantial changes to how the disability standard would be applied.  That then reverberated over the next 25 years.  So, one of them was, instead of the previous focus of the disability determination decision had been whether an individual met one of the listed impairment categories or had a number of impairments that came together to equal one of those impairments. So, it was kind of look them up on a big list of possible disabilities and see if they matched. Congress changed the operational definition of disability to the ability to function in a work-like setting. So, again, tying it even more closely to employment. The second thing it did was the SSA had previously tended to not give full weight to claims of mental illness and pain because they were difficult to verify.  And Carter said: Well, if they are difficult to verify then you don't know that they are not true. So you have to believe those claims unless you have reason to know they are false. So, that increased the weight given to pain and mental illness.  In addition, Congress said that the SSA had to give highest weight to the evidence brought by the claimant rather than its own consultants or examiners. And finally, they changed the rules regarding continuing disability reviews (CDR). So, previously a CDR was essentially a de novo evaluation of the case.  In other words, you start from scratch and try to reach a new decision or not. Congress said: Well, now, CDR, to terminate someone based on a disability review you must prove that they have recovered from whatever state they were in at the time they were given benefits. So, if they were given benefits by mistake, that's not sufficient.  They have to have recovered from whatever that state was to lose benefits. It really raised the bar for the SSA to administer any awards it had made. <b>Russ:</b> And what year was that? <b>Guest:</b> This was done in 1984. <b>Russ:</b> So, presumably the number of people who are taken off the rolls now is a very small number. <b>Guest:</b> It is a very small number. <b>Russ:</b> Is that close to zero? <b>Guest:</b> Interestingly, there wasn't a big surge in disability awards after 1998, because the economy was doing great and growing very rapidly. So, the labor market was in great shape.  It wasn't until the early 1990s, that first jobless recovery that you mentioned, that Disability started growing extremely rapidly and has not looked back since. <b>Russ:</b> And ratchets upward with each recession because people are on the rolls for a long time. <b>Guest:</b> It does. <b>Russ:</b> And they are still going to stay on the rolls.  Do you have any measure of how often people voluntarily come off the rolls? <b>Guest:</b> Oh, it's tiny. It's less than 1%. <b>Russ:</b> That would be tiny. <b>Guest:</b> Per year.  And even many of those, it turns out--it's a very small number.  There are people who work, as you mentioned; but people tend to do what we call income targeting, which is that if they are working, they try to not exceed that substantial gainful activity level, because they, for understandable reasons, do not want to forfeit those benefits. Something like 10-15% of claimants appear to be doing some work-for-pay that is registered in the SS system. But they do it at a very modest level.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">36:07</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, how did the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) affect the program, and how does it, if at all? <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's an interesting question.  And the notion of ADA is completely different. <b>Russ:</b> Which passed when? <b>Guest:</b> Different than the SSDI program. <b>Russ:</b> The ADA passed in 1991? <b>Guest:</b> The ADA passed in 1992 I believe; going to double-check that number. Um. <b>Russ:</b> It's after these liberalizations that we've talked about. But it's at the beginning of this set of mild recessions with mediocre job growth. <b>Guest:</b> So, it was passed in 1990. And as I mentioned, the definition of disability under the SSDI program is essentially the inability work. The disability program views work and disability as offsets. The ADA, in 1990, says, and I'm quoting now: "The nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to ensure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency." <b>Russ:</b> Ironic. <b>Guest:</b> So the ADA says: Disability does not mean inability to work. It simply means impairments that may stand in the way of self-sufficiency; but our goal is to help you be self-sufficient. So, the irony is that the disability program essentially can't help you until you prove that you are incapable on your own.  So, it essentially says: You want benefits?  Well, prove it to me by don't being in the labor force. Don't be making a decent income.  You have to prove it by making it clear you are deserving of help. And then we'll help you, but not if you start working again on any serious level, because then you are not disabled, and then you are not qualified. The ADA, on the other hand, says people with a work level should be given support to allow them to maintain economic self-sufficiency and enjoy the dignity and other benefits of work.  Unfortunately, since the ADA was passed, the employment rate of the disabled has only gone down. [more to come, 38:23]
</td></tr>




</tbody>
</table>

]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Burkhauser on the Middle Class</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/burkhauser_on_t.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9738</id>

    <published>2012-04-09T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-04-11T11:56:09Z</updated>

    <summary> Richard Burkhauser of Cornell University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the state of the middle class. Drawing on recently published papers, Burkhauser shows that changes in the standard of living of the middle class and other parts...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Growth" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Income Inequality" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Philosophy and Methodology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Richard Burkhauser" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www.human.cornell.edu/bio.cfm?netid=rvb1" target="new">Richard Burkhauser</a> of Cornell University talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the state of the middle class. Drawing on recently published papers, Burkhauser shows that changes in the standard of living of the middle class and other parts of the income distribution are extremely sensitive to various assumptions about how income is defined as well as whether you look at tax units or households. He shows that under one set of assumptions, there has been no change in median income, but under a different and equally reasonable set of assumptions, median income has grown 36%. Burkhauser explains how different assumptions can lead to such different results and argues that the assumptions that lead to the larger growth figure are more appropriate for capturing what has happened over the last 40 years than those that suggest stagnation. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Burkhausermiddleclass.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Burkhauser on the Middle Class','Russ Roberts and Richard Burkhauser',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:09:23</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Burkhausermiddleclass.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 27.7 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 

]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.human.cornell.edu/bio.cfm?netid=rvb1" target="new">Richard Burkhauser's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w17164" target="new">"A Second Opinion on the Economic Health of the American Middle Class and Why it Matters in Gauging the Impact of Government Policy,"</a> by Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff Larrimore and Kosali Simon. <i>National Tax Journal,</i> March 2012. NBER Working Paper version available for purchase.
<ul><li>Summary table from paper:<br/>
<a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/BurkhauserTable1.jpg" target="new"><img src="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/BurkhauserTable1.jpg" width="400" title="Table 1, Burkhauser, Larrimore, Simon" alt="BurkhauserTable1.jpg"></a>
</ul>

<li><a href="http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/pikettyqje.pdf" target="new">"Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,</a>, by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics,</i> February 2003.
<ul>
<li><a href="http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2010.xls" target="new">Tables and Figures from Piketty and Saez</a> updated to 2010 in Excel format (.xls). (March 2012).
</ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PovertyinAmerica.html" target="new">Poverty in America</a>, by Isabel V. Sawhill. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/10/bruce_meyer_on.html" target="new">Bruce Meyer on the Middle Class, Poverty, and Inequality</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/11/robert_frank_on_1.html" target="new">Robert Frank on Inequality</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/02/cowen_on_the_gr.html" target="new">Cowen on the Great Stagnation</a>. EconTalk podcast.



<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: March 29, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Topic: Economic status of the middle class.  We hear a lot of talk about the middle class as disappearing.  Colleague Tyler Cowen talks about the Great Stagnation.  There's a view that the rich are getting richer; everyone else is either treading water, falling behind--so inequality is growing.  And of course there are statistics to back these claims up. The median wage rate is growing very little, if at all, since the 1970s, and there does appear to be growing inequality.  But it turns out a lot of these data are subject to interpretation and decisions have to be made by researchers on what they mean.  And what we are going to talk about today is a paper you've done with Jeff Larrimore and Kosali Simon from the March issue of the <i>National Tax Journal,</i> which is called a "Second Opinion on the Economic Health of the American Middle Class." And what you show is that depending on how you define income and the unit of analysis, you can get a very different take on what is happening.  So, start off by telling us what you did and how you came to the project. <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  I've been looking at issues of income and poverty for the last 30 years, really.  And my efforts in this regard actually go back to at least 10 years ago, when people were looking at what was happening in the 1980s. And that's when this issue first began--the issue of the middle class, the rich getting richer, the poor getting poorer, and the middle disappearing. Just confusing conventional methods in those days, using what the Census Bureau uses to measure income.  We--that is, income from the current population survey, pre-tax, post-transfer income--that is, the income that people report when the Census Bureau guy knocks on your door and you say how much are your earnings, how much did you get in interest and dividends--those sorts of things.  When you simply did that and looked at the distribution of household income of individuals and grade them from no income to the person with the highest income, you get a distribution.  And we did something just very simple.  We looked at this distribution--and it's kind of a Bell curve.  There are two tails and a bunch of people in the middle, a little hump there; and we did it for 1979, which was the start of the 1980s business cycle; and we did it for 1990, which was the end of the business cycle; and we put those two distributions on top of each other. And we found this really kind of interesting thing.  It was absolutely true that when you put the 1989 distribution on top of the 1979 distribution, the middle shrank.  It disappeared. But where did all those people go?  Well, they disproportionately became richer. So, we actually could see that you ended up with a very small portion of the tail that got poorer, about 10%, and of the mass that you pushed down from the middle, moved to the left and became a little poorer.  But 90% became richer.  So, this whole business that was talked about, about the middle disappearing--if you think about it mostly as the middle mass, where most of the people are--it is true that that disappeared.  But most of it disappeared by people getting richer.  So, I've always been suspect of people who make these claims just using the simple statistics that the government provides us.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">4:52</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, let me just clarify that.  So, obviously if somebody asks you what you earn or what your income is, what your salary is, most people have in mind is what you said before--their pre-tax income. They don't think about what their after-tax income is.  If they were asked, they might be able to get close to that. Most of us have some idea what we pay in taxes. Although I would argue that it is pretty imprecise except around the month of April.  But when we look at government data on income, we are typically looking at the pre-tax income, to start with.  And what you are talking about, this change over that decade of 1979-1989, you are talking about when you include non-earnings.  You are adding in interest income, you are adding in government transfers? Is that what you are talking about, or are you still just talking about pre-tax income? <b>Guest:</b> No, I'm absolutely talking about that.  That's right. This all gets very interesting when we decide, well, what is it that we are going to count. So, historically--well, what I should say is that empirical economists are really limited in what they can say by the data that they get.  So, a major scientific innovation, beginning in the 1960s, was that in the 1967, for the first time, the Census Bureau became willing to go out and poll people in their homes; and we started to have an annual current population survey.  In that survey, which is now the most important data set used to measure the income and employment of Americans, the surveyor goes into the door.  They ask the principle person in the household to describe all of the sources of income of that person and all the other people who live in that household.  And that is both market income--that is, returns to land, labor, and capital--and any transfers from the government. The technical term for that is pre-tax, post-transfer, in-cash income. <b>Russ:</b> So, it does not include in-kind benefits: It would not include food stamps; it would not include my vacation; it would not include my health insurance? <b>Guest:</b> That's right. Exactly. And also any subsidies you get for housing or many other in-kind-- <b>Russ:</b> non-cash-- <b>Guest:</b> that's right, exactly. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. So, starting in 1967, the Current Population Survey (CPS), gets that information. So, if I'm trying to figure out what's happening--I just want to make one other key point here, which is that in these debates, people often focus on the median, which has a very good thing about it.  Which is, it's not sensitive to outliers.  So, if the overall population is getting a lot, if national income is growing but it's growing because a few people at the very right-hand tail are gathering all the goodies, which is what some people think, then the average could go up, but the average person wouldn't be getting any of it.  So to avoid that problem, the right-hand tail in distorting what's happening to the typical American people, uses the median. Now the median has its own problems, which we'll come back to later.  But its best advantage is it avoids this problem of outliers to the right or to the left. Somewhat to the left, because zeros are obviously a little bit weird.  But we'll put that aside.  So, the advantage of the median is it isn't distorted by outliers. But one of the problems is what you count still is difficult to decide. Or sometimes you may have an axe to grind.  So, if you want to make the growth in median income look small, you leave out in-kind benefits, and cash-benefits, outside of income, because they've got more important since 1979. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. And it's not only true that they've become more important because they've become an increasing component of the transfer system of government to low-income people.  But even the compensation of workers has increasingly been in non-wage compensation.  And the most-important one is the employer-provided health insurance. So, approximately 75% of all the workers in the United States either have their own employer providing them with compensation in health insurance, or they are the spouses of someone who is working and they are on their plan.  So, this is a major part of the compensation program, and it is not included in measures of wage earnings or in income. <b>Russ:</b> Let me ask one more clarifying question, because you raised it when you said how the survey is administered.  So, I'm sitting at home. The doorbell rings.  It's the Census Bureau.  And this is an annual survey, not the every-10 year, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Right.  It's done each March.  And while the CPS actually has people in it for a period of 16 months, it's only in March they actually ask the detailed questions about income; and the other months they ask questions about employment. <b>Russ:</b> So, the guy knocks on my door, and the unit of analysis--which we are going to come back to later--in this case, with the CPS, the unit of analysis is the household. So, if my father lives with me, and he receives Social Security, that would be included in post-transfer household income. Not, obviously, pre-transfer--it's not earnings.  Just looking at the income of the household, my father doesn't work.  But if he lives in my house and he gets Social Security, that would be included in the Survey--if I remember to tell them.  Correct? <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">11:00</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What else would be in that household income that might be a little bit offbeat or might be a little bit unusual?  Because I think it's important for people to remember: This is not a bunch of individuals who get surveyed.  It's the household as a group. <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's right. And one of the major issues is that there are three kinds of sharing units, as we call them, that you can think about.  The idea here is that if you are doing a study of wage rates or wage earnings, the natural unit to look that is the individual. And so we don't worry about what the individual does with its earnings.  But once you recognize that people share things, and we do that in a natural way, when you are trying to look at people's economic wellbeing, you actually want to think about what their power is to consume.  And what you recognize is that if you simply looked at the personal income of people who live in households, you'd get very strange results.  You'd get that a dad who works fulltime in the marketplace and a mom who works fulltime at home raising their children, you'd end up if you used the individual for your analysis showing that the husband was making a lot of money and was in perfectly good shape. <b>Russ:</b> The wife would be dirt-poor. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. The wife would have no income of her own and therefore would be counted as having, as being poor.  And of course the children would be poor. But that's of course an odd way to think about things. In fact, we live and share in units, and we share income. So, you want to be sure to get the sharing unit correct.  So, there are three ways of thinking about that.  One is the household.  All the people in the household, you assume share their incomes together. But, what we know is there could be more than one family in a household.  A family is defined as anybody who is your blood relative or who you are married to.  And it's possible that that's the sharing unit.  And the third sharing unit is the tax unit.  And the tax unit is who you put on your income tax form when you pay your money to the government. <b>Russ:</b> So, that would include my daughter, who is in college, who makes some money, working part time.  That money by itself would make her look desperately poor.  But of course, she's not poor, because she is still in my tax unit, and really still in my household even though she does not live here. <b>Guest:</b> That's right.  The tax unit is--in our work, and our most recent work, we really think carefully about which is a more appropriate unit for the sharing unit.  Should it be the sharing unit or should it be the household? And I think there are two really nice examples of a difference between those two. So, the first is two people who share everything except a marriage certificate. And increasingly in the United States in the generation of the people in their 20s, 30s, and more, people are testing out relationships before they officially marry. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> And so you can get two people who are not officially married, who are not blood relatives and who are not married, who in fact share everything. But if you use the tax unit as the unit of analysis, you are assuming that they don't share anything in their individual units.  If you use the household, you recognize you are sharing.  That's one example.  The other is the one that you mentioned, that if your father lives with you and is getting Social Security benefits, he's a tax unit, a separate tax unit from you and your family. <b>Russ:</b> He's not my dependent. <b>Guest:</b> That's right, he's not your dependent.  But he is living in your household and he is probably sharing things with you.  And likewise your child,  your adult child, who started out--got his college degree but is a so called-boomerang kid and is living in your basement--he maybe works a little bit but maybe not a whole lot.  He would be considered a separate tax unit, also. <b>Russ:</b> And of course, one of the issues here, which you have to deal with, is the expression that "two can live as cheaply as one." It's not quite true; but there are a lot of economies of scale, obviously, within the household, which is why you are talking about the sharing unit: you are sharing the food, you are sharing the responsibilities of upkeep on the house perhaps.  A lot of these things mean that this group--looking at people as per capita within this unit isn't quite accurate. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. So, the next kind of building block, once you've chosen a sharing unit, then you have to recognize that if you are going to compare sharing units, and figuring out how much income they have and which is a better sharing unit, you have to recognize that a sharing unit that is one person and has $50,000 is going to be a lot better off than a unit that has four people and the same $50,000. So, what you really want to do is not look at the sharing units, or tax units, but look at the income of a household, the income available to people living within a sharing unit; and that says that you take the total income, whatever it is that you've measured within the sharing unit and  you divide by the number of people in that household or tax unit. But, as you said, the old saying is two can live as cheaply as one; that's not quite true or else you would just take that number. <b>Russ:</b> You just divide by the number of people in the household, but that's not quite right because you said, one person earning $50,000--two people earning each $50,000 and living together have a little more command over goods than that person. Even though the average in the house is $50,000, the two living together are going to have a little advantage in terms of their command over goods and services than the one person living on his own with $50,000, because of the economies of scale. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. You use the same amount of heat whether there is one person in the room or four; you can buy the economy-sized containers of milk and the large portions of meat, which is a little bit cheaper than buying the individual packs. <b>Russ:</b> A two-bedroom house isn't usually twice as expensive. A one-bedroom house where the two people sleep in the same bedroom is going to be the same price for the two.  So, that's an even more dramatic example. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly right. So, for that reason the formula people usually use is take the income, divide it by the number of people, and then do it to a power; and if the power is 0, any number to the power of zero is 1; and that means that there are perfect economies of scale. That would mean that you love me so much that if I eat an apple, you feel satisfied. That's probably a bit much, so we don't want to say that a one-person household needs no more than a 10-person household.  If you raise it to the power of 1, then of course that's per capita and you say there is no returns to scale.  So what people do in the international literature, and I think this is a reasonable number, is they move it to the value of 0.5. I think if you move it to the power of .5 you get a very nice relationship. That is, a family of four needs exactly twice as much as a family of one to be at the same level of economic well-being. <b>Russ:</b> The power of .5 is just the square root. So, what you are saying is that if I've got a family of 4, which is, say, a traditional nuclear family of a husband, wife, and 2 kids, that family of 4--we could have many ways that that family could earn $100,000. Each parent could be working earning $50,000; one parent could be working earning $100,000 and the other working at home. But if the total command over goods and services is $100,000, that's equivalent to what of one person? <b>Guest:</b> $50,000. So, just take that 4, take the square root of it, which is 2. <b>Russ:</b> And divide that into $100,000. So, instead of taking literally per capita income, which would be $25,000, in the case of that family, you are really saying each family member is like living on $50,000, even though they don't each get $50,000 of spending money. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. Okay. Keep going. <b>Guest:</b> Now, I'll just say that one of the nice things about that is that that simple calculation approximates the way that poverty lines are set traditionally in the United States. So, that elasticity, which is what we call that power, is very close to the elasticity that you would get if you looked at the poverty line for one person, a family of two persons, a family of 3 and 4, in the United States. <b>Russ:</b> So, analogously it doesn't just ramp up multiples of the number of people. It takes into account the fact that larger households can economize and get a larger per capita effective share. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly right.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">21:15</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, the work we described before--if you are using household units as your measure of analysis, how does that play out when you are looking at, say, the growth in income from 1979 to 1989? So, there's two issues here.  One is, you are saying that if you change from pre-tax to instead pre-tax/post-transfer, you get a different answer. How does that calculation we just went through--why is that relevant? <b>Guest:</b> Once you've done that, the simplest measure of how the typical American is doing is how the median person is doing. But how do you determine who the median American is? <b>Russ:</b> How do you line them up? <b>Guest:</b> Right. An interesting point is that if you ask about what's been happening to the median household, you are going to get a very different answer than if you ask what's been happening to the median person in the United States. <b>Russ:</b> Using household income. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  It turns out that the median person has higher income than the median household does.  Which seems like a Lake Wobegon statement that all of our kids are higher than average. But it's perfectly consistent to say that, because the majority of people live in households that are above the median. Why is that the case? It's because households with more income also have more people. This is why these seeming footnotes really matter.  It turns out that if you just look at income last year, median income is about $50,000; but the median person in those households has income of about $60,000. <b>Russ:</b> So, I'm confused by that.  Let's try to walk through that with maybe a stylized example. Because when you are saying the median person, are you saying using the calculation with the square root you just talked about? <b>Guest:</b> No, not even doing that. <b>Russ:</b> You are just taking all earners and lining them up.  Is that correct? <b>Guest:</b> All persons. Yes. <b>Russ:</b> So, explain to me again why in that situation--maybe we could take an example of three households. That might be too hard to do.  If I have three households were all six people are working--I'm not sure how to construct the example. <b>Guest:</b> This is the way to think about it: Take those three households. One household has $20,000 in it; the next has $40,000 in it; and the next one has $60,000 in it. <b>Russ:</b> Median household income is $40,000. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. But it turns out that the first household only has one person in it, the second has two people in it, and the third has three people in it. <b>Russ:</b> So the median is in the highest household. But that won't work--because the $60,000 has 3 people in it, but they are only earning $20,000. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, but the household income of the median person is $60,000. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. I'm with you there. Now I understand. Great. Correct.  If I went to you and you are in that large household and I said: What's your household's income? You'd say $60,000. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. <b>Russ:</b> So, if I survey individuals and rank them, I am going to get a $60,000. So, I agree with you.  So, richer families tend to have more income regardless of what the source of the causation is, there's a correlation there. Some of it is because they have more people working; but some of it is just for other reasons. <b>Guest:</b> I think the only point is you have to really think through what it is that you are measuring, why it is that you are measuring it; because all these things that seem to sound the same turn out to lead to quite different measures.  Now, it's not because there's mathematical errors here.  It's that all of these measures of social success can lead to different levels and trends in what's happening in the United States. And it's why--I start this story out by talking about the 1970s. I talked about the 1970s and 1980s; I am old enough to have lived through the 1980s and in the 1990s when people were saying that the rich were getting richer, the poor were getting poorer, and the middle class was shrinking, that just didn't seem right. Because I looked at the United States and I thought we were much better off over the 1980s than the way these numbers were coming up. And it's what got me first into recognizing how the little details can really matter in terms of the perceptions of what's going on. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I have the same issue. It doesn't pass the sniff test with me.  Of course, it's dangerous to think that way.  It could be you just swim in the wrong circles, or very special circles. I live in the Washington, D.C. area and the economy looks pretty healthy; I shouldn't--that's not a very good indicator of how the economy is doing because Washington is very distinctive. But when people tell me that we have made no progress on average since 1970, 1975, 1974, 1979--I was alive then. I remember what cars looked like, what stores looked like; and the average person has a much richer material life now than they did 30, 40 years ago; and it's absurd. It seems absurd. Maybe I'm wrong.  So, that's why you have to look at the data.  But as you point out, it's not simple to look at the data.  You have to make all kinds of decisions and assumptions; and your biases and ideology of course color what your assumptions are. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">27:47</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> I think that's right. So, there are two issues. One are the things you just talked about.  I think that's why it's very important from a political perspective to objectively look at these things. But I'll tell you the truth--and the truth is, and this is just the way we academics are, and I'll admit it: the puzzle to me is how can you get such apparently wildly different visions with the same data? And to bring us up to the paper we talk about today, it comes from a quest on our part to figure out two extraordinarily smart people--Piketty and Saez--could get such wildly different perspectives on what's happening in the United States using their data than I could using these traditional measures that I've been looking at for the last 30 years. So, I was getting some results that were much different from the vision you get looking at Piketty and Saez. And I knew these guys were really smart. So, either there was something wrong with the data they were using versus the data that we were using; or they were using different assumptions in the way they were measuring this data than we were; or one or the other of us had made mathematical errors. And it took us 4 years to actually figure this out.  But the answer is: It wasn't the data. It wasn't that we were making mathematical errors.  It was that we were fundamentally asking different questions, but using almost the same words to describe our findings. <b>Russ:</b> So, tell us what you did. Of course, now we are going to be looking at a longer span of time--1979 to when? <b>Guest:</b> We actually with them go back all the way to 1967 to 2007, and that paper is actually coming out in the <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>, this next issue; but it's also--that paper explains why we are doing different things. And then this paper that just came out in <i>National Tax Journal</i> argues that we think our way of thinking about it is better than their way of thinking about it. <b>Russ:</b> Let's do the <i>National Tax Journal</i> first, if you think that's appropriate, because you have a nice little table in there that shows dramatically how making slightly different assumptions that seem innocuous or relatively unimportant, like tax unit versus household unit, you get radically different answers for what's happened for, in this case, the last 20 or 30 years. <b>Guest:</b> Right. So, let's take the simplest measure of economic well-being of the typical American, and let's look at what's happened to median income between 1979 and 2007. <b>Russ:</b> This is pre-tax. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. So, first of all, this is using the CPS, which is not what Piketty and Saez use.  They use IRS data. And this is a very important point. I started the conversation by saying economists are limited by the data they have available. Our questions really can only be answered in terms of the units we are talking about, beginning in 1967, in a consistent way, because that's when the CPS first started. Piketty and Saez were asking questions about: What's been happening to income back through the entire 20th century, and they used as their unit of analysis Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on tax units. So, they looked at tax units; we looked at households.  So, what we did, and this is what's kind of cool, is we took their assumptions about sharing unit--that is, the tax unit, which you can get in the CPS data.  They can't get the household in the IRS data. But because the tax unit is a subset of a household, we can replicate their assumptions. So, we used a tax unit--that is, the units that people include in their tax filing units. We look at pre-tax, pre-transfer income, which is called market income.  That's the return to land, labor, and capital. <b>Russ:</b> And that's really all they have as their income measure, because they have tax data. That's right. They don't have transfers, they don't have in-kind benefits, they don't have compensation that's non-monetary. <b>Guest:</b> They are asking a perfectly valid question: What's been happening to the median market income of tax units? That is, when you add up the returns to land, labor, and capital, what's been happening to median income? They don't adjust for tax-unit size, and as you said, they don't adjust for government transfers.  They are just looking at the returns to land, labor, and capital. And when we use their measure in the CPS data from 1979-2007, we get a pretty discouraging result.  The median income of these tax units has only increased by 3.2% over the entire 30 years. <b>Russ:</b> Which is close to zero. That's not annual; that's not per year. That's over the total--that's flat. <b>Guest:</b> That's stagnation. And that's what they call it: the middle class has stagnated over the last 30 years. And that statement is correct. But what does that statement mean, and how do you put it in the context of how the typical American has done in the last 30 years?  Is it true that we haven't increased at all in the last 30 years in our ability to consume things? <b>Russ:</b> Or that if we have, it's all gone to the top 5% or 1% or tenth of 1%. The pie is clearly bigger.  There's two issues here.  One is one's absolute command over goods and services. And then you can discuss one's relative command and where you are in the distribution, or a group's command, a certain segment of the population--the middle fifth, say. But this is saying in absolute terms, if you just look at income and capital income--earnings plus dividends plus capital gains--correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> Then it's flat between 1979 and 2007.  That's corrected for inflation. Once you correct for inflation, no gains to the median household. Median tax unit--excuse me. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. Now, I want to be careful here: the CPS does not collect capital gains. So capital gains are not in here.  And actually in the original paper that Piketty and Saez did, where all this stuff came from, they also didn't use capital gains in their principal measures.  So that's a problem. <b>Russ:</b> But for the median it's not that big.  It's pretty small. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">35:32</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Okay, so carry on. But then you made a different assumption, so you got a different result. <b>Guest:</b> Okay; so let's--and this is the fun part of the puzzle.  Let's no longer take the tax unit as the unit of analysis. Now let's look at the household. And you go from a gain of 3.2% over that period to a gain of 15.2%. And that happens because the number of tax units per household has been rising over that 30-year period.  There are a lot more people living together and sharing everything except a marriage certificate. <b>Russ:</b> Fascinating. Let's stop there for a second.  So, that, just changing the unit of analysis from tax unit to a household unit, taking account of the fact that there are people who are living together who are called separate for tax purposes but actually can have some economies of scale--that changes the growth rate by a multiple  of almost 5. <b>Guest:</b> It's actually different even than that.  We haven't even brought in economies of scale yet. In the sense of dividing. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, it's just the unit. <b>Guest:</b> Strictly going from a tax unit to a household unit changes that because in these tax units, you have people--their assumptions about tax units are: they care very much about what the top 1% or 5% of tax units are. But they also want to include not only the people who pay taxes, but the people who don't file taxes. So they have to make some assumptions about who is in these tax units.  And their assumptions are that anyone over the age of 20 who is not married is an individual tax unit. So, they get a lot more individuals, low numbers than you would when you recognize that most of these people who are above the age of 20 but aren't married are connected in some way with other individuals in households. So you get fewer. <b>Russ:</b> So, they've got a bigger left-hand tail. They get a lot more units, total. And since they are below the median, typically, they are pulling the median down. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct. Now, I want to be clear on this.  They can't do this.  That's why they didn't. The advantage of what we can do is we can actually get a median because we know what the distribution is below these top units. They don't know that.  They make assumptions about that. Piketty and Saez can't tell you what the median tax unit's pre-tax, pre-transfer income is: they just don't have that data.  We do because we have the CPS and we can put it into smaller tax units. And the important thing about the recent paper that we've done is we can virtually get their results using the CPS. That's what is really cool about that paper. <b>Russ:</b> Just to make that clearer to people who find that confusing: You are using a different data set than they are using. But you can replicate their results because you have a lot of the data that they are effectively using. They have more of it; yours is just a sample. But it doesn't matter.  Because you can mimic what they've done by taking the same assumptions in  your data. So that's a way to check the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions. If you start with their assumptions with your data, you get a similar result even though you are not using the exact same data set. <b>Guest:</b> That's exactly right. And here is the really important intellectual point here: No one has been able to do this before. So, people have argued that you can't actually use the CPS to look at the tails of the distribution, and therefore, Piketty and Saez, even though their data has problems, those problems are less than the problems in the CPS. The thing that took us 4 years to do was to show people: No, that's not true. We can actually get very close to the levels and trends that they get in the IRS data using the CPS data.  That's what took a long time. Once that is established. Once you grant me that the CPS can get approximately what the IRS is getting, then you can write a <i>National Tax Journal</i> article that can actually show how sensitive the assumptions that they are forced to take, because of the limits of their data, matter if you go beyond what it is that they are asking.  That's what this paper is I think interesting about, and is so profound--this one table, as we go through it, is, I think, so shocking that you can get such dramatically different numbers for a simple concept, like median income. So, we've gone from tax units, where there's an increase between 1979 and 2007 of 3.2%, simply from going from the tax unit to the household unit, we get 15.2%. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">41:06</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Almost a five-fold increase.  But still, 15.2% over that length of time--it's 28 years--it's not great. It's like a half a percentage point a year.  It's fair; it's pretty good.  It's not stagnant. But it's not great. <b>Guest:</b> So now, when you go to household, size-adjusted, pre-tax, post-transfer income--so now we are going to the usual measure that I've been using, the Census Bureau's measure: pre-tax, post-transfer income and the unit is the household; and we are adjusting by the number of people in the household to the 0.5. You go from 15.2% to 23.6%. So, now, instead of 3.2% for a tax unit, pre-tax, pre-transfer, you now have 23.6% for a household sharing unit, adjusted by the number of people in it; and we are including government transfers. <b>Russ:</b> Is it pre-tax, post-transfer? Is that correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, that's right. <b>Russ:</b> It's not post-tax, post-transfer. <b>Guest:</b> That's correct.  We haven't looked at income taxes and sales taxes yet. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. <b>Guest:</b> Okay, then, what you need to recognize is: Not only does the government transfer money from high-income to low-income people through government transfers like Social Security benefits, disability benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, and those sorts of things, but it also does it through a progressive income tax. So, when we then use the National Bureau of Economic Research's tax simulator, with the CPS data, we can simulate the amount of income taxes, state taxes, and payroll taxes that people pay. <b>Russ:</b> Because you know a lot of their characteristics. So you are going to try to approximate what their income tax form would be filled out to yield, if you could see it. You can't see it, but you know a lot about it. You know how many kids they have, what kind of income; you don't know everything about them because you don't know their charitable deductions, all their medical deductions. Do you know the value of their house--do you have their mortgage? You might have that, right? <b>Guest:</b> We don't know about mortgage payments. <b>Russ:</b> So, it's a crude estimate. So, what do you find, then? <b>Guest:</b> So, then we go from 23.6%, which is the median income without taxes, to 29.3% growth. Now you might say: How can you get median income growing faster when you are subtracting things out? And the answer is that we've actually been paying, at the median anyway, a smaller share of our income into taxes; and that's why you get the growth is 29.3% rather than 23.6%. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. And then there's one last change. <b>Guest:</b> Yes,                                                                                       and then the last change is to talk about this growing share of earnings that comes in non-wage compensation, and also the fact that Medicare and Medicaid have been growing also. So, as an example of how important it is to think about in-kind transfers as well as in-cash transfers, and to think about the value of health insurance for employees as well as their wages, we are able to estimate the employer share of employer-provided health insurance to workers and the insurance value of Medicare and Medicaid to lower-income people who are getting those benefits. And when you do that, it goes from 29.3% to 36.7%. So, we are really talking about a difference from 3.2% in the way Piketty and Saez are thinking about things in tax units, to 36.7% if we simply include the value of health insurance as well as do the other things that we've talked about. <b>Russ:</b> It's a tenfold increase. So, I think there are two obvious thoughts here.  One is: Boy, it sure makes a difference, what you can assume. And as you point out, there are different justifications for what you might look at.  But if you are looking at economic wellbeing, it's hard to argue that that first measure is the right measure. You'd want to include things like transfers and health insurance. And you've left out a bunch of stuff, by the way. There are at least two things you've left out. One is: there's all kinds of other non-monetary compensation that isn't in the CPS that I suspect has been growing.  Small things, but not zero. Dental benefits, vacation; I'm not sure it gets bonuses. Does it get non-regular bonuses, in the March CPS? <b>Guest:</b> In principle it does, but how well that does I don't know. <b>Russ:</b> But they've become more important over the last 30 years in compensation.  The point is: one, as you said, it's a beautiful example of how assumptions matter and data analysis. There's "lies, damn lies, and statistics." It's kind of amazing that range, from 3.2% to 36.7%. But the other thing that some people will be asking, and this is the kind of thing I hear sometimes from students: So, which one is right? Because they can't both be right. One's really big and one's really small. So, which one's right? Because they want to write it down on the exam.  When the exam comes and says, how is the median income person doing, you've got to put in an answer. And there's A. really well, B. pretty well, C. not so well, D. lousy.  What's the right answer, Professor Burkhauser? <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think the right answer depends on what the right question is. So, if you are asking what's been happening to market income, I think there's no question that wage rates have become more unequal. But once you adjust for health insurance and other things, it's less unequal. And that in terms of real compensation, it's clearly rising. So, I think that even there, returns to work have been rising. The notion that we as a society are not doing as well as we were 30 years ago, I think by virtually any reasonable measure, is just false.  And I think that's the main statement. The issue of distribution is a little harder.  It's a little harder to argue.  We have become somewhat more unequal. But even there, what we find, in the CPS data, is between 1992 and 1993, there was a change in the ability of the Census to capture exotic incomes of the top 1% of the income distribution. So, if people look at the CPS data and don't recognize that in 1993 we suddenly were able to better capture income, they will get the false notion that income inequality increased between 1992 and 1993. It didn't.  It just was in our ability to capture that income. And we actually adjust for that here.  But what it says is that when you get people telling you things that just don't seem to be consistent with reality, you really do need to look very carefully at the assumptions they are making. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">49:38</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, what kind of reaction have you gotten from these two papers? Oh, by the way, we haven't talked about the <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i> paper. Give me a punchline on that one. <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  Well, the punch-line on that one is that when we sent that paper to the <i>American Economic Review</i> (AER)--we sent a paper to the AER that made the following statement: that income inequality in the United States rose substantially between 1967 and 1992, but hasn't increased very much since 1993. And we did that using the measure I just talked about--household size-adjusted pre-tax, post-transfer income. And we got back a referee report from the AER that said: This clearly can't be true because Piketty and Saez have found that income inequality has risen dramatically in the last 20 years. So, we were just minding our own business, using the traditional measures, and hadn't paid a lot of attention to Piketty and Saez in that literature.  So, in order for us to publish, clearly, in traditional ways of measuring things, we had to demonstrate to referees that in fact you could get those two results. So, that's when we looked more carefully at what Piketty and Saez did.  We then took--the other thing we had that was really cool was that the CPS public use data limits what you can know about top-income people, because in the top codes, each of the 23 types of income that people get--by top-coding I mean that they want to protect the confidentiality of people, so that if you have a lot of income and a particular source of income, they-- <b>Russ:</b> They truncate it. <b>Guest:</b> Right-- <b>Russ:</b> They just call it a million, even though it might be $87 million, or whatever is the truncation. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. So, good economists, recognizing that, stopped using the CPS to measure inequality, because the top parts of the distribution were non-systematically lopped off. And they started using 90-10 ratios, and those sorts of things: looking at persons in the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile.  So, we actually gained access--and this is kind of a cool story in itself--to the internal CPS data.  And were able to get around these top codes. And to see much more clearly what was going on. At least the top codes, in the interim, they were much more in the range of the top 99.2 or 99.3, rather than lower down, which is what the other ones were doing. And we observed one important thing.  In 1995-1996, it appears in the public use data that income inequality gigantically increases.  Well, it turns out the only reason it gigantically increased was instead of using top codes, in 1996 starting in the public use data, it began using cell-means of the top parts of the distribution.  That is, rather than lopping things off at a million dollars and giving everyone a million dollars as the value, they looked at all the values above a million dollars, found out what the mean of those values was, and gave you that. Say, $2.5 million dollars. So people naively used the public data. Suddenly they saw all these $2.5 million millionaires, that were the $1.0 millionaires they had the previous year. So, all these kinds of things. <b>Russ:</b> And it always makes the <i>NY Times</i>, and I always look at those data and I want to say: They changed the definition or it's a coding error.  The world doesn't change like that in a year. But that never stops them.  And maybe I'm being unfair to the <i>NYTimes</i>. But I guarantee, I'm very confident that someone wrote an embarrassing article assuming those numbers were meaningful. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. You'll still see those pictures in the <i>NY Times</i> and even the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, surprisingly enough. So anyway, we got around all that. We got the internal data. And that's when we found this kind of important point: that while income inequality has increased slightly since 1993, it hasn't increased by all that much. We couldn't get that published, because people said that was inconsistent with Piketty and Saez. Then that led us to see that Piketty and Saez were really measuring market income, not the total income.  They were looking at tax units rather than the households.  They weren't looking at government transfers. And we were able, then, to ask the question: What's been happening to the trends in the top 1% of tax units? How much of total tax market income do they hold? What about the top 5%? 10%? And we were able to show that for the 90-95th percentile, when we used the CPS data but their definitions, we got their trends dead on. For the 90th, 95th percentile. For the 95th-99th percentile, we got their trends dead on. It was only in the top 1% that we had some differences.  The two biggest differences--and this is kind of cool--is that in 1992, 1993, when I told you that they changed the ability in the Census to get these exotic numbers, there is a big jump in our data that's clearly an error--not an error, it's a change in definition-ology in the CPS. We get a big uptick, where they are actually getting a downtick. So, their numbers are better there, and that's clearly wrong. And that said that we should lift all of our previous years up so that there is no break.  But they also have a tick.  The Reagan Administration worked with the Democrats in Congress in the 1980s to adjust the top taxes of the top                                                                                           personal income taxes, and in the 1986 reforms, for the first time made the highest personal income tax rate lower than the corporate rate.  And when that happened, not surprisingly, there was a dramatic increase in the amount of market income recorded on people's taxes. <b>Russ:</b> Because they used to take it as distributed profits in partnerships and other businesses. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly right. Yeah. So, in their data, they have this big uptick in the share held by the top 1% that in our data there is no change.  So, I would argue that that is the exact same problem.  When you adjust for those two sorts of things, then the trends are actually pretty close. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">56:41</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Okay. So then you were then able to look at a different trend, when you include--I assume you are then going to do something similar to what you do in the <i>National Tax Journal</i> piece. <b>Guest:</b> Actually, we didn't even do that.  All we did in that was show we could get their results. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, okay. 
<b>Guest:</b> But that's important because it says--it's important for them and important for us--we both verify that if you are asking the question that they are asking, they are correct, and we can verify it. And if we are asking the question we are asking, we are correct. And it's not inconsistent with what they are doing.  But it goes back to this question. The ultimate question is: What's the question? To me, here's how Piketty and Saez can really be misused. There's a book out that uses the Piketty and Saez numbers and it's by a political scientist.  And he's arguing that look, we are back to the Gilded Era in the United States; the share of income held by the top 1% is as great today as it was in the 1920s.  Well, that is true of market income.  But let's think about the 1920s and think about today.  In the 1920s, there was no Social Security System. If you weren't earning market income, you were in bad shape.  We do now have a Social Security System, and all the people over the age of 65 who have no market income are not starving in the streets.  But that transfer income is not included in that comparison. So, to make comparisons with what's been going on with market income and imply something about the economic wellbeing of people in the United States, is to completely misuse Piketty and Saez's numbers. <b>Russ:</b> I just want to mention to listeners that Pitketty and Saez's work--we'll put links up to it--they make their data available online.  If you are playing with it, you can see it.  They are very transparent about their data. You can create your own spreadsheet or cut the numbers a little differently than they've done it.  But as you point out, they are asking a different question. What I think the real issue is, is people don't care what question they are asking.  They are going to take their answer and they are going to use it to answer their own question, which is: How are people doing? How is the country doing? I think to give them the benefit of the doubt--and as my listeners know I'm very skeptical about these theories that the average person is doing poorly, so I'm very amenable to your kind of improvement--what I would call an improvement.  But let me play devil's advocate for a minute. If you look at, say, men's income or men's wages, it is remarkably flat.  Now, you have to be careful because--and I'm talking about individual workers now--one of the mistakes that people make, it's a very subtle point, is that if you are taking an increasing share of your income in the form of health care insurance from your employer, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) that you are using then to deflate your market earnings is misleading.  Because that CPI has been going up somewhat dramatically partly because health care costs are going up. But if you have health care insurance you are insulated from that somewhat.  You are taking your income in the form of that insurance, but you can't then use the entire CPI to deflate your market income. It's not the correct measure because you don't have to use that market income to buy health care. So, that's a subtle point; I don't know if people listening can grasp it; maybe I spoke too quickly there.  But the point is that on the surface the stagnation of market income is not encouraging. It's not that comforting to be told: Oh, well, don't worry, you are getting it in the form of health care insurance.  Well, yeah, but what I have left over isn't changing much.  Part of what you have left over is actually a little bigger than it appears because of the way the CPI is calculated and this fact that you are getting this in-kind transfer. But still, it's not the cheeriest conclusion to say, well, the middle class is doing better because if you include transfers it turns out it's pretty good.  That is slightly alarming. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think that the more important point is that what is driving these kinds of changes and what can you do about it.  I think that's where all of this goes to. These are social success indicators that hopefully give us some idea of what's happening. So, I think that's what happening is that the returns in the market place are now more unequal, that there is a great premium on education and training. And you want to ask yourself: Why is that happening? The sort of simple-minded answer to that, which some people would argue, is because the greedy top 1% are getting all this in profits and exploiting the working man.  I just think it's a much more complex issue than that, and we need to get beyond that and think about what's actually happening here. And what I think most economists are arguing is we're having technological change which is skill-biased, and if you have skills you actually are doing pretty well.  The return on education has been rising even though the number of people going to school and getting higher educations has been rising. But if you don't have skills today you are really competing with the unskilled labor around the world. And what are we going to do about that? Again, it depends on how you think markets work.  I think markets work--markets are like mirrors; they show you the way the real world is working. And you can either deny that or you can adjust your practices so you are able to do better in that world. So what it says is, if we are going to be in a world of competition, a world where we allow the free movement of goods across borders--and if you have international trade that means we have to be skillful. And if we have workers, we have to invest in education and we have to recognize that if you don't do that, our return is not going to be that great. So, my view is, for people who don't have those skills, have low income, are poor, I'm absolutely in favor of transferring income to those folks; but I want to do it in a way that doesn't kill the golden goose that allows us to be productive--and that is by allowing people to get a fair return on their investments.  So, this class warfare discussion that seems to come from this rather arcane discussion that we are having, I think is very serious.  And what I am suggesting is that the numbers that I'm showing is that yes, things are more unequal in the marketplace, but they've been offset substantially by 50 or 60 years' of programs that have worried about redistribution. But worried about it with the recognition that you can't do simple things like raise the marginal tax rates on the top 1% and not expect that to have some impact on productivity and growth.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:05:02</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Well, I guess, two thoughts, and I'd like to get your reaction.  One is, if you do raise taxes on the top 1%, you are going to change the pre-tax income of the top 1%, not just the post-tax income.  So, there is sort of a presumption of all parties that we'll just take this money and give it to these folks and then pre-tax income will be more equal.  Well, it won't be, because you are playing with the returns to the labor market, and supply and demand are going to push the pre-tax compensation of those folks up partially to compensate for their lost income in the form of taxes. So, in fact, what you are going to do is often make what appears to be the gap between rich and poor actually bigger. If you tax the top 1%, or the top 25%, or whatever it is, you are actually going to raise their pre-tax income through economic forces, market forces; and it's going to look like you've made it worse.  Your post-tax is going to be closer together, but your pre-tax is going to be bigger.  The second thought I have is that that 50 and 60 years you are talking about of transfer income, and I thought you were going to allude to this earlier, that affects your market income. Obviously our ability and generosity through the political system to make it easier for people to get by with less work makes it easier for people to work less. And so you can't look at the independently. You can debate how big those effects are, the disincentives to work from transfer programs and implicit high marginal tax rates of those programs. But you can't just look at the market system's distribution of wages based on skill independently of that transfer system, because it affects it. <b>Guest:</b> Well, of course that's exactly right. And that comes to the major problem of all evaluators of policy--what's the counterfactual? What would things really have looked like if you hadn't done the policy?  And that goes back to this 1929 comparison I was talking about.  In 1929, people over the age of 65 had far more market income than they do today. That's not because they can't work.  It's because they don't have to work, because we have these transfer systems that allow people to not work after the age of 62. <b>Russ:</b> And if they do work, they lose some of those benefits, so they are discouraged from working. It's not just that they are comfortable. <b>Guest:</b> That's right.  And actually a wonderful example of that is the one group whose market income has dramatically increased since 1996 are single mothers.  Well, why has their market income increased so much? It's increased so much because we went from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which completely discouraged work, to the new TANF program, which says that if you are a single mom, we will allow you to get benefits, but only for 5 years; but if you work, we will, even if it's in a low wage job, we'll provide you with earned income tax credits which will supplement and subsidize work rather than leisure. So, in that sense, if all you want to do is increase market income, I suppose you could stop providing all transfers, and then we'd have a lot more market income. But do we really want to do that? <b>Russ:</b> It's a question for another time. 
</td></tr>

</tbody>
</table>
                        
                     
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Eugene White on Bank Regulation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/04/eugene_white_on.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9708</id>

    <published>2012-04-02T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-05-11T10:25:02Z</updated>

    <summary> Eugene White of Rutgers University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the regulation of banks and financial crises. White argues that most regulation tries to limit the choices of banks to restrain them from making choices that create...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Business Cycles, Recessions, and the Great Depression" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Eugene White" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Money, Banking, Monetary Policy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Regulation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://econweb.rutgers.edu/ewhite/" target="new">Eugene White</a> of Rutgers University talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the regulation of banks and financial crises. White argues that most regulation tries to limit the choices of banks to restrain them from making choices that create instability or fragility. A better approach, White argues, is to change the incentives facing bankers so that they would be encouraged to make prudent choices without the need for top-down monitoring. He shows how in the 19th century various regulations and market results encouraged stability and prudence while some regulations made the system more fragile. White discusses the lessons for the current crisis and what might be done to improve the current state of regulation. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/WhiteEbanking.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Eugene White on Bank Regulation','Russ Roberts and Eugene White',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:00:20</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/WhiteEbanking.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 27.7 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> ]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://econweb.rutgers.edu/ewhite/" target="new">Eugene White's Home page</a>

<li>"Rethinking the Regulation of Banking: Choices or Incentives", by Eugene White. Conference paper prepared for the Witherspoon Institute, Dec. 5-6, 2011.

</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html" target="new">Savings and Loan Crisis</a>, by Bert Ely. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FinancialRegulation.html" target="new">Financial Regulation</a>, by Bert Ely. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/calomiris_on_th.html" target="new">Calomiris on the Financial Crisis</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/11/kaplan_on_the_i.html" target="new">Kaplan on the Inequality and the Top 1%</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/11/selgin_on_free.html" target="new">Selgin on Free Banking</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/02/larry_white_on.html" target="new">Larry White on Hayek and Money</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/william_black_o.html" target="new">William Black on Financial Fraud</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/11/reinhart_on_fin.html" target="new">Reinhart on the Financial Crisis</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: March 22, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Banking regulation; we are going to draw on your recent paper, "Rethinking the Regulation of Banking: Choices or Incentives." What do you mean by the title of the paper, choices or incentives? <b>Guest:</b> I meant it to distinguish between two approaches to how you regulate banks.  Banks are institutions which we really create--we give them certain privileges; and we retain the right to regulate them. However, the dominant means of regulating them for most of the past century has been to tell them what they can and cannot do--to regulate their choices, say you can invest in this or you can't invest in that, or you must make this type of loan. What I'm suggesting here is that there is another approach to doing that: instead of telling people what the choices are they should be making, what the bankers should be making, they should be giving the proper incentives for them to do so.  That is, giving them incentives to make the right choices rather than telling them what the choices are. <b>Russ:</b> That seems like a very good idea.  One of the stranger parts of the current mess we're in is the role that leverage played. And there's a debate--I think mainly a confusion, not so much a debate--about how much leverage was allowed to be used by certain types of banks. Some people have pointed to a 2004 change in regulation which turns out as far as I can tell only affected the brokerage side of banks, not the bank holding side, and so it wasn't nearly as important as people point to. But the intellectual part of that discussion, which I find strange, is the implication that if leverage was allowed to be 40:1, say, then it <i>would</i> be 40:1. That there was no natural restraint on the incentives that banks had to be leveraged, or more importantly on their creditors to continue to lend them money as their portfolios got more risky. <b>Guest:</b> No, I think that's right. If you say there's no natural restraint: well, the restraint would be, if because of that leverage, the individuals choosing that level of leverage, would then bear some penalty for it. <b>Russ:</b> Normally, it raises your risk of becoming bankrupt or insolvent, which means that usually people wouldn't lend to you. The fact that they continued to lend to these institutions, to me suggests the role that moral hazard played in the crisis. <b>Guest:</b> Right--that's the other side of it, that in fact, we've basically had a strong tendency to insure risks.  So, there are two parts to the problem. One is that we haven't given managers, stockholders, the right incentives; but also haven't given depositors or lenders the right kind of incentives.  And in fact sometimes they are very confused.  People don't know what their liability is in all this. <b>Russ:</b> What do you think the role of moral hazard was in the crisis? <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think moral hazard played a big role, but I think I would take it back one step further--is that we've, there are different, for any type of financial institution there are all people who have an interest in the institution. We call them usually stake-holders. They are depositors, other lenders; there are managers, there are shareholders, and the directors which represent the shareholders.  And the problem is, is that many of these parties, don't actively, aren't working as actively as they should be to ensure that the institutions don't take too much risk.  Part of that is because--we'll say the managers or directors--don't bear a lot of risk if the institution fails, for themselves.  They take on certain risky decisions. And the other is that we've provided all kinds of insurance to all the other lenders, so that they don't pay enough attention. If you had to ask any depositor who held $50,000, $100,000, $200,000, we had a limit of deposit insurance of $100,000.  But many people who had $200,000 or $300,000 in the bank would never even think of running on the bank because there's an implicit insurance.  They believe the government won't allow the institution to fail, so why should they seek out a safer institution? That allows the firm to take more leverage. <b>Russ:</b> And isn't it true that in the Savings and Loan crisis, in the aftermath of the S&L crisis, that large depositors who were above the FDIC limit were reimbursed anyway? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, that's true. <b>Russ:</b> Almost any one of them. <b>Guest:</b> And in fact, we raised the limit from $100,000 to $250,000 during the crisis, and we extended it to Money Market Mutual Funds. [Clarification: the FDIC limits were raised to those levels after the Financial Crisis of 2008, not during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s.--Econlib Ed.] So, it's much broader than is oftentimes made explicit.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">5:56</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What incentives then--since your suggestion is we ought to regulate choices less and incentives more--why? Let's talk in a little more depth about the incentives facing--right now we've just talked about the incentives facing creditors, depositors.  Obviously a depositor who has under $100,000 or under $250,000 doesn't think for a second about whether the bank they are depositing their bank in is a good, solvent, likely solvent bank. They just look at the rate of interest being paid and go to the highest one. <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> What about the executives in the banks, the decision-makers on the ground? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it seems to have really changed quite a bit.  One of the things I like to do in my own research is I look back in time and look back to the 19th century, and there you can see a very different sort of regime which existed, which is that managers, and I will say the president of a bank or the chief financial officer or even the directors had a lot more of their interests tied to the institution. Many of them had significant exposure in terms of stock, but also sometimes in terms of performance bonds. <b>Russ:</b> Explain that. Because I was shocked to read that.  That was amazing. <b>Guest:</b> So that, consider the Chief Financial Officer, which in those days would have had a simpler title of Cashier. We've tended to inflate titles quite a bit. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, less impressive. <b>Guest:</b> But the Cashier of the bank was the second-most important individual. And frequently they would be asked to post a bond equal to one, two, or three times their salary.  And the idea there was that if the bank got into trouble or if failed as a result of some mismanagement, that bond would be forfeit. Strong incentive to make sure they don't take too much risk. <b>Russ:</b> Now, that was law, correct? <b>Guest:</b> No, that was not law. <b>Russ:</b> Was that market? <b>Guest:</b> That was the market driving that, primarily. <b>Russ:</b> Because that would encourage confidence that the cashier would keep an eye on things. Who else was doing that kind of bond-posting? <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's a fairly--even the regulatory agencies sometimes do that as well. I can't give you precise data about when they stopped doing it, but it's only true in the 19th century that the Federal regulators had to post a performance bond as well. <b>Russ:</b> The <i>regulators</i>? <b>Guest:</b> Uhh, yes. Sometimes. <b>Russ:</b> And where would the bond be held? Where would that money go? Who was holding it, who was keeping an eye on that? <b>Guest:</b> Well, we don't know much about how the system operated, but it might have been held at the Treasury. A lot of these were not very carefully specified so it's not certain whether it was held by the government or by some private agency. These are some of the dark corners we don't know too much about in this period. The reason this information comes out is in terms of bank examination, when the regulators would go in and see how, what the performance of an institution was like. And examine and report back all these issues.  So, you might say: Suppose banks failed in this period? This is the period I am talking about from after the Civil War up to WWI. If a bank failed, what would happen?  What would happen--to understand the dynamics of this--is that what I call the liability regime differed.  And the most important difference was that they had double liability.  What this means is that anyone who held a share of stock, if that bank failed, the receivers for that bank-- <b>Russ:</b> the creditors-- <b>Guest:</b> Well, the Receiver, the person who is managing the closure of the bank-- <b>Russ:</b> Okay-- <b>Guest:</b> would have the right to go back to every shareholder and ask for a contribution to pay out all the creditors, equal to the par value of the stock. <b>Russ:</b> So, if I have a million dollars worth of stock in a bank, I was liable for up to a million dollars worth of the losses. <b>Guest:</b> Let's say that you bought the stock when it came out.  And I bought a million dollars' worth of stock. The price might go up or down but you would be liable for that original million. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, so the par value means what it came out at. What you paid for it. <b>Guest:</b> What it came out at. So, what would happen is that every shareholder would be a little more nervous. Because you might buy your stock, but you better pay attention because the money you originally put out may come back and you may have to fork over more money.
</td></tr> 


<tr><td valign="top">10:52</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, that was a regulation, correct? <b>Guest:</b> That was a regulation. That was stipulated in the law, and they did go after the shareholders to do this.  What this meant was that shareholders paid a lot more time paying attention to the management. <b>Russ:</b> Y'a think? <b>Guest:</b> Well, yes.  Not very happy. And we know that they must have done so.  We know that bank failures occurred.  But what were much more common was that the shareholders and directors to close down a bank that wasn't doing well.  That is, you didn't a bank to go on and on, over the edge, but you closed it down before it went over the edge. And that means the bank was not doing very well.  You didn't push it to be more risky. In fact, you stopped. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  And it's a fascinating example, given in the recent crisis when people talk about turning points, when a bank could have made a different decision--such as Lehman Brothers after the situation with Bear Stearns.  They could have been a little more prudent.  Instead they continued doing business as usual.  That would sober you up, that idea that you were at risk. <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  I mean, it's very different than the S&L crisis in the 1980s, which one really could think of as a complete disaster episode, where when the S&L, Savings and Loans, basically had been traditionally very conservative institutions which took savings deposits and made mortgage loans, when they became insolvent institutions, basically in the very late 1970s, the reaction in Congress, really in response to a lot of special interest groups, was to not close them all down, and absorb the large losses, but to raise the level of deposit insurance, keep people in, and then give them new lending powers. To take more risk. <b>Russ:</b> Hoping to, at least in principle, that they could recover from the-- <b>Guest:</b> That's right. It's just like a gambler, saying, Okay. It's like the house at a casino saying, All right. You owe us now, I don't know, say, $25 million. That's okay.  We're going to let you gamble again. And we're going to let you take greater odds. <b>Russ:</b> Because at the roulette wheel, you put $25 million on black, if it comes up black, you are back in the clear. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. And instead you end up owing $100 million. <b>Russ:</b> Which doesn't naturally follow, as we've talked about in here and with William Black and the work of Ackerlof and Romer. The problem isn't so much that that's an inherently bad idea--though it probably is. But that once you do that the incentives to take more risk rather than less is really not so healthy. <b>Guest:</b> Sure. And also, too, if as part of that risk--suppose you win that bet. You say the institution, but because managers' pay is tied to their performance, they will get a big kick in salary.  But if they fail, if the institution failed when it was already a little bit insolvent, they wouldn't have any lass. In other words, there's no loss they incur by taking more risk. <b>Russ:</b> They just push out the right-hand side tail; the left-hand side tail is truncated at 0. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">14:33</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I guess the question some people would ask is, and I've been asked this myself a number of times.  I have an answer; I'd like to hear yours. You could argue that the CEOs of the recent crisis--particularly Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers and Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns--well, they had a lot of skin in the game.  They were stockholders.  They lost about a billion dollars, on paper, from their depreciation of the value of their companies.  Surely they had the right incentives to act already. You are talking about ways to use incentives rather than regulating choice.  Didn't they have lots of incentives to perform prudently? <b>Guest:</b> Well, they did have lots of incentives. I think part of the question is, you can have losses.  Were they wiped out? <b>Russ:</b> No. They cleared about $500 million each--a mere $500 million is what they were left with. <b>Guest:</b> Well, see, one doesn't want to sort of judge--lapse in judgment--but that doesn't sound like a huge penalty. <b>Russ:</b> No, it doesn't. <b>Guest:</b> As one of my friends would say: That's already rich beyond your wildest dreams. <b>Russ:</b> Sure. <b>Guest:</b> I guess you could say perhaps. They are not any more in the billionaires' ring. <b>Russ:</b> That's right. <b>Guest:</b> But that doesn't deprive you of being in the top 1/10th of one percent of the wealthiest, in some sense.  And certainly, I think if you would have posed this question to a 19th century banker, even J. P. Morgan, he would have been shocked. To see things like this happening. <b>Russ:</b> My claim is that their risk-taking before the collapse--which might have turned out well; they didn't deliberately plan to destroy the bank-- <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> Jamie Dimon did similar things. He turned out fine; he got to keep his $1.5 billion or whatever he's left with. But in the meanwhile, while the stock was going up and down, they were buying it; and selling it. And pocketing the profits.  And they weren't stupid.  They weren't putting all their eggs in one basket. They put their money elsewhere, so that they were left with $500 million. Now, Steven Kaplan, who I interviewed on this issue--his claim is that that's wrong; they sold their stock along the way, not to pocket the gains from their aggressive risk-taking but just to pay off taxes and other things.  I think that's an open question.  I think Lucian Bebchuk has claimed otherwise. I don't know what the answer is; I'm still open-minded. <b>Guest:</b> Well, a financial collapse is always very messy, and it's very difficult from looking at single examples to see what happens. Especially when it happens industry- and economy-wide. It's hard to assess right out what we call a broad or systemic shock from the individual actions of who was a virtuous manager and who was a risky--we'll say an unvirtuous manager--taking more than appropriate risks. I think in some sense we often would like to isolate things, and I think the case of MF Global is very interesting to look at. Because that's a specific firm, but clearly one that took enormous risks.  <b>Russ:</b> Well, using your customers' money, which has been alleged, is a special kind of risk. It's called fraud.  <b>Guest:</b> Right, but the interesting question is--well actually, it's not a law that you segregate these, as far as I understand. <b>Russ:</b> Really? <b>Guest:</b> As practice. This is the problem, I think--I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about this.  But there was supposed to be a bright line dividing this. <b>Russ:</b> I think it's a law. But we'll find out. <b>Guest:</b> We'll find out about that one.  But the interesting thing is it doesn't appear that the man in charge bears any liability for this. He's the one--this is Mr. Corzine--who took over the firm and said: All right; we are going to make lots of money. We're going to make lots of money by proprietary trading. And yet he looks now and says: I don't know what happened. I don't know how we got this.  And I think that's the kind of disturbing thing. Is that, if you are the CEO of a firm and you are pushing the firm to earn for all your shareholders, and for you--you must know that some wheels are turning underneath you. <b>Russ:</b> You'd think so. <b>Guest:</b> And I would find it disturbing to find that they are all the customer losses and that the senior executives don't bear any responsibility for that. And I think that's part of the misalignment.  That's not to pass any judgment on a case where we don't know all the facts yet.  But it is one that should make us ask certain types of questions. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I agree. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">20:14</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's contrast the past regulations of the late 19th century, which you talk about and we've touched on. To me there's some kind of continuum, and we go from one extreme to the other. In the late 19th century, shareholders not only had the risk that their firms would go out of business, which would wipe out the value of their shares, but if that happened they were potentially at risk for additional monies, is what you are saying. <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> We go to the current situation where shareholders don't bear any additional risk. They do risk being wiped out. Some shareholders can buy and sell along the way, of course, and make a great deal of money. And I guess the other point that you make, which I think has been under-discussed, is the change on Wall Street--and now we are talking about investment banks, not commercial banks--but investment banks from partnerships to publicly traded companies. So, starting about 15 years ago, 18 years ago, virtually every investment bank on Wall Street which was  a partnership became publicly traded.  The last one I think was Goldman Sachs. But they are all publicly traded now. And in the old days--meaning 18-20 years ago, there was no way that that partnership would use the leverage that the publicly traded companies used, putting the partners' nest egg at risk. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. <b>Russ:</b> So, explain that, and then, why did that change? Why do you think it changed? <b>Guest:</b> This is one of these contributing factors to the boom and bust, which is  a little bit hard to tease out, because it's one of those slow changes which happens over time and gains speed.  But you are right. About 15 years ago almost all big Wall Street investment banks were partnerships. And in that respect each of these partners had a most of their capital tied up within the firm. So, if the firm went under, basically they lost most of their wealth. But along the way, and I  forget which firm went first in switching, but when one of these firms went public, the partners got stock; and the initial incentive is, well if you have stock, you should diversify. So, that they were able to move some of their capital out of the firm. They are sold to the public; there was a considerable benefit to that.  But then what happens? The public firm can become more leveraged; it can borrow more and take more risks. <b>Russ:</b> Get dramatically larger. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, become a bigger firm.  And that's a [?] to other firms.  Because it's bigger, it can take  more risk; it can pay higher salaries to anyone from the stars down to their staff. And that can attract the best people to that firm.  That's going to drive the other investment banks to do the same thing, to go public.  So, there's a dynamic pushing the whole industry that way. <b>Russ:</b> Well, it raises the question, though; and this has come into the news because of the recent piece by Greg Smith, who resigned his Vice Presidency at Goldman Sachs, and says: I was disgusted; they treat their clients like dirt; their customers, they call them names.  I don't know how much of that's true.  It's an interesting, provocative piece. <b>Guest:</b> It follows from a long literature about the misbehavior of young men at investment banks. <b>Russ:</b> Right. But part of the mystery--a lot of people on the left and the right both loved this piece and hated it, for a whole bunch of interesting reasons. But one of the things that no one paid much attention to is: If you treat your customers like dirt, in most industries you have trouble keeping your customers.  So, what's going on in this business that makes it possible--so you started talking about the  competitive pressure to leverage up and get bigger and take more risks.  But hey, wouldn't people say: I don't want to be part of this; I'd rather be in this nice, safe partnership with people I trust and like than these gunslingers. So, what was going on? <b>Guest:</b> One would hope that there would be a clear distinction between the two types of firms, but some of the firms which are--Goldman was earning its some of its customers, doing well by them. <b>Russ:</b> Evidently. Because they stuck with them. <b>Guest:</b> Well, here's the thing. In a boom--a boom lifts all ships.  So, maybe you are doing this, but the customers don't perceive that they might be doing better. That's I suppose the rub.  But traditionally, investment banks did worry more about reputation, about their customers and their links to them.  This is certainly true in the great tradition of J. P. Morgan, who worried a great deal about making sure that they were presenting good deals to his customers in terms of buying stocks or bonds. And I remember reading this one great history of Lazard Frere, which at one time was a top investment bank.  Talking about the 1950s, 1960s, some time ago; but it's kind of astonishing to read that the head of the company didn't want to have a new building. Didn't want any frills--because he thought customers would believe that he was being paid too much and misspending their money. <b>Russ:</b> Interesting. The good old days. <b>Guest:</b> We turn aghast at reading that because somehow that's been transformed to: if you have a bright new shiny building, you must be earning a lot of money; and we can do well for you. But I always think that when you see a firm erecting a new giant skyscraper, a luxurious one,  you should ask the question of: What's going on? <b>Russ:</b> Where's my money going? <b>Guest:</b> To make a case in point, Northern Rock, just moved to England, built a great new headquarters--just before its collapse. So, that's what I would say is one of the potential signs of a problem. <b>Russ:</b> So, my story, which I'm kind of stuck with; I really like it; I'm always aware that I may be cherry-picking things that confirm it and ignoring things that don't; and correlation is not causation. But it seems striking that this move away from partnerships to publicly traded companies, which results in a massive growth in size in these firms, would seem to correlate with the middle of the too-big-to-fail era, where it suddenly became easier to attract borrowed funds from people because the government had got into the habit of compensating creditors 100 cents on the dollar. I don't know if anyone's done any work on that.  It's just a thought. <b>Guest:</b> Well, no, but these two trends I think merge.  If you say, why don't we have double liability any more, it turns out the answer is really the Great Depression. Where, again, you have this systemic, broad, wide shock, and it's very difficult to collect from anybody money to pay out depositors.  There's a new idea for deposit insurance. So at the same time as they introduce FDIC insurance, they cancel out double liability. <b>Russ:</b> Interesting. <b>Guest:</b> FDIC insurance starts out as a very limited program. The idea is being a mutual fund, where the banks will pay in; and they'll pay out for bank failures, but not directly impinging upon the government. <b>Russ:</b> What does that mean? <b>Guest:</b> Basically it's like an insurance pool. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, you mean not requiring government funds. <b>Guest:</b> Not requiring government funds. But there is a slow creep.  And if you look between 1934 and even up to 1980, the levels of deposit insurance creep up. People get better at splitting their accounts and moving them bank to bank. And once you've insured commercial banks, there's pressure to insure savings banks, and all kinds of other types of intermediaries. So, it's been a broad movement, not just by the  public but by the institutions, because you don't want to compete with a rival institution which is insured.  So there's a general, I would say, spread of this idea of liability insurance. And that's very hard to shift back.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">29:48</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Well, let's talk about a wider range of political economy, and let's go back to the 19th century, which I know you've written about. The 19th century, I think the casual history of the era in the eye or mind of the lay person is: Well, the 19th century, that was a terrible time. We had a lot of bank runs, we had a lot of panics, so obviously all these incentives you are talking about didn't work very well.  And it was a huge mistake; and finally we got out of that era, fortunately, with the Great Depression. It was a tough price to pay, but mercifully we got a different regulatory world, and look how good it worked. Now, I'm channeling a certain style of  critique: Until Glass-Steagall was repealed, this was great; we had a good 60-year run, which isn't bad.  What's your take on that--19th century bad, 20th century good? <b>Guest:</b> If we look at the big picture, what was growth of the economy like back in the 19th century? It was actually pretty good. It's a period of rapid growth. So the whole economy is growing fairly rapidly. They do have recessions. <b>Russ:</b> An occasional depression--1894 was a really one. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, but probably more in line with what we call a long recession. In the sense that--business cycles are a natural phenomenon. They occur. Now it is true that there were runs on banks and panics; it appears that the panics tended to amplify the depth and duration of a recession. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. <b>Guest:</b> This seems fairly well established. <b>Russ:</b> And for those who have forgotten, there was no Federal Reserve until 1914. <b>Guest:</b> So this is a system where you don't have a central bank operating. <b>Russ:</b> No lender of last resort. <b>Guest:</b> If the panic was bad enough, the banks simply closed their doors and restricted payments until everyone calmed down. Which is very extreme. But we know that panics tended to make these recessions worse.  The question is what's driving the panics? And there really are two factors, which are underlying these panics.  Panics and bank runs are much more frequent in the United States than they are in Canada or Britain or France, whatever economy was at roughly the same level of development. <b>Russ:</b> That's because we're a more nervous people. <b>Guest:</b> No, no, not at all.  It's because we impose a particular set of regulations--we prohibited branching. So, we had tons of small, undiversified institutions. So, you might have a bank out in Kansas in a small community. There's no branches, but it lends mostly to wheat farmers. It has wheat farmers' deposits.  If there is a drop in the price of wheat, you can have people withdrawing funds and failing to pay on loans, and the bank can fail. Given that all the banks are tied together through having to clear checks and everything else, one bank oftentimes can move to other banks engaged in the wheat business or farming business, and you can have a panic.  So, with this  fragmented banking system, it makes panics more likely.  That's factor one.  Factor two is you don't have a central bank to provide liquidity. So, with the two of these we would sometimes have these very large panics, which would spread. Now, Canada at the time had no central bank but it had a nationwide branching system, and it did not have the same problem. It didn't have these very frequent panics. So, that's always the root cause; and it's very important to make sure you don't misidentify the cause when you are searching for a remedy. <b>Russ:</b> That's a good point. So, my question would be--and George Selgin talked about this in his podcast as well--it raises the question: Okay, I think that's clearly part of the reason we had more runs in the United States than in Canada. Why do we have that silly law, and why did Canada have such a good law? <b>Guest:</b> Well, this is probably the result of what we might call the Law of Unintended Consequences. Early on, in the very early 19th century, early banks might have had no branches, or one or two. Not that many. Because, given the state of technology, you didn't necessarily do that.  In the United States, they were very concerned--it's hard to explain why sometimes you get a particular regulation. In the United States, the National Banking Act of 1864 specified that the major activities of the banks be conducted in its office. And it seems to be the purpose behind that was to make sure that when an examiner came, he would have all the documents there.  They wouldn't be moved around from branch to branch. Because there's no telephone, no real good telegraph, to follow around all of that.  And once you get that law in place and you have single-office banks, the person saying: We can manage a branching bank. Then that bank is larger and might have some economies of scale and may be able to drive the small, unit-bank offices out of business. And they resent that and resist.  So, that's what we really had, a system where we created, not really realizing what was going to happen, a very strong lobby of single-office banks which resisted branch banking.  And we know this because the United States is really one of the last countries ever to have nationwide branching. We only actually get that in 1997. It takes a long time to reach that point. It takes basically a century. <b>Russ:</b> The wheels of progress turn slowly. I remember--I went to school at Chicago--and Illinois, maybe it was Chicago, but I think it was Illinois--there were no branches. <b>Guest:</b> The whole state of Illinois. <b>Russ:</b> Right. So, your bank--I think they could have a branch within something like 500 yards. So, my bank had a branch, just a nearby storefront, for some people it was a little more convenient. <b>Guest:</b> It was exactly like that. And every state effort to do this, they might begrudgingly allow them to have that.  Or, New Jersey, for example: When they allowed it they said: We'll allow you to branch, we're going to cut the state into three zones, and you can only branch in your zone. Things which today sound really pretty silly, because we want--if I'm traveling from New Jersey to California, I might want to access my bank there from an automatic teller or whatever. So, this is one of those regulations which weakened the U.S. system profoundly for a very long period  of time, and really in many ways contributed to the collapse in the Great Depression as well, because it was still many small banks, which were not robust.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">37:22</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> How does that political economy of the power of these small banks play out in the creation of the Fed? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it has a big influence on the creation of the Fed. <b>Russ:</b> Because most people think the Fed was created to prevent banking panics. <b>Guest:</b> The Fed's job certainly was aimed at preventing panics.  It satisfied: It allowed it an ability to provide liquidity; but it didn't change the branching requirements. But the unit banks had a profound influence on the shaping of the Fed. Because all those--in 1914 there are well over 15,000 small banks--many of them are very nervous about the idea of having one central bank. And they are kind of sold the idea that they are going to have 12--12 regional central banks, which are going to look like clearing houses, which are going to help them process their checks, which they like, and which will have an opportunity to provide them with credit. So they said: Okay, that's a good idea. So a decentralized system that is really a reflection of this unit banking system much more than anything else. All the regional Feds really owe their existence to that. <b>Russ:</b> And, of course, if we imagined a different world today, which is sort of what economists do--say, wouldn't it be great if these were the incentives? Given the entrenched winners of the current system, whether it's by design, whether it is merely an emergent phenomenon, or whether it's an accident--it's kind of just a side-note of some other attention--do you think there's much prospect for doing anything other than what we are currently doing?  Let me ask it a different way. Question number 1: If you had your 'druthers, what would you do? And then secondly: Why isn't it going to happen? Because whatever you say, I don't think it's going to happen. <b>Guest:</b> So, as economists will say, if I were able to be a social dictator, the person who can redesign things, how would you do that? I'm looking actually here for one second to give you a quote, which is actually pretty-- <b>Russ:</b> While you look for it, I'll tell you my version of this. I was once asked by a reporter: If you were President for the day, what would you do about x, using your skills as an economists? And I said: Well, if I were President, I wouldn't be an economist any more; I'd be a politician and I'd do what politicians do.  Why would you think I'd act like an economist? It's the way of the world. People respond to the incentives usually of the job. <b>Guest:</b> Of course, I couldn't find it. But if you enter into the Federal Reserve, there are two bronze panels. One with a relief, a profile of Woodrow Wilson; the other of Senator Glass. And the quote underneath Wilson's says basically we can't start with a blank piece of paper if we are going to improve our financial system; but we can take it step by step to make it better.  I think that's a very interesting quote because it's a very hopeful one. <b>Russ:</b> It is. It says you can't get it all done today or tomorrow, but we'll get in the car and we'll head in the right direction. <b>Guest:</b> The problem is that most of the time what we've done is we've tended to layer, add one layer of regulation on top of another. We've not done what he said we could or should do. And that's part of the problem. And that's why when you look at current legislation, it may deal with a few of the problems, but far from all of them. And it may add additional problems.  The hard part for economists is there are so many different constraints and regulations, it's hard to say what the outcome is. Because it's not a simple model where you have one imperfection or regulation. You have thousands. <b>Russ:</b> It's like you make something more expensive; it's easy to predict people do less of it--we're good at that; but you are right: When there are all these interacting, interlocking effects it's almost impossible. <b>Guest:</b> And we can take, in the discussion about how to implement Frank-Dodd, this all comes to the fore, and as a result, a huge controversy about regulations and what their effect will be. Now, say, if I could advise some country which is just starting out, what would I do? I would set up a system which had relatively minimal regulation, but set up the right kinds of incentives so that depositors, directors, shareholders, and managers all had their interests properly aligned.  That wouldn't mean they would take zero losses, but the incentives would be aligned with the risks they take. That's very general; I have to apologize because that's not a specific policy recommendation, but a general approach to design. <b>Russ:</b> I understand.  But it's not so helpful. <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> I need a little bit of help. You can't just say: Well, I'd create a world where people would be encouraged to do the right thing on their own, so they wouldn't need much regulation. The question is: Is there a way to do that? To me, the obvious way to do it is to tell them: You are on your own. Depositors, you are on your own. There's no federal insurance; there's no central bank; there's no lender of last resort; there's no backstop; there's no do-overs; there's no subsidies to irresponsibility. Now, the claim is that we can't do that; that's out of the question. Because when push comes to shove, we'll always bail out the losers, because it's just too expensive.  Well, that's the claim; I don't know if it's true. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I think the problem with just saying everyone's on their own is the problem with asymmetric information. If everyone had perfect information then you really wouldn't even need banks, even, because I would know immediately who to lend to. I wouldn't need anyone to intermediate that. But I can't. You need people who specialize. <b>Russ:</b> Correct, it's unrealistic to have perfect information. I don't assume that. <b>Guest:</b> But what I'm saying is that once you allow someone to create a bank and they take my funds, it's hard for me to monitor the bank. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> Because there's some information they might be induced to disclose, but there's a lot of proprietary information. So, then you get to fall back on disclosure and reputation. And I think there is always some role for government in setting up the rules under which these institutions will operate. And setting common standards. Because you don't want each bank having their own accounting rules. Because it's impossible to distinguish between the two. <b>Russ:</b> Well, it would make it expensive. <b>Guest:</b> That would make it very expensive. In some sense the evolution of regulation is part of the natural process, but trying to get each part to play its appropriate role. And I think that's the trick. And we've gone way too far. We expect too much from the regulatory authorities in solving the system. <b>Russ:</b> Which is surprising, don't you think, given their track record? I think it's fascinating. I'm not being silly. I think it's an extraordinary thing.  I think it's reflected in the Rogoff and Reinhart title, <i>This Time is Different</i>. The implication is, now we've learned. We didn't know before, but now we've figured it out. It's remarkable that we have this, what would you call it, naivete? Idealism? Foolishness? <b>Guest:</b> Well, there is a little bit of disconnect because if a bank fails and I'm bailed out, I'm ultimately a taxpayer. I have to pay the bill. And people don't connect those two halves necessarily. <b>Russ:</b> Well, they've started to lately. I think they've kind of caught on. I mean, one of the virtues of the current mess we are in is it has raised people's consciousness rather dramatically about the nature of the rules of  the game. <b>Guest:</b> It's a good thing; I think it's a very good thing. But the problem is in the political system, which is the general taxpayer has to contend with the special interests who tend to retain those special privileges. <b>Russ:</b> And has a little more of an incentive to be paying attention day to day. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">46:47</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What about the Fed? Would you do anything the Fed? Or do you like the way it's constituted? Another way to ask it: What incentives does the Fed face? <b>Guest:</b> I think what I'd do is focus--there are two tasks the Fed has.  They have monetary stability and financial stability; and I'll focus on the financial stability part, because that's in a sense I think the Fed's done reasonably well in terms of maintaining price stability in the  country. We've had a period of not much inflation, no deflation, for quite a period of time.  The real problem appears to be in the financial stability side. There's a big problem which we face because the authority for financial stability is broken into many agencies, each of which is funded differently, each of which has different incentives. And each of which fights for its position. And as a result, you get often to have what we call regulatory arbitrage, which is where financial institutions seek the weakest regulator. And so you have competition among the regulators. And this is very destructive and very weakening. <b>Russ:</b> Children understand this when they are negotiating. <b>Guest:</b> What we really need to do, and again this is unlikely to happen without a profound change, is to move more towards a system where we move all these agencies into one.  We don't need to have many different types--we don't need a regulator for every type of financial institution.  This is one of the ways we got into trouble on multiple occasions. And the Fed is just one of those regulators. <b>Russ:</b> I was just going to say that children understand regulatory arbitrage.  If the Dad says no, they ask the Mom. And they don't tell the Mom often that they've already asked the Dad. And when the Dad says: I told you not to, they respond: Well, Mom said it was okay. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly the same idea.  This is a major problem. When I talk about this I am thinking of what I call the spaghetti diagram.  In many different locations there's a picture of all the agencies and the different institutions and the lines of authority between the  two of them, and it just looks like a plate of spaghetti. <b>Russ:</b> There is a temptation to say: The more the better, because at least someone will be looking out. <b>Guest:</b> I would say that's a very nicely hopeful view. <b>Russ:</b> Well, the incentives to look out are not very big when there are lots of you, because you could say someone else is supposed to do it. <b>Guest:</b> And if we take the case of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which I'm going to say that I think that the agencies are staffed with honest and hardworking people; but it depends on the tasks you give them and the funding you give them.  And we know that before the crisis, some of the agencies were starved for funds.  We'd have to take  a close look at the numbers, but it's not surprising that sometimes--for instance, the  SEC--we know that's been subject to budgetary cuts at various times, usually before a crisis. And then people say: Well, gee, you didn't go out and catch the crooks. So, they are subject to a lot of these political constraints. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">50:38</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let me ask you about--we could talk about these desirable worlds versus the world we live in, and that's nice.  But a lot  of the time when you push seriously these kinds of changes that probably you and I  would rather see, these reductions in guarantees, reductions in backstops, more incentives for executives and risk-takers to be prudent through their own incentives rather than outside monitoring--a lot of people respond by saying: Yeah, one of the problems with that is that our whole capital system, our whole financial system, would shrink. And one of the great things about America--allegedly--is we've got this vibrant financial system with this huge credit market, and that's the benefit of these kind of loose encouragements to risk, that you've got all this capital available. What do you think of that? <b>Guest:</b> I think that's kind of misplaced. <b>Russ:</b> And they say, for example: If we regulate too stiffly, if we make it too hard to make a lot of money, well some of these banks will just go elsewhere. And I'm thinking: So what? That would be good. <b>Guest:</b>                                                                                                          When I've gone to Europe--actually, I was in Spain recently, at a conference on Spanish savings banks, which are deeply troubled institutions. And you can walk around Madrid and you can see all these closures. And so one of the things I asked my host, I said: Is there any new entry? Are there any new banks taking their place? And the answer is: No, it's too difficult. And I suspect, and it's pretty clear, that there are too many barriers to new banks or new financial institutions opening up. It's very hard to clear the regulatory procedure.  One thing about the United States is that there is easy entry into banking. Any year you look at, there are new banks opening up. New small and medium-sized institutions.  These provide credit to lots of small and medium-sized enterprises across the country. That tells me that our system would remain vibrant, even if you had the reforms we are talking about, because there's an opportunity. We have certain problems because of the way we regulate banks, and other countries have a different set of problems.  The different set I find in a lot of European countries is that it's hard to enter with a new firm.  That's not the problem here. So I think that there would be plenty of opportunity. There will be venture capital, there will be new banks--a whole range there.  That, I don't think, is a big problem. <b>Russ:</b> One of the things you hear, though, is that some of these so-called innovative techniques wouldn't be available. So, in the aftermath of the crisis, people were fixated on re-establishing asset-backed securities markets.  My view was: They didn't work so well.  They misallocated capital.  Why would I want to resurrect them back to their old level? But that was the push.  And I think that push was mainly self-interested, not wise.  What do you think? <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's because I think people wanted a quick fix, not a permanent fix.  And that's important.  The markets have to find their way around. One of the problems about insuring large financial institutions, insuring institutions, and so forth, is they may grow to be ungainly. They may have too many things they are trying to do simultaneously. And--let me try to give you an example.  We know that in all the foreclosures the processing of documents was abysmally handled. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, not so good. <b>Guest:</b> One feels terrible for people who were in a housing foreclosure and can't negotiate because the banks messed up all their documents. One of the things--it's very hard to understand exactly what all the incentives about insuring these institutions is--but if they can't fail, they are going to start absorbing all kinds of subsidiary enterprises, which become insured as well. So, they may begin to do everything poorly. So, one of the things you might see if you took away this permanent guarantee is that you might see banks becoming simpler types of institutions.  Which would be the right way to proceed, as opposed to saying: You can't do this and you can't do that.  But letting them decide which set of things they ought to specialize in and which they ought to contract out to. <b>Russ:</b> And as you said, creating the incentives for them to pick the right mix rather than the mix that affects taxpayers. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">55:26</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's close with a look to the future.  You are not a big fan of Dodd-Frank in terms of what appears to be its attempts to solve some of these problems. It really didn't do too much about Too Big to Fail. As far as I can tell, it doesn't have any teeth in it. Are you optimistic or pessimistic that there will be some serious useful reform, or do you think we are just going to keep going with business as usual? <b>Guest:</b> I tend to be a bit of a pessimist on this one. I don't like being a pessimist.  One of the things is, at this point, Dodd-Frank really isn't in place. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> Because the whatever, 1500 pages of Dodd-Frank, sits in outline and then delegates to the agencies to implement the laws. <b>Russ:</b> Bizarre example of modern legislation.  It's common; I don't get it. <b>Guest:</b> So, in many ways, we don't know what the ultimate outcome will be.  There may be some improvements.  But on the whole, it kind of props up--and as you pointed out with the asset-backed market--the existing system without engaging in some underlying changes. <b>Russ:</b> So, we don't know how it's going to be implemented. And of course, the problem with that is that the people who have the incentive to pay attention during the implementation aren't you and me.  And we care a lot. We are probably the top 5% or maybe 1% of informed people.  But we are not going to be watching when that legislation gets put into place. <b>Guest:</b> I'm quite willing to believe that the people on the committees at the Federal Reserve and all the other places are people of good will who want to make the system better.  The problem is, they are delegated by Congress to do certain things, they are given a certain degree of discretion, and then they are subject to very large pressures.  Each one of those groups--and it's going to be hard to get consistency across them.  It's a very hard task. And I'm afraid that when you get increased complexity, where once you set it in place, which allows creative entrepreneurs and their lawyers to find ways around some of the legislation which is designed to prevent problems. Which has happened before. <b>Russ:</b> So, help me out. I'm listening at home. You are talking to a listener who is jogging or doing some dishes or commuting. And basically you've just said: You know, it's going to just kind of keep going the way it is. Is that it? Is that the best you can do? Given the amount of political anger on the left and the right at the current system, it's kind of striking that it's business as usual, don't you think? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, it is kind of striking. But by the same token, we might argue that the political system is somewhat dysfunctional. And yet, it's very difficult to reform that. If we don't like, for instance, what redistricting every ten years has done, that's very difficult to reform as well.  The only thing I can say, in a somewhat positive note, is that the crisis has swept out a lot of rotten trees from the forest, so it's going to clear things out; and for a while we'll have a fairly stable system.  The only thing of course is that firms may be hesitant to offer credit because they've been told to be tight. But things should be stable for at least the medium term future. <b>Russ:</b> Is that 18 months? How long? <b>Guest:</b> At least 18 months. Because all the weaker institutions have been swept out.  It gives them no sense that you have some stability.  But for the longer term, you really need long-term solutions. 
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>
                
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Boudreaux on Public Debt</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/03/boudreaux_on_pu.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9682</id>

    <published>2012-03-26T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-03-27T11:28:15Z</updated>

    <summary> Don Boudreaux of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the nature of public debt. One view is that there is no burden of the public debt as long as the purchasers of U.S. debt are...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Don Boudreaux" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Finance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Government Budgets and Taxation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Public Choice" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/boudreaux/bio.html" target="new">Don Boudreaux</a> of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the nature of public debt. One view is that there is no burden of the public debt as long as the purchasers of U.S. debt are fellow Americans. In that case, the argument goes, we owe it to ourselves. Drawing on the work of James Buchanan, particularly his book <i>Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement,</i> Boudreaux argues that there is a burden of the debt and it is borne by future taxpayers. Boudreaux argues that all public expenditures have a cost--the different financing mechanisms simply determine who bears the burden of that cost. Boudreaux discusses the political attractiveness of debt finance because the taxes lie in the future and those who will pay for them may not be clearly identified. The conversation closes with a discussion of the role of expectations in both politics and economics of debt finance. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Boudreauxpublicdebt.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Boudreaux on Public Debt','Russ Roberts and Don Boudreaux',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:24:06</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Boudreauxpublicdebt.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 38.6 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> ]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/boudreaux/bio.html" target="new">Don Boudreaux's Home page</a>
<li><a href="http://www.cafehayek.com" target="new">Cafe Hayek</a>. Don Boudreaux's blog (with Russ Roberts).
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv2.html" target="new"><i>Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement</i></a>, by Nobel Laureate <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Buchanan.html" target="new">James Buchanan.</a> Free online at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/krugman-nobody-understands-debt.html" target="new">"Nobody Understands Debt,"</a> by Paul Krugman. <i>New York Times</i>. January 1, 2012.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Teachers/ricardianequiv.html" target="new">"Does It Matter How You Pay for a State Dinner: Lessons on Ricardian Equivalence,"</a> by Morgan Rose. Teacher's Corner, Library of Economics and Liberty, September 24, 2001.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Jasaychild.html" target="new">"Shall We Borrow from the Children?"</a> by Anthony de Jasay. Library of Economics and Liberty, November 3, 2003.
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2009/Hummeltbills.html" target="new">"Why Default on U.S. Treasuries is Likely,"</a> by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel. Library of Economics and Liberty, August 3, 2009.
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GovernmentDebtandDeficits.html" target="new">"Government Debt and Deficits,"</a> by John Seater. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Inflation.html" target="new">"Inflation,"</a> by Lawrence H. White. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html" target="new">"Keynesian Economics,"</a> by Alan S. Blinder. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Taxation.html" target="new">"Taxation,"</a> by Joseph J. Minarik. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics</i>.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Buchanan.html" target="new">James M. Buchanan</a>. 1986 Nobel Laureate.  Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Ricardo.html" target="new">David Ricardo</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html" target="new">Milton Friedman</a>. 1976 Nobel Laureate.  Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/07/hennessey_on_th.html" target="new">Hennessey on the Debt Ceiling and the Budget Process</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/12/hamilton_on_deb.html" target="new">Hamilton on Debt, Default, and Oil</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/07/taylor_on_the_s.html" target="new">Taylor on the State of the Economy</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: March 14, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Our topic for today, particularly on the national level, and particularly for folks in the United States, though we may bring in some issues related to debt around the world.  We want to try to get at what is a very complicated issue, which is often called the Burden of the Debt.  Is there a burden of the debt in the future? Some people say that when the United States borrows money today and pays it back down the road, as long as the bonds are bought by Americans, the phrase we often here is: We owe it to ourselves. And: therefore there is no debt burden. No burden of the debt on future generations.  A lot of people find that unintuitive, and we're going to talk about whether that's true or not. And we are going to draw on some writing by Paul Krugman and also James Buchanan, I expect, in talking about the different views of debt.  So, I want to start with a family.  A family that goes into debt to buy a house.  Is there a burden of that debt in the future?  What's sacrificed, and what's gained, I think is useful.  Again, a lot of people argue that that's a bad analogy for debt at the national level.  But I want to start with the family level, the personal level, because I think it's a useful way to set the debate and discussion.  So, when a family borrows money and goes into debt, say, to buy a house, or have a lot of fun, is there a burden?  What are the costs and benefits to the family? <b>Guest:</b> Of course there's a burden. There's a cost.  Jim Buchanan--we shouldn't get into it here because it gets way too esoteric--himself distinguished between the subjective cost and the objective cost.  But speaking just in plain language, when you undertake a project that you have to pay for, whether you pay for it with current income or whether you pay for it out of future income, you have to pay for it.  You have to give up something to pay for it at some point. You have to pay for whatever you consume today. Let's recognize at the very start that just because something has a cost doesn't mean it's not worth buying.  Almost everything has a cost.  So, to say something is costly doesn't mean it's not worthwhile to do. Let's also make the related point that because something is financed with debt doesn't necessarily mean that that decision to finance it with debt is irresponsible. There are many good reasons for financing things with debt instead of out of current income.  Buying a home is typically regarded as one of the more responsible things to finance with debt.  There's no moral opprobrium that attaches generally to debt.  Public or private. <b>Russ:</b> So, let's talk about that family. So, if I go into debt and I borrow $250,000 to buy a house; and I'm going to presume that I expect to have the wherewithal to pay that back. <b>Guest:</b> And the mortgage lender expects it, too. <b>Russ:</b> That's the point.  So, a private individual, until this recent dysfunctional era of U.S. mortgage markets, that is sort of coming to an end--it may not, we don't know what is going to happen--but historically, if you wanted to borrow a lot of money, your ability to borrow was limited by the expectation of your ability to pay it back. Things could happen that were unexpected.  Inflation is one. Losing your job is another.  There are all kinds of reasons that you might have trouble paying that back.  But the mortgage lender knows that, and takes that into account.  That's part of the reason it has to be compensated with interest. Which is clearly one of the costs at the personal level of borrowing money.  You have to pay back more than you started with.  And at different times that burden is going to be different, because of different interest rates. And inflation will change what actually happens.  You have an expected payment in terms of what you will have to give up in consumption.  It may turn out to be different if inflation is different than is expected, which it often is. But if I am going to go and borrow that $250,000, the lender expects me to be able to pay it back. What does that allow me to do? <b>Guest:</b> It allows you to transfer future income into the present, in effect.  You and the lender, both, make an estimate. Obviously it has some amount of risk associated with it. But you and the lender make an estimate that your future earnings will be sufficiently large that your lack of liquidity today--your lack of cash today--should not be a barrier to you buying this asset or buying this consumption item--however you classify it today. So, you are in effect telling the lender: Look, I'm going to make this future income; I'd like you to advance me the future income today, and I will return it to you with interest in the future.  And the lender makes a similar assessment: I believe that you will have that future income; I believe it well enough that I will advance you that future income on your promise to repay me. So, going into debt allows us to transfer income from our future into the present. Now, let's take an example that's different from a house. The house, by the way, is the collateral.  It's the insurance policy that the lender has that things might go awry; and of course the value of that collateral is uncertain.  Which we are seeing right now.  Sometimes it turns out to be less than what was borrowed, ex post.  But ex ante it's not going to be, generally, if things are working as they should. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">7:09</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But let's say I go out and instead of borrowing $250,000 to buy the house, instead I borrow $250,000.  I own a house; I own it free and clear.  I go to the bank and I say, I'd like to borrow $250,000, called a line-of-credit or an equity loan, because I have equity in the house.  And I am going to take that money and I am going to throw a party for a bunch of my friends. A heck of a party. Maybe a lot of friends.  And I'm going to spend $250,000. It's pretty clear what I've done in that case, which is? <b>Guest:</b> You've spent a lot of future income to have a really big party today.  As subjectivists, we can't say for sure absolutely that that was wrong.  I can't get into your mind if you do that.  But most people, a fairly noncontroversial statement, is that you are behaving irresponsibly. $250,000, assuming your income is what it is--if you are Bill Gates and you are spending $250,000 that's one thing, but you wouldn't have to borrow the money, in that case. <b>Russ:</b> Well, I'm going to disagree with you. I don't think there's anything irresponsible about it.  I've decided--and again, maybe this is the Buchanan distinction--but I've decided I would rather have a lot of fun now, and a lot less fun later. <b>Guest:</b> Okay. Let me concede.  At the individual level, there's no way we can say, no way an outside observer can say it was good or bad.  Some people do behave irresponsibly; may wake up in the morning. <b>Russ:</b> I might regret it. <b>Guest:</b> Ten years of time you may think: Boy, I wish I wouldn't have spent $250,000 of my future income in order to have a one-night party.  But you are right.  There is no way, at least at the private level--one adult can assess that decision.  <b>Russ:</b> And the reason I gave that example is that it's pretty clear there's a burden. I pay a price for that. It may be worth it; it may not be worth it.  You are suggesting it may be unlikely it's worth it.  I agree with you in the sense that most people don't do that, at our income levels. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah.  If your child did that-- <b>Russ:</b> I'd stop him. Maybe. Depends on how old they were. But the point is that you would never want to say: Well, it's only a loan, so it's free to me.  A child actually--one of the fun things about child-raising is that when you go to the grocery and you give this little piece of plastic and they give you all these bags of groceries, that looks like magic. And you explain to them: Well, it's not so magic. They go and take stuff.  Giving them the card gives them the right to take a lot of stuff out of my bank account. "Oh. It's not free."  It looks free. It looks like you just pass the card through this magic device, the scanner; my card gets kind of warm after a while because I've been running it through too many times.  So, when you go out and you borrow $250,000 to throw a great party, the costs are in the future.  The benefits are today; the costs are in the future.  All you've done is transfer future benefits into current benefits.  Which means you have lower benefits down the road. Because not only do you have to pay back the $250,000, but you have to pay it back with interest.  Because you've had access to the money.  You might die.  You might not keep your job or keep  your promise along the way. The lender is going to require, typically, both collateral and a premium for letting you use their money. <b>Guest:</b> Right. And in a world of inflation, a premium for the lender to bear the risk of potentially higher-than-expected inflation. <b>Russ:</b> Meaning, when you pay back the money, it might not be worth as much as before. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah; so the lender doesn't want to be paid back--if the lender thinks he is going to be paid back in dollars that are worth less than what he loaned, he is going to attach an inflation premium to the interest.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">10:58</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> In this example, and I don't want to get ahead of you, it's important to point out here that the person who pays for your party--in common sense--no one would say it's the bank. No one would say it's the bank's depositors.  It's you. And you don't escape that payment just because the money advanced to you today to buy your party paraphernalia and party food and drinks comes from a third party. You know you have to repay it, and so the burden is on you to repay it. The fact that that burden doesn't become manifest on you until some time in the future does not mean it is in any way a lower cost to you than if you pay for it out of $250,000 that you had sitting in your bank account.  In both cases, you pay for it. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, and I want to add another twist, which I think will come in handy in what generalizes and what doesn't in the national case.  The fact that I can push the cost to the future rather than today is tempting.  Now, part of that temptation is rational--I might not be here when it's time to pay it back. Of course, the bank knows that.  That's why there's collateral, right? <b>Guest:</b> And an interest premium above the pure time preference aspect. <b>Russ:</b> Absolutely. But it's always tempting to push off costs to the future for future benefits today. And as adults, we try to learn that.  Our children struggle to learn that.  Our children in general want benefits today and costs tomorrow, and have trouble putting aside money for the future. As adults we have had some experience with that, and we realize that that can be irresponsible, immature--whatever you want to call it.  But inside of us, benefits today and costs tomorrow has a tremendous appeal. For obvious psychological reasons. <b>Guest:</b> Evolutionary as well. <b>Russ:</b> Right. And so you've got that urge to borrow money. And the marketplace tempers that urge. It forces you to pay a premium, as we've been talking about; and if you mess up and you buy something like an extravagant party, which as fun as it is turns out not to be as much fun as going 20 years of living badly to pay off the loan, you then learn that it was a bad year.  Ex ante it seemed like a good deal, but that was before the fact. After the fact, it turned out not so well; and as you grow up, you learn to try to anticipate those feelings for consequences. And I would argue that's what growing up is. That's a key part, to a large extent, of being an adult. Do you want to say anything more? <b>Guest:</b> Everyone knows that in spite of our protestations about the sanctity of subjectivism, which I agree with-- <b>Russ:</b> The sanctity of what? <b>Guest:</b> Subjectivism. We can't second guess other people's preferences and behaviors.  Everyone knows.  The world is full--at least the industrial world is full of a lot of people who have credit card debt that they wish they didn't have.  That they now regret having.  <b>Russ:</b> That the toys they accumulated, the TVs--<b>Guest:</b> Not just in the sense that they wish they could have gotten these things for free. We all wish we could get what we consume for free.  But in the sense that: Boy, I wish I had had more self-discipline yesterday or last year, and would not have borrowed the money for whatever it is I bought so I wouldn't have this credit card debt hanging over me today.  We all understand the temptation to consume now and delay the costs until the future.  And modern credit institutions allow us to do that; although, as you point out, the interest rates do temper that proclivity. <b>Russ:</b> And the flip side--you started to say it, actually, because it is such a useful phrase--the flip side is delayed gratification.  Instead of saying: I want the fun now and I'll pay for it later; what savings is all about, as opposed to borrowing, is saying there's stuff I want. I can't have it right now.  I could, but I'm worried about the consequences of that, so I'm going to delay my gratification and have it when I'm ready to pay for it and the costs are not as high. <b>Guest:</b> We are both parents, and I'm sure the case is true not only for you but for any parent.  No parent has any trouble teaching his child to enjoy things now.  We don't have to say: No, no, Junior, you want to consume; you want to have more fun now.  Part of what parents teach children is to delay gratification. Or the importance on many occasions of delaying gratification.  It would be a very odd little human being indeed who didn't have to be taught that by parents or some guardian. <b>Russ:</b> There aren't many frugal children. <b>Guest:</b> No, it's just not natural. <b>Russ:</b> Just a footnote: I think one of the great lessons of time management is understanding the difference between important and urgent. There's a lot of urgent things that are not important; and if we only do the urgent things we don't end up having a lot of time for the important things.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">16:41</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, let's turn to the national level, and let's ask: Do these lessons and implications we've been drawing for debt apply when a country goes into debt--we should be careful. I want to use the word government, not a nation. When a government borrows money, spends more than it takes in in revenue, and--there's different things government can finance with debt.  And we could debate the appropriateness of some expenditures versus others.  So, we could talk about, in a war that threatens the very essence of a country's survival, whether that's a good thing to borrow money against; whether it's to have a party at the national level, whether that's a good thing; transfers to special interest groups; infrastructure which in general would have a future benefit that would stretch over time. <b>Guest:</b> Assuming it's not  a bridge to nowhere. <b>Russ:</b> Right, as long as they are bridges to somewhere, bridges that the private sector wouldn't build very well.  So we could talk about a range of government activity.  And I think the extremes would be payments to friends, special interest groups such as farm subsidy payments, or, to my mind worse--building things that are not productive, the use of real resources, which often involves payments to friends, so the people who build the bridges to nowhere benefit but you are not just giving them a check. You are actually getting them to pour concrete and use up real resources. And at the other end an attack on a country whose very survival is at stake and goes into debt to finance the war expenditures.  Let's talk to start with about differences if any between the case we just talked about at the family level versus the national level. <b>Guest:</b> I think there are a lot of similarities. A lot of things are identical. That everything is identical--when you make a private decision to borrow, you are not imposing a cost on anyone. You are imposing on maybe your immediate family-- <b>Russ:</b> Unless you lie about your income or ability to pay it back. You could impose costs on other people. <b>Guest:</b> Right, but even there, your credit rating suffers if you are found out of falsifying a document. So there are a great deal of similarities, the analogies between private and public debt hold in a lot of ways.  But there are differences. <b>Russ:</b> So, you just gave one that's important. <b>Guest:</b> It's a vitally important difference. <b>Russ:</b> Because it confuses a lot of the discussions, as we'll see.  So, the first difference is that, in the case of private--let's call it personal debt--in the case of personal debt, I make the decision and I bear the cost.  And in the case of the public debt, there's a whole bunch of different people who are going to be involved in that decision. Not just one decision-making unit.  And the costs and benefits are going to fall on different people.  We'll get into that. What other differences do you think are important? <b>Guest:</b> I think that's the main difference.  You have the decision-making process to go into debt and the decision-making process that determines who will repay the debt and how it will be repaid is  very different in both circumstances.  And we lose sight of that when we talk  about "the nation" going into debt, when we speak as if we have one big collective mind choosing our debt today and being responsible for repaying that debt in the future. Actually, a related difference then--well, I'll just leave it at that for now. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">21:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> There's one other difference I think is important, and this certainly is going to be an argument that the justifiers of borrowing are going to invoke.  Like many issues in economics, unfortunately this one has ideological and methodological baggage alongside it.  So, historically--by which I mean the last 80 years or so, people who want government to be bigger typically are going to be people who are associated with the Keynesian theory of macroeconomics, and a view that borrowing is overly feared; that we should be less fearful of borrowing.  Those of us like myself, yourself, who like to see a smaller, more limited government tend not to be Keynesians and tend to be fearful or perceive the costs differently than the other side. I want to get that on the table to start with.  It's easy to talk about this as if it's a pure economics conversation, but there's political and ideological baggage alongside it that we should be honest about; and I want to try to bring it out on both sides.  But to give due to those on the other side of our view, the people who say that when government borrows it's not as bad, or it's cheaper, or it's more justifiable than at the personal level; public debt is very different from private debt--one of the arguments they make that I think is correct is that I as an individual cannot borrow perpetually.  I cannot live beyond my means, in general.  There may be moments when I borrow, for example, to buy a house; but then I'm going to pay it back. And it would only be an unexpected outcome that would allow my net borrowing to be other than 0. Meaning I lose my job,  or whatever. So, I can rearrange my consumption. <b>Guest:</b> But over time you can't consume more than you produce. <b>Russ:</b> Other than through good fortune or bad luck, one side or the other.  And the reason is that the lender--when I'm 80 years old and retired it's a lot harder to borrow money than if I have a nice, full-time job. <b>Guest:</b> No one's going to give you a 30-year mortgage when you are 80. <b>Russ:</b> Correct.  Well, if it's short and small enough and you have other assets.  But in general it's a lot harder. Two reasons. One is that you die.  And the second is because you die, your lifetime earnings pattern typically has an inverted U-shape.  That when you are younger, your earnings climb, and when you get older they fall. Part of what borrowing allows you to do is smooth the consumption over that rather than living poorly and then living well and then living poorly; most people, for human psychology reasons, just the nature of our satisfaction and life, want it to be a smoother stream and not as jerky.  But that's different at the national level. <b>Guest:</b> I'll concede that, but I'm not sure how relevant that is, actually, for the thrust of the arguments that are made to excuse gargantuan public borrowing. <b>Russ:</b> I like that term, gargantuan. It has a nice--a neutral term, Don. But I think it's relevant in the following sense.  In a minute we'll give some examples and we'll see how relevant it is or irrelevant. But certainly if a nation is productive--meaning if it has good institutions and good laws and its people are innovative, as the  United States typically is; and our productivity is growing over time, our product is growing--we have productivity--and as a result, it's possible--it may not be desirable but it's possible at the national level, as it is not at the individual level, that the United States could perpetually, the U.S. government certainly, could spend more than it consumes. Somewhat it can, and I hate to bring this up, but it's useful--I hate to bring it up because it's just another level of difficulty in the conversation--but certainly a  country can run a trade deficit over a long period of time, meaning it can consume more than it produces--a capital account surplus, if nations want to invest in the United States by having a stake in our assets. If those assets are productive and growing we can at any point in time consume more  than we produce as a country.  It's not debt, as you have written many, many times; and I've written a few times; we certainly agree on this.  It doesn't have to be debt at the trade deficit level. <b>Guest:</b> It's not debt by identity. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  But that's one way in which a nation can consume more than it produces, year in and year out. And I think Great Britain did it for decades over its history, a century. <b>Guest:</b> Well, the United States has done it with relatively few exceptions for 400 years. What is today the United States. <b>Russ:</b> And certainly then--to move away from the trade issue and talk about spending--the U.S. government--doesn't mean it's desirable--but the U.S. government can year in, year out spend more than it takes in in revenue as long as the world finds that investment in the U.S. government debt to be attractive and there's confidence that the U.S. government is going to be able to pay back those promises and keeps those promises. That when the nation reaches either a size of debt or a problem with its inner economy and tax revenue that it can't do that, that's when you have a default risk.  But in theory, unlike an individual, certainly a nation can borrow perpetually, if it does not over-borrow and stays within its ability to repay. Agree or disagree? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, of course; but the same can be said of a corporation. <b>Russ:</b> Yes, that's true. <b>Guest:</b> There's nothing special about government. Now, the government does have a special ability that private corporations don't have and that is that today's government have sovereign monopoly power over the money supply.  That gives them an added attractiveness to borrowers--excuse me, to lenders. If I know that you have, that Uncle Sam has just given you, Russ Roberts, to print as much or as little dollars as you want, I am more likely to lend to you because your risk of default is a lot lower.  If your income doesn't rise, then you can always revert to the printing press to pay people. <b>Russ:</b> I disagree with that.  I think that's a negative for the lender. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, no, not at all.  The government can abuse the power, of course; it can cause inflation to be so high that lenders not longer wish to be repaid in those. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. <b>Guest:</b> But-- <b>Russ:</b> It reduces the risk of absolute default but it creates the risk of implicit default.  It seems to me that the-- <b>Guest:</b> But from the perspective of the individual lender. <b>Russ:</b> China? You think China is comforted by the fact that the United States can print money when it lends it money? I think it goes the other way.  I think China is anxious and they've explicitly said so, that there's a temptation on the part of the U.S. government to inflate the debt away. And I think it's a very real risk. <b>Guest:</b> Well, they are still lending money to us. <b>Russ:</b> That's true. <b>Guest:</b> They are still buying American bonds.  I haven't thought through this, but perhaps there's a difference between very, very large lenders acting as a single entity, such as a major foreign government. But at the individual lender level, the individual-- <b>Russ:</b> When I go out and buy a Treasury bond. <b>Guest:</b> I think the fact that the government has access to a printing press at the margin makes it more attractive to lend. <b>Russ:</b> What I thought you were going to say is that it's ability to tax. <b>Guest:</b> Well, it has that, too. <b>Russ:</b> I think that's the real comfort. <b>Guest:</b> It has that as well, of course; and that adds to it too.  But even that can be abused.  If the tax power, much like the inflation power, if it's over-extended, then the government can be thrown out of power, or it  can collapse. <b>Russ:</b> Absolutely. <b>Guest:</b> None of these things is guaranteed.  But yes, the  power to tax, the power to issue money created de novo at the margin at least for relatively small lenders makes lending to the government more attractive than otherwise. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">30:56</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's now turn to James Buchanan's insights into this. Buchanan, in 1958, wrote a book called? <b>Guest:</b> <i>Public Principles of Public Debt.</i> <b>Russ:</b> I had not read the book until recently.  Don and I talked about this podcast and he got me to read some of the book. And Don has written about it at CafeHayek, our blog together. What I think is creative--in a way it's so straightforward you could argue in a way it's not creative, but sometimes it's hard to see things that are out in the open--what Buchanan has done in that book. It's a very short book; it's a very dense book.  He thinks slowly and carefully. <b>Guest:</b> It's only 160 pages in print, but it's about 800 pages in thinking. <b>Russ:</b> It's complicated. You've got to read it a few times.  I read it very slowly.  But what I think is useful about his approach, and quite important and striking, is he very explicitly rejects the notion that the national government borrows money and repays that money as if it were a single individual.  Because we know we are a nation of different individuals.  And the people who lend the money, the people who get the government spending, the people who pay back the money, and the people who receive that payback are all different people. Different groups of people. So, Buchanan's simple point in a way is that you have to take that into account.  You can't just say we owe it to ourselves.  Because there's no "ourselves." <b>Guest:</b> You can't be misled by Keynesian aggregates, is what he's saying. <b>Russ:</b> Right; there's no ourselves there; there are different groups in our country that borrow the money, pay it back, and receive it. Although there is very little in the first part of the book that is explicitly about Keynesianism, there is a Keynesian aspect to this, which is that, to some extent in the Keynesian view, aggregates are what matter.  And things wash out because of that.  Whereas in the Buchanan view, and I would say my view and yours, they don't wash out all the time. Let's go through this.  Let's start with Buchanan's argument--again, we don't have to think about what kind of government spending it is--let's walk through who pays for it and who gets the benefits. <b>Guest:</b> Let's assume that the government spending is regarded by everyone as being justified; no matter what that might be, it's justified. Buchanan, in 1958, was reacting against what was then a fairly new theory of public finance.  He called it the New Orthodoxy. And it emerged in the 1930s right along with Keynesian economics.  And it served--although it's probably not necessary for Keynesian economics--it certainly served the Keynesian agenda and people who accepted it were Keynesians. They bought into it. Because, if you bought into it--and I'll explain in just a moment what the "it" is--you didn't worry about debts that you encouraged the government to undertake.  The "it", this New Orthodoxy, the new theory of public finance that emerged in the 1930s, was that because the debt doesn't come due until some time in the future, to the extent that that debt is payable to people within the same political community that undertook that debt, then the debt is not a burden. <b>Russ:</b> That is Americans, in this case. As long as the borrowers are Americans and the lenders are Americans, the people who buy the Treasury notes are Americans. <b>Russ:</b> Because it's so important in Keynesian economics for the government to be able to borrow--functional finance--and because prior to Keynes there was, for better or worse, certainly in the economics profession, a bias against government indebtedness in peacetime, the Keynesians had to, at least psychologically to get rid of that.  Because we have to be able to go into debt in peacetime on many occasions. And the Keynesians then were able to say because the debt is owed to people in the future, and because those people are citizens of the same country we belong to, it's no problem. "We owe it to ourselves"--that was the famous phrase that justified the debt--so it's not a burden. Buchanan said: Nonsense. Let's look at the individuals involved here. We have citizens/taxpayers, who somehow participate in the political process.  We have politicians, who obviously participate in the political process. We have lenders--these would be people who buy government bonds, lend money to the government. And then we have future taxpayers, people whose tax bills will rise when the debts come due. And the bondholders--they can be either the same people who lent the money today or they can be the heirs of the bondholders. <b>Russ:</b> Or the people they sold the bonds to. But that's confusing, I think.  There's one other group--those who benefit from the spending. Which could be the nation as a whole, for fighting off an invader.  Or it could be the friends of someone. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">37:42</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> So, let's take the war example, which is the example most people regard as the most justifiable use of debt when we all believe the threat is real and imminent. So, government borrows a trillion dollars to fight off an invading enemy, because it doesn't have the liquidity today.  Private lenders--and let's assume they are all American-- <b>Russ:</b> We are going to play within the Keynesian rules as much as we can here.  So there are no foreign holders of U.S. debt in the story. <b>Guest:</b> So, Americans lend, voluntarily, a trillion dollars to Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam spends that money effectively in winning the war; America survives. The debt comes due 30 years from now.  All the holders of the bonds are Americans; Uncle Sam honors its debt commitment. It raises taxes. Or reduces spending.  Let's assume it raises taxes. The story is not fundamentally different. It raises taxes 30 years from now to pay off the debt; so some Americans have to pay, or Americans in one capacity have to pay higher taxes; Americans in another capacity receive the principle and interest on the debt that Uncle Sam took out 30 years earlier. Buchanan says: Even though we might agree--we do agree in this case--that the debt was justified, it is still a burden; and this is the crucial part.  The people who bear the burden of that debt are the future taxpayers, the taxpayers 30 years hence, whose taxes rise in order to pay off the debt.  The fact that, 1. The debt holders 30 years from now are citizens of the same country of the people who paid the debt, that doesn't mean there's no burden to the debt.  The fact that the resources to fight the war were of course contributed and literally consumed 30 years ago does not mean that the people who contributed those resources voluntarily bear the burden of the debt.  Those are the bondholders.  They chose to lend the money to Uncle Sam in return for--additions to their financial portfolios that made them better off.  They are not the ones bearing the burden of the war.  The burden has to fall somewhere, and it falls on the people who pay off the debt, and those people are the future taxpayers.  The nationalities of the bondholders when the debt is redeemed is utterly irrelevant. The burden is shifted to the future, and its real.  It's not reduced just because, number one, it doesn't exist today, when the debt is taken out, and number two, contrary to what the Keynesians say, contrary to what Paul Krugman says, it's not reduced or disappears just to the extent that the bondholders are citizens of the same country as the taxpayers whose taxes rise to pay the debt. <b>Russ:</b> So, I think in the Buchanan story, the way to see it is that the bondholders, the people who lent the money to the United States--and obviously some of them died, have heirs; that just confuses things; it's not relevant--so let's make an unrealistic assumption for the sake of understanding the economics: let's assume they are all still alive when the debt comes due.  Might be a 5-year bond. <b>Guest:</b> Some of them will be. <b>Russ:</b> Some of them will be. So, they are better off, slightly, by the attractiveness of this opportunity to lend the money relative to other opportunities to lend money. The people today who received the benefits of the government spending--they are not killed in a war as a result; or it could be that they have better bridges and roads-- <b>Guest:</b> And we could even say that people in the future-- <b>Russ:</b> I'm going to get to that.  And it could be these benefits extend over time. <b>Guest:</b> And I would assume they did. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. They are not enslaved by a foreign power, or they get to enjoy the bridges that were built. The special interest payoff is a slightly different story; we could talk about that later as an exercise. So, whatever those benefits were--which we think are huge; we are not disputing the value of the benefits--it's clear who pays for them. In one dimension.  It's a little unclear.  But in one dimension, it's clear who pays for them: the people who have to finance the taxes to pay back the bonds plus interest. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, I think it's completely clear who pays for it. It's those people. <b>Russ:</b> Well, the reason I want to say it's not so clear--here's why I want to say it's not so clear; and this is a confusion that may be unproductive.  We'll see how it goes. And this is why this is such a difficult topic.  When the government in the present convinces would-be savers to give their money to the government in the form of bonds, other things don't take place. And if the government were to say, we are not going to fight this war, those other things would take place; and some of those investments would be productive.  And so those resources today-- <b>Guest:</b> That's true.  But that's true for any economic decision-taking, whether it be political or private. <b>Russ:</b> So, I think the right comparison is to talk about a war financed by taxation today versus debt. Which, as Milton Friedman would point out--that's just taxation tomorrow.  You can call it debt. When government finances activities, it can either tax today or tax tomorrow, and Friedman used to always say, and I think it's in agreement with Buchanan. <b>Guest:</b> It sounds on the surface like it contradicts him, but it doesn't. <b>Russ:</b> I think it's the same point.  What Friedman used to say is, if you are debating government activity, don't be fooled by whether it's financed by debt or by taxes.  Just look at if it's worthwhile.  If it's finance a war that's going to save us from destruction, it's worthwhile whether you finance it out of taxes today or taxes tomorrow.  It might make sense to do it out of taxes tomorrow, but certainly it's a good idea.  If you are doing it to dig ditches to nowhere and fill them back in, you it doesn't matter whether you finance them by taxes today or taxes tomorrow.  It's still a bad idea.  <b>Guest:</b> What Friedman is saying is the full cost, the cost of government activity today, is the amount of money government spends today, not the amount of explicit tax revenue it takes in today.  It's measured by spending, not taxing. <b>Russ:</b> And borrowing doesn't somehow allow you to have a free lunch. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">45:04</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's walk through that a little slower to make sure that's right, or at least that we're comfortable with it.  Because the alternative facing this terrible war, is instead of to borrow the money, we could have said: Folks this is really bad.  I mean, we could think of two ways to finance a war.  We could think of three ways, excuse me.  The way we just talked about, which is we are going to borrow the money, take the borrowed money and buy stuff with it to fight the war; which is "voluntary," on the surface, because it's taken from people who choose to buy the bonds.  The involuntary part comes on the people who have to pay it back. <b>Guest:</b> Which is an important point. <b>Russ:</b> No, it's huge. We're going to come back to the politics, because that's part of the political incentives that are in play here. But it looks voluntary. It's the same involuntary thing; you just push the involuntary part to the future. <b>Guest:</b> That's exactly right. <b>Russ:</b> Alternatively, you could said: Folks, bad news.  We're going to be attacked. We are going to have to tax-- <b>Guest:</b> Raise the taxes by a trillion dollars this year-- <b>Russ:</b> And that's going to be painful.  It means less private consumption. And the only difference between those two is which Americans end up paying the price.  It could be a slightly different group.  Which is one of the reasons the political incentives-- <b>Guest:</b> But no, in both cases, the people paying the cost of the war are the taxpayers. <b>Russ:</b> It's just different points in time. <b>Guest:</b> The fact that the taxpayers who pay it in the borrowing case are in the future and the taxpayers who pay it in the taxation case are in the present, does nothing to change the fact that the burden falls on the taxpayers. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. So now the third way--and there's a fourth way, too, I'll get to. <b>Guest:</b> We can stop money creation. <b>Russ:</b> No, I'm getting away from that.  That's not my third or fourth; that's the fifth way.  That's, again, a different kind of tax.  It's an implicit tax. <b>Guest:</b> Fundamental tax, to distort. <b>Russ:</b> But here's a third way.  The government could expropriate private resources.  It could say: One of the things-- <b>Guest:</b> Well, that's a form of taxation. <b>Russ:</b> I know, but there it's very clear where the burdens are.  The government could say: We need transportation in this war; we need to move troops around; we need to fly airplanes. So, U.S. Airways, Southwest, we are coming to you.  We are taking all your planes. <b>Guest:</b> To hell with the Third Amendment to the Constitution; we are going to quarter soldiers in your house. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  And we are going to steal all your buses and your cars are going to become government.  Now, everybody would understand in that case. You wouldn't say: There's no burden, because we all understand that we still have the cars.  We still own our cars.  We understand that whatever those cars and buses and trains produced for us in benefits--as you said before, it might be worthwhile to use them to fight this terrible external enemy--but we never wanted to say: Well, it's free. Because we still own our cars. <b>Guest:</b> The people getting the benefit from the seizing of Southwest Airlines and the seizing of private homes and hotels to quarter soldiers, or Americans--that doesn't make it free.  We seized it from ourselves.  No one would say that makes the burden go away. <b>Russ:</b> It's clear what the real cost is.  The real costs are those private benefits and pleasures we would have had from travel and comfort in our homes.  And by the way, the same thing with food. We have to pay for the food for the soldiers. So, we are coming to your farms, and we are taking your crops. All that does is change who pays for it.  It doesn't change the fact that there's a burden of it, or that there are prices to pay. Now most people would argue we have to spread the burden because we are all getting the benefits of this security. <b>Guest:</b> And that would be true.  That would be correct. <b>Russ:</b> And so therefore it's not right to just punish people who already own cars, happen to own airplanes.  Let's spread the burden. <b>Guest:</b> And that's why there's a Just Compensation requirement in the 5th Amendment Takings Clause [to the Constitution].  <b>Russ:</b> Yeah.  So I think we've made some progress. <b>Guest:</b> Did you list all the ways to pay for it? <b>Russ:</b> We could ask people for donations.  We could ask people voluntarily to give. <b>Guest:</b> In which case they would be the payers. <b>Russ:</b> And I think in the background of our conversation, which I think both Keynesian and classical economists, and I would put both you and me and Buchanan in the classical camp-- <b>Guest:</b> In this case yes-- <b>Russ:</b> A pre-1930s view of debt. What everybody agrees on is that there are some distortionary effects from these different methods.  The form of taxation matters. Whether the tax system is well-designed.  There are extra costs from that. But we also all agree that that's relatively small compared to what we are talking about.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">49:49</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Okay. You want to say anything else before we gone on? <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> So, now this is where we are 49 minutes into this; and now we get to preps [?preparations?] the hardest part. Which is that I am going to take a quote from Paul Krugman and see if we can apply what those claims are so far, and if we can disagree with him in a useful way.  So, Krugman explicitly, in a column that was written January 1, 2012-- <b>Guest:</b> January 2, 2012 edition of the <i>New York Times</i>. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  It was online on January 1st, but it came out in print on January 2nd. <b>Guest:</b> I know the column well. <b>Russ:</b> Don's written on it. And I've been chewing on it since he got me to think about it. Here's what he [Krugman] wrote; and I'm going to try to sketch out the rest of our conversation.  I want to try to address the Krugman point. And then I want to go to the really large question of sovereign debt generally and whether we are in a crisis or not in some dimension.  Greece is still embroiled, as we record this, in some serious problems; Spain and Italy seem to have some problems. And a lot of people say: That doesn't apply to the United States. Other people say: Oh, my gosh, we are going down the same path. <b>Guest:</b> John Taylor, for example, is worried that we are not there yet but close to it. <b>Russ:</b> I'm a little worried about it, myself.  So, here's the Krugman quote; and it applies perfectly to what we've been talking about.  He just has a different view. And by the way, those of you who have written me, I appreciate it and you have encouraged me to have Paul Krugman as a guest--I am eager to have Paul Krugman as a guest. I prefer to have Paul Krugman defend himself than have to read him. I've invited him; he has not responded.  It could be he is not interested.  It could be he has not gotten my emails.  If anyone knows him out there and wants to encourage him to come on, we'd be happy to have him. It surely would be interesting and lively and we'd both learn a lot; at least I would.  But here are Paul Krugman's words: <blockquote>Deficit-worriers portray a future in which we're impoverished by the need to pay back money we've been borrowing. They see America as being like a family that took out too large a mortgage, and will have a hard time making the monthly payments.<br/><br/>This is, however, a really bad analogy in at least two ways. <br/><br/>First, families have to pay back their debt. Governments don't -- all they need to do is ensure that debt grows more slowly than their tax base. The debt from World War II was never repaid; it just became increasingly irrelevant as the U.S. economy grew, and with it the income subject to taxation. <br/><br/>Second -- and this is the point almost nobody seems to get -- an over-borrowed family owes money to someone else; U.S. debt is, to a large extent, money we owe to ourselves.<br/><br/>This was clearly true of the debt incurred to win World War II. Taxpayers were on the hook for a debt that was significantly bigger, as a percentage of G.D.P., than debt today; but that debt was also owned by taxpayers, such as all the people who bought savings bonds. So the debt didn't make postwar America poorer. In particular, the debt didn't prevent the postwar generation from experiencing the biggest rise in incomes and living standards in our nation's history. </blockquote> Before we talk about it, I want to let people chew on that quote.  You might want to rewind and hear it again. It's a long quote.  I want to both be fair to him and to--it just so perfectly captures the alternative view to what Don and I have been talking about. But I want to just re-emphasize his points.  He makes two points.  The first is that government doesn't have to pay back it's debt.  It can roll it over.  And the second is, it's not harmful; there is no burden, and we owe it to ourselves. To the extent that taxpayers are the holders of the debt rather than foreigners.  And again, I want to give him the benefit of the doubt, and assume that that's not literally true, but it is to a large extent. <b>Guest:</b> The argument he's making is that--he admits that his argument and that part of it applies when the debt is internally held. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. So, what's wrong with him? What's wrong with that argument?  Is he wrong? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> Why? <b>Guest:</b> Well, first of all, you didn't point this out, but it is true of course that the debt incurred to fight WWII did not prevent America from growing economically. Well, again, just because a debt has a burden does not mean that it is not worthwhile.  Just because an expenditure has a cost does not mean that expenditure was not worthwhile. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. Well, that argument, that part of it-- <b>Guest:</b> And that also, this is a sort of post hoc fallacy, in a way. <b>Russ:</b> Correlation isn't causation. <b>Guest:</b> You could have someone here who makes a strong--. Let's assume these expenditures were completely wasteful, and yet America grew. Therefore these wasteful expenditures weren't that wasteful.  But maybe America wouldn't have grown even more. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> But we can forgive him that.  It's a column for a newspaper.  We all write sloppy things. <b>Russ:</b> We simplify things. <b>Guest:</b> We simplify things.  I write sloppy things sometimes. The heart of that claim is that because we owe it to ourselves, it's not a real burden.  That is a mistaken--this is the claim that Buchanan so carefully examines and exposes as fallacious in his writings, most noticeably in the book that you'll put online, that Buchanan wrote in 1958. By the way--and I've searched his blog and I've looked at his columns.  I see no evidence that Krugman even acknowledges Buchanan's contributions. In 2012, unlike say, in 1957, you cannot make the claim that Krugman makes as if it is an established, indisputable truth that only untrained economists disagree with. You have to deal with Buchanan's argument.  You have to show why Buchanan mistaken.  And that is what I think Krugman has not even attempted to do.  Maybe he's done it elsewhere. <b>Russ:</b> But he doesn't need to.  Because it's obviously-- <b>Guest:</b> Well, the way he dismisses it, he dismisses it, in his newspaper column, his blog, he dismisses Buchanan's view as-- <b>Russ:</b> Irrelevant-- <b>Guest:</b> As if it's a flat-earth kind of claim. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  It's irrelevant. <b>Guest:</b> So, yes.  If American A has her taxes raised so that American B has his bond redeemed with those taxes, the money stays in America, but that doesn't mean there is no burden to that debt. The taxes are still raised.  Krugman will admit, as the Keynesians admitted--there is a slight burden, the distortionary effects of having to raise marginal tax rates. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> No one denies that. But the absolute amount of money paid from A to B does not disappear as a burden just because B is a citizen of the same country as A.  And that is what Krugman is suggesting. 
</td></tr>
<tr><td valign="top">57:41</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> So, here's why, here's where the politics comes in. Let's now, let's get away from the war thing, because we all agree that war is necessary to fund.  <b>Russ:</b> If you are under the threat of imminent invasion. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, yeah, right. Much of Uncle Sam's belligerence. <b>Russ:</b> To pick a better example, I'll take the example of the example of-- <b>Guest:</b> Stimulus spending-- <b>Russ:</b> No, no, I want to take an example of, there's an asteroid about to hit the United States and if it hits, everybody understands on its current path it's going to devastate 330,000,000 people and destroy all their stuff, so we've got to build a complex set of activities to shoot it down out of the sky. <b>Guest:</b> Let's back up for a moment.  His claim can't be dismissed this easily. Resources had to be spent to fight the war.  Resources had to be spent to destroy the asteroid.  Resources have to be spent for corn subsidies.  Resources have to be spent and are being spent today with borrowed money.  That money has to be repaid.  The need to repay is a burden.  It's not reduced as a burden just because it's funded with money borrowed today and taxes put off into the future.  Would Krugman say--I suspect he would not--but would he say, let's suppose the war were funded out of current taxes, going back to your previous example.  You wouldn't say: Oh, you are paying those taxes to ourselves, therefore these people who worry about the cost of the war, they are absurd because most of that money is being paid to us.  It's still a cost. Again, it may be worthwhile.  We can agree it's worthwhile.  That doesn't mean it's not costly. It doesn't mean it's not a burden--on the people who pay the tax. And this is the problem.  Because current taxpayers, participants in the political process, by being able to borrow through government are able to consume more today than they otherwise would could.  Oh! I get to have whatever goodies the government is going to give me today! Without my taxes! Or anyone else's taxes rising today!  Then, that creates an incentive, because we all like to spend other people's money, an incentive to spend the more today.  So, at some level, the fact that the burden can be pushed off to other people, particularly people who aren't voting now--they are voting only in the future if they vote at all.  They can't even identify themselves. That creates a not-logically necessary but it creates a politically-likely scenario in which the government does spend more money than otherwise. It does use up more resources today on projects today that it would not otherwise engage in, if those projects had to be funded out of current taxes. Because they don't have to be funded out of current taxes, then government spending rises higher than it would otherwise rise.  You cannot say that the cost of those programs, whether they are necessary or not, disappears just because taxpayers in the future will be the ones who see their tax bills rising to pay off the debts when the bonds come to be redeemed. And that's what Krugman wants to say: Oh, you people are so dumb; you don't realize, that you see we are paying it to ourselves so it is not a real cost.  Again, that's easy to see when you recognize it.  You wouldn't say that if the programs were being funded out of current taxes.  You wouldn't say: There's no real cost to this program because you see, we are taxing some Americans and giving the proceeds to other Americans.  So, it's not costly!  Of course it's costly. The cost is being paid by the people who have to pay higher taxes.  It makes no difference at all whether those taxpayers are existing and paying taxes in the current fiscal period or if they exist and pay the taxes in the future fiscal periods. They are the ones who pay. And the burden is no lower; in fact it is probably higher because the incentives for government to spend more money today are raised due to the fact that the cost can be pushed off into the future.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:02:11</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, the way I see it--I think that's beautiful but here's the way I would suggest to challenge Krugman's view. And I really hope Mr. Krugman responds even if he doesn't want to be a guest on the program. Or some of his friends will, I'm sure.  So, I invite people who think he's right to comment on this podcast in the comment section.  But the way I think about it is: It's a slippery slope of intellectual reasoning to think that we owe it to ourselves.  Because on the surface, it would seem to justify any size of government spending, because there is no burden. For example, let's say it would cost a trillion dollars to fight off the invaders or destroy the asteroid, or whatever it is.  A trillion. But let's suppose the government decides, out of political reasons, to spend $4 trillion. Make a much bigger effort.  Turns out to be a mistake.  Turns out it isn't necessary. Turns out we could have just spend $1 trillion.  But, while we are borrowing, let's borrow $4 trillion. <b>Guest:</b> And this is why. If people believe the Krugman view, then they are more likely to accept that. "Oh, well, we owe it to ourselves."  Then why would they care how much government spends?  If it's not a real cost, if we owe it to ourselves, then by all means reduce that risk even further by spending not just $1 trillion but $4 trillion.  Why not $40 trillion, because we all owe it to ourselves; it's not really costly?  <b>Russ:</b> And, if the government borrowed enough money, as each individual borrower decides whether it's worthwhile or not--and one of the complications we've left out here, which I suspect would be part of Krugman's defense or someone else's defense--is that interest rates would perhaps be different if you went to borrow $4 trillion versus $1 trillion.  You'd have to pull resources out of the buyers of the bonds to induce them to offer $4 trillion; you'd have to offer them a higher interest rate than if you were only doing $1 trillion. I worry that that complicates things.  Put that to the side. If the government goes and borrows $4 trillion, that means there's less stuff that's created today. If they requisition not just the airplanes for the war, but the cars, too, just in case, you wouldn't say: Well, because we're going to pay back, say, the car owners--suppose we borrow the money to buy the cars from the private sector rather than confiscate them. So, again: three methods. We can borrow the money today to buy the cars from people so we have them to use for the war. Turns out not necessary, totally unproductive. We could tax people today to get the money to buy the cars. Or we could just confiscate the cars. In all three cases, we don't get the benefits of using the cars.  We hope that it's there's a benefit from defending ourselves, but if it's a mistake, if it turns out that we shouldn't have taken the cars out of circulation and all they did was sit around in government parking lots, you wouldn't want to say: Well, if we used borrowing to finance them, then it didn't cost anything.  It obviously cost us the fact that we didn't have our cars. People who paid for it, it would be different. In the confiscation case, it's the people who own the cars. In the current taxation case, it would be the people paying current taxes. And in the debt case, it's people paying taxes tomorrow. Those are the people who finance the use of cars in the war. You wouldn't want to say there's no burden. <b>Guest:</b> Take a simpler case.  Suppose government changes transportation policy: it just requisitions cars from people in the top 50% and gives those cars to people in the bottom 50%. So, we are just giving it to ourselves.  Now, you can think it is a good policy. And I will concede for argument's sake here--let's assume it is a good policy.  God dictates it's a good policy. So, we all agree it's a good policy.  That does not mean that that policy does not cost Americans anything.  It costs the people whose resources are confiscated. It costs the car owners whose titles to those cars and ability to use those cars are stripped from them. And the fact that the cars are given to other Americans does nothing to reduce the burden of those people who have to pay for the policy. <b>Russ:</b> I don't know if that's a good example or not.  I don't know if I agree with that.  I agree with your point, but I would argue that's probably different than what we've been talking about in that that's a reallocation. At least you can argue, correctly, that the total number of cars hasn't changed in the United States. <b>Guest:</b> Well, but if government had this power to do this kind of requisitioning, what would happen to the amount of requisitioning that it does. That's a marginal tax point. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> But the point of my example here--I agree, it's a little bit different than the debt thing--is simply to point out that just because the person who is taxed--in my example, a car is taken from him or her--is a citizen of the same country who gets the  proceeds of that tax--the other American who gets the keys and the title to the car--that does not mean that there's no burden.  That Americans in fact pay no price, that there's no cost to this program.  There is a cost; it's borne by the people who lose their cars. <b>Russ:</b> I think Krugman would agree with you there. <b>Guest:</b> I don't think he will. I think he would  be consistent. He wouldn't. He's saying that there is no burden except for the marginal tax rate point: there's no burden when in the future, future taxpayers are taxed in order to pay future bond holders. What's the difference? Okay, they are in the future. So? <b>Russ:</b> I think he'd say-- <b>Guest:</b> I think he clearly does not want the two--and we're picking on Krugman here; this is the view held by a lot of people prior to when Buchanan wrote-- <b>Russ:</b> Correct-- <b>Guest:</b> Krugman's just resurrected it.  Krugman does not want the two to be the same.  But I think they are the same in important respects.  Not in all respects. But in the essential respect that just because the people who have resources confiscated or are citizens of the same country to whom those resources are transferred, does nothing to reduce the burden of the program. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:09:24</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Well, I'm not sure.  But the point I want to make a slightly different point that I think gives Krugman his due. And I think Krugman is consistent in a way you've suggested is inconsistent. I think fundamentally what the defenders of debt spending are saying today--the sovereign debt issue we're not going to talk about--obviously everybody agrees, people who want bigger U.S. government debt now, and those of us who are opposed to it, that if you make it too big, you could eventually risk default.  The debate right now is: Is it too big now? There's arguments on both sides.  You could argue that we're in perilous waters; you could argue there's nothing to worry about. I wish we had time to talk about; but we don't.  I want to make a different point. I think the fundamental reason that Krugman makes the argument that he does, and people like him, who are arguing for bigger debt, is that when they say there is no burden, I think fundamentally they are talking about aggregate demand.  <b>Guest:</b> Yes, yes, yes. <b>Russ:</b> I think they are saying--the reason there is no "burden"--I am going to call them Keynesians.  I am going to get away from poor Mr. Krugman. He's certainly a Keynesian.  Let's talk about Keynesians generally. Keynesians are worried about aggregate demand.  And they are worried about spending. Those of us who are classical argue that that's misplaced emphasis, and maybe often wrong. But certainly  a misplaced emphasis, in that while it is certainly true that in the future, when bondholders are repaid by taxpayers, there's no net change in aggregate demand <i>then</i>, that doesn't mean it's free.  And of course, where I think, what is strange about that view of the Keynesians is that it's also true today. That when we issue bonds today, we are taking money from one group of Americans and giving it to the others, the people who are hired by the government or who benefit from government spending. In that sense, it's a wash on the surface, in terms of aggregate demand. They have to argue that: Well, the people who lent the money were going to keep it under their mattress or some other unproductive thing--and that's an interesting argument. We've had conversations with people about that before. But I think just fundamentally, intuitively why they ultimately look to the future and say this is not a burden is because they are saying: Well, aggregate demand is going to be preserved, so the economy is healthy, and we are going to get back on track. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, I agree with that. And even if we concede both the centrality of aggregate demand in a Keynesian way, we concede when American A pays American B, that does not--and I agree. That's what motivates a lot of this.  By looking at aggregate demand, they so: Oh, because we owe it to ourselves, there is no threat to the economy.  That <i>may</i> be true.  That's a separate issue in macroeconomics.  But it's very dangerous.  Particularly for someone who has a public voice, of the kind that Krugman has. Very dangerous because it's wrong to say-- <b>Russ:</b> Maybe-- <b>Guest:</b> wrong to say that debt owed to ourselves is not a real burden.  It makes it appear as if, at least to the careless listener, as if someone like Krugman is saying: Well, you know, it's not costless at all. As long as we borrow money from Americans and then tax Americans to pay that, then that somehow gives us an ability to get something for free. We get it for free.  We don't have to pay for it. Well, if people believe you can get something for free and don't have to pay for it: Why not? Why would you pay? <b>Russ:</b> There's no budget constraint. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:13:32</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's come full circle. Let's try to take it back to the family level. Which Keynesians-- <b>Guest:</b> Krugman-- <b>Russ:</b> do not accept.  My punchline, and the reason I don't like your car example, is that I think that's a reallocation of happiness and wellbeing among Americans.  And you can debate whether that's good or just or whatever. <b>Guest:</b> And all I'm saying is it's costly.  It has a cost. <b>Russ:</b> I understand. But I think the Keynesians would accept that. I think part of  the confusion in this issue is definition of cost and definition of burden.  And we've given our implicit definition. <b>Guest:</b> It is an intricate issue. <b>Russ:</b> But I'm going to cut through all that.  And again, I'm going to talk about an expansion of government spending, not a reallocation of private consumption.  A family who goes into debt on a get-rich scheme that is flawed. So, I go out and I borrow a huge amount of money to buy up an inventory of a product I think is going to be a world-changer.                                                                                                                            And it's a loser, it turns out. No one wants to buy it.  <b>Guest:</b> You buy a warehouse full of chocolate pickles. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, exactly. That's a mistake.  And whether I fund that out of debt, with debt--that is, future consumption--or I say to my family: We are going to move into a really small house and we are not going to be able to go out to eat, and nobody can buy clothes and if you get holes in your socks and your shoes, too bad, because we are making an investment.  We are going to be fabulously rich, because these chocolate pickles are going to be a huge success.  It doesn't matter whether I borrow the money or whether I give up my consumption today.  There's a cost to me, and all that really matters is whether chocolate-covered pickles are a hit. If they are a hit, it's only a question of when I pay for that investment. <b>Guest:</b> Yep. <b>Russ:</b> And I would argue--the part where I think both you and I agree and where we disagree with the Keynesians, is that if government goes out and does something gloriously productive like save us from an asteroid that is going to destroy us, it doesn't matter whether it's financed by taxes today or taxes tomorrow. If it's a good use of money, the only difference is who bears the burden of the debt. If it goes and buys chocolate covered pickles because it thinks those protect us from an asteroid--that's a bad example--because they think it's going to improve the health of the nation, it doesn't matter whether it's taxed or borrowed.  It's a bad use of real resources today. <b>Guest:</b> Right. [more to come: 1:16:11]
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>
                        
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Acemoglu on Why Nations Fail</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/03/acemoglu_on_why.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9658</id>

    <published>2012-03-19T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-03-23T13:38:15Z</updated>

    <summary> Daron Acemoglu of MIT and author (with James Robinson) of Why Nations Fail talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in his book: why some nations fail and others succeed, why some nations grow over time and...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Daron Acemoglu" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Law and Institutions" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Political Science" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Poverty and Development" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu" target="new">Daron Acemoglu</a> of MIT and author (with James Robinson) of <i>Why Nations Fail</i> talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the ideas in his book: why some nations fail and others succeed, why some nations grow over time and sustain that growth, while others grow and then stagnate.  Acemoglu draws on an exceptionally rich set of examples over space and time to argue that differences in institutions--political governance and the inclusiveness of the political and economic system--explain the differences in economics success across nations and over time. Acemoglu also discusses how institutions evolve and the critical role institutional change plays in economic success or failure. Along the way, he explains why previous explanations for national economic success are inadequate. The conversation closes with a discussion of the implications of the arguments for foreign aid and attempts by the wealthy nations to help nations that are poor. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Acemoglunations.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Acemoglu on Why Nations Fail','Russ Roberts and Daron Acemoglu',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 56:40</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Acemoglunations.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 26.1 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu" target="new">Daron Acemoglu's Home page</a>

<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0307719219" target="new"><i>Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty</i></a>, by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.  Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html" target="new">An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations</a>, by <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Smith.html" target="new">Adam Smith</a>. Free at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Ivans-War-Life-Death-1939-1945/dp/0312426526/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331787317&sr=1-1/" target="new"><i>Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945</i></a>, by Catherine Merridale. Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html" target="new">Mercantilism</a>, by Laura LaHaye. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IndustrialRevolutionandtheStandardofLiving.html" target="new">Industrial Revolution and the Standard of Living</a>, by Clark Nardinelli. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Schumpeter.html" target="new">Joseph Schumpeter</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/North.html" target="new">Douglass North</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/04/ravitch_on_educ.html" target="new">Ravitch on Education</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/08/weingast_on_vio.html" target="new">Weingast on Violence, Power, and a Theory of Nearly Everything</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/02/easterly_on_gro.html" target="new">Easterly on Growth, Poverty, and Aid</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/01/collier_on_the.html" target="new">Collier on the Bottom Billion</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/03/mccloskey_on_ca.html" target="new">McCloskey on Capitalism and the Bourgeois Virtues</a>. EconTalk podcast. [Sound quality issues but an interesting podcast with discussion of the Middle Ages.]
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/02/brook_on_vermee.html" target="new">Brook on Vermeer's Hat and the Dawn of Global Trade</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: March 14, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Your book is an unbelievably ambitious and sweeping account of historical economic issues.  What are you trying to explain?  What are you trying to understand and illuminate with this book? <b>Guest:</b> I think one of the key questions that gets many people into social science is the same one that Adam Smith pulls: <i>The Wealth of Nations</i>, why some countries are poor, why some countries are rich. Two hundred and fifty years or so after Adam Smith wrote the book that shaped economics, the puzzle is deeper. The gaps between rich and poor nations have widened, even though we live in a very integrated world.  And we haven't developed a satisfactory and comprehensive answer to what factors are at the root of these differences and why there are such glaring gaps in prosperity across nations.  That's the question that we are trying to answer in this book. <b>Russ:</b> There are a number of attempts that have been made to explain it.  And of course it's possible there isn't one theory that explains everything.  But we, as human beings, seem to be drawn to single-idea theories.  Talk about some of the alternative explanations that you reject in the book that have been prominent and used to explain growth and poverty. <b>Guest:</b> I used to say there are as many theories on this as the number of authors who wrote on it, and then I realized that some of them do more than one theory.  <b>Russ:</b> That's right. <b>Guest:</b> So, there are a huge number of them.  But there are a couple of those that are very influential when you look at the writings of academics or pundits or journalists.  One of them that perhaps is the least favorite among academics but still kind of has a presence is the geography hypothesis, that some places are rich because they have a favorable climate or-- <b>Russ:</b> Natural resources-- <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, good natural resources. And so on. And I think the evidence doesn't support that.  There's a very interesting thesis that Jared Diamond's <i>Guns, Germs, and Steel</i> sort of formulated, which is that really the geographic factors determined where early civilizations blossomed, and that, almost in a deterministic way, shaped which societies are more developed today. And we go in detail about why we sort of disagree with the thesis and why it's not really capable of explaining the patterns of what we see around us today; but they are interesting sort of variants of this. But the one that I think is more kind of popular among journalists and academics is a sort of cultural hypothesis. Max Weber was the person who developed the most famous example of this, or the Protestant ethic and constructive process; and Catholics. That's not as popular perhaps today.  But if you sort of ask people why China is doing so well: Well, it is about Chinese culture.  Why the Mexicans aren't doing so well or why sub-Saharan Africa is poor: It's all about national cultures or some cultural traits shared by a variety of individuals; or it would be Muslim versus non-Muslim.  And again, we try to explain why such explanations are very limited. China has had the same Chinese culture but it did extremely badly under Mao-- <b>Russ:</b> For a few centuries-- <b>Guest:</b> Sorry? <b>Russ:</b> They did extremely badly for a few centuries. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, but even more recently, they did extremely badly 40 years ago when they had terrible incentives under Mao, and suddenly started doing well when the incentives changed. And all the while the same people in Hong Kong were doing very well. That should tell you something.  But the one I think is most popular among perhaps the listeners to this podcast, or more broadly among economists, is what we call in the book the                                                                         Ignorance Hypothesis. And we are sort of naturally drawn to that as academics because our business is to think of good policies and judge which policies are bad, and so we think that that's really important. Many of us--not me--but many of us do advise governments so we think that the advice that governments get is really important.  So, if only Greece listened to the right advice, or if only Ireland did the right policy, or the U.S. President had the right policy. <b>Russ:</b> There's something to that. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  Obviously we, as economists, know, can analyze policy better; there's good policy and there's bad policy. But what we try to articulate in the book is when you look at the policies and choices that are most consequential for economic development, they don't get it wrong by mistake. They get it wrong by design.  It's not that people don't know what's good or what's bad, but just like Mugabe choosing policies that would destroy the economy with 100,000% inflation, and total chaotic land grabs--they are not about achieving prosperity for the nation.  They are either clinging to power at any cost or enriching a specific group of people, including themselves, at the expense of the rest of society.  So, that's the sense in which we say they get it wrong not by mistake, not by ignorance, but by design. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">6:24</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> How would you categorize the arguments where people say--and we're going to come to your explanation in a second--well, we know what causes prosperity: it's the rule of law, private property, incentives with decentralized price system; and yet often when those "solutions" are put in place where they had not been before, nations don't prosper. Eastern Europe, Russia, being an obvious example.  Now, two possibilities: One is that they didn't implement the policy; and the second is something else was missing.  Where do you come down on that debate? <b>Guest:</b> Actually, I think it would be useful to come to our explanation. In answering that question I think we'll come to it in your next question. <b>Russ:</b> Go for it. <b>Guest:</b> Our explanation is that these things are really important: prosperity is created by incentives, and incentives are created by institutions. So, private property is very important, markets are very important, freedom to trade is very important.  But, our explanation really sort of departs perhaps from some of the versions of the stories. These things don't exist in a vacuum.  They need to be also supported by political institutions; and they need to be effective. So, what happens is if you take a society that's dysfunctional, say, for example, Russia, and on top of it you just foist a privatization scheme because that's going to take you closer to-- <b>Russ:</b> prosperity-- <b>Guest:</b> to a market economy, what you are doing is you are taking an entire ill-distributed system of political power and then you are just giving people one more ability to grab assets.  And what you get is not a market allocation, where assets go to the people with the best use and people can sell it and buy and sell in whatever way they want; but the people who are politically connected are able to grab these very useful state assets very cheap.  And you end up with millions of oligarchs.  So, I think that's a good parable for how our view differs from--just worry about markets being open and don't worry about anything else. You really need to worry about the political system and the social context in which those markets are situated. <b>Russ:</b> So, I think that's undeniably true.  It reminds me of a podcast with Diane Ravitch; we were talking about educational reform, and she's very critical of attempts to introduce business models or incentives in education. And I came to the realization that it's not dissimilar from these issues in development, where what appears to be a good solution, incentives, if it doesn't have the embedded other pieces that emerge naturally with institutions, the incentives don't work very well. Or worse, they end up being perverse. <b>Guest:</b> Right, exactly. <b>Russ:</b> I'm thinking about Enron or California's attempt to create an energy market, which was highly--it really wasn't anything like a market except that it had prices.  So it's like a market but it didn't have all the other parts of a market that matter. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. I think the problem is two-fold, and I think that's very important.  One is that it's not going to work--for exactly the same reasons as the Russian one didn't. Because you introduce market, supposedly--prices--but in the end that's just a facade.  Still in the background power is so unequally distributed, the connections matter so much, that people are going to make the allocations not on the basis of those prices but on the basis of who actually has the information about which state assets are being sold for cheap and can shut out other competitors. And so on.  The second thing is that you may even get it to work momentarily.  You may be able to have a market economy foisted upon a system in which political power is extremely unequally distributed and is in the hands of a small minority; but then at some point they are going to have the incentives and say: Why don't we start playing around with the market incentives so we actually are benefited ourselves? Why don't we start putting entry barriers so that people don't compete against us; why don't we start grabbing some of the assets that people have now built with these market incentives.  And once the realization of that possibility comes, of course the entire incentive system implied by the markets and property rights are going to collapse because of the political system is going to interfere. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">11:22</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> To give the listeners a little bit of the feel for the analysis, talk about Nogales, Arizona and its Mexican counterpart and how--it's only one data point of course, but it illustrates why other explanations are not so satisfying and how your explanation has a chance of being a better explanation. <b>Guest:</b> I think it's a very simple example, and you can find several others.  When you compare two societies at two different ends of the world, there are so many things that differ; and if somebody wants to say, no, it's not really the incentives, not really the institutions, but it's the culture or the geography, one can--it's very difficult to argue against it in a conclusive manner.  But if you look at a society that's ethnically, culturally, geographically very homogeneous but you divide it through a border and you set different sets of laws and incentives on one side than another, then you have something that's almost like a natural experiment.  You can see how two different parts that are otherwise similar are performing under institutions.  South Korea versus North Korea, Nogales, AZ versus Nogales, Sonora are examples that we can come up with.  And you can see, you cross the border and you suddenly enter into a very dilapidated part, much lower levels of income, people are not in school, they have low health, buildings are in worse situation; and north of the border it's entirely different. Because one part is part of the U.S. institutions and benefits from all of those incentives and businesses from the rest of the United States. And south it's much less. <b>Russ:</b> And the counterpoint to that would be--again going back to the stupidity explanation--well, they have bad policies in Mexico, they have bad policies in North Korea.  I really like your point--we touched on this in a podcast with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita as well. It's not so much that they don't know what the best policies are.  It's that they can't get there from here. They've got certain public choice and institutional barriers which don't, to the outsider, especially to the international economist who looks over and says: Oh, this is easy to fix; we'll just do x, y, and z. Again, in those contexts, North Korea and Mexico--why don't better policies help those people? Why can't they get there from here? <b>Guest:</b> I would say our theory has three parts.  One part is about how institutions and through them the incentives are central. These comparisons, Nogales versus Nogales, North Korea, they are about showing that these institutional factors are important. The second part of the theory is about why are these institutions there in the first place. And there is where we argue it's not stupidity, not ignorance; it's really conflict of interest or people who control power as politicians or as leaders or business leaders or whatever of the country, are having their preferred policies imposed on society, even if it's not good for society. And the third part is about how is it that those institutions change over time and why some societies have ended up with one set of institutions versus another. So, in some sense the Nogales comparison is all about showing it's about institutions; but to argue that it's really not stupidity but more structural factors, we need to look at other historical episodes.  But I think this case is very clear when you look at it.  It's very difficult to make the case that the reason why Liberia did so badly under Charles Taylor or Zimbabwe is doing so badly under Mugabe or the Democratic Republic of the Congo--or Zaire as it was then called--under Mobutu has very little to do with these leaders not  knowing that was good or not being able somehow to get the right advice.  It had everything to do with the fact that these were very rapacious leaders; they were just interested in their own power and enriching themselves, which they have all done with great aplomb. And they were able to do so and at the expense of the rest of society.  Sure, the contrast when you look at Greece versus, I don't know, Austria, is not as stark as when you compare Zimbabwe to Botswana; but it's still there.  It's hard to make the case that Greek leaders for the last 20 years were just uninformed about what was good for the economy or somehow unable to get the right advice.  But there was a lot of corruption; they didn't want to do the hard choices; they wanted to benefit from the transfers coming from the European Union, which painting a rosy picture to the population; and they were able to get people to go along with it. <b>Russ:</b> So, the obvious challenge to that, and you deal with it in the book, but I want to let you give the answer, is: Well, if you are exploiting your people--and the phrase you use is "extractive"--if you are extracting resources from the rest of the country for you and your friends, you'd think you'd rather have a bigger pie to take your share from than a smaller pie. So at one level there's a puzzle as to why these autocrats, who care only about themselves, and no one is naive about that--why don't they just pass good economic policies and take more? <b>Guest:</b> I  think that's a great question, an actual question that economists have asked. And I think the wrong answer that some economists developed in the past is to say: Well, institutions will gravitate toward being efficient because you can always separate maximizing the size of the pie from its distribution, and nobody would turn down something that would increase the size of the pie.  And the reason that's not the right answer is because resources, the distribution of the pie, the sharing of the pie, is not separable from what its size is.  And we classify the reasons for that into two in the book: we call them economic losers and political losers. Economic losers is actually an idea that's very familiar to economists, and I think a lot of people will sympathize with that, which is that many times the things that increase the size of the pie will come with a sort of Schumpeterian creative destruction. New people will come in with new ideas and replace the rents of monopolists, or the earnings of workers who have specific skill for the old technologies; and we know that happens all the time.  But we argue in the book that even the more important problem is what we call political losers; and by that what we mean is that many times the changes that will make the pie bigger also change the distribution of political power.  And the distribution of political power is actually even more primitive.  Because after all, if all you had to do was keep your power and then some new technology comes, you can always try to use your political power to get some of the rent. But the real tragic thing if you are a leader that is just interested in your own bottom line, is that the changes are also going to unseat you.  And that's what the political losers are about, and what we try to show through historical example is that many of the fundamental transformative technologies and many of the institutional changes that unleash economic growth throughout history have come together with changes that weaken the political power of rulers.  And that's why they've been resisted by rulers. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">19:52</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I just want to mention to listeners--there's no way in a one-hour conversation that we can do justice to the scope and breadth of this book. It's a little short of 500 pages, but the historical richness of it is quite extraordinary. It spans time and place in an incredibly ambitious way, and in a very informative way. <b>Guest:</b> Some would say too ambitious. <b>Russ:</b> That's true.  That's one of the challenges of a theory of everything--that you are trying to make everything fall in there, or at least a large number of things, and so I'm sure there are people who quibble or complain a lot about any one particular example. But I think the success of the book is the volume of  those examples and the richness with which you discuss them.  Let me ask you a question along the way. The book is called <i>Why Nations Fail</i>. I'm curious why you called it that instead of "Why Nations Succeed." Any particular answer there? <b>Guest:</b> Yeah; it's a very boring and bad answer, because "Why Nations Succeed" doesn't sound as good. <b>Russ:</b> Succeed is not as attractive in its cadence. <b>Guest:</b> <i>Why Nations Fail</i> has this sort of a single-wordish feeling. The right title is: Why Some Nations Fail and Others Succeed. But that's just a mouthful. <b>Russ:</b> Or: <i>An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.</i> <b>Guest:</b> Somebody had taken that one. <b>Russ:</b> Of course, you can't copyright a title, but it's awkward I think to take a title from someone else. <b>Guest:</b> And a little pretentious, I would say. <b>Russ:</b> But that's Adam Smith's--that's the full title of Smith's book <i>The Wealth of Nations</i>. <b>Guest:</b> Just like someone in macro writing today a book called <i>The General Theory</i>. A little pretentious. <b>Russ:</b> So, how do you see your work relating to Smith? Because there are certain overlaps.  <b>Guest:</b> He's a beacon.  So, I think Smith, much more than anybody else, had it right. He had a lot of things right.  But what he didn't do is that he sort of didn't go to the political level.  He really understood how incentives work, he really understood the role of economic institutions.  So, essentially what we describe as inclusive [?] economic institutions versus extractive economic institutions is more or less what Smith describes.  Of course, there have been changes since then. We put more emphasis on innovation, the power of innovation to transform. <b>Russ:</b> There's been a lot more. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, we've seen much more of that. Things like equal access to education so that people can depart [?] of the modern technology, that doesn't feature as much in Smith because the times were different.  But there are remarkable parallels.  But what Smith sort of doesn't engage so much with is: How is it that you make this type of economic institutions stick and emerge?  And that's where our notions of inclusive and extractive political institutions come in.  That's where we sort of build on Smith and expand on him.  Not that he was unaware of it. He has a famous passage from another work, from a letter, I think: In peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice--as sort of the three factors underlying it and you can sort of recognize them as political factors at some level. But that's not where he goes.  The other person on whom we build very heavily is Douglass North; and did put a lot of emphasis on both political and economic institutions. But we sort of go further, I think, than Doug North, and try to understand why some institutions emerge in some places and the interplay between economic and some political institutions. <b>Russ:</b> To be fair to North, his work with Weingast and Wallace--we did a podcast with Barry Weingast on this-- <b>Guest:</b> Fantastic stuff-- <b>Russ:</b> They emphasize open and closed orders where people have access to political and economic power.  It's not too  dissimilar to your pluralism. <b>Guest:</b> No.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">24:02</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Give a little, flesh out a little bit more, your view of government as a healthy institution, because I don't want readers to misunderstand your thesis.  You believe that a strong government is crucial, but not too strong. <b>Guest:</b> You need to have a government that's strong enough to impose law and order                                                                                        , regulate things it needs to regulate. But at the same time, the government needs to be, a). checked--that's the same idea, goes to our Founding Fathers, checks and balances, restraints on power; but also it needs to be responsive to a broad cross-section of society.  In other words, what we call in the book, pluralism.  Or a different way of putting it, there needs to be a broad political equality in society. So, you won't get good political institutions from which inclusive economic institutions will follow if political power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow group, be they unions, the businessmen, landowners, an ethnic minority-- <b>Russ:</b> the military-- <b>Guest:</b> that's not going to be conducive. You need everybody to have a political voice. And that political competition will sort of rule out policies and choices that will enrich one group at the expense of the rest. <b>Russ:</b> Now let's take some specific examples.  Many of them are quite fascinating, and we can't get into all of them.  Let's start with the Black Death. Not many times I get to say in a podcast, "Let's start with the Black Death." One of the things that you are interested in is the evolution of institutions.  It's not enough just to say these guys had good institutions, these guys had bad. You talk a lot about critical junctures and some path-dependency throughout history.  Why was the Black Death, which was a nasty plague that swept through Europe--what did it do to the institutions? <b>Guest:</b> I think, taking a step backwards, I said we talk about the three pillars of our theory, the role of institutions, why bad institutions emerge and stick around, why these extractive institutions are not mistakes but are by design; and then the third is how they actually change. Where we put the emphasis on how they change is the same sort of conflicts that are inherent and lead to extractive institutions sort of emerging and persisting also mean that there will be people who try to bring down those extractive institutions.  There will be those who bring them down so they can build their own extractive institutions, or sometimes people will try to sort of get themselves out from under those institutions, to get some relief from the extractions.  And many of these conflictual periods sort of come to a head during periods of what we call critical junctures--if you want to think of it as social and political disequilibrium period, when a shock hits and the existing balance is disrupted. And at those points, these existing paths of institutions will interact at these critical junctures, leading to a divergence. Because in some places the conflict will resolve in one way and in other places in another way. So, the Black Death is one of the examples that we start off things to illustrate how this works--a huge plague that really ravaged the population of Asia and Europe, but mostly we focus on Europe. And really shook the foundations of the existing feudal regime. What happened when the Black Death hit, of course there were millions of people, up  to perhaps a third or more than a third of the population of many parts of Europe perished.  But it also changed the economic landscape in a major way. So, Europe was in a manorial system based on servile labor at the time; and many of these people died, both in the countryside and in the cities.  So, through the usual economic channels, the demand for labor increased.  There was much more land per worker and much more work in the urban areas for a worker to do as a result of the decline in population. <b>Russ:</b> The supply of labor decreased. <b>Guest:</b> The supply of labor diminished big time.  So, now this created two opposing forces.  One of them is that the elites, who were the masters of this servile labor, now they had an interest in extracting even more surplus out  of the labor, because the marginal product of the labor was higher. If there was a free labor market, wages would have increased because supply went down, as you just said. So, now if wages are high, I can take even more of that.  But against that, once labor became more scarce, political power increased.  More pull from urban areas; you could bargain with your employer because your employer was really dependent on you--you were the only employee that he had.  And other feudal lords or cities were trying to attract as many laborers as possible. Now, which of these two opposing forces are going to come out dominant? Well, that depended on the political path and the social/economic path that they've taken. And the contrast that we give is between Western Europe, England, and Eastern Europe.  What happened in Western Europe was that the cities were strong enough and there were already protections for peasants for a variety of reasons and because of some of the peasant uprisings, that actually the workers were able to sort of get the better hand. And many of them actually gained their independence and reductions in the dues that they had to pay to their lords and so on.  Whereas what happened in Eastern Europe                                                                                    was that actually this was a prelude to the second serfdom, where the obligations of the serfs became even more onerous.  So that's sort of the illustration of the critical juncture and how it plays out; but of course its implications for the development of Europe were major because that was the collapse of the feudal regime, and the market economy started building as all of these labor obligations and bonded labor started leaving the scene in places like England, France, and so on. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">31:19</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I'm going to ask you a very complicated two-part question. You answered one question that's bothered me as an amateur historian: there was a point in history--this was probably 1500s, shortly after the Black Death--where there were three dominant, very successful countries in Europe.  And high standards of living for at least a small part of the population.  Differed by country, of course, in how much it was spread.  But England, Spain, and Holland--the Netherlands--were all very successful at this point. Or at least had shown a lot of growth.  They had done a lot better than they had before that.  We go forward a few hundred years later--and Deirdre McCloskey has a very interesting argument--it's also very ambitious--that this was a cultural change.  I'll let you throw in a critique of that if you like it. A certain tolerance for commercial life became apparent at that point, or emerged, and that allowed some of these countries to succeed. Particularly in the Netherlands and in England.  And this became eventually the Industrial Revolution, and yet England dominates over that time period, and Spain fades away as an international power, national economic force.  And Holland becomes a much sleepier place.  How do we explain that very broad procession of history, and in particular, you focus on why the Industrial Revolution had its home in England. I'll give  you 90 seconds.  No, you could have a little more time.  Obviously we could spend two hours just on that, but take a stab. <b>Guest:</b> Right. I'm going to give a very short answer. <b>Russ:</b> It's in the book; folks, if you want to read the book-- <b>Guest:</b> That's the 90-second answer.  But I think the answer is very instructive.  Spain is benefiting a lot from the New World trade.  But look at <i>who</i> is benefiting from the New World trade.  It's the Crown.  Actually the Crown is getting stronger in Spain.  The Parliament, Cortez is never called because the Crown is so powerful. Whereas in England, the gains from Atlantic trade, because of the way that the English monarchy had previously bargained with Parliament and passed laws, is not the monopoly of the Crown.  And so it enriches many of the groups that are most opposed to the Crown.  And they want their independence.  And as a result, the same process that is leading to enrichment but political closing down in Spain is leading to a series of institutional changes that bring constitutional monarchy and the beginning of what we call inclusive institutions in England. And it is--those inclusive institutions are sort of enshrined in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and 1689, that really are directly leading to the changes in incentives and changes in market structure that underpin the Industrial Revolution that starts 50 years ahead.  I think it's very difficult to see how culture is such a driver here. A lot of the cultural factors are developing slowly over time. In Europe there's a lot of shared culture, actually, at that time.  If you think of Enlightenment, for example, Enlightenment doesn't start in England, doesn't start in Scotland; the Dutch Enlightenment is perhaps the most path-breaking here, followed by the French.  Those are all important factors, but those are not the things that really make people throw themselves into finding innovations and                                                                                            spinning and weaving technologies, and mental energy, and engines that really transformed the British and English economy. <b>Russ:</b> I'll let Deirdre defend herself another time on the program, but I think what's striking in your treatment of this is when you catalog some of the incredible innovations that take place in England.  And many of them do take place in England.  Of course, you could be cherry-picking the data; I don't think you are.  I think the dominant, and I think there's a consensus on this, that the dominant innovations did come from England.  If I remember correctly you argue that they came from England because they had an incentive to find them.  And everybody else had less of an incentive. <b>Guest:</b> And some of them actually came from people who emigrated to England from other places.  They did so because the same innovations would not have been rewarded--in fact would have been punished in other parts of the world.  So, we give the example of Puffin, for example, who also made very important advances in the steam engine. But his innovations would not have been allowed, and he was trying to emigrate to England because he thought: That's the only place where I can actually make these things true.  He died before he could do that. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">36:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, to push the mix of geography and culture just for a second, and let you respond to it.  One of the things that's striking about your book--I remember as a young person, I don't remember how old I was, but I read <i>The Conquest of Peru,</i> by Prescott, which I think has uncertain historical accuracy.  But it's an utterly fascinating book.  May be a work of mostly fiction.  But it's fascinating, about this clash between the native people of Peru and the Conquistadors coming from Spain.  And what your book lays bare in a very brutal and important way is how badly--badly doesn't do justice to it--how brutally many of the colonizers treated the native people. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> You give the example of the Dutch in the East Indies not just subjugating the population, not forcing the patriation, but just murdering an enormous portion of them and leaving a few behind to help exploit the natural resources.  In the case of the Spanish in Latin America, in South America, just a brutal serfdom and slavery and extractive relationship. And then you contrast it with the British relationship in North America, and you are going to use that of course to understand the evolution of those two parts of the world; North versus South America turn out very differently decades and then centuries later. And you mention that, well, when the British got to Jamestown, they weren't able to subjugate the native population and they had to actually get along, and eventually trade.  Obviously there was a lot of exploitation and cruelty to the native American population, ultimately. But in the early days it was nothing like what was happening in Latin America. And similarly in the case of the Black Death, the political response is that the Crown in England, how they responded to these labor issues and were forced by competition in these market forces to share wealth and share power, didn't happen in Spain.  It does cross one's mind that maybe there's something unusual about Britain and the English. <b>Guest:</b> I think that's a very natural thing in people's thoughts.  Adam Smith also, Adam Smith on British colonies was very different.  Churchill wrote volumes on the history of the English-speaking people. <b>Russ:</b> Well, they would.  They are biased. <b>Guest:</b> But it's not true. It's not true. And that's what we try to sort of explain.  If you look at the history of the Jamestown colony, it's remarkable that the people who were the governors and the captains of the Virginia colony, their model of colonialization was identical to that of Pissarro and Cortez and all of the Conquistadors who went to the East.  They wanted to subjugate local populations and get food and gold from them.  They couldn't do that because there were no such populations to subjugate.  There was no gold, nothing to grab. Once they couldn't do that, they said: Okay, fine, let's not subjugate that population; let's bring our own sort of serfs from Europe. So bring people who were poor enough to sell themselves into indentured servitude, and they'll be the lower class and we'll be the upper class. They called them under different names, like [?] in Maryland. And that was going to be a very two-class society, very textbook extractive institutions.  That didn't work either.  So, it wasn't out of the goodness of their heart, but because once these people came in, because the environment was so different that there was the open frontier, you couldn't coerce them to stay.  They could go and try to find their own plot of land.  They made an about-face and they said: Okay, fine, now this doesn't work; we'll give you economic incentives. And then economic incentives were insufficient because these were the same people who were first trying to subjugate you at the [?]'s edge, and they said: Okay, fine, if you don't believe the economic incentives we'll also give you political incentives. We'll also let you have a general assembly, so that from now on you will be the rulers of this land.  And that's when sort of the very different institutional paths that later became the United States started. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">41:11</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I just was puzzled why the British were unable to enslave the native population.  Did they not send enough people? <b>Guest:</b> Oh, there wasn't enough native population. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, you think it was sparse. <b>Guest:</b> The power really draw there, was that in the same way the Spanish were not able to enslave the native population when they went to what is today Buenos Aires.  They went there; the people countered; they were the Charruas and the Guarani [?], and these people were very hunter-gatherers, very sparsely settled, just like the native Americans in North America.  And the Spanish couldn't enslave those either.  But the Spanish could go out to other parts where there were hierarchical, more densely-settled civilizations that they could enslave and subjugate.  But the Americans, the British, didn't have that.  And the British didn't have that precisely because they were latecomers to the game of colonialism. <b>Russ:</b> They got the worst-- <b>Guest:</b> You know, the Spaniards didn't want North America.  North America wasn't the prize colony. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that's because they didn't get the taxes and find all that oil.  But your basic point is obviously correct, that the gold and silver of South America was an incredibly seductive draw for Spain.  Tell me if this is accurate: One way to describe the difference between the British experience in North America and the Spanish experience in South America is that in North America it was much easier for the Indians to run away. Whereas in South America a lot of them had big, large population centers. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. But again, it's not because of the Spanish versus the British, the South versus the North.  The same thing happened exactly to the Spanish Conquistadors when they tried to colonize the area around Buenos Aires and Uruguay. The Charruas and the Guaranti [?] ran away. Because they were sparsely settled and they did not have very well-defined, settled hierarchies like the Aztecs or the Incas.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">43:22</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Shifting gears, Africa and South America are generally quite poor relative to North America.  But there are exceptions, which make it interesting. In South America you single out Chile and Argentina; and in Africa you single out Botswana.  What went right for those three? <b>Guest:</b> I wouldn't say Argentina, we single out in the same way. <b>Russ:</b> I guess you can't single out Argentina and Chile--I'm not sure you can "single out" two countries. <b>Guest:</b> Sure. But also I think the story for Argentina is very different, and it's a tale of caution as opposed to the Botswana case.  Let me say a few words about Botswana and then I'll come back to Argentina.  I think Botswana is very interesting.  It was one of the poorest countries at the time of independence; no great resources, at the time; very few educated people, no roads, no infrastructure.  It would have been on the list of everybody and it was on the list of everybody who didn't make a list, of countries that were going to go nowhere.  And then of course it became the fastest-growing country in the world. Why?  Well, one factor was that they discovered diamonds.  But that's not a factor, because they've been discovered everywhere in Africa,  and there's civil war and all sorts of bad things. But the key thing in Botswana--the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to have had this distinction--it has had an unblemished democratic record.  What happened was that it was one of the unique places in the colonial world where colonial powers, in this case the British, did not interfere with existing institutions, because they thought this was such a useless place, just a buffer zone, just leave it as it is. There were accidents, the contingent paths of history, that made them do so, which we go into detail about in the book; but through a variety of factors, the pre-colonial institutions in Botswana survived. And then one more lucky thing--the pre-colonial institutions in many places were pretty awful.  In Botswana, as these things go, they weren't so bad.  They were much more participatory, and there was some nascent amount of pluralism in Botswana. And it was that--they were again lucky perhaps because they had leaders that were not Mugabe and Mobutu.  Those pre-colonial tribal institutions became the basis of its democracy; the democracy functioned, people participated; and as a result there weren't strong enough incentives to adopt extractive institutions or plunder the diamond wealth or introduce marketing boards to drive the price of cattle--which was the main thing in Botswana--to zero, as they did in many other sub-Saharan countries.  And you see what happens when you give good incentives to a place like that--it just grew. So, I think that's a very instructive case. It shows what makes you distinctive is this ensemble of economic and political institutions.  It's not just free markets, but it's the fact that its democracy worked that made it possible, orthodox policies, good macroeonomic policies, free markets, and so on to survive. Now, the Argentina path is very different.  It's much more like Russia today. Argentina became very rich despite its extractive institutions because of resources.  And that then came back to bite it.  If you become very rich because of resources but your institutions are deeply extractive, the moment the resources go away or even before, the conflict is there and people are going to use the institutions for enriching themselves. And the history of Argentina in the 20th century has been coups and counter-coups. And when it has been democratic, it has been the worst kind of democracy. Now, where policies have been extremely populist and presidents who get elected--the elections have still used repression and quite dodgy policies and means to control power. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">47:42</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about the Soviet Union, because you spend quite a bit of time on it. I'm going to disagree with you a little bit on how you interpret it.  But give your explanation. You talk about how sometimes countries with extractive political and economic institutions can still grow. <b>Guest:</b> Let me bundle that together with China.  We discuss them separately in the book but they are very related, because today people are all enthusiastic about China, the Chinese economic model, the authoritarian growth model, and so on; and our interpretation for China is it's exactly like a version of the Soviet Union. Somewhat different; there are limits to the parallel. But the Soviet Union achieved extractive growth.  It used the state power to channel resources from agriculture into industry, and it could do so in a rapid way because agriculture was so unproductive and it had a lot of catch-up growth to do, because technology was so far ahead of where the Soviet Union was.  And by the forceful relocation of resources from agriculture to industry it achieved remarkable growth for about 40 years.  And we see China to be the same--it's a form of catch-up growth under extractive institutions, and the theory that Jim and I have is that unless China is able to fundamentally change its political institutions as well as strengthen the reforms it has already undertaken in its economic institutions, its growth, just like that of Soviet Russia, will be short-lived. <b>Russ:</b> My issue with that is that I'm not really short what kind of growth they actually had. An alternative explanation is there was a measurement issue, and it's really twofold.  One is that when they transferred those folks--and in this case they literally transferred them; it  wasn't so much of a market process; a little bit more in China than in the Soviet Union.  When people became part of industry rather than agriculture, a lot of the stuff that wasn't being measured, now was measured. Second, a lot of stuff was mismeasured.  I read, recently, a phenomenal book called <i>Ivan's War,</i> by Catherine Merridale. She chronicles the daily life of the Soviet soldier in WWII. One of the more interesting things is when the Soviet army reached places like Poland--Poland was the most dramatic one--soldiers couldn't believe the standard of living in Poland. Some of the natives responded to this and said: You should see Belgium. You think Poland's rich? When they get to Germany, they also were shocked at how rich it was, but they got comforted by the fact that, well, of course Germany was rich because they stole everything. They couldn't imagine that Germany could be a productive economy, anything like what they saw, because what they knew in their home life was so miserable. <b>Guest:</b> I think there's some truth to that. Soviet GDP in 1985, 1987, was probably exaggerated because a lot of things were so low-quality. <b>Russ:</b> Or unvalued. They had output, but they attached a number to it that people didn't. <b>Guest:</b> They produced a lot of tax. We put tax in our GDP, so they can put tax in their GDP. <b>Russ:</b> Fair enough.  <b>Guest:</b> Their cars were crappy, very crappy, that's for sure. But it wasn't pure measurement.  They were the first ones to send a dog into space.  They were the first ones to send a man into space.  So, they could do certain things by sheer force and coercion.  But they couldn't produce a decent car. <b>Russ:</b> And they couldn't produce the right amount of toilet paper, either. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. Pins.  They couldn't produce the right sized pins. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">51:41</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What are the implications of your approach for foreign aid?  There's a big debate; we've had Paul Collier on here, William Easterly. Obviously there's a lot of debate in the literature and the policy space about whether aid works or not. What can we learn from your work about foreign aid? <b>Guest:</b> I think the most important thing is that it's just a secondary debate.  It's not the first thing we should be debating about development.  Foreign aid cannot be the solution.  It's obviously not the source of the ills; it's not the reason why places are less developed. And it cannot be the solution.  First of all, how can you have solutions to deep institutional problems from the outside, from thousands of miles away, by people sending money?  But more importantly, if you throw money into an unchanged institutional structure, nothing is going to change. We are seeing that in the context of Afghanistan in the United States. The United States has done much more than just sending foreign aid, but it has done it within a given institutional structure; and unless that institutional structure changes or unless you have a strategy for changing it, which just doesn't work in general unless there are some exceptional circumstances, it's not  going to work.  So if the problems start with the institutions, therefore the solutions have to come to grips with those institutions.  And unfortunately there are no silver bullet solutions for changing those institutions. <b>Russ:</b> What do you think about this argument that aid actually is counterproductive because it enhances the power of the extractive authoritarians? <b>Guest:</b> I think there is some of that.  If you look at the aid that Mobutu received, obviously counterproductive.  On the other hand, in Afghanistan, some of that aid actually went to build school. <b>Russ:</b> I don't know if it helped institutions. <b>Guest:</b> No, it did not help institutions. <b>Russ:</b> Excuse me--I don't know if it helped education, is what I meant to say. I remember a reporter once asked me if I was in favor of sending money abroad to help build schools.  I mean, who could be against that? And I said: We can't even figure out how to spend money in our own country to increase education.  We're good at spending money <i>on</i> education to help schools, but to actually make kids learn more seems to be a little bit trickier. And to expect to do it from a distance. <b>Guest:</b> There's a little wastage. So, people I trust, when they calculate how much of a dollar actually reaches destinations, it's between $.10 and $.20. But still, I think some parts of the world are so poor--Haiti is so poor--that even if a little bit of it gets wasted--10 cents or 20 cents is not so bad.  But who am I closest to if I take Easterly versus Sachs? Of course I'm much closer to Easterly. But I think Bill [Easterly] would also say foreign aid is a source of ill. I would say foreign aid has been a source of ill in some places but in most places it's done a minimal amount of good because it's transferred resources to places that are most in need. But it's not part of the solution. <b>Russ:</b> You said there's not much we can do to shape institutions. <b>Guest:</b> I think there's not a silver bullet we can use.  But there are obviously certain things that we can do to be a positive force toward institutions. <b>Russ:</b> What are those? <b>Guest:</b> In Syria, the regime is killing people and trying to help the resistance in one way or another, trying to reduce bloodshed, those are obvious things you can do.  In Egypt, we have not been very successful, but the intention was actually good.  U.S. and others tried to build civil society organizations, give support to the formation of political parties and pro-democratic governments; and many of them ended up in jail.  But those are the kinds of things that we can do.  Those are small things.  They are not going to be game-changers, but they are certainly--there is every reason for the United States and Europe not to be disengaged with the developing world.  But we don't have silver bullets. We cannot change the domestic political economy, political equilibrium with a push of a button. 
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>
                                               
                                 
                                  
                               
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Derman on Theories, Models, and Science</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/03/derman_on_theor.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9634</id>

    <published>2012-03-12T10:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-03-13T11:19:49Z</updated>

    <summary> Emanuel Derman of Columbia University and author of Models. Behaving. Badly talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about theories and models, and the elusive nature of truth in the sciences and social sciences. Derman, a former physicist and Goldman...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Emanuel Derman" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Finance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Philosophy and Methodology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www.emanuelderman.com/" target="new">Emanuel Derman</a> of Columbia University and author of <i>Models. Behaving. Badly</i> talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about theories and models, and the elusive nature of truth in the sciences and social sciences. Derman, a former physicist and Goldman Sachs quant [quantitative analyst], contrasts the search for truth in the sciences with the search for truth in finance and economics. He critiques attempts to make finance more scientific and applies those insights to the financial crisis. The conversation closes with a discussion of career advice for those aspiring to work in quantitative finance. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Dermantheories.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Derman on Theories, Models, and Science','Russ Roberts and Emanuel Derman',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 59:30</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Dermantheories.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 27.4 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.emanuelderman.com/" target="new">Emanuel Derman's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Models-Behaving-Badly-Confusing-Illusion-Reality-Disaster/dp/1439164983/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1331308482&sr=8-1/" target="new"><i>Models. Behaving. Badly: Why Confusing Illusion with Reality Can Lead to Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life,</i></a> by Emanuel Derman at Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/EfficientCapitalMarkets.html" target="new">Efficient Capital Markets</a>, by Steven L. Jones and Jeffry M. Netter. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hayek.html" target="new">Friedrich Hayek</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Kahneman.html" target="new">Daniel Kahneman</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Fisher.html" target="new">Irving Fisher</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>  See in particular, <a href="http://www.econlib.org/cgi-bin/searchbooks.pl?searchtype=BookSearchPara&id=fshPPM&query=water">paragraphs in <i>The Purchasing Power of Money</i></a> relating to hydraulic water flow analogy.
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Simon.html" target="new">Herbert Simon</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Scholes.html" target="new">Myron Scholes</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Markowitz.html" target="new">Harry Markowitz</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Sharpe.html" target="new">William F. Sharpe</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Keynes.html" target="new">John Maynard Keynes</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Marshall.html" target="new">Alfred Marshall</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

</ul>
<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McGovern%E2%80%93Hatfield_Amendment" target="new" rel="nofollow">McGovern-Hatfield Amendment</a>. Wikipedia.
</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/01/fama_on_finance.html" target="new">Fama on Finance</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/01/taleb_on_antifr.html" target="new">Taleb on Antifragility</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/09/rosenberg_on_th.html" target="new">Rosenberg on the Nature of Economics</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/03/dyson_on_heresy.html" target="new">Dyson on Heresy, Climate Change, and Science</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: February 23, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> I want to start with your personal story.  You began your career as a physicist, and then you went to Wall Street.  Tell us about that journey. <b>Guest:</b> I originally grew up in South Africa, and I liked literature and the arts.  But, you had to specialize very young when you were in South Africa.  It was like a British system. When you were 16 or 17 you went to college; that was it.  You did arts or sciences or medicine or law or business. So, I liked physics, and I went into physics. And I got very attracted to it, and I was inspired by all the famous physicists, just like everybody else.  You read about Albert Einstein and Erwin Schrodinger. So I did four years of physics in South Africa and then I came to Columbia University, where I teach now; but I teach financial engineering. But I came to do a Ph.D. in physics over there. It took me a long time--7 years.  I had the wrong kind of background, a very classical physics background, and Columbia was doing, obviously, very modern physics and quantum mechanics.  And then I worked--I did a thesis on weak interactions, on theoretical physics--and I worked as a post-doc and an assistant professor for 7 years, doing research and kind of liking it. But also getting a bit discouraged at times. <b>Russ:</b> And why did you leave physics? And                                                                    where did you go? <b>Guest:</b> I graduated from Columbia, and it was very difficult to get jobs.  Hatfield-McGovern Amendment at the end of the Vietnam War passed [? The bill failed, but the discussions had repercussions.--Econlib Ed.], and a lot of the physics jobs in academic life, even the theoretical ones, were being funded by the Department of Defense.  And some of the [?], and I had a 2-year--no permanent jobs. And even temporary jobs you were lucky to get.  So, I had a 2-year post-doc at the U. of Pennsylvania; and then I had a 2-year post-doc at Oxford U. in England in theoretical physics; and then I had a 2-year post-doc at Rockefeller University back in New York. And my wife and I were both in academic life and juggling being in different parts of the world.  And then I got a tenure-track assistant professor job at Boulder, Colorado. I kind of went there but my wife couldn't get a job there, and we had a two-year-old kid already, and life got complicated. And that was--nominally while I [?] physics, I want to say I was getting a little discouraged.  Physics is very difficult and very appealing at the same time, and after a while, unless you are really, really good, you feel like you are no good at all. <b>Russ:</b> That's not uncommon in many fields, but I think it's particularly true in physics.  Because you feel like--as a friend of mine once described it--you are just slicing the salami; you are not really extending anything. <b>Guest:</b> Good metaphor.  Yes. You run into people whose papers you could maybe understand but you could never do anything like that. Even if you are smart. <b>Russ:</b> It's sobering. So, how did you go from that? You are thinking: I wish this were better.  How do you go from that to being on Wall Street? <b>Guest:</b> Well, in two steps.  First, I wanted to move back to New York where my wife was still working and where my son and my wife were. And at that time, what Wall Street was for the last 20 years--in 1980 it was telecommunications and energy, because of the energy crisis; and Bell Labs was hiring a lot of ex-physicists and so-called rocket scientists to do business research.  And I ran into some people from there; I'd known some other physicists who went there, and I got a job at Murray Hill in a business analysis systems center, using ex-physicists and computer scientists and people to sort of do, I won't even say financial modeling.  Maybe financial modeling and then build financial modeling tools for people at AT&T headquarters.  And I did that for 5 years.  That was sort of a big shock to my system, actually, because I was used to being in academic life where you think you are your own boss and you can do whatever you like; and suddenly I was in this industrial complex where everybody had a supervisor and every supervisor had a department head and every department head had a--I forget what. <b>Russ:</b> But somehow you end up at Goldman Sachs. <b>Guest:</b> I end up at Goldman Sachs because I actually learned a lot of useful stuff at Bell Labs, but maybe to my detriment, I hated it. I took the authority over me very seriously in those days. <b>Russ:</b> You were spoiled. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. I think it's an academic thing. I don't know.  I was definitely spoiled. I always wanted to get out of there, although I actually learnt a lot of useful stuff.  I kept thinking: Should I go back to physics or should I leap all the way out, and eventually Wall Street came knocking on people's doors and I  went all the way out, although it took me 5 years.  Well, the first 3 I didn't even think about it; and then it took me like 2 years to decide to go. <b>Russ:</b> So, what year, roughly, did you decide to go to Wall Street? <b>Guest:</b> I went to Wall Street the end of 1985. I actually was offered a job there a year before and turned it down. <b>Russ:</b> And how long did you stay? <b>Guest:</b> I stayed on Wall Street from 1985 to 2002. <b>Russ:</b> Long time. <b>Guest:</b> And I still actually work part time at a fund to funds called Prisma Capital Partners, run by some ex-Goldman people in NY; I usually work there on Fridays. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">6:30</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, when you were at Goldman, you actually were there during the transition, I think, from being a partnership to being a publically traded company.  <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  I came there in 1985; I actually worked at Seligman for one year in 1989 and then I went back to Goldman. I was there till 2002. They went public, I don't know, maybe 1999. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, late 1990s. I'm just curious, because it's an issue that I'm intrigued by. Did you notice any changes in the company from that? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, very marked. Although some of it had to do with growing in size, and then some of it had to do with going public. But, I always think--maybe it's sad.  But Goldman, I think they felt they had the obligation to go public because they thought they were, as a private partnership, up against all the big commercial banks, which could make low interest loans to people in order to get business and not have to mark them to market, whereas Goldman had to mark those things to market. And they always felt a shortness of capital. In 1994, they had a lot of partners leave when the fixed income world had a very bad turn, and I think they got scared.  And they went public.  I think the firm did change; it got much bigger.  It got, I would say, internally more secretive and less congenial. I think it was a very well-run--probably still is a very well-run--firm, because there were partners seated all over the place who suppressed, for lack of a better word, sociopathic behavior. Because their capital is going to be locked up in there for 20 years.  Even if they retire they had to leave their capital there.  And so the place functioned very well.  One thing that changed was that [beforehand--Econlib Ed.] they weren't playing with other people's money--they were playing with their own money; and that's always a big sort of sanity contributor. <b>Russ:</b> That's the thing I'm interested in--when you go from a world--it's true it's nice to be leveraged.  It's hard to be leveraged when you are a private partnership and the public doesn't allow them to borrow more than they otherwise would have which made them more risk-taking, I think. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. Although they had episodes before, I think in the mid-1990s when they went public, sort of having internal hedge-fund-like groups. They were always trying to raise money--I forget, the head money fund, there's some Hawaiian school's wealthy endowment; and they had money from them and from some [?] because they were always short on capital.  So they solved it by going public. <b>Russ:</b> Seems like a good thing, always being short of capital. The alternative always having plenty is not a healthy situation, maybe. <b>Guest:</b> I agree with you.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">9:33</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So. In your book, you talk at length and in very interesting ways across science, philosophy, economics, and finance about the distinction between theories and models. Those are two words that we often use interchangeably to mean our attempt to understand the world. But you make a nice distinction between them. Explain the distinction and talk about the differences between theories and models in science and in the social sciences. <b>Guest:</b> Thanks. I came to that--it's my use of the word, somewhat, although I like them; everybody has a slightly different definition of theory and models.  And I did used to equate them. I used to, a long time ago, talk about fundamental models and more phenomenological models which just tried to describe                                                                           the world but aren't fundamental.  But eventually I decided I liked the distinction between theory and models.  Let me start with theories.  To me, theories are really attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to describe the world the way it really is.  They are kind of destructive and they look at the world. So, for example, if I were to take Newton's Laws and force = mass times acceleration, and the inverse squared law of gravity--those are descriptions of the world that are theoretically framed in mathematics but they are not an analogy.  They are trying to describe the way things actually work. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah; they are not an approximation, except under various situations. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, they are not an approximation; although they may not be dead right. I think sort of [?] is a theory or, I mention in my book I think Spinoza's theory of emotions is a theory because it doesn't rely on analogies.  It doesn't have to be correct, but its aim is to describe things as they are. <b>Russ:</b> And a model? <b>Guest:</b> A model--I sort of came to the conclusion while I was writing my book that it was really much more of a metaphor, an attempt to find an analogy between something you want to understand and something to really do understand, either heuristically or by a theory. So, I have an example in my book--there's a quote by Arthur Schopenhauer where he says, a very pretty metaphor: Sleep is--I'm going to have a hard time remembering it, now. <b>Russ:</b> I'll riff for a minute. If you have the book nearby you can look it up. It's a haunting quote to think about, because what he was dealing there was: Is evil the absence of good or is evil its own entity? Is darkness the absence of light or is there really something called darkness? Is death just the absence of life or is death as vivid and life is the thing that's sort of temporary or otherwise. Those are the things I remember.  <b>Guest:</b> I wrote a big section about presence and absence. I'm just trying to find his quote. Here it is.  He says: <blockquote>Sleep is the interest we have to pay on the capital which is called in at death; and the higher the rate of interest and the more regularly it is paid, the further the date of redemption is postponed. </blockquote> Actually, I have no idea where I came across that any more. But what he's doing is, he is looking at sleep and saying one of the characteristics of sleep is that it happens periodically, every night. And one of the characteristics of bonds is that you owe interest on them and you pay them every month or every six months.  And based on the analogy of the similarity between the two periodicities, he then says, since you pay interest because you once borrowed money and you have to pay it back, in the same way you go to sleep at night and subject yourself to darkness because you once borrowed you life from the darkness and you have to give it back at the end. <b>Russ:</b> And that's a metaphor. <b>Guest:</b> So, it's a metaphor.  But it's based on a limited analogy, which is the periodicity of coupons and sleep; and then he's extending it or sort of analytically continuing it in a mathematical way to say something about sleep and life by comparison.  And I think models are like that.  I was going to talk about the efficient market model later.  But I think that's similar in that you sort of say: stock prices or the returns on stock prices behave like smoke diffusing. And there's something similar about them, but it's not an accurate description in the way that, say, Newton's Laws attempt to be an accurate description.  It's really based on an analogy to something you do understand, which is smoke diffusing, and saying maybe stock prices behave a lot like that. <b>Russ:</b> And it helps you--models are useful.  Because they can, if the analogy is accurate enough, help you get at the intuition of what's going on.  When I was reading those sections I was thinking about macroeconomics, which you touch on very briefly in the book. You touch on finance, but you mention economic models and I think about them way too much.  But obviously, there's no such thing as Aggregate Demand.  It's a conceptual idea to help us try to understand our myriad of connected interactions as buyers, sellers, employers, employees, investors, etc.  And it may be a useful metaphor; it may not be.  But it has a black box quality. In a theory, you are getting at the mechanics of the black box. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, I agree with you. I like what you said about Aggregate Demand, because I read something by Hayek once where he said that in the physical sciences what you really understand are macroscopic concepts like pressure and volume and temperature and tension and stuff like that; and then you deduce from them the existence of  atoms, which you never see but which explain those things.  And I think he then sort of points out that macroeconomic things like supply and demand and liquidity are really not things that you observe.  They are the metaphors. What you really observe are the individual people.                                                                          There, it's the elements that are real and the other things are more metaphorical. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, it's true. <b>Guest:</b> People are--he sort of said theoreticians are going in the wrong direction in economics by trying to mimic the direction of physics, going from the large to the small. <b>Russ:</b> That's obviously an ongoing debate that's not settled. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">16:21</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> The other part of this section of your book which I found utterly beautiful and fascinating--and correct me if I'm wrong, I think I read it in your book; I've been reading some other things as well--but it's sort of the order of theory and empirical evidence. You say at one point that Newton <i>saw</i> the way the world worked; and then he did some experiments to confirm it.  He didn't do a bunch of experiments, noodle around with the data, and then say there seems to be a relationship here.  He actually saw the answer, saw the theory, and then he had to confirm it.  It might not turn out to be true, but the flash of insight came first.  Is that what you wrote? <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, that is what I wrote. A little bit about Newton and then a lot more about Ampere and Maxwell. I have one chapter about electromagnetism and comparing it to the history of the efficient market model and trying to explain exactly what you said, that there's a succession of physicists who make great descriptive discoveries like Newton's Laws or Ampere's Law of electromagnetism or Maxwell's equations; and each one of them is recursively amazed by the person who came before them could claim to deduce this law from experiments because it looks to them like they must have thought up the law first and then checked that it confirms experiment. <b>Russ:</b> And sometimes that's true because there's a faith, almost, in the underlying mathematics that it implies something that has to be there even though you can't see it or don't have the measurement tools; but eventually it's found; and that's an unbelievable aspect of physics. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, a lot of things.  I'm a big fan--fan is the wrong word--of people who play the  role of creative and artistic intuition in all these discoveries--in economics and in physics and in mathematics.  In mathematics I think people understand it. I was sort of reading a bit of Kahneman's book on fast and slow thinking, and he points out all the errors in fast thinking. But I'm sort of a fan of equating that roughly with intuition.  I'm still sort of a fan of intuition. And I think of observation--at some point there has to be some leap which comes from somewhere or another. <b>Russ:</b> And I think the thing that fascinates me is we don't understand that.  And I think even more importantly the people who make the leap don't understand it.  There's this wonderful description by Andrew Wiles where he, having proved Fermat's Last Theorem, finds out that his proof is wrong. He spent 7 years proving it; he proves it; it's on the front page of the <i>New York Times</i>, and then someone finds an error in the proof.  And it's back to the drawing board, and he spends 18 months.  And in those 18 months he must be in total despair most of  the time. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, it sounds like it. <b>Russ:</b> And at one point, I think he said it was Saturday morning, he's sitting at his desk, he's looking at this equation he's been looking probably 8 years; and all of a sudden he says: I just saw it. It's not like, oh, he did all this work, and dug this ditch and then the water flowed in.  It's just something inexplicable, miraculous really; he just saw it. He didn't see it before, can't explain how he saw it.  It's an amazing thing. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. And that's what I wrote in my book, about Kepler and Newton and Ampere, Maxell, and Einstein, who all do something like that; and everybody who writes about them--in fact Ampere's paper is called something like: Deduction of the Laws of Electromagnetism from Observation. And Maxwell and Poincare say there's no way he could have done experiments to deduce these laws. He had to know, he had to sort of intuit the law and then confirm it. <b>Russ:</b> There's that story--I've mentioned it before on the program--where Einstein's theory is confirmed by the bending of the light of the star, by the sun during an eclipse; and when asked what he would have done if it had been proved wrong, he said: Well, I wouldn't have believed the experiment; because I know my theory is right. <b>Guest:</b> I just saw today on the Internet that there is now actually a flaw--there are these people at Cern who claim that neutrinos travel faster than light. And there's now some report on some website today saying that their GPS system was connected by faulty wires. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, no! <b>Guest:</b> And there's a 60 millisecond gap there. It proves it, but there's definitely a mistake there. <b>Russ:</b> Truth is elusive.  Of course, we are all overly confident in our theories. But sometimes they are right.  And Einstein's right more often than the rest of us, more of the time. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">21:02</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But let's move on to models. So, we have theories, which are testable and are often confirmed.  They may not be perfect, they may need tweaking; but they are trying to get at the way the world is.  And then we have models, that try to get at--the way I understand your idea, the underlying intuition of what's happening based on an intuition we have of some understanding we have from somewhere else. <b>Guest:</b> Yes; and my claim is it's usually a model that's usually only a partial mapping between the thing you are interested in and the thing you are trying to compare it to. In fact, if I get pedantic, I read some history of Maxwell when I was doing this, and he eventually came up with Maxwell's equations, which are just mathematics and describe electricity and magnetism; but he actually proceeded by first building a bunch of metaphorical models in which he thought of magnetic lines of force as fluid flow.  Which they resemble but aren't exactly identical to.  He actually says, very categorically: I'm trying to get some intuition and I want to build a model; I don't believe it but I want to see what I can extract from it. <b>Russ:</b> Irving Fisher, economist in the early part of the 20th century, used hydraulics--the flow of water.  I don't know which book it was in.  He's got a book where he's got these complex hydraulic models, water flowing through pipes and into basins, and it's supposed to capture something about liquidity and interest rates--the level of the water is analogous to the--. And they are really beautiful, really interesting. Everyone knows that financial markets are not bathtubs.  They may be like bathtubs in some dimension, but they are not bathtubs. And that can lead you astray. <b>Guest:</b> Jeremy Bernstein, who is a physicist I know, gave me a quote that I use in my book that says--I think it comes from Herbert Simon, but I'm not sure now--he has a drawing of a bird and he says this looks like a bird, but no bird looks like this. <b>Russ:</b> So, let's talk about the models in finance, particularly ones that you worked with for that long period of time on Wall Street.  I recently interviewed Eugene Fama, who is associated with the efficient markets hypothesis.  Then you also talk about Black-Scholes, and you talk about the Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM]. Let's talk about each of those in turn, if you would--what you like about them and what you are not so crazy about. The efficient market model--it seems to me everyone has a slightly different definition of what they mean. I know Burton Malkiel reviewed my book in the <i>Wall Street Journal,</i> and he liked it generally, he was complimentary, but he claims in one paragraph that I was putting too much weight--he sort of claimed that all the efficient market model says is, I don't know what's going to happen next, as opposed to saying that current prices are right. <b>Russ:</b> The first claim is a modest claim. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, it is a modest claim. And I think maybe he is technically correct, but I think in everyday parlance people strive for a stronger version of it. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah; I think the way you wrote it in the book is that prices reflect all publically available information. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> It's an attractive idea. And there's something to it. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. And I'm getting off topic a little, but I'm always a little disappointed by what's happened in Behavioral Finance and economics because whatever people do, it's sort of interesting in a small way, but it doesn't seem to have the overall breadth that the whole Efficient Market aspiration of the model had. So, I like the model; but when people put it into practice--and here I'm thinking of CAPM--they assume geometric Brownian motion for stock moves.  And so I think what's wrong with it--I think it's probably right in some sense, or at least defensible, that current stock prices reflect at least all available information.  But I think the bad, the faulty part of the model is saying that stock prices satisfy, geometric stock returns satisfy geometric Brownian motion, and that risk is this well-defined thing you can tap into by just giving a standard deviation or a volatility. It's got the qualities of something risky, which is nice, but it doesn't have all the attributes of real-world risk. <b>Russ:</b> Going back to Hayek, it's using, say, Brownian motion or other high-level mathematical concepts to fancy-up the model, is scientism.  Not science. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> It gives the patina of science.  I like the Gilbert and Sullivan quote: It gives verisimilitude to what is otherwise a bald and unconvincing narrative. It gussies it up and makes it look fancy; but maybe it isn't true. <b>Guest:</b> Maybe it's kind of a valiant effort.  I don't agree with Nassim Taleb; I think everybody who invented these things deserves whatever Nobel Prizes they got. But at the same time, the real world is much more complicated.  The real world of human beings and stock returns and markets is much more complicated than can be captured in saying stocks' risk can be captured by their standard deviation. <b>Russ:</b> But I think the plus side of it--and again I think there's a big difference between how I use the efficient market hypothesis and how Wall Street people use it--but for me, when somebody says: I have a great idea for a stock, because I saw that this company just invented blah-blah-blah, I always say: It's too late.  Now, it's possible it's not too late.  Maybe the price hasn't already risen. But as an inducer of caution, it's a very effective idea. And I think it's a very powerful idea. Where it seems to go wrong, of course, is that things don't always act as we expect. Arbitrage conditions don't always hold in every instant.  And there is often psychology that intervenes in ways that make markets work a little differently than you expect. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, exactly.  And stocks jump.  People get panicky, in this contagion.  None of that violates the strict mathematical assumptions behind the efficient market model. <b>Russ:</b> And that may mean there is money to be made that wouldn't otherwise be available.  But the odds that <i>you</i> are going to make it can maybe still be very small.  Which is why I think it's a good, sobering thing to keep in mind.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">28:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But the other two models are more complicated.  And you spend a lot of time on Black-Scholes.  Talk about what Black-Scholes tries to do. <b>Guest:</b> I was sort of amazed by Black-Scholes when I first saw it.  And then for a while, 10 years ago or so, I thought it wasn't so good.  But I've sort of come around to thinking that it really is admirable.  And the way Fischer Black and Myron Scholes originally derived it, the derivation you read now is always the stochastic calculus one, but the way they derived it was by saying qualitatively that the [William] Sharpe ratio of a stock, and the Sharpe ratio of an option, and the Sharpe ratio of the underlying stock that the option is written on has to be the same; that the excess return per unit of risk for both of them should be the same when the market is in equilibrium. And I think that's a completely reasonable statement.  You are saying the option and the stock have the same underlying source of riskiness. And if you use one or the other, then if everybody is sensible, then you'll get the same excess return per unit of risk, whichever one you decide to employ.  <b>Russ:</b> So, back up a little bit. First, explain what an option is. And then you can try to get to the Sharpe ratio without a blackboard. But you might not be able to do that. But the intuition. <b>Guest:</b> I can try. Everybody knows what a stock is.  And a stock price can go up or down at any instant, and nobody generally knows which way it is going to go.  So, an option is a derivative or a contingent contract on a stock. And for example, a call option says: you only pay for a contract that gives you an upside, but not the downside.  So, if a stock goes up, you make a dollar that a stock goes up eventually; but if the stock goes down, you don't lose anything.  And so it's a-- <b>Russ:</b> And you pay for that privilege. <b>Guest:</b> You pay for that privilege.  And the big puzzle of Black-Scholes was how much do you pay for the upside risk but no downside risk; in this case.  And what Black and Scholes came up with, from my point of view of looking at it, was saying--it's tricky.  But the source of risk for both the option and the stock is the same.  But the mathematical characteristics are different because the one is on the upside and the other has symmetric risk.  And you can find the risk of the option in terms of the stock, mathematically. <b>Russ:</b> So, to think about it again, without the math: if the stock price goes up, I make money if I hold the stock. If the stock price goes up, I make money with the option. But if the stock price goes down, I lose money.  But not with the option.  So, there's got to be a value to that.  They both have risk.  Because in both cases, the stock can go down. In which case you lose--in the case of the option, you lose what you paid for it.  You forfeit that.  But you don't lose more than that. So, obviously the value of those two things has to be interconnected.  And that's what this tries to calculate, right? <b>Guest:</b> Right.  And trying not to be mathematical--I'll have to think more about how to say it--but Black and Scholes show that if you borrow money and buy the stock, you can buy something that's very much like the option for a moment. <b>Russ:</b> That's the clever part. <b>Guest:</b> That's the clever part. I like to separate the science and engineering.  The science is--the ostensible science is defining what the risk of a stock is like, and the geometric Brownian motion, and that's scientific, but it's not accurate. The theory is wrong, or the model is wrong; it's not a real description of the world.  But then the second idea is their engineering idea, which is that you can create the risk of an option by borrowing money and buying the stock. That's a very great idea, and they are sort of building a recipe for creating an option, for creating the risk of an option out of borrowing money and buying a stock; and that's the sort of engineering/modeling idea. And I think that's completely right and everything they derive after that is right <i>if</i> you assume geometric Brownian motion; but it's the geometric Brownian motion, the risk of the stock, that's badly modeled in the efficient market model. <b>Russ:</b> I have to say, the part I find strange about this--not being a finance person--is the focus of Wall Street on getting the right price. We don't do that anywhere else in the economy.  If you hadn't, if it was a long time ago and we hadn't had this scientific revolution in mathematical finance and financial engineering, if you had said to me: What's the right price of the option? I'd have said: Well, sell it. Put it on the market.  See what people pay for it. That's the right price.  That's how we price everything else in the world.  We don't say--you give the examples, it's a nice example, the example of apartment buildings.  We don't say: Well, this apartment has so many square feet, it's so many miles from this subway station and it's got this school district, so therefore the right price is $2300/month. And if somebody says: Well, I'll pay $2400, we don't say we hear a fool. That's what people value it at. Because we don't pretend to have scientific weights on the attributes of the apartment. We understand that it has something to do with square footage and something to do with location, but we don't pretend to try to weight those, because everyone weights them differently. And similarly, with financial products, people weight risk differently.  Of course they can diversify some of it away. And I think maybe this is your point: that you can't diversify all of it away and pretend that you can, pretend you can create a portfolio of something that's "the same" when it's not quite the same. Maybe it's an illusion. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, I agree with you.  I wish I knew more economics.  Maybe one day off the interview, you can tell me what's a good way to get educated in economics. <b>Russ:</b> You just have to listen every Monday morning, Emanuel. EconTalk comes out every Monday. An hour a week!  I don't know. In two or three years, you'll be a genius!  Like my other listeners. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I still don't know much about economics, but I sort of learnt everything the wrong way around.  I learned finance first and economics later; and I'd really like to learn more economics now. It seems to have more importance. <b>Russ:</b> Well, yeah, more and more people seem to feel the same way.  Maybe we ought to pay more attention to it. Of course, a little learning is a dangerous thing, as folks have said. <b>Guest:</b> Alexander Pope? <b>Russ:</b> Yes. He said: <blockquote>A little learning is a dangerous thing; <br/>
drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: <br/>
there shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, <br/>
and drinking largely sobers us again.</blockquote> So, either drink a lot or don't drink. Don't pretend you are an expert when you have only had a little bit of drinking, a little bit of knowledge. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">35:01</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's talk briefly about CAPM. CAPM is an attempt to extend some of the insights of pricing to a wider range of stuff. Give it a shot. <b>Guest:</b> So, I start with the efficient markets coming first, meaning that you don't know if stocks are going to go up or down, and therefore the simplest model is this model of Brownian motion, where stock prices can diffuse somewhat like smoke diffusing from a cigarette.  And then Sharpe and Lintner and what's the name, Fischer as collaborator--Treynor--come up in various version with CAPM. Which, the way I like to look at it is, they are saying that: You should only get paid for taking risk that you have to take. And any risk you can diversify away or hedge away, you shouldn't get paid for because you didn't have to take it. It's only [?], obligatory risk that you should get paid for. And then they analyze how you can diversify, how you can diversify away risk or hedge away risk and end up with a price for the--the only risk you can't get rid of is the whole market's risk; because all the risk of individual stocks you can get rid of by putting together a big portfolio where the risks mostly cancel out.  And they come up with a formula that relates the expected return of the stock to the expected return of the market. <b>Russ:</b> And what turns out to be important is some stocks are very correlated with the market--they move up when the market goes up in lock step--and others don't move that way. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, and so it depends on their correlation, their beta to the market, as finance professionals call it. And Black-Scholes, or actually Fischer-Black, was very in love with the whole CAPM market, and he just applied CAPM to options and derived the Black-Scholes model, which was what I was explaining imperfectly before.  But I think Black-Scholes is much better than CAPM. Although it is based on the same idea. Because different stocks really have such different risk characteristics that the assumptions of geometric Brownian motion and the assumptions in CAPM don't hold very well for individual stocks. Whereas--and I think the model is much more flawed. Whereas when you apply it to options, you are saying the stock and the option on top of it have to have the same bang per unit of buck or the same bang per unit of bang per unit of risk.  And you are talking about a much more confined world when you are talking about a stock and an option than when you are talking about CAPM, which refers to all the stocks in the universe. <b>Russ:</b> Black-Scholes isn't as ambitious. And that's no fun. <b>Guest:</b> So it's much more--in fact, yeah--that's a very good way you put it. It isn't as ambitious and it's actually able to go a lot farther. And the same is sort of true of I think fixed income financial engineering or quantitative finance compared to  equities, because fixed income instruments have regular coupons and have a much more mathematical behavior, you can write down much more truer things about them than you can for stocks, where anything goes. <b>Russ:</b> And it's hard not to, as Nassim Taleb says: It's hard to not extend your scientific knowledge into areas where it may not be as applicable. It's hard to fight that urge.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">38:37</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> At the end of the book you talk about the crisis that we are still in the middle of. And you say that you are unsurprised by the meltdown, in some dimension. Talk about that. You say you are not surprised that economics didn't do so well, and that finance didn't do so well. For example--you don't mention it specifically in this book, but that the value-at-risk models that people are using that attempted to look the riskiness of an overall portfolio--they turned out to be ghastly and incorrect. You say you are not surprised by that.  Why not? <b>Guest:</b> I think there was a time that I would have been surprised. When I first came to finance in 1985 from physics, I only saw the similarities between finance or mathematical finance and physics. And I really imagined, as I said in my first book, I thought you could write down some grand, unified theory of finance.  As it did in physics.  But over the years I got to realize that financial models--and they are mostly models, not theories--are really, are really glorified ways of interpolation.  And I don't mean that in a bad sense.  But what they do is: They take some analogy between financial markets and smoke or hydraulics or something that you understand better, and then apply that.  And make predictions on the basis of it. And it works in a very narrow range when the world doesn't change too much. But when the world undergoes a crisis, your model is fundamentally wrong and inapplicable. And all bets are off. All the assumptions you make about individual prices being independent of what everybody else in the whole wide world does or having the reservoir of a market, all of that just drops away when people get panicky.  And your whole interpolation mechanism based on some analogy breaks down when you have big moves happening.  I think all of these models only work as long as you stay close to the regime you started out in.  <b>Russ:</b> And of course, an even simpler model: That model is going to be like today; and today is like yesterday. You don't need all the firepower that these models typically bring.  And then, what you want the firepower for is when you have a big change. <b>Guest:</b> And then they don't work.  <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. I think about that a lot when I think about the Keynesian multiplier. We have got all these time series models in economics, we estimate these relationships; they are very stable. And then all of a sudden they don't hold and the model isn't useful any more. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, I'm always amazed when I read on the Internet the battles between the different camps of economists; the effect of the multiplier and how big it will be.  And nobody seems to agree. <b>Russ:</b> Well, it's difficult when you can't verify it. The biggest thing I've learned about macroeconomics since the crisis started, in a scientific framework or trying to; and the reason I don't think economics is a science, is that it's one thing to say your predictions aren't very accurate.  It's another thing to think that you can't verify them. So, when people say that the stimulus created 3.3 million jobs--how would you know? It's an interesting idea.  But there is no independent way to verify that the prediction is accurate.  Other than the same model you used. So, it's like saying: We're sending a rocket to Mars.  When it should be halfway there, you are asked: Is it going to end up there? You sure: My model predicts that it will.  And then when it's supposed to land there, you say: Where is it?  You say: Well, it's there! Because my model said that's where it's going. But if you can't see Mars and you can't get a broadcast back from the ship, you are fooling yourself. <b>Guest:</b> That's very well put.  I always in retrospect admire Fischer Black.  I was trying to find this quote, he was saying that reminded me: he sort of understood that models were not reality.  I'm trying to find this quote.  I think I've got it here.  He says he is going to build a model and he is going to rely on stylized facts and introspection.  Because he sort of understands that you are trying to come up with something plausible. <b>Russ:</b> That's what we do in economics. <b>Guest:</b> Here he says; sorry, this is actually Newton, actually Keynes quoting Newton. Newton had this great intuition, more than anything else. <b>Russ:</b> It reminds me--who was it?  Maybe it was Alfred Marshall; maybe it was Keynes quoting Marshall.  You had these great results, and somebody said: He hid the tools that did the work. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, oh! <b>Russ:</b> And I think--maybe it's not Marshall.  I'll see if I can find it. <b>Guest:</b> Similar to what I was saying Maxwell was saying about Ampere. <b>Russ:</b> Right, sure. <b>Guest:</b> Murray Gilman [?] has some kind of French cooking in which you bake something between slabs of pork and afterward remove the pork, but not the taste.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">44:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> What sort of shocked me more was the breakdown of what I thought of as capitalist morals, somehow. <b>Russ:</b> Talk about that. <b>Guest:</b> Somehow I always, I don't want to say justified, but I always thought that capitalism was kind of a little brutal, but it's symmetric.  You know, you make money if you take risk, and it takes human ingenuity and human endeavor to take risk, and that's what the market runs on; but if you want to get the upside, you have to get the downside.  And what was horrifying for me during the last four years was seeing how some people had gotten the upside and said, praised risk, big corporations; and then they ran for government help and got government help when they were bailed out by taxpayers. <b>Russ:</b> And other people weren't bailed out. It was a very asymmetric system.  People who borrowed a lot of money to buy a house they couldn't afford, they are struggling. But the people in large institutions that borrowed a lot of money to buy assets that weren't worth very much--the lenders got all their money back. It's a total mystery to me.  And I used to argue with friends about it, and they would all say: Well, you want to just punish them and destroy the whole world in order to seek revenge? I don't know how close we came to destroying the whole world.  I mean, the economic world does run on credit; I sort of more and more understand.  But nevertheless I think it's a terrible example to see people or corporations literally saved by taxpayers and go back to record profits the next year. <b>Russ:</b> It's not a matter of vengeance.  It's a matter of the costs of those incentives. I don't want to punish them.  There's no evil when you make bad decisions. But if you reward bad decisions, you get more of them.  That's the part I find troubling. <b>Guest:</b> You mean if you allow people to get away with them. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. It's not that I want to see General Motors or AIG punished. But I don't want to see them rewarded. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, I'm exactly the same. I can't quite believe it. <b>Russ:</b> Did you have any conversations with former colleagues about that? <b>Guest:</b> At Goldman, you mean? <b>Russ:</b> Yes. <b>Guest:</b> No; I've really been gone for 10 years, so not really. Most of the people I know are gone.  But I ran into people around the time when Goldman and Morgan got access to the Fed window, commercial banks.  I think people were really scared at the time. <b>Russ:</b> They were. <b>Guest:</b> I mean, it was a race to the bottom to see whose stock was going to be gotten rid of next, and they were heading for the bottom when they were saved.  It's sort of like everybody thinks there's only price risk; but all of these places have terrible funding, overnight funding risk.  I think Goldman didn't own trash the way Merrill or Lehman did; but nobody is going to lend them money any more. <b>Russ:</b> But they created that world.  They chose to live in that world. Overnight funding risk is a crazy way to run a business.  It's the same thing we were talking about before.  If everything is going fine, it makes total sense to lend enormous sums of money overnight on assets that seem to be worth something. If they turn out not to be worth something and all of a sudden people start to be uneasy, I think people are aware that that could happen.  But they didn't bother planning for an alternative strategy or an insurance plan, because they figured if the whole thing melted down, they'd all be taken care of.  And they were. <b>Guest:</b> I agree with you.  This is where I differ with my friends, who say, for example, Goldman and Merrill were smarter and they were only hurt because of overnight funding.  But that's one of the risks you take.  I agree with you. And it's a bad example to see people saved from that by-- <b>Russ:</b> That's why they were able to make so much money.  That's the real problem.  If you are going to say: This world is a good world because you take risk and you earn profit, but there's a chance you'll get losses. If you don't have the losses--boy! Where are we going next? <b>Guest:</b> I agree with you.  I'm getting out of my depth when I'm talking about the Fed, but I don't really understand what they are doing, either. <b>Russ:</b> You are not alone.  Don't worry about that. Let's talk a little bit about that ethical issue.  The way I think about it, which is really not the way economists think about these things at all, is there is a certain groupthink that pardons ethical lapses in certain settings.  Nobody was murdering people on Wall Street to make money.  What they were doing is selling something that they maybe weren't so confident that was what they said it was. You said something in the book about the importance of transparency. It's hard to be introspective about morality when it's the norm of your culture and people around you do what you are doing and accept it as it is. It's a shame.  But I think that's the way we are as human beings. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. There are a lot of things that aren't acceptable now. Politically correct point of view that we were completely okay 20-30 years ago. <b>Russ:</b> Do you think there is any evidence that things are changing on Wall Street? <b>Guest:</b> I'm not close to--I sort of deal with people on the buy-side but I'm not close to people in investment banks any more. But I would say not.  They got away with sort of metaphorical murder, and now it's back to business. I don't see any real change. <b>Russ:</b> Obviously if you don't let them suffer, they are not going to learn that lesson. <b>Guest:</b> I think you are right.   It's not so much punishment as just setting an example for the future.  You can have all the regulations in the world, but I think seeing people who did something that deserves to fail actually fail would have a much bigger effect. <b>Russ:</b> There are people that argue--I'm not one of them--that Wall Street did pay a price.  It's smaller; a lot of people lost their jobs.  But it looks to me at the higher level where decisions were made, there was pain; but it was pain that was compensated for by other gains.  So, people point to Richard Fuld of Lehman or Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns losing about a billion dollars on stock. <b>Guest:</b> But they were still left with $60 or $80 million. <b>Russ:</b> $500 million. <b>Guest:</b> It's hard to feel sorry for them.  People do point them out as examples, but I don't think it's a very good example. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I don't get that.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">51:12</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, what do you teach? <b>Guest:</b> I teach two courses. One is called Introduction to the Volatility [?], which is about models that go beyond Black-Scholes, that try to explain the nature of option pricing in equity derivatives.  And Black-Scholes doesn't work quite right; it doesn't describe the way volatility behaves.  So, I teach one course on that. And another course, more like a discussion course, where each week--it's called Discussion Papers in Quantitative Financial Engineering--we pick one paper or one or two papers and the first couple of weeks I make a presentation to let the students get up to speed, and then they start making presentations in small groups for the rest of the class, and we discuss it.  Actually, this year we did a lot of financial stuff, but this year, since the crisis, I'm trying to incorporate some economics in there, to educate myself.  So, we did one on the financial crisis last week and read, used as a basis a paper by Metrick--two guys from Yale, Metrick and somebody, weekend's worth of reading on what happened in the financial crisis and various people's theories about it. And we did convertible bonds, when we could have used some more traditional stuff.  We are going to do something on the theory of money, so I'm trying to get some economics in there for my sake. <b>Russ:</b> So, at the end of your book, you talk about--the models have usefulness.  They are not use-less.  But they have to be used with caution. How do you integrate that into the classroom?  Or, more generally, what do you think young people going into finance should have in mind as they go forward? Given that when we are young, just like physics was very seductive for you, I think we love when we are 19 and 23, we love certainty and we love equations and we love results and beauty; and if they are not quite right we tend to say: Well, they are close enough and we keep going. <b>Guest:</b> In the course on teaching options, which was the thing I did on Wall Street; in the papers I wrote, I try to bring a lot of intuition into it.  I use the mathematics, but I try hard to explain that all of these are just ways of trying to get a handle on how to price something.  In fact, what I like to say, is the only way to price something in finance, the only law of finance, is if you want to know what something is worth, you have to find a way to make a recipe to create it out of other things using values you already know.  Sort of if you want to know what fruit salad is worth, you tell me what fruit is worth and how to make fruit salad, and I'll tell you what fruit salad is worth. I try to use that principle to price options and exotic options and CAPM and all kinds of stuff, all based on this common-sense principle that if you want to know what something complicated is worth, figure out how to make it.  And then I try to point out all the flaws in that, as well. I'm careful to try to stress--even before the crisis--that all of these are approximations, and when the world goes crazy, and equality disappears, none of this is going to be very accurate. <b>Russ:</b> Do you think they listen? <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, up to a point. The general tendency--and I think I'm anomalous in a sense--in all finance is to get more mathematical and less and less intuitive or real world. I think that does seem to overwhelm them, although I try to combat it. They are all in jobs, which is reasonable. <b>Russ:</b> It reminds me--I used to teach in a business school, and I taught economics; and I taught it as a very intuitive, non-mathematical class. And one of my students complained; she said: I wish it were harder. And I said: I think it's incredibly hard.  And she had struggled in the class. She meant: more equations.  More calculus.  Calculus is harder.  Intuition, by definition, is easier. But to me it's the other way around.  Calculus is easy. You get answers and you know what the right answer is.  But intuition is harder; artful and harder. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, it is. I never want to come across as saying--I mean, I think finance is harder than physics, not easier than physics. I got an email today. One student is going to work for the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] in their risk division, just got a job there. <b>Russ:</b> Just like Wall Street has its own incentives, so does the SEC.  Hard to stay pure in both places, I suspect. A question; I'll pretend it's a question of personal advice.  My oldest son is 17; he's very good at math and he's very good at hypothesis testing and using data to think about analytical questions.  Five years ago, if you'd said, 6 years ago, where should I encourage him to go study and what should he study, one of the things I would have thought about is finance.  It's a natural thing for him.  It's financially rewarding; it's got an intellectual aspect to it.  I would have said: That's a good life.  But I'm not so sure any more. It seems to me there is an aspect to it that is less noble, less pure, and a little bit tawdry, I'm afraid to say. Dirty, corrupt.  That the links between Wall Street and Washington are not so healthy. Maybe the practitioners themselves are not so aware of it, but as an outsider it gives me the creeps.  I'm not sure I want my son in that world.  He may go there anyway. I can't control him. But in the past I might have encouraged him to think about it.  Now, I'm not so sure.  Do you think that's an unfair-- <b>Guest:</b> No, I think it's fair. I went into it when I was 40 and I wanted to do something interesting; and it was.  But I kind of agree with you a little.  I think it's changed.  I've kind of become much more aware of all the sort of political ramifications, or the sociological ramifications.  Which go beyond just the math.  I think it's fair.  I also think it's a bad idea for students to do this stuff as undergraduates, although we have that at Columbia.  I think it's better to spend your undergraduate career doing things that are not evanescent.  And I think financial models are mostly evanescent.  Not very real.  I think it's better to do arts or science or physics or music or something as an undergraduate and only do the stuff in graduate school if you are going to do it, and then maybe first get a job for a couple of years in the industry to see how you like to get a sense of what's important, rather than imagining that what they teach in graduate school is what people do. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that's good advice.  I'll pass that along. 
</td></tr>

</tbody>
</table>


]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/03/calomiris_on_ca.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9600</id>

    <published>2012-03-05T11:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-04-26T09:10:51Z</updated>

    <summary> Charles Calomiris of Columbia University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about corporate debt, capital requirements, and financial regulation. This is an in-depth conversation about how debt works on a firm&apos;s balance sheet and the risks that debt vs....</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Charles Calomiris" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Finance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Financial Crisis of 2008" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Money, Banking, Monetary Policy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Regulation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ccalomiris/" target="new">Charles Calomiris</a> of Columbia University talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about corporate debt, capital requirements, and financial regulation. This is an in-depth conversation about how debt works on a firm's balance sheet and the risks that debt vs. equity pose for the survival of the firm. Calomiris applies these insights to financial regulation--how it works in practice and the firm's choices in responding to various interventions including bailouts and capital requirements. The conversation closes with a discussion of some of the government interventions in the financial crisis. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Calomirisleverage.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation','Russ Roberts and Charles Calomiris',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 1:27:17</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Calomirisleverage.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 40.1 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ccalomiris/" target="new">Charles Calomiris's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Bagehot/bagLom.html" target="new"><i>Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market,</i></a> by Walter Bagehot. On Econlib. 
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/SmithV/smvRCB.html" target="new"><i>The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative,</i></a> by Vera C. Smith. On Econlib. Bank balance sheets, including discussion in the appendices.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/DepositInsurance.html" target="new">"Deposit Insurance",</a> by George G. Kaufman. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BankRuns.html" target="new">"Bank Runs",</a> by George G. Kaufman. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FinancialRegulation.html" target="new">"Financial Regulation",</a> by Bert Ely. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

</ul>

<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/william_black_o.html" target="new">William Black on Financial Fraud</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/08/admati_on_finan.html" target="new">Admati on Financial Regulation</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/calomiris_on_th.html" target="new">Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/calomiris_on_th.html" target="new">Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/11/kling_on_credit.html" target="new">Kling on Credit Default Swaps, Counterparty Risk, and the Political Economy of Financial Regulation</a>. EconTalk podcast. Details of repo market.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/09/cohan_on_the_li.html" target="new">EconTalk episodes on the Financial Crisis of 2008</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: February 15, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Financial regulation and how greater regulation of the financial system might be achieved.  You have been critical of the current system.  The current system, of course, includes the recent past and the present, and how that might be improved. You've made some suggestions.  I want to start with some basic ideas that we've touched on in many other podcasts, but we are going to try to go deeply into the foundations to try to bring people up to speed, including myself. First, when we talk about a bank having a particular amount of capital, or if we talk about capital requirements, which is going to be related to what we call leverage--the ratio of debt to equity or debt to capital.  What are we talking about? What does that actually mean in practice? <b>Guest:</b> Well, the word "capital" as it pertains to banking is, from a regulatory standpoint, is referring to regulatory capital requirements. Regulatory capital is not just the equity value of the bank on a book-value basis. It also includes other capital items. Now, this is a little bit tricky to explain to people who aren't familiar with finance and accounting; so I think the easiest way to get at it is the following.  Capital is a shock absorber. And if you are the U.S. government and you are looking at a bank, you first look at all the deposits of the bank.  And what we learned in this crisis is that even the ones that don't have deposit insurance--if you are going to cover them--because they might be in excess of $250,000 you are still covering them, guaranteeing them--they still certainly aren't capital. They are not something that we are depending on to absorb shocks.  Because they are going to be--the people holding those claims against the bank--are going to always be made whole, no matter what happens on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet. <b>Russ:</b> You are saying that because of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC].  Because we have statutorily-- <b>Guest:</b> Not just because of the FDIC. You know, Russ, we threw out the FDCI Act of 1991 complete banana-republic style, in the United States. We violated it.  We decided not to stay with the provisions that were supposed to limit the insurance of uninsured debt in the midst of the crisis.  We just pretended that that act didn't exist. <b>Russ:</b> We ignored it. We've talked about that before. We are talking about Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act [FDICIA], the improvement act. <b>Guest:</b> Which was supposed to--it's not just the things that FDIC insures that are protected. If the government issues blanket guarantees, as we did during the crisis, and if furthermore makes Fed lending available on a very generous basis, there are lots of ways to protect different claims on the bank.  Well, what I'm saying is that if you are looking at this from a regulator's standpoint, or from say the taxpayer's standpoint, you look at the items on the bank's balance sheet.  The assets can go up and down in value, and you need something to absorb the shock.  When the assets go down in value, somebody has to lose.  It's just arithmetic, right? Some claims on the bank have to fall in value when the assets' value falls.  And capital is best thought of as: If you take a realistic perspective on which claims can fall in value, those are the claims that really constitute capital of the bank. So from a regulatory perspective, we want to make sure that there's enough on the bank's balance sheet that we can realistically refer to as capital that when the assets of the bank's balance sheet fall in value, that there's something there to absorb the shock.  Because if there isn't enough of that stuff there, who is going to absorb the shock?  The U.S. taxpayers.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">4:55</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's talk about this at an individual level, to help me understand it.  Because I think I understand it really well at the individual level.  When I go to the bank, I get in trouble because my accounting knowledge is mediocre.  And you can enhance that, I hope. So, at the individual level, if I want to buy a house that costs a price of $250,000, and I put 20% down--I put down $50,000 and I borrow the other $200,000 from a bank--then I have $50,000 of equity in the bank--excuse me, in the house. So, if the value of the house, unexpectedly perhaps, goes down from say $250,000 to $225,000, I only owe the bank $200,000. So, the bank is okay if the value goes down to $225,000. They are still happy that they lent me the money. Because if worst comes to worst, and I lose my job and I can't pay my mortgage payments, the bank can reclaim the house, sell it for $225,000, and get their money back. $200,000. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  So your $50,000 down-payment is capital. <b>Russ:</b> Correct. That's my cushion; that's my buffer.  The shock absorber that you are talking about. Now can you tell me a story for a financial institution--and let's start with a vanilla bank, which is going to be a bank that has depositors.  And then we'll move on to an investment bank, which to me is a little more complicated. Let's start with the vanilla bank.  How would this work? <b>Guest:</b> Let's make a real simple bank.  It has loans, and cash for assets. Let's say it has $80 million of loans and $20 million of cash.  And let's say that it has $90 million of deposits, FDIC insured deposits, on the liability side; and $10 million in capital.  Meaning, just to keep it simple, just the equity that shareholders in the bank own. <b>Russ:</b> So, I got lost in that, because the numbers were different. So, I raise $90 million from my depositors.  I'm bank. I take that $90 million and what do I do with it?  And excuse me: and I raise $10 million from people who bought my stock. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  So now you have $100 million. And what you do is you lend out $80 million of it in loans. <b>Russ:</b> Which are risky--you are uncertain whether they are going to work out. <b>Guest:</b> Which are risky. And you are also holding the rest of it just in cash, the $20 million. So your bank's assets are $80 million in loans--what people owe you--plus $20 million in cash. And on the other side, the liability side, you have $90 million of deposits and $10 million that is claims owed to your stockholders.  That is, they have what are called the residual claim.  Whatever you get after you pay off your depositors, your $90 million to in depositors, will stay with your stockholders.  So, just now let's talk about shock absorber and why we think about capital as a shock absorber. Perfectly analogously to your mortgage example that you gave a minute ago, if the value of those risky loans--suppose that I've got $80 million of loans outstanding--but suppose that $10 million decide not to pay me back. And they go bust and I can't get anything back from any of those. A complete loss on $10 million of my loans. Well, what just happened? Well, I have enough left in assets--I still  have $70 million of good loans; I have $20 million of cash--that's $90 million. It's just enough to pay off all my depositors.  The reason is because capital was an adequate buffer. Capital was adequate to absorb the losses coming from those risky assets. And so, in that situation I had enough capital.  But I just want to give one quick addendum to this.  Suppose that the losses had been greater.  Suppose instead of only losing $10 million, I had lost $20 million.  Well, those FDIC insured deposits are still going to get their money.  So, where does the other $10 million come from?  Now this bank has what we call a negative net worth, negative $10 million? Well, that's going to come from the U.S. taxpayers. So, the reason from a regulatory standpoint that we care so much about capital adequacy is because we care about making sure that the people running the bank for their own profit and pleasure are--that is the stockholders who control the bank, who control managers, must be responsible for what is going on--they get the benefit of the profit, but we also make sure that they are responsible for dealing with the downside. When the downside occurs they are the ones who lose, not the U.S. taxpayers. <b>Russ:</b> So, we'll talk later about how that might work in the absence of an FDIC guarantee, because that would change the incentives of both the depositors, who under the current law only have to worry about the solvency of the U.S. government. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  That's a very important point, that the bankers are going to behave differently if they are insured or they are not insured.  And the reason that we really need to worry about this from a regulatory standpoint is because the government now is the one who is really standing to lose. <b>Russ:</b> You and I. <b>Guest:</b> All of us are.  But the point is, the depositors, as depositors, are protected. Now the same people, as taxpayers, may be bearing some of the cost of the protection of the bank, but as depositors they are protected.  And that means, as you were just saying, they don't really have much incentive to be worrying about their bank.  Whereas in the olden days, before we have protection of the bank depositors, bank depositors were really being very attentive to what was going on in banks and were making sure that the banks were worried. And, as I like to say: If the depositors aren't worried, the bankers aren't scared. <b>Russ:</b> Yes, and of course the moral hazard problem is that if you know that your depositors aren't worried, you are not scared. You can risk a higher rate of interest to offer them, because if you can't pay it off, they'll get their money back anyway. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  If you pay a little bit above the risk-free interest rate that people earn on other things, and they know that there's no risk, you are going to attract money like gangbusters. Right?  You are paying someone even a quarter of a percentage point more than they can earn elsewhere, with no additional risk--you are going to get a lot of money.  And that is exactly the thing we worry about.  So, we have to make sure, in a regulatory system where we protect bank deposits and other bank debts, that banks are adequately capitalized.  And when we do that, not only do we protect sort of after the fact by absorbing losses, but the most important thing, which you were hinting at already, is that we affect the bankers' incentives toward risk.  So capital, as a shock absorber, isn't just there to protect us against bad luck.  It's also there, through protecting against bad luck, it's there to change the incentives of bankers toward risk. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">12:39</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Yes.  It's to protect us from imprudence. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. <b>Russ:</b> And fraud.  We recently had William Black on talking about fraud. I understand the incentives for fraud.  I think there's an interaction there between the incentives for fraud and moral hazard that maybe we'll get to.  But I want to make sure I understand the example, because I'm a little bit confused. I open a bank.  And for some reason I'm a credible person to invest with. You, depositors give me $90 million; I get another $10 million from people who think this is a good investment. They are going to share in any profits of the bank with me.  I take the $100 million; I make $80 million in loans; and I keep $20 million off to the side, in cash.  Which is a bummer, because it's not earning very much money.  It's not earning as much as the loans are.  So, there's a natural temptation to make that cushion of $20 million smaller, but the smaller I make it, the less likely people are, in the absence of deposit insurance, people are going to get nervous for the same reason the regulators get nervous when there <i>is</i> deposit insurance--that there's not a cushion.  So, in that story, when I have $80 million in loans and $20 million in cash, and I have $90 million in deposits and $10 million in equity, what is my leverage? What is my capital ratio in that story? <b>Guest:</b> Well, if you define your capital ratio or leverage ratio as the book value of your equity, or the book value of your capital, relative to the book value of your total assets--let's call it equity/assets--it's 10%. <b>Russ:</b> So, I'm leveraged 9:1. That would be the lingo. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, you could say it that way: debt to equity is 9 to 1. <b>Russ:</b> What I'm confused about is that in that story, usually when we talk about leverage, the "1" that's capital, the $1 out of every $10 in that story, the one we just created--that's my cushion.  But it looks like the $20 million in cash is the cushion. Why is the equity the cushion? <b>Guest:</b> Oh, I'm so glad you said that.  I have a lot of articles I'm writing about exactly this point.  Because notice that's what's really protecting the taxpayers is a combination of the cash on the left-hand side--the asset side--and the capital on the right-hand side.  Bankers have always understood this. Prudential regulation didn't used to be about capital ratios.  It used to be about cash ratios. What's really funny is that starting in the 1980s, the shift was to focus on the capital ratios as the thing that was making people behave honestly and protecting against loss, buffering against losses.  But the main focus used to be on cash.  And my view is: We have to think with both sides of our brain here, and it's really the combination of cash and capital that matters. Let me go through an example, just to clarify that.  Let's stay with our example.  We have a bank that has $80 million in loans, $20 million in cash on the asset side.  It's financing that--it's getting its money from--$90 million of depositors and $10 million contributed by stockholders. So the $90 million contributed by deposited, $10 million contributed by stockholders, went toward lending $80 million and keeping $20 million in cash.  Now, if we think about risk on risky assets as a possibility of a percentage loss-- <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, that's why I'm getting confused. <b>Guest:</b> I promise you, you won't get confused.  I'm going to give you two alternative versions and you'll see how it differs. So, suppose you give a 10% loss. <b>Russ:</b> Let me try to do this.  I'll be the student.  So, I had $80 million in loans I was expecting, but it turns out 10% of them turn out to be bad, so I only collect $72 million. Is that what you want me to do? <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. So, you only collect $72 million.  Take that $72 million; add it with the $20 million in cash--because cash can't fall in value-- <b>Russ:</b> Correct. Well, it can, but not in nominal value. <b>Guest:</b> Not in its cash value.  So, you've got $72 million worth of loans, because you lost 10% of them, plus your cash. Now you've got $92 million. How much deposits do you have to pay? <b>Russ:</b> $90 million. So, I'm okay. <b>Guest:</b> So you're okay. <b>Russ:</b> And more importantly, if there were a run on the bank, if for some reason people were anxious about their deposits and they all showed up at the same time--which never happens unless there's this weird psychological anxiety that spreads throughout the group of depositors--they could all get their money back. There would be no "It's a Wonderful Life" scene where Jimmy Stewart is trying to talk him into taking less than they want.  We all understand that.  <b>Guest:</b> Well, let's slow down on that, because that's not exactly-- I mean, I do agree with you, but how I agree with you is pretty complicated.  Because notice, we've got $90 million in deposits, and we have only $20 million in cash, so if all $90 million came back and asked for their money, we wouldn't have enough cash to pay them. And then we'd have to start selling our loans. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, right.  Sorry.  Because all the loans don't pay off at the same time. <b>Guest:</b> And the problem might be we might not be able to realize, in the secondary market, the full value on our loans. But I do still agree with you, though. And here's what we know from empirical evidence and hundreds of years of history.  People don't come and randomly ask for their money back all at once.  Which isn't surprising.  What they do is they come back when they are worried about the default risk of the bank. So, if the bank isn't at risk of defaulting on depositors, they don't tend to run and ask for all their money back.  And so I would actually say that it is true that if we had in the example we just went through, possibility of that 10% loss on the $80 million of loans, so we go down to $72 million of loans; add to that the $20 million in cash we are holding; we still have $92 million. And we have more than enough to pay off our depositors.  The depositors know that we have more than enough. There's no reason for them to run. <b>Russ:</b> We're solvent. <b>Guest:</b> We're solvent.    
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">19:25</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> But now let's look at a different version. We raise the same $90 million from our depositors; we raise the same $10 million from our stockholders; but now we lend all of it out. <b>Russ:</b> No cash. <b>Guest:</b> We lend all of it out in loans.  And now we get a 10% decline. Well, the 10% decline means that the loans fall to $90 million in value.  Now we are still solvent.  We have 0 net worth. But you could say we have just enough. <b>Russ:</b> We're on the cusp. <b>Guest:</b> On the cusp.  Now if we had constructed this example with an 11% decline--let's go back to our two cases.  We started in the one with $80 million in loans and $20 million in cash--with an 11% decline we have a loss of about $9 million, so we are still solvent.  But if instead of $80 million in loans and $20 in cash, we had $100 million in loans, an 11% decline means we lose $11 million; now we are insolvent. So what did we just learn? <b>Russ:</b> Insolvent meaning that if our depositors realize this, they will realize there is not enough liquidity to satisfy our demands in total. And it wouldn't be a bad idea to run to the bank. <b>Guest:</b> Better run to the bank, because the last one in the line isn't going to get their money. What happens then, what this logic shows--which people in banking have known forever--is that really there are two ways to skin the cat.  The cat we are trying to skin here is to prevent risks that are arising on the asset side to leading to insolvency of the bank.  And there are two ways to mitigate against those risks.  One of them is by holding a higher proportion of cash on your asset side.  And the other is by financing yourself with a higher proportion of equity or capital on your liability side. And those are two different ways to skin the cat. Meaning: if you tell me a level of risk of insolvency for the bank that you want to achieve--meaning give me a certain probability of insolvency--I can get to that probability with a combination of a lot of cash and a little bit of capital, or a lot of capital and a little bit of cash. I can get to the same result in terms of insolvency with different combinations of cash and capital.  Now, the reason I'm emphasizing this so much is--this is a lot of what I've been writing about lately--is that we need to think about cash requirements, not just capital requirements in our prudential regulation. Think about them from the perspective of reducing default risk in banks. And so, I just gave you an example of how cash and capital can both work.  But one thing I would say--and I don't want to belabor the point too much, but I want to make one important point: there really is, in a model where we can see these losses, in a world where when a bank suffers a loss everything is observable. <b>Russ:</b> It's transparent. <b>Guest:</b> And there's not much of a difference between using cash and using capital to solve the problem. <b>Russ:</b> Correct. Because it really is the same thing. <b>Guest:</b> Well, they are similar.  They are not the same.  One is solving the problem with holding cash; the other is by raising a higher percentage of your funds from capital.  Here's where they get completely different.  Suppose that you can't observe the loan losses. <b>Russ:</b> Or, the bank can but the outsiders can't. The bank knows that this region where they've made a disproportionate share of their loans has got some unemployment; it looks like there's going to be a higher default rate than they've anticipated.  <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. And now let's add another wrinkle to it.  Even though the government supervisors and regulators might be able to observe them. <b>Russ:</b> Because they are monitoring the books every once in a while. <b>Guest:</b> But  they have strong incentives to do something called forbearance.  By the way, whenever you hear three-syllable words in finance, they typically are synonymous with "lie." So, you only hear about how banks are "evergreening." And regulators are "forbearing." Whenever you hear words like that--first of all, evergreening invokes this beautiful forest.  And forbearance is a Biblical concept. It's God's patience with us, his condescension for us. It makes you think something noble is happening.  All that's happening is a conspiracy of lying, not to recognize loan losses. Why? Because the bankers don't want to recognize them; that might require them to raise more capital or go out of business or something. And the regulators don't want to recognize them because it's politically extremely inconvenient for their bosses.  And so what you end up with is, the taxpayers, if you just rely entirely on capital requirements, notice that capital in our example, when the loss occurs, it only shows up in the bookkeeping when you recognize the loss.  So let's go back to our example.  You've got $80 million in loans, $20 million in cash; the loans fall in value by 10%. But if you don't recognize the decline in value-- <b>Russ:</b> Recognize meaning on the books. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  You pretend it didn't happen.  Then your books still show that you have $10 million in capital.  <b>Russ:</b> 10%.  <b>Guest:</b> Yes; they still show a capital ratio of 10%.  That doesn't mean that's real.  It just means that's what the accounts show. And one thing that's really interesting about cash is, what we just showed is, that capital is an accounting fiction. Capital can be manipulated by banks and their supervisors and regulators to political purposes to mask losses when it suits both of their interests.  Which is almost always. During crises they want to mask their losses. <b>Russ:</b> I want to push off.  You are talking about the political pressure. It's sort of like when you borrow from the guy on the corner and he comes to collect and you say: I need another week.  He might hit your knees with a baseball bat. But he might let you go for a week.  You're going to plead for it. It's a bad example, a guy with a baseball bat, because he breaks your knees.  But the regulator might say: If I put it off a month, or 6 months or a quarter or whatever it is, it will maybe turn out fine.  Maybe the assets will re-increase in value, and then this whole thing will blow over. <b>Guest:</b> There's an old principle in banking which is: The one thing you never do with a borrower--and in this case the borrowers in a sense from the taxpayers--the one thing you never do is <i>just</i> give someone more time. You might want to give him more time with some additional restrictions. With a plan of action, with some recognition that there is a problem. But you never want to give somebody who is in a losing situation more time because what they do with more time when they are already underwater is they take big risks. <b>Russ:</b> Because they have no downside. <b>Guest:</b> And so this whole forbearance-evergreening thing is really the reason why small losses turn into big losses in banking.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">26:56</td><td valign="top"> <b>Russ:</b> So we need to go a little bit more into the forbearance.  Let's go back to our example.  Let's say there is a 10% capital requirement, and I'm doing fine.  I'm meeting that requirement. Now all of a sudden a bunch of my loans turn bad, 10%.  I think I want to conclude that my capital requirements aren't being satisfied; I need to do something. Is that correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> And the forbearance is going to be: Well, you don't have; we'll give you a little more chance. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. We'll give you a little more time.  Let's make it really interesting, because we've been too conservative in our thinking here.  Let's let the value of the loans fall 20%.  So now our loans went from $80 million; they fell by $16 million.  So now our loans are $64; plus our $20 in cash--we've got $84 million--and we have $90 million in deposits.  Our capital ratio is right now really negative--what would you describe it as? We have a total of $84 but we have $100 in debt, so we've got -$16 million. Did I get that wrong? Let's slow down a little. We had a 20% loss in our loans, so our loans fell by $16; so they are still worth $64; plus $20 of cash. So my total assets are worth $84 million.  I have $90 in deposits--ah, that's what it is.  I have $90 in deposits.  So I have a negative $6.  I have -$6 million in net worth.  I am insolvent to the tune of -$6 million.  So, if I have to recognize those losses, the regulator would tell me: You are insolvent; you have to go to your stockholders and raise more capital; go to the market, find a way to raise more capital; try to convince people that you are worth saving; and have them cough  up capital. <b>Russ:</b> And in that case how much would I need?  I'm having some trouble with my balance sheet. <b>Guest:</b> Well, with my requirement--suppose that my capital requirement is we have to--we're being arbitrary so let's continue with that. Suppose that we have a requirement that says we have to raise 8% of our non-cash assets as capital.  That would mean that you would have to raise, on your book value of assets, which are $80 of noncash assets. <b>Russ:</b> No, my non-cash assets are $64. <b>Guest:</b> Well, not on a market-value basis, or on a book value basis.  Remember you have to have capital adequacy to make sure your deposits are paid.  I'm trying to keep this on a real regulatory basis.  So, if you have risk assets of $80, and you have an 8% capital requirement against your non-cash assets, that means you have to have 8% of $80, which is--help me out here-- <b>Russ:</b> $6.4.<b>Guest:</b> And so what the regulatory capital would say: against your risky assets, you have to have $6.4 million, not -$6 million. So you better go to the capital markets and raise $12 of new equity. That might not be easy to do if you are insolvent. But the point is, that's what you'd have to do if the regulator were doing his job.  He would require you not just to get back to a point of 0, but to get back to a point where you had-- <b>Russ:</b> I had the cushion back. <b>Guest:</b> Right, where you'd get that cushion back.  And the cushion is defined in some minimal sense to make sure that going forward, now we've lost our money, you have to have enough capital to replace the losses and to have enough going forward that we are not so concerned about future losses wiping out your bank. <b>Russ:</b> Even bigger future losses than we've already incurred. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">31:04</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's take a real-world example of this. Because with that example I got lost. So I want to take a less numerical example and try to figure out how it would apply.  So, in March of 2008 when Bear Stearns was in trouble, one of the things that happened was that people became aware that some of the assets that every investment bank was holding were not as valuable as they had thought before.  That the default risk in mortgage-backed securities that were on the books of those institutions were worth less than before.  And that's analogous to the defaults in the loans that we just talked about, with a vanilla bank. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, it is.  It's a decline in value that's understood in the market. <b>Russ:</b> So, Lehman, watching this happen, and watching all the creditors of Bear Stearns who got their money back, was not as interested in dealing with that recognition of the new marketplace as they would be in a world where the government had not helped Bear Stearns's creditors.  Because when the government helped Bear Stearns's creditors, it said to Lehman, well, you know, keep lending to them; it's going to be okay. <b>Guest:</b> Think about this for a minute.  Initially the deal was that not only were Bear Stearns's creditors bailed out.  The initial deal was that Bear Stearns's stockholders got $2/share, initially; and then that deal got renegotiated up to $10 a share. So not only were the creditors bailed out of Bear Stearns, but the stockholders were, too. <b>Russ:</b> Should have been wiped out totally. <b>Guest:</b> So, the real issue there is, Merrill Lynch and Lehman and some other institutions, but those are the two most obvious examples, in the spring and summer of 2008, they had 6 months to go out and raise new capital.  But let's look at it.  I won't say the name of the person, but I had breakfast with a prominent person, one of those banks; and I asked him: You know the market now knows that you've got declined asset values; you need to go out and raise some more equity.   I said: There's lots of people out there who want to buy your equity.  He said: Yeah; the problem is they don't want to pay the price we want.  We don't like the price. <b>Russ:</b> Funny how that works. <b>Guest:</b> So, here's the thing. If you are protected on the downside, you look at Bear Stearns and you say: The Bear Stearns stockholders got $10 a share from Uncle Sam. <b>Russ:</b> Sort of. <b>Guest:</b> Instead of selling my equity cheap, for let's say $12 a share into the market, why don't I wait, hope that the market conditions improve, in which case I don't have to sell equity cheap and dilute myself; and on the downside if something goes wrong I'll get my $10 a share just like Bear Stearns. And so the problem was, it wasn't even just  that the creditors were protected. It was that the stockholders were actually receiving, at Bear Stearns, $10 a share. <b>Russ:</b> Okay, but I want to make sure I want to understand the range of actions that the bank can take. When we use the phrase "raise more equity," what we mean is issue additional shares of the stock.  That's why you are talking about dilution.  Offering a new stock option to raise capital, raise equity, to build a cushion against future realizations of losses in asset value. Now the alternative is to sell assets and convert them to cash. <b>Guest:</b> Well, there's more alternatives. <b>Russ:</b> Give me some. <b>Guest:</b> Let's go through them one at a time. <b>Russ:</b> And the reason I mention the equity not being the only one is that as you point out not only does it dilute the existing shareholders--which the executives are not too keen on because they own a lot--as you say, in that breakfast conversation, when people things aren't going so well, they are not so excited to invest in the company.  They are willing to do it if you give them a low enough price because they are willing to buy a lottery ticket; but it's not so exciting. <b>Guest:</b> And part of the thing is that outside equity investors don't know as much about your assets as you do. And so when you go to the market and say: I want you to have the opportunity of owning an interest in my company.  Is that because you are generous?  There's this great upside that you are generous about? Or because you happen to know there's about to be an announcement of a problem right after I make my contribution of investing in the equity? And then you, Russ, as the new investor, take a ride with me on the downside. So, when you are in the middle of a financial crisis and you are dealing with banks whose assets are very hard for outsiders to know as much about as the bankers who made them, then you have a little bit of a challenge.  It's not an insurmountable challenge, but it's still a challenge to convince people that you are worth investing in.  What that means is that you will tend to spend a lot of money for your investment bank on the road show, taking everybody through the due diligence.  And you are also going to have to offer things at a little bit of a discount.  That's called dilution.  In order to encourage people who are already suspicious.  As Groucho Marx said: You wouldn't want to belong to any club that would have you as a member. And it's the same thing with stock.  If a company is desperately eager to sell you stock, you are a little bit concerned about what you might be buying.  Where is the hidden problem? <b>Russ:</b> Could be that they have this great opportunity; they've decided to use the cash for that. But that's only one possibility. So let's get to the other-- <b>Guest:</b> But notice that the one you mentioned has exactly the same problem.  If you get back to  a higher capital ratio by getting rid of your assets and your debt.  So, let's go to our bank example.  Let's be very specific here.  We have $80 million in loans, $20 million in cash; and we have an 8% capital requirement against our non-cash.  So that means we have to hold at least $6.4 million in capital. So we're fine, because we've got $10 million in capital; we've got $90 in deposits.  But then we start being concerned because we see some losses in our loans.  Now one way we could deal with this is to sell off some of our good loans and then use the proceeds from the sale of those good loans to pay off some of our depositors.  And that would increase our equity ratio through what's called deleveraging. Which is, it's not that you raised new equity.  You just sold off some of your assets and used the proceeds to retire some of your debt. That would be another way to get back to a higher equity ratio. <b>Russ:</b> That makes sense. <b>Guest:</b> Well, the problem is, you've got to sell those loans.  And if there's that same information problem that I mentioned before where potential buyers of new equity aren't so sure about the value of your assets, well then if you actually try to sell those assets into the market, people aren't going to be so sure about their value either. <b>Russ:</b> Or more realistically,  we know they are lower. Because market conditions have changed and that's why we have a problem. <b>Guest:</b> But what normally happens in this circumstance is, if there is this troubled group of assets, because it's so hard to value them accurately, people when they are buying those assets also want a discount. <b>Russ:</b> Understand. It's the same problem. <b>Guest:</b> Sometimes that's called a fire sale discount. <b>Russ:</b> But it's not 0. People sometimes say: Well, you can't sell them. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">39:28</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> But Russ, you have other choices.  I want to go through your other choices. They are going to be the ones you are going to like better. <b>Russ:</b> Bring them on.  <b>Guest:</b> Next choice is: instead of selling off these questionable assets that have fallen in value in order to realize, to get your deleveraging going, you have another way to deleverage.  I'm your good customer.  I've got a line of credit.  I'm your good loan customer; you are the guy running the bank. And my line of credit comes up for renewal, and you just say: I want you to pay off your loan. <b>Russ:</b>  Instead of rolling it over. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. You just say: Pay it off. You say: There's nothing wrong with me.  I'm an innocent victim here.  You say: Yep, you're an innocent victim of my capital requirements.  That's called a credit crunch. When the bank suffers a loss from one class of assets and it has to meet its capital requirements, if we don't have evergreening and forbearance, often the path of least resistance is instead of going to the market to raise new equity, instead of trying to sell off your dodgy assets in some kind of secondary market, which is going to be very hard, what you do is you just don't roll over  your good loans.  Or another way to say it, which we find over and over again is: When people have to sell off assets they often sell off the higher quality assets, because those are the ones that are easier to sell. And that's just like deciding not to renew your good loan risks. And so there really are innocent victims out there.  When the Russian crisis hit in 1998, Brazilian sovereign debts fell a lot in value, because the firms, the hedge funds that were holding both, had to meet their debt calls for the banks, which said: Hey, you just had some losses; you have to cut your debt, you have to deleverage.  The banks deleveraged--how did they do it?  They couldn't sell the Russian debt. <b>Russ:</b> No one wanted it. They wanted it, but too cheap. <b>Guest:</b> So what did you do? You sold the Brazilian debts.  And then the Brazilians are saying: Hey, what's going on here?  What did we do?  And the answer is: You didn't do anything except the people holding your debts happen to need to sell stuff.  Massively. And so, similarly, in a credit crunch, it's often the innocent victims who wonder what happened.  Why are their debts being sold, why are their loans not being rolled over?  And yet that's exactly what economic theory would tell you to expect.  Because that's the path of least resistance. <b>Russ:</b> So, do you have any other options for me?  That's three.  Give me some more. <b>Guest:</b> Now the next option is: Suppose that we define capital--remember capital is a shock absorber.  But capital doesn't necessarily have to be equity.  It doesn't have to be stock.  So, we could imagine capital being a debt instrument that converts into stock. And the idea here is that it might be that this dilution problem we talked about, that is how if you tried to sell stock into the market it's going to be very difficult, that that problem isn't going to be as great if you are trying to sell something called convertible debt.  And so part of capital, under the Basel capital requirements and a lot of capital requirement systems, part of capital is convertible debt.  And we have one particular version which regulators are talking about; and I'm proposing a specific version of it as part of the capital requirement, called contingent capital certificates, contingent convertibles, or CoCos for short. And the idea of this is that it might be that since you are more protected on the downside--you are not protected but you are a little bit more protected.  If you are the CoCo holder, you still have equity holders in the bank who are junior to you. So, think of it like a waterfall, where in the waterfall you've got the depositors of the bank--the most senior claimants. They get the money first, whatever money there is to be had. Next are the CoCo holders.  And then finally, if there is any money left over, are the equity holders. <b>Russ:</b> So, CoCos are in between promises like depositors and equity holders.  But I don't understand how they work yet. So try again. <b>Guest:</b> So, the idea here is that if you tell banks: You can satisfy some of your capital requirements not just with equity but also with these CoCos that that might be helpful for banks in mitigating the costs, reducing the costs of raising capital in the market when they need to.  And that's one of the main advantages of convertible debts. Of course this is a very complicated topic; we are now in pretty complicated finance theory about how to structure balance sheets in the optimal way.  The key thing that I want to get at this point is just one idea; and we've known this in corporate finance a lot, which is a lot of different studies talking about it: that if you are issuing into the market at a bad time for you, for  your business, if you issue convertible debt--that is, debts that convert to equity--you will not have the same kinds of dilution problems for your shareholders than if you were issuing shares into the market. <b>Russ:</b> Because there's some uncertainty about whether it will convert or not? Is that why? <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  You are not asking someone--remember the Groucho Marx point--we are not asking you to become  a stockholder like me.  I'm asking you to be somebody who is senior to me.  I'm the stockholder and I want you to give me money but you are still in line ahead of me. <b>Russ:</b> So, it's not dilution, but it's semi-dilution, because it's basically saying--you still have the same claims on the company, but there's a chance that you might not get exactly what you expect. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. You are at risk but you are less at risk than if you bought stock.  And I--suppose I'm the existing stockholder and I have a little bit of a loss and I come to you and say: Russ, remember we were talking on your program about this idea.  What do you think? I'm the stockholder and I don't want to sell stock because I really have confidence in my firm.  But I'm going to give you special protection. I'm standing between you and any losses.  I'm the stockholder, all losses come out of my pocket before you lose a dime.  I lose everything before you lose a dime.  And I want you to cough up some contingent capital, some convertible debts; and yes, there's a chance you are going to lose money, but I promise you you won't lose a dime until I've lost everything. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">46:35</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Okay, so that's interesting; but I think, and as you say, it's a little bit arcane.  I'm just going to make an aside here--we're about 46 minutes into this podcast. And I'm enjoying every minute of it.  Those of you out there who have listened this far--I don't know how much you enjoy hearing these kind of what I call the basics, podcasts where we delve into these fundamentals to help people understand.  If you like this, let me know: mail@econtalk.org if you've listened this far.  Maybe you turned it off--not another podcast about the financial crisis, bookkeeping issues.  Let me hear from you if you like this, or if you are a dutiful listener and you don't like, but you are still listening, you can let me know, too.  I think there are two things I need to figure out.  I'm learning something really important here; I hope others are, too.  Here are the two things I'd like to get to: they are the following.  What is the natural incentive of the bank to leverage that makes it necessary for the regulatory folks to make these requirements?  That's the first question. The second question, much harder for me because I'm very confused about it, is when we are not in a world of depositors, which is the investment bank--when we are not in a vanilla bank, American FDIC-insured stuff but we are in this more complicated shadowy bank world, I want to figure out how the story changes, if at all. Let's start with the first one. Let's say there's no regulatory requirements.  None. There's no FDIC.  I'm a bank; I want to attract deposits, and I want to invest those deposits in loans and other things.  Houses. All kinds of assets, potentially.  And to do that, I've got to make sure that you as the depositor feel comfortable with what I'm doing.  So, one way, and there are many ways, is to set aside a cushion.  Like we've talked about.  Could be two cushions--equity or cash.  Now, what we do know, even if you don't understand what we've been talking about so far, is that banks like leverage.  So, why is there a natural incentive to exploit the FDIC guarantee? What's going on that makes leverage so attractive for them.  Well, it used to be, before FDIC, that the banker borrowed money from depositors; depositors knew that they were at risk of losing it; and that meant that depositors were worried.  Which made bankers scared.  How did the bankers convince depositors not to be worried?  They held enough equity on their liability side and they held enough cash on their asset side. And in fact, especially because during crises it can be hard to really be confident about the bank's bookkeeping on capital, the way banks really restored confidence was they accumulated cash. Because if you are accumulating a lot  of cash, depositors know there is going to be cash there. <b>Russ:</b> There's not uncertainty about the value of the asset. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  Here's how dramatic it was.  In 1929, New York City banks, on their asset side, were holding about 1/4 of their assets in cash assets--that's Treasury Bills and cash at the Fed.  By the end of the 1930s, they were holding 3/4 of their assets in cash. Those banks didn't fail.  They didn't experience runs even, the NYC banks in the 1930s. What they did experience was a lot of depositor concern.  They as felt that concern in the form of some withdrawal pressures, they felt very strong pressures to reassure depositors.  They cut their dividends, so that they could try to boost their capital ratios; and they raised their cash ratios dramatically, from 25% up to 75%.  And that's how they stayed in business. Now, that's the old days.  When depositors worried and bankers were scared. Once you had FDIC insurance, the depositors aren't worried.  Well, if the depositors aren't worried, then the banker is thinking: Whatever I do, even if I hold very little capital and very little cash, I still only have to pay a very low interest rate on those deposits.  Now, imagine if I told--most corporations in the world, if they increase their leverage, they have to pay more to their debts. <b>Russ:</b> You are talking about a regular "company," not a financial institution. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  Or a bank, prior to FDIC insurance.  If you increased leverage, all of a sudden people start asking for a substantial amount more money for their debts.  And that discourages you.  Just as the banks I talked about, in the 1920s and 1930s, they were encouraged by markets to keep their leverage appropriate.  And to keep their cash appropriate.  Notice, we don't have capital requirements for non-financial companies. We don't need to. <b>Russ:</b> Microsoft. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. Microsoft doesn't need a capital requirement or a cash requirement.  They are rewarded in the market for having adequate capital and adequate cash because if they go off of capital adequacy, the markets will penalize them. They'll have to pay a lot more for  their debt; their  stock prices will fall; everybody will say: What's going on at Microsoft?  But bankers, once they are insured--when they increase their leverage, they don't have to pay higher costs of debt. And so that's called the moral hazard problem.  That's the temptation.  Because you actually can show that bankers will increase their profits by leveraging more because their deposits are protected.  So bankers face a strong incentive to increase leverage.  It just comes from the fact that the normal effect of increasing leverage and raising your cost of funding doesn't apply when you are funding is insured. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. <b>Guest:</b> So that's why we need capital requirements.  We need capital ratio requirements and cash ratio requirements, both. <b>Russ:</b> Well, you say we need them.  We need them if we are going to have insurance.  My alternative would be to get rid of the insurance. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I've written quite a bit about that topic. There's a very good economic argument for doing that. I would also just remind everyone that the person who passed deposit insurance, the person who was President when it was passed, Franklin Roosevelt, was against it. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, he had been against it.  The Republicans pushed it through. <b>Guest:</b> It was actually Henry Steagall of Alabama who really pushed it through. And the reason they pushed it through was they wanted to subsidize the small banks that were at risk.  And so it was small banks in mainly rural areas that had a huge amount of political interest in pushing that through. And there was logrolling done in the Banking Act of 1933 that made this happen.  There's a long political history of this going beyond that; I don't want to get into it except to say I've come to the conclusion that politically, getting ride of deposit insurance doesn't solve our problems in the United States.  <b>Russ:</b> You have it anyway.  I've heard people saying that. <b>Guest:</b> Because we have a political problem.  A new book that Steve Haber and I are writing called <i>Fragile Banks, Unlikely Partners: Why Banking Is All About Politics and Always Has Been</i>--we're talking about this problem.  And basically the problem is in the United States we have a political coalition which is a very unlikely one, between big bankers and what we call urban populists. And what this means is the kinds of subsidies for risk-taking that occur to the benefit of the big banks and to the benefit of affordable housing policy and other kinds of policies are very much there on purpose--to satisfy certain political constituencies.  And ultimately deposit insurance and bank regulations, the phenomena that are--you might think you are going to control the world with them, but they are really just outcomes of deep political processes.  I'm not even sure we are at a point where making changes in deposit insurance coverage are credibly. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I agree. <b>Guest:</b> And that's the problem. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">55:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's move on. By the way, I look forward to talking to you about that book down the road.  Let's talk about--we're very close for me on actually understanding this, so I don't want to miss the opportunity. Let's move from an FDIC insured bank that takes deposits from people who have savings accounts; they use that money to then fund loans.  That's the model we've been talking about.  Let's move to an investment bank, which I am confused about two things, that you are going to help me understand.  One is: Did they have capital requirements like a regular bank? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, they did. <b>Russ:</b> And the second question: They are on paper leveraged much more highly than the so-called vanilla banks.  And the second question, and this is the one I'm really interested in, is: Who is funding the leverage if it's not depositors?  Let's start with the first question, which is just the regulatory environment that say, Lehman or Bear or Morgan Stanley is in. <b>Guest:</b> East to answer all these questions.  The first was: Were the investment banks subject to capital requirements like the commercial banks?  And the answer is: Yes.  Starting in 2002, in response to European complaints that American investment banks were not regulated under the Basel system, the United States imposed the Basel system on the investment banks.  Now, the Basel system thinks about capital requirements using something called a risk-based capital system. It measures risk-weighted assets.  Under Basel I and Basel II, it imposed an 8% capital requirement, on a risk-weighted basis. So, for example, just in our little example we've been using: If you had $80 million in risky assets, with risk weights of 1, meaning they are considered-- <b>Russ:</b> Average. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, let's call it average risk weight.  Then your capital requirement would be 8% of that $80 million.  Because it would be 8% of risk-weight 1, multiplied by $80 million. <b>Russ:</b> But if it's triple-A, if it's a really "safe" asset, then you could go to what? <b>Guest:</b> Very low.  So, notice that under the Basel II system, some of these investment banks had capital ratios of 3%. But their capital ratios on a risk-weighted basis were still about 8%, you see. Because the risk weights were very low--they were less than 1.  Now, where do those risk weights come from? If I told a 10-year old, they wouldn't believe me. <b>Russ:</b> I know.  They come from the banks, I know. <b>Guest:</b> The banks made them up.  <b>Russ:</b> And the regulators said: Your models look pretty good to me. So the safe stuff is then mortgages, because we know housing prices are good. <b>Guest:</b> How could <i>those</i> go down in value? <b>Russ:</b> And debt from Greece. Because Greece is a country. <b>Guest:</b> We all know that sovereign debt is almost riskless. <b>Russ:</b> If it's European. And Greece is in Europe. <b>Guest:</b> So, actually, these are really important issues nowadays.  So, remember: Risk weights are a regulatory, therefore a political, concept.  They are determined in practice by the banks' own models, or by ratings' agencies' opinions. <b>Russ:</b> Which, by the way, is really just a fancy version of forbearance. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely.  Well, it can be. Unless there is something credible about the way that's done. Now, there are some ideas, I've been writing about ways to try to make those ideas more credible. But let's just not go off on tangents.  Let's stay with your question: Yes.  They are not very credible.  And so the problem is that capital--real capital relative to total assets--can get very small. Notice that the banks in the United States, commercial banks, had an additional requirement, over and above the Basel system requirement.  They had to also meet what was called the simple leverage requirement, which meant that no matter what risk weights they attached to their requirements, they had to, in order to be well-capitalized, have at least 5% of their total assets in capital.  So, the reason that commercial banks were not able to get their capital ratios down as low as the investment banks is that on top of the Basel II system, they had this special leverage requirement. <b>Russ:</b> Now we are at the key question.  So, what is the role of depositors?  And I want to come back to saying something I've said a million times, but I'll keep saying it because I think it's so important; I think people have trouble understanding it. It came up in the podcast with William Black.  People say--including him--the equity holders get wiped out, so obviously market discipline doesn't matter. But the equity holders, they get wiped out once in a while.  They expect that.  They diversify.  That's why they have the upside. It's the fixed-income folks, it's the creditors, who have no upside, only care about the downside, who I call the watchdogs of recklessness.  So if you take away their incentive, the watchdogs of recklessness, you get more recklessness.  So, here's the question. In our story about a commercial bank, we know who the depositors are.  They are people like you and me who have savings accounts in these banks.  In the case of an investment bank, they are borrowing and financing their investments with a very different kind of thing.  What is it? <b>Guest:</b> Now we are getting somewhere, aren't we? <b>Russ:</b> I hope so. <b>Guest:</b> Well, how different is it?  That'll be the question.  So, let's see.  Suppose they invented something that was a very short-term instrument.  I'm not going to even give it a name yet. <b>Russ:</b> I know the name of it.  Because I find this mystifying. So, keep going. <b>Guest:</b> So, suppose it's overnight.  It matures overnight.  And suppose that its total quantity is even greater than the total amount of deposits in the banking system.  So that there's this overnight money that they are funding themselves from, of huge quantity.  Maybe, I'm going to say, $8 trillion.  We don't know, to this day we don't know what the number was.  But I'm going to tell you $8 trillion.  Now, if it was $8 trillion of what are called repurchases, or repos, now look at what the politician and the regulator are facing.  If this bank gets into trouble, and it loses a significant percentage of its value; and since it only has 3% of equity, then that means, that if it starts losing significant value on its asset side, that means that some of these repo guys aren't going to get their money back. Or they are at significant risk now that they might not get their money back. As they start seeing this happen, they might decide not to roll over their repos.  And what actually happens--it's a little bit more complicated.  There were these things called repo haircuts, which just meant that they started requiring more collateral against the overnight debts. To make a long story short, what happens is, the government doesn't like the way that story ends.  It doesn't want to see deleveraging, which means all sorts of assets being sold.  Trillions of dollars worth of assets being put up for sale all of a sudden in investment banks; the possibility of investment banks going bust, with counterparty risk--that means all of the contracts they've entered into not being honored--leading to financial chaos in the minds of the politicians and the regulators.  And so, what do they decide to do?  Well, you know what they are going to do.  They are going to apply deposit insurance to these debts of the investment banks. That's what we're talking about, right? And in fact, the money market mutual funds shares are going to be insured, because they didn't like the fact that some of the Lehman paper might not be repaid. So, financial intermediaries all over the world, whether they--they didn't have to have things called deposits.  If they had assets-backed commercial paper, commercial paper, medium term notes, repos, even the shares in the money market mutual funds--all got treated like they were just insured debts. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:03:57</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I sort of get that. I'd love to avoid going into detail on how the repo market actually worked.  I love your shorthand way of saying it: It's an overnight loan. Let's not talk about how it was actually executed for a moment.  Maybe we can get away without doing that. We've talked about it a little before, a long time ago on this program.  But what was going on is I'm borrowing overnight.  And the next morning, I say: Can I do that again? <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. <b>Russ:</b> And the reason you are lending to me overnight is that I'm putting up as collateral--yes, they are usually fine, and so far they seem to be totally okay. They seem to be worth what you say they are worth.  And that's how that market worked in a very abstract way. <b>Guest:</b> Right, and you could see, as the assets start to decline in value, and if they start getting a little riskier, either of the two--if they start being perceived as at risk to decline in value or they start declining--you start asking for more collateral against each dollar that you are lending me. Overnight.  Where am I supposed to get this collateral? <b>Russ:</b> Because my assets are strapped. <b>Guest:</b> And so ultimately what it comes down to is, as the collateral demands get higher, we start seeing that people either start throwing assets off like crazy, which is causing asset prices to fall dramatically.  Or, they can't repay their debts.  In other words, they are not allowed to roll over their debts and they might not be able to repay their debts.  So, you start looking at a situation where-- <b>Russ:</b> Panic-- <b>Guest:</b> The government says: Well, let's just guarantee everything.  Which is what we did. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  But I need to hear--we are real close to the punchline of the story.  Try to tell me that repo story in the context--I understand that the government treated the people who lent money to these investment banks as if they were depositors who had insurance. Whether it was because of political forces or fear of systemic risk or contagion or whatever it was doesn't matter.  That's the way they treated them.  Here's what I don't understand.  I want to make the analogy--perhaps I can't--but I want to make the analogy to our previous story of equity and leverage and capital ratios.  So, I'm Bear Stearns.  Every night I am borrowing massive sums of money.  Can you tell me the story of the 80-20/90-10 in that? Tell me how it works. <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  Substitute, instead of deposits, call it repos.  Instead of bank deposits, the way you are raising your money is with this overnight debt.  And notice that: Why did people like complying with that? <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I want to know that. Why was it so attractive? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it comes down to the same thing.  It turns out that there's a very large group of people in the world, institutional investors, who, as part of their portfolios, want to hold something that they regard as nearly riskless.  And that turns into what is called money market instruments. Deposits, commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper, and repo.  And so the institutional investors can carry--these are all debt obligations by somebody.  By banks, by commercial paper conduits, by commercial paper issuers, by investment banks.  All of that list of things I described, which are called money market instruments, they are all considered very low risk.  And there is a particular appetite on a particular institutional investor's balance sheet, where you have certain amount of cash assets.  And so as long as--he's interested in some of his portfolio being in these very low-risk things. And so there's an appetite out there for institutional investors to invest in things that have the properties of being very low risk.  And so the investment banks were able to say: Well, you've got an appetite for very low risk things; we can supply those.  We'll call them repos. It's overnight money and it's collateralized. So, if you ever need it back, you can get it back.  Sounds pretty good, so long as everybody doesn't want it back on the same day. <b>Russ:</b> But is it correct to say that, given that this is the shortest of short-term loans, almost the shortest--overnight; it's not an hour from now but it's overnight--the idea would be then that if I decide to change my mind and I want access to that, I want to do something more risky with my money instead of lending it at a relatively low rate overnight, I can. Because it's flexible.  I can.  It's only a day. <b>Guest:</b> Only a day. Exactly.  So you have flexibility.  But you also have protection. <b>Russ:</b> Because you have collateral. <b>Guest:</b> You have collateral and the short maturity also gives you protection, too.  Because things don't go south in two hours in the world.  Things go south over a matter of days or weeks.  And so, by having overnight maturity, you have protection.  You can get out.  Commercial paper has a maturity--we are talking about commercial paper you buy, maybe nonfinancial terms. <b>Russ:</b> What is commercial paper? <b>Guest:</b> Commercial paper is a promissory note issued by anyone who is in the commercial paper market.  It's rated and it typically has a maturity of under 270 days, I think it is.  It's a negotiable instrument, governed under certain law.  But the key thing about it is: It's of the highest quality.  So, there are only two ratings that matter in commercial paper: Hello and Goodbye. There is no junk commercial paper. Commercial paper is being held by people, it's like a cash substitute.  If you start looking as an issuer, if the growth rate of your earnings or your sales start to decline a little bit, you basically get your yellow card, or your red card--like in soccer.  You are told you are out. When you issue commercial paper, the average maturity is usually about a month. <b>Russ:</b> So all it is, is a bond that has a very short time frame from a very safe issuer. <b>Guest:</b> And because of the short time frame, and the safe issuer, it's actually considered to be very liquid.  It's not just that it's tradable. It's also that you know you can convert it to cash very quickly, because it matures. And you don't have to know about the issuer's prospects till eternity. You just have to know about them for a month.  And so repos are even more extreme.  They are collateralized, by specific assets.  You get to decide on a day-by-day basis whether you want your money back.  You could also decide: I'll let you keep the money but you have to cough up more collateral. And so it's a way--if the investors have a certain amount of assets that they want, that they consider to be very, very safe--and that's exactly what was going on.  Investment banks found a way to cater to that taste by promising something that looked like it was really safe. And it <i>was</i> safe--except if all of a sudden the investment banks all had similar kinds of losses of large amounts.  And now they've got to figure out: How do we convince these repo guys not to leave? How do we convince them not to demand more collateral than we have, and how do we convince them not to leave?  And the answer is: You can't.  And if you can't, ultimately you start getting a meltdown in the financial system.  It's all coming from the fact that the mortgage-backed securities are declining in value on the balance sheets.  And so, what's the answer? The answer we came up with was: Just bail everybody out.  Not a very attractive answer.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:11:56</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Here's the punchline, that I'm still confused about. A lot of people describe the Bear Stearns describe the Bear Stearns event of 2008 as a bailout of Bear Stearns. It's not really a bailout of Bear Stearns.  Bear Stearns disappears.  Their equity holders, as we've already mentioned, initially were going to get $2; eventually they got $10.  It's down from $1.70; it was an unpleasant period of time there. It didn't turn out as they had hoped. But the real point is that people who had held those repos of Bear Stearns were made whole by J.P. Morgan Chase.  JP Morgan Chase honored all of them.  Now, they were only willing to do that because the government guaranteed $32 million of "toxic assets." <b>Guest:</b> But shareholders were bailed out, too.  <b>Russ:</b> A little bit.  But I want to put that to the side. Because in other cases of what I call these creditor bailouts, the shareholders were wiped out. <b>Guest:</b> True. <b>Russ:</b> Continental Illinois, they were wiped out; a lot of times we are only talking about bond holders, so the Mexico guarantee was creditors of Mexico. So here's my question.  Who  <i>were</i> the creditors of Bear Stearns? I know JP Morgan Chase was one of the biggest ones. And they bought them.  So that's a weird situation.  I was told maybe they were a clearing house; what it meant to be their creditor was a little more complicated than just what we are talking about here in terms of repos and financing. So, who got made whole in the Bear Stearns rescue who didn't get made whole in the Lehman Brothers--because they didn't do it? Who got made whole in Citigroup and these other examples? Who were these people who were jumping up and down with joy when they realized for a minute they were going to get wiped out and then realized: No we're not; we're going to get everything back. <b>Guest:</b> Well, it's a broad range of holders.  Because we are talking about many trillions of dollars' worth of debts.  And it's mainly short term debts.  Citibank was running conduits from which it was issuing medium term notes, commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper.  All of those people were at risk; but they ended up not losing a dime.  Right?  All of the holders of commercial paper issued by Citibank's special investment vehicles were beneficiaries of the bailout. Similarly, all of the repo holders, who were beneficiaries of the interventions to protect Bear Stearns, to protect the various banks who were involved in the repo market.  I mean, repo, as I said, was a multi-trillion dollar market. <b>Russ:</b> Do we know who they were? <b>Guest:</b> I don't know who they were. <b>Russ:</b> The reason I ask-- <b>Guest:</b> We're talking about across all these asset categories, when you add them all together. <b>Russ:</b> But-- <b>Guest:</b> It's institutional investors, broadly speaking.  And to some extent--for example, the Lehman commercial paper that's experiencing losses, that's being spread through the money market mutual fund industry. <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> So, we can kind of see who the beneficiaries are; but to a large extent they are institutional investors who are holding repo and asset-backed commercial paper and commercial paper.  And of course banks that are holding interbank deposits. So, you are right that short-term creditors, largely institutional investors, are the major beneficiaries.  Exactly who is benefiting from which-- <b>Russ:</b> It's a little more complicated, because--let me structure this a little differently.  Let's suppose it comes to be believed, in the United States and maybe elsewhere, as it turns out to be, that creditors, lenders, bondholders of large financial institutions were going to be made whole.  Which was true for everybody except Lehman's creditors. Now Lehman filed bankruptcy in September or October of 2008.  And I looked at their bankruptcy filing, and their largest creditors--the largest creditor was quite large, I think it was Citi. And then most of their other creditors were Japanese and Asian, Korean banks who don't have a lot of political pull in the United States.  So I wondered, when I saw that, were the other banks different?  And in particular, you would think there would be two groups that would benefit from these kind of creditor rescues.  One would be the creditors, obviously; they would clamor for rescue.  They would call Hank Paulson if they could reach him. But the other people of course are the banks themselves, who profit from the opportunity to leverage.  Those are the two groups that have a political stake in this system.  I wondered--at first I thought, they are kind of the same. Overnight in this repo market, they are lending to each other.  It's not just like there are some banks that are repo banks. <b>Guest:</b> No, no.  But it's not just the banks. It's all the institutional investors.  Remember, we've got hedge funds. <b>Russ:</b> Pension funds. <b>Guest:</b> Mutual funds, insurance companies.  So, we've got a large group of investors who are not part of the same institutions that are the issuers of repo, or the issuers of commercial paper. So, it's not just that they are all lending it to each other. <b>Russ:</b> Because it can't be. <b>Guest:</b> It's not.  On net--we don't know the exact amount, but on net it's the non-bank institutional investors who are, internationally and domestically, who are the holders of these debts.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">1:17:46</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, what's the political economy of that?  Why did the U.S. government save those folks? <b>Guest:</b> Well, and as you pointed out, it didn't in the case of Lehman. But it's a really interesting question.  I've thought a lot about what's going on here.  I think that it's hard to really--I don't buy in to some of the stories that say things like, oh, Hank Paulson really wanted to save AIG because he cared about Goldman and really hated Lehman.  I don't believe those stories.  I think that there was inconsistency. <b>Russ:</b> It would make for a good movie. Could be true. <b>Guest:</b> I'm not saying it's not true. I'm just saying it's not the way I think these people probably behaved.  I think that the main thing to say here is number 1, there was huge incompetence due to inexperience.  The people we had at the top of this effort really didn't know what they were doing. And I mean that as an historian who has focused a lot of my career and research on financial crises.  We had incompetent management.  The Federal Reserve did not understand securitization. It did not understand financial risks very well.  My friend, Ben Bernanke, is a great economist; he knows a lot about the Great Depression; I think he was not really aware of what was going on as of 2006 and even early 2007.  And I am absolutely sure that Hank Paulson was not aware of what was going on.  And more importantly, they didn't even really know what they didn't know; and they didn't know because of the U.S.'s experience.  They didn't really understand crisis management. What I mean by crisis management--I wrote a paper in 2005 with two World Bank economists who'd spent a lot of their lives working in different crisis countries on how you deal with financial crises.  There's actually a group of 100 episodes in the last 20-30 years of countries that have financial crises and how you dealt with them.  There's a wide range of things you can know about this topic.  We just didn't have any real institutional memory or understanding of it.  I just think that we mismanaged it.  I look at the variety of experiences, and the fact that we did some balance and didn't do others as largely reflecting just incompetence, rather than some sort of conspiracy to sometimes help and sometimes not.  But I'll tell you one other thing about Lehman. <b>Russ:</b> But I've got to interrupt you there.  You can come back and tell me about Lehman. Hold that thought.  Are you really suggesting that this relentless policy, going back to Continental Illinois, of rescuing creditors is just incompetence? <b>Guest:</b> No, I'm not saying that.  I'm talking about--I thought you were asking me about why it was such a kind of random policy: AIG gets bailed out and Lehman doesn't. <b>Russ:</b> I agree with you; that's hard to know. It was a little bit chaotic.  Their public statements I don't find credible. But it could be true. <b>Guest:</b> The public statements are not credible. But I'm going to tell you another one here.  Here's the secret I'm going to reveal to you and your listeners, without telling you my source. <b>Russ:</b> That's in-credible, but go ahead. <b>Guest:</b> In the summer of 2008, it's probably pretty well known at this point that Met Life looked at buying Lehman. <b>Russ:</b> A lot of people did.  Barclay's was in the market; there was a Japanese firm. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  Well, MetLife looked very carefully and they really wanted to get into this area.  And as much as they wanted to get into it, they concluded that Lehman was so dead, so under the water, that they couldn't touch it.  That was not September of 2008; that was some time around May, June of 2008.  And someone called Tim Geithner, who at that point was at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and said: Tim, I'm a member of the Board of a certain company and I've heard something; and what it comes down to is what I've heard is that MetLife has done its due diligence, and as much as they'd like to do this, they can't do it; and so  you have a deeply insolvent financial institution on your hands called Lehman Brothers.  And you've got to figure something out about it. <b>Russ:</b> Free ride on their analysis and get to work. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah.  And then Geithner apparently pooh-poohed it. And the person on that line said to him: Look, MetLife would like to do this deal, from what I understand; they would like the numbers to work. So what's their incentive for-- <b>Russ:</b> For being so pessimistic. <b>Guest:</b> For being pessimistic. They have no incentive for being pessimistic.  They'd like to make it work.  They are walking away. And Tim: Wake up call, man! Now, if you want to start talking about incompetence, let's start there.  And then what happens with this incompetent individual? I have to be frank: He then gets promoted. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, it's depressing.  To me, the biggest thing that disturbs me about that is that when AIG was rescued and there was negotiating, and of course the rescue would give haircuts to their creditors because they weren't going to pay them all back; and once the government stepped in, the negotiations just weren't very effective.  Because they just said: Well, let's wait.  And Geithner supposedly insisted that there would be no discounts.  And I think--I don't understand that. <b>Guest:</b> Well, that one I'm more forgiving about. Because the problem there is you are playing chicken.  The creditors are thinking: I know that the Fed is not going to pull the trigger on this because if they don't--if I'm playing a game of chicken and you are driving the motorcycle at me and I'm driving the motorcycle at you, and I know that I am wearing some kind of bulletproof outfit and you are not, you don't have a helmet and I do, I know that you are going to swerve away first. And I think the problem was that people were correct in surmising that the government wasn't going to allow further meltdown on the AIG deal. And so the creditors hung tough. <b>Russ:</b> But couldn't the government have said $.90 on the dollar? <b>Guest:</b> Well, they could have said anything.  But the point is it's a game of chicken.  The creditors could say: That's not good enough; let's go to bankruptcy. And the view was: That would have caused so much damage that even though it would have hurt the creditors, it was something that the creditors correctly surmised the government wasn't willing to do.  So, if you are negotiating with somebody and you know they are not willing to do what they are threatening, you are going to hold out, right? <b>Russ:</b> Yeah. <b>Guest:</b> So the creditors had us over a barrel.  Which was the reason Ben Bernanke argued we needed to have this resolution authority in Dodd-Frank.  And I thought it was a reasonable argument, except they crafted it in such a way that it's completely non-credible.  So, it's just been one comedy of errors after another. It's hard to understand.  We're in exactly the same position again. <b>Russ:</b> Well, it's like FDICIA.  <b>Guest:</b> It's exactly like FDICIA. <b>Russ:</b> We fixed it except we are not going to use it. <b>Guest:</b> Your program's been great at bringing out a lot of these things.  The problem is: How many people have the hour to sit and listen to us, and then they have to do with it something--vote or something. I hate to be so pessimistic, but the people who are making so much money by ignoring these problems and buying politicians, one way or the other, who will ignore these problems, is really our problem.  And we have--it comes down to the politics of this.  And we are really not going to solve this problem very easily, because Americans need to understand it and hold politicians accountable. Judging by where we are right now, with how much economic literacy there seems to be in our country in understanding what's happened and who is responsible and what's wrong, I have to say I'm not that optimistic.  I wish I could say different, but I'm not. <b>Russ:</b> Well, on the positive side, I don't agree with the analysis of Occupy Wall Street, and I don't agree with their solution. I think they miss--like you say, I think they have sufficient economic literacy. People are saying what they are saying.  But they are on to something. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, absolutely. <b>Russ:</b> They understand that there is something not quite kosher about the way that the banks and the government are interacting.  So, I'm a little more optimistic. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I like your optimism.  After all, Winston Churchill really got it right when he said: America will always do the right thing, after it's tried everything else.
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>

]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Weinberger on Too Big to Know</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/weinberger_on_t.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9578</id>

    <published>2012-02-27T11:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-03-03T11:19:41Z</updated>

    <summary><![CDATA[ David Weinberger of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet &amp; Society and author of Too Big to Know, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in the book--how knowledge and data and our understanding of the world...]]></summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="David Weinberger" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Information and Technology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Philosophy and Methodology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www.evident.com/" target="new">David Weinberger</a> of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet &amp; Society and author of <i>Too Big to Know,</i> talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the ideas in the book--how knowledge and data and our understanding of the world around us are being changed by the internet. Weinberger discusses knowledge and how it is attained have changed over time, particularly with the advent of the internet. He argues the internet has dispersed the power of authority and expertise. And he discusses whether the internet is making us smarter or stupider, and the costs and benefits of being able to tailor information to one's own interests and biases. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Weinbergerinternet.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Weinberger on Too Big to Know','Russ Roberts and David Weinberger',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 1:03:24</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Weinbergerinternet.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 29.1 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.evident.com/" target="new">David Weinberger's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Too-Big-Know-Rethinking-Everywhere/dp/0465021425/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322859961&sr=8-1/" target="new"><i>Too Big to Know: Rethinking Knowledge Now That the Facts Aren't the Facts, Experts Are Everywhere, and the Smartest Person in the Room Is the Room</i></a>, by David Weinberger at Amazon.com.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html" target="new">An Essay on the Principle of Population</a>, by <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Malthus.html" target="new">Thomas Robert Malthus</a>.  1st edition.  Free at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPlong.html" target="new">An Essay on the Principle of Population</a>, by Thomas Robert Malthus. 6th edition.  Free at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Reports/rptPLC.html" target="new">Poor Law Commissioners' Report of 1834</a>. Nassau Senior, ed. Free at the Library of Economics and Liberty.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Teachers/defendmalthus.html" target="new">"In Defense of Malthus,"</a> by Morgan Rose. Library of Economics and Liberty, September 16, 2002.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Teachers/critiquemalthus.html" target="new">"What Malthus Missed and Attacks on Individualists,"</a> by Morgan Rose. Library of Economics and Liberty, October 28, 2002.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/LevyPeartdismal2.html" target="new">"The Secret History of the Dismal Science. Part II. Brotherhood, Trade, and the Negro Question,"</a> and <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/LevyPeartdismal4.html" target="new">"The Secret History of the Dismal Science. Part IV. Paternalism, Hierarchy, and Markets,"</a> by David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart. Charles Dickens on poverty and race in 19th-century England. Library of Economics and Liberty, August 27, 2001.
<li><a href="http://mises.org/daily/3229" target="new" rel="nofollow">"The Pretense of Knowledge,"</a> by <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hayek.html" target="new">Friedrich A. Hayek</a>. Nobel Prize lecture, December 11, 1974. Online at Mises.org.



<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Malthus.html" target="new">Thomas Robert Malthus</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Bentham.html" target="new">Jeremy Bentham</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>
<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://hunch.com/" target="new">Hunch</a>.
</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/11/kelly_on_techno.html" target="new">Kevin Kelly on Technology and What Technology Wants</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/04/benkler_on_net.html" target="new">Benkler on Net Neutrality, Competition, and the Future of the Internet</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/05/sunstein_on_inf.html" target="new">Sunstein on Infotopia, Information, and Decision-Making</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/01/hanson_on_the_t.html" target="new">Hanson on the Technological Singularity</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a target="new" href="http://econstories.tv/2011/04/28/fight-of-the-century-music-video/">Fight of the Century: Keynes vs. Hayek Round Two</a>. EconStories.tv. Rap video, Russ Roberts and John Papola.



<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/01/taleb_on_antifr.html" target="new">Taleb on Antifragility</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: February 7, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Subject for today is knowledge, which is what your book is about: how has knowledge and our understanding of knowledge changed because of the internet and how has it changed over time. Early on in the book you give a brief history of empirical knowledge and expertise, and you use Thomas Robert Malthus as an example of someone whose work had change.  Can you talk about that? <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  So, the question is what role facts play, because in the modern world, these days, we continue to have a hope that facts will settle arguments. This is put really well by Senator Moynihan when he said: Everybody's entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.  Which is a sort of lovely way of putting an old idea. At least an enlightened idea--I think you can trace it back way further than that--and the idea is that we seem to have lots of disagreements; there are lots of opinions in the world, lots of ideas; and we argue about them.  But, says Moynihan of the role of facts themselves, if we just sit down and look at the way the world is, look at the facts, reasonable people can come together and knowledge will heal is, will help us pass these divides.  Knowledge that, in particular, in this case, looks at facts.  Facts are the irrefutable foundation of knowledge. And so, much as I like facts--I believe in facts, I think some things are true and some things are false--nevertheless facts are a very modern invention. They are very new as a concept, and their role in knowledge is only a couple of hundred years old. And so in the book I use Malthus as a convenient example of what a pre-fact form of knowledge looked like--that is, when we didn't try to build knowledge up based on the recitation and citation of facts.  And so in his famous work that showed that the world is likely to starve itself to death because the population increases faster than the food supply-- <b>Russ:</b> Or so he thought. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  And at the time.  But we've managed to break that pretty well. So, he writes a book about it; and it's an important book, a classic work. But it's really sort-of fact free. He's not arguing by looking around the world and looking at statistics about food consumption and food production and population growth. He instead is doing the best he can at the time, 1800 or so, gathering information about various ethnic groups--sorry, not really ethnic groups, but cultural groups around the world and how they manage the problem of food supply.  Really not very fact-based. But then over the next 20-25 years he revises it six times--six editions.  It gets substantially larger, and it gets filled with modern facts.  It looks much more like a modern work.  And so over that period of time--this is why I use him as an example--you can see the rise of facts as a way of grounding knowledge and of arguing for positions.  It's pretty dramatic; it happened very quickly. <b>Russ:</b> And what in his case--did something jar him? Did he get pushed? Or did he just have this new opportunity? <b>Guest:</b> It was in the air, for a couple of reasons.  One is statistics started to grow as a way of looking at the world. The word "statistics" entered the English language I think around 1780; came from the German; so statistics as a discipline is growing. And Jeremy Bentham's work begins to have a major affect on British thinking. In particular, the British class system was pretty crummy for those who were not in the upper classes, and it was assumed that the poor were poor because they deserved to be.  It was basically a moral argument or a set of moral assumptions--that the poor were, they drank, they were lazy, had no discipline, were dishonest.  And so, that's why they're poor; and the rich were rich because they embodied the virtues.  Pretty nasty sort of social stew, especially when it results in 8-year-olds being shoved into 7x7" chimney flues to clean them and it's really for their own good.  And you get this sort of argument--you can read it in Parliament as some of the reform bills are being introduced, that it keeps them off the streets, because they'll be pickpockets and grow up to be like their fathers anyway.  And it's really good for them; it's really not bad for them in any way; it's a good, healthy work ethic and good healthy work for those 10-year-olds.  So, Bentham comes along, a polymath, philosopher guy, and suggests that there might actually be another way of thinking about how to structure, how to make value decisions in a society: which is that you assume everybody has an equal interest in happiness or pleasure or whatever you want to call it, and so you just sort of measure: What policies will bring more happiness to the world or less? And you drop out of it who is it bringing happiness <i>to</i>. So all happiness is equal.  And so now you can do a type of statistical measure.  At least you can start looking at that to see what the effect of policies might be.  And maybe even more important, you have a reason to look at what the current happiness rate is of your population regardless of class.  So, you drop the moral thing out of it, and you just look.  And so now you have an incentive to go out and look across your society and to wonder: Well, are poor chimney sweep boys actually being harmed medically by this?  We'd like to believe not, but let's take a look.  And so the culture beings actually a factual investigation. <b>Russ:</b> And they find that it's actually not so good for them. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  It's during the first half of the 19th century in England, you start to get these reform movements that are based on facts.  So, the Parliament starts to compile a blue book, so-called for obvious reasons, which are modern-day reports based on statistics and facts, in order to argue policy. And by the mid-19th century this regime of fact is so dominant that Charles Dickens actually starts pushing back against it. Facts, facts, facts.  He has Professor Gradgrind, one of these awful--you already know these-- <b>Russ:</b> You know he's the bad guy.  Dickens didn't pull any, he wasn't subtle. <b>Guest:</b> No, he was the sort of the Steven King of his era. You already have Dickens pushing back against policy determined only by fact, as opposed to understanding the human plight.  This is a very modern sort of complaint, by the way. <b>Russ:</b> Sure. Post-modern. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah.  We've had echoes of this throughout our culture all throughout the 20th century and beyond, where the fact-based expert is viewed as cold-hearted and merely a numbers cruncher. <b>Russ:</b> Green eye-shade. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  So, the avatar of this in American culture is the RAND Corporation.  Now I'm having a senior moment in forgetting the guy's name, the nuclear theorist. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, Herman Kahn.  <b>Guest:</b> Thank you so much. <b>Russ:</b> I read your book. <b>Guest:</b> You read the book more recently than I did! So, in the modern age--this is too old for many of your listeners, I am sure, but Herman Kahn in the 1950s, the RAND Corporation was still very important company in consulting to the government. Kahn was writing books about nuclear theory, game theory, in which he would make calculations about: Well, if we responded, here are the various responses possible to a Russian first launch.  If we did this, that would happen; if we did this other thing, only 20 million people would be killed. And you know, it is a sort of rational calculation that he was making. It's better for 20 million people to be killed rather than 100 million.  Nevertheless, for I think pretty obvious reasons, he got taken as a very symbol of a cold-blooded, fact-based, statistically-based expert. Basically, a character. In your life, I don't know.  But culturally, he became a character right out of Dickens.  And it was the same sort of pushback against knowledge based merely on facts.  
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">10:56</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> His most famous book, at the time, and you are right that it is lost to many of our younger listeners, was <i>Thinking the Unthinkable</i>. Which was a great title. That would be thinking the unthinkable, right? What's the best way to minimize the losses from a nuclear attack?  And you could argue that's a good thing to think about, or you could argue it's not a good thing to think about. <b>Guest:</b> And both arguments were made. The argument against was, as I remember it, that by making it thinkable you were making it more plausible. <b>Russ:</b> Now, I just want to mention that we do have the first and sixth editions of Malthus's work on population up on the Library of Economics and Liberty website.  If you want to wade through them or challenge Weinberger's assertion that the later editions became more empirical, but I suspect you are right.  But you can read it for yourself and watch that happen, which is very cool. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">11:51</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, what's interesting about this to me, as a modern, is that there's this unavoidable tension between--fact-free discourse is obviously dangerous. But there's this  other danger--it's not so much that you leave out the human side, but it's that facts are not really truth.  You often need a context or theory to generate them, understand them, not be misled by them; and we have this worship of facts, which you do talk about in the book, this transition between, certainly between the ancients and the moderns, that moderns are more empirical and experts have the facts on their side, which is a little bit misleading in its own right.  It's not always reliably true.  Facts to not always get us closer to the truth. And certainly not all statistical analysis gets us closer to the truth. <b>Guest:</b> No, but I want to tread a very careful line.  Because we have seen what happens when we have administrations that don't care about facts. Some things can go terribly wrong.  Facts are really important.  So, on the one hand I do not want to be lumped with people who say: All facts are constructions and that you can believe whatever you want to believe.  I don't believe that. On the other hand, I do think it's important, as you say, to recognize that facts are to some degree constructions.  The world is one way and it's not other ways.  Let me give you an example; and this is also from the book.  So, there's a website called Hunch.com, which is a recommendation site--it recommends things that are matters of taste: What movie should I see tonight? What type of food am I in the mood for?  And it will give you an answer.  There's not a lot hanging on the answer. I want to buy a wedding gift for a cousin; can you make any suggestions? So, the  way that Hunch works is that it asks you a series of questions, basically an endless series of questions, many of them generated by users at this point. And the questions are themselves sort of game-like, and often by themselves silly, irrelevant, and impossible.  So, some of them could be straightforward things: do you prefer pink or red? But many of them are things like: Have you ever petted a dolphin? Do you store your kitchen glasses right-side up or upside down? Do you, when you get a cellphone, also buy a cover for it? Do you own any plaid clothing? And from this they deduce what your preferences are for what you want to see, what movie, or what food you want to eat.  In my case, it works pretty well. One of the interesting things is that they very explicitly do not, at Hunch, try to generate a theory of human taste.  They don't know why if you've ever touched a dolphin helps as an indicator of whether you will want to go see a particular movie tonight.  They purposefully are theory-free.  <b>Russ:</b> Just looking at the numbers, doing the correlations.  <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  Which I think is interesting because it's a type of knowledge without understanding. Insofar as it works. But the reason I bring it up is, as you go through these--would you rather take a subway or eat a brownie--these are not polar opposites. It's a very silly question.  But they don't care. But it nevertheless is a fact. Here's a fact that I've learned from Hunch: I've never petted a dolphin. That's a fact.  It may well be that the next question they are going to ask me is: Have you ever petted an orangutan, and that's a fact, too. Have you ever touched an orangutan's ear? No, I haven't--another fact.  Have you ever petted a plant dolphin? No, I have not, now that you ask.  That is  also a fact. Insanely trivial facts, but they are facts. 	The reason that I bring this up  is that I think it helps make clear the extent to which facts are constructed. So, the content of the fact can be right or wrong, but that you have picked this particular set of things as the facts that are worth looking at is entirely a construction.  It depends on what your interests are.  So, facts remain very important.  But to think naively, as I think in our history we have, that we can get to knowledge by accumulating facts is not at all the case.  Because I have never touched a plant dolphin; that's also a fact. There is art as well as science in deciding which of the facts are the foundation upon which you are going to build belief.  And that means that foundation is itself not a natural object, as we have thought.  It is itself a construction. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">17:28</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Well, let me--I want to take your example and take you to a different place and see if  you still agree.  I certainly agree with you that there is this very narrow, nuanced path that I often feel myself taking in this jungle of whether facts are truth or not, or constructed or not; and if you are not careful you can end up--you believe in voodoo or Extra Sensory Perception [ESP] or something that finally you think is wrong, but if you go the other way you can be deluded into thinking that you have the truth when you are not even close. I'll give you an example.  Your examples, barring a mistyping on the survey or on the computer or a whimsical decision to lie about my dolphin-petting experience--right?--those facts are either true or false.  I've either petted a dolphin or I haven't. I might lie about it on the survey or make a mistake, but in general those are facts.  How tall I am at any point I am in my life.  These are measurable things. There's a measurement error potentially; you might want to say plus or minus a millimeter or two because maybe I'm slumping a bit or  may have had  a bad night's sleep, but we all understand those kinds of uncertainties about facts.  But those aren't the facts we use for public policy decisions or social science or even physical science.  The things that we use for those, those are facts in I would argue in a very different kind of way.  Let me give you an example and see what your reaction is. In the 1980s the U.S. homeownership rate fell.  It fell fairly dramatically by historical standards, and one of the reactions of policy-makers was concern that housing had become unaffordable, that the housing market wasn't working well.  And that was either an excuse, justification, or cause for a lot of public policy encouraging home ownership in the United States. Now, was it a fact that the home ownership rate was declining?  It was probably a fact.  Why it was happening is not a fact.  That's a theory, a model, a metaphor, a vision, a hypothesis.  And in fact the standard interpretations of that, one of the things that I've never seen discussed, as an example, is that the divorce rate was rising dramatically in the United States throughout the 1970s.  And so when you went to measure the home ownership rate you had a lot more entries in the denominator, because there were a lot more households all of a sudden. And while those people had split up, if they became a renter and had been a home owner before; and so that told us nothing about how easy or difficult it was to afford a house. It was a result of a social phenomenon called a higher divorce rate. And so those kinds of facts, which come up with income inequality, growth of income--crucial issues which are going to affect politics, legislation, etc.--they are not in the same realm of have you petted a dolphin.  They are complicated.  And often not truth.  They have truthiness but they are not truth. <b>Guest:</b> Hmmm.  That home ownership fell isn't truthy.  It's true. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, that's right.  I agree with that. <b>Guest:</b> I'm just trying to make sure that I'm getting the gist of this.  I  think that we agree, but let's say. So the fact that home ownership fell, we'll take as true.  We'll stipulate is true, and thus is  a fact, and likely an important fact.  How we put them together, that's all we talk about, even in the age of facts, is what the relationship among the facts are. And, are we considering the right facts? It's one of the reasons why <i>Freakonomics</i> is an eternal best seller--holy cow, there's a set of conditions we haven't considered. <b>Russ:</b> Well, I think there are very few facts in that book, actually. There's a  lot of statistical analysis, which I don't consider factual. <b>Guest:</b> Interesting. <b>Russ:</b> Do you?  Let's talk about that.  I mention it because--well, you're not a regular listener; I talk about it maybe way too much on this program. But I'm very interested in the problem of how we understand causal relationships in social science.  And in economics--and I would say it's equally problematic in the other social sciences, if not worse--we use various multivariate statistical techniques to tease out causation. To take one that's in the news: Did the stimulus create jobs? I'd say we have no idea.  I don't think that's a scientific question.  It gets answered using scientific techniques.  Facts are accumulated about past government spending and past levels of employment, past levels of output, statistical relationships are teased out among those variables. "We do the best we can."  Have we established a fact about, say, the relationship between a dollar of government spending financed by debt and the impact on national income? I'd say: No, it's not a fact. It's not even close to a fact.  It gets quoted as a fact: The relationship is 1.57, or .6.  But I don't consider that a fact.  And I'd say that's an enormous percentage of what goes for knowledge in the social sciences. And I  think it's fake knowledge. <b>Guest:</b> Well, so I disagree with you. <b>Russ:</b> That's fine. <b>Guest:</b> Okay, I will. At least on this point.  I very much like your way of putting this.  I would point maybe to two things. And put it a little differently. You may disagree, but you'll tell me.  The first is that I don't think it's an accident that we are seeing the rise of complexity theory in an age when we have the tools by which we can gather enough information that we see how complex it is and have tools that can help us a bit to understand that complexity. The computing power doesn't keep up with the complexity, or else it really wouldn't be complexity.  Nevertheless we can do better than we could when we were just writing things down. So, we have a long cultural history of making the exact sort of assumptions that you've just been talking about--namely, there's a set of facts; there's causality; and if you put the two together you can answer a question like: Did the stimulus create jobs? Or like: What was the cause of the Civil War?  What were the causes of WWI? As if this is a finite question that must have an answer.  And maybe we're not going to be good at answering it, but it's got to have an answer.  If we are in a world that is more complex than we can imagine, the more that we learn and the further down in the level of detail that we go, the more complex it becomes.  It doesn't become simpler--it used to be the case that if you went to the simpler elements, you were trying something simpler.  But in a fractally complex world, that's not the case.  So, systems biology that's looking at simple cells, the most basic element of life--it should be simple, or at least much simpler than life itself.  It turns out to be so complex that brains can't understand it; computers do understand at least a bunch of the attractions that happen across the cell wall. But it is a deeply complex area of life; and that is the simplest level. <b>Russ:</b> Right.  My brain, or your brain, is unbelievably complicated; and we are not close to understanding it very well. And now we're going to talk about how my brain interacts with your brain. <b>Guest:</b> We don't, as far as I am concerned, even have a good metaphor for the brain at this point.  And I don't know that we ever will.  Anyway, so, yes--we have on the one hand, we have--I think--a very healthy embrace of complexity theory where somebody can draw up the conversation and say: I'm not even sure if that question is science, is a scientific question.  And the second thing that's happening, at the same time, and not accidentally at the same time, is the growth of data commons as a way of proceeding. These enormous clouds of data that are being released from multiple disciplines.  A few weeks ago there was a report saying that we are likely to have an exabyte of simple genomic data within the next two years. <b>Russ:</b> I assume that's a lot. I don't know what an exabyte is.  Is it after tera? <b>Guest:</b> No, it's after peta. <b>Russ:</b> Okay. Giga, tera, peta, exa. <b>Guest:</b> Probably wrong, but that's what I remember. In any case, it's a gigantic bunch of data of the sort that we never even talked about, that was beyond reckoning. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">27:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> So, we have these enormous clouds of linked data in formats suitable for computers to troll through them, and there's this guy, John Wilbanks, who until recently was the head of Science Commons, that was part of Creative Commons. So, he's very interested in helping to facilitate the growth of these data commons and multiple sciences to [?] in ways that allow them to intersect their data, hook up their data.  And he says--I think he puts this wonderfully.  He's pushing back against the idea that we can take all of this data, model all of the rules, input the data, and get predictions on outcomes and understanding on the other side.  Which makes sense on the old view of facts and knowledge: here are the facts, we know how they go together, turn the crank. Even for complex systems.  And he says: No, that will never happen.  What we really need--and here's the quote--is my nerds arguing with your nerds. In a perpetual argument.  And then my nerds win and crush your nerds--in that argument, the multiple nerd argument, which is looking at facts and taking facts and data very seriously, we don't want to lose sight of that.  Facts still matter a lot.  But the knowledge consists in not the resolution of these issues, because in a complex world the things don't resolve that nicely; but is rather in the continued engagement, discussion, argument, disagreement among the nerds who are looking at the data and looking at the facts. I love the quote and I think it captures exactly what the idea is. <b>Russ:</b> There's real insight there.  I keep thinking about something I saw of Nassim Taleb's--I can't remember if we talked about it in the recent interview with him; I think it came up--but he has a diagram where he has a giant cube; and that giant cube is what we'd like to know.  And pulled out of that giant cube is a little tiny cube, and that's what we know scientifically--through the scientific methods, through confirmable hypotheses and tests; and we are constantly fight the urge, and usually failing, to take what we know in that little tiny cube and apply it to the big cube.  I think about that quote you just gave; again, putting it in a economics context--does Keynesian stimulus work?  I did a rap video called the Fight of the Century where we talked about how this debate between say, Keynes and Hayek, or the pro-stimulus and anti-stimulus people is unsettled; it's still going on. Somehow we haven't figured it out yet. And thinking about your quote--my nerds versus your nerds--I've come to believe it's probably not resolvable through the traditional methods of science. But you do learn something from arguing about it, even though you don't convince each other in a way that you do through a normal replicable experiment.  I think both sides learn something. Now, what they might learn is to get more entrenched in their own views. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">30:24</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's turn now back to some of your arguments in the book. One of the things you talk about, I think very provocatively and insightfully is this sort of tension on the internet between hanging out with people who think just like you, which is comforting and feels good often, but dangerous, because it's prone to groupthink or echo chamber effects, versus exposing yourself to other viewpoints and learning about things you don't agree with, and maybe getting smarter. But less comfortable.  Talk about how that's going on on the internet. <b>Guest:</b> Okay. This is actually one of my least favorite topics, because I'm so uncertain. <b>Russ:</b> Well, we'll make it short, then. I have plenty of other questions. <b>Guest:</b> I think it's a really important topic to bring up in any discussion of knowledge on the internet.  Because the echo chamber argument is a powerful argument.  It says that if you give people many different sources to listen to, they will naturally tend to listen to ones that they agree with.  And there are bad consequences to that--namely you get further convinced of your own beliefs and in fact you get more extreme in your beliefs. There's some evidence that's what happens.  And the internet is just that situation. And so there's a great deal of agitation about the echo chamber. On the one hand, part of me doesn't care about how severe the echo chamber effect is, whether it's a lot or a little, because even if it's a little, we still need to be doing everything we can to avoid closing ourselves off to alternative views.  I'm a good liberal, not just politically but in terms of certain traditional liberal enlightenment sort of guy, so I think that openness to contrary ideas improves thought. Sorry, that's what I think; and I'm old; and that thought itself isn't very open to contrary opinion. <b>Russ:</b> You're pretty close-minded about openness. <b>Guest:</b> I am, absolutely.  So on the one hand, it doesn't matter how severe it is; we still need to be doing everything we can as parents and as individuals and institutionally to avoid it.  On the other hand, it seems to me there's some wrong conclusions, or maybe there are assumptions within that model that we also need to be careful about.  The echo chamber model seems to assume that the only good conversation is one with somebody with whom you disagree, and otherwise you are just in your comfort zone.  I mean, the language around it is all negative.  You are in your comfort zone, you are reconfirming, you are closing yourself down.  So, a real conversation is you arguing with somebody with whom you disagree; and not just arguing, but being open to change. Because if you are not open to change then you incapable of learning and there is no point. And so the model should be: The Jew--I say this as a Jew, as my example--talking with a neo-Nazi, and the Jew says: Welcome my friend, let's have some coffee--because we are in a coffee shop, that's the setting for these conversations, these ideal conversations. <b>Russ:</b> Or a salon.  It's the salon/coffee shop/faculty lounge--it's where we romanticize intellectual discourse. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah.  In the Jurgen Habermas thing it's the coffee shop. So, I'm going to put it in a coffee shop, if you don't mind.  So, would you like--it's on me, we'll get your Nazi latte; and lets talk and work down to our differences, and I am open to becoming a Nazi, my good friend, just as you are open to becoming a Jew.  And that's a real conversation.  But that conversation not only never happens.  It can't happen. Because conversation needs a great deal of  agreement.  And so I worry that the echo chamber argument leads us to undervalue the extent to which we need similarity in order to have a simple conversation, or to have a culture at all.  So, for you and me to talk, we have to share a language, we have to have a topic that we both think is interesting, a basic set of assumptions and values or else we can't get anywhere. We have to have a set of conversational norms that are very particular and precise even if we don't generally articulate them, that guide the conversation.  We have to have so much in common simply to have a conversation.  And furthermore the conversations that advance thought generally are not between the Jew and the Nazi, or between the creationist and the evolutionist, or whatever you want to pick.  They are conversations among people who know a great deal about a topic, share huge amounts. I mean, they are 99.999% in agreement; but they are two economists who disagree about this particular issue.  And the conversation that advances both of their thinking is the one that iterates on some tiny difference, something that they are getting all heated in their discussion but to an outsider who doesn't know economics, it would look like they are arguing--you'd ridicule them, because they are arguing over something trivial.  Echo chambers are an issue, but we should not undervalue the extent to which knowledge is based out of conversations with people with whom we fundamentally agree. <b>Russ:</b> It's a very deep insight. The reason I think it's hard to think about is that word "echo chamber" or "groupthink." Those are so horrifyingly negative as a way to describe it.  But when we describe it as you describe it, we have to have these shared values, norms, it makes sense.  And when you look at your own life--when I came here to George Mason U., I'm a pretty hard core free market, libertarian, classical liberal guy, I was worried we'd sit around all day when I got here and we'd talk about how bad the minimum wage is.  That's not what we talk about.  It's not very interesting and fortunately, it's not what we do. And I've learned an enormous amount of economics from my colleagues here, even though we pretty much agree on most things.  As you say, because of that agreement, we can go very deeply into aspects of things you don't fully understand in a way you can't with somebody who doesn't share norms, basic values, etc.  So, if you look at your own life and you ask yourself, who did you learn the most from, it is romantic--we do say often: I've got this great friend, we don't agree on anything but we respect each other.  And often you argue with those people.  And if you are lucky they are polite and civilized.  But I think the people you <i>learn</i> the most from are maybe the people you already pretty much agree with.  That may be more an indictment of our dogmatic selves; but I think it's a deep aspect of human nature. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  And I don't think it's a dogmatic aspect.  It's how culture advances.  It's how knowledge advances.  So, if you are trying to come up with--if you are in a lab and you are working on a vaccine, or whatever, and you are having your weekly meeting to have your people advance, it's not helpful to have somebody there who says: Vaccines cause autism.  You don't want--that discussion may be important to have someone. <b>Russ:</b> But not here. You need the groupthink; you need the echo chamber working.  You do. <b>Guest:</b> You do. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">38:11</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Which is, as you say: there might be a time and place to worry about issues that are not shared, where there's diversity.  It's interesting. It challenges the notion, by the way, that diversity is inherently good. You talk about this a little bit in the book. This view that the way we get wiser is by encouraging all views.  There's some truth to that. Obviously groupthink is dangerous and you need the crank. Sometimes the crank is right; sometimes the heretic is right. Sometimes the apostate is onto something.  But a lot of times that person is a crank and you are better off moving forward. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, and what you say is important.  You need both. <b>Russ:</b> You get plenty of both on the internet. <b>Guest:</b> Well, but you don't have to. This is the argument, do we indeed--it's there but are we consulting it. I think data are very uncertain about this, because it's a very difficult question to pose correctly. So, Cass Sunstein, from whom much of this argument comes-- <b>Russ:</b> He's been a guest on here. <b>Guest:</b> He looks at the links at political sites to opposing sites, and he finds--so I always get facts and stats wrong. <b>Russ:</b> Ironically. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, well.  I think he finds that only 15% of political sites have links to the opposition; or it might 15% of the links on political sites link to the opposition. Yochai Benkler, who is a brilliant thinker and writer, as I'm sure your listeners know, has responded in part. He has a deep response to this, but part of it is: He hears Sunstein citing this number and he doesn't know whether he should be happy or sad.  Is 15% a lot? You can think of that as actually being: Wow! Political sites actually have 15% linking to the opposition? That's amazing! <b>Russ:</b> Half full. <b>Guest:</b> You could say, well, it really should be 50%.  Which would be the clear thing.  You are on the site, DailyKos or RedState--it's all about having a conversation among people who have a basic agreement in their politics and you think it is a failure of democracy if half their links don't go to the opposition? We don't have a metric for what's a reasonable amount of openness.  And so the data are to gather and evaluate. <b>Russ:</b> I just think all those concerns are just way over-rated.  Benkler's also been a guest, by the way. We talked about something else. But I think this whole issue, which you talk about in the book at length, whether the internet is making us stupider or smarter--there's nothing new under the sun. And you refer to this as well.  People have always complained about open access being dangerous, for a hundred different reasons.  So, now we have a few new ones.  But we have the old ones, too.  People can't handle it, they are not smart enough. They just hang out with people they agree with already. And my reaction is really: So what?  I really don't get what the outcome would be that you'd want if you accepted these arguments. I don't understand it.  I think there is no doubt that there are negative things about the internet, from my life. There's also no doubt most of them are glorious. In terms of knowledge and understanding and options and choices. And I read mostly people I agree with; but I read lots of people I don't agree with.  Some of them are commenting on my blog.  And some of those are just sport.  And they are not teaching me anything.  And some of them are deep and make me think. And I think we learn through conversation, which is why I like this podcast.  I learn a lot from my guests.  And I think what the internet lets us do is have a lot of conversations with more kinds of people.  And some kinds of conversations are just for fun; and some of are in that lab where you are trying to advance truth and science.  There are all kinds.  There's more there and more there than you can ever possibly want to enjoy.  They are all there to sample and taste. I think it's phenomenal. <b>Guest:</b> Well, I do, too.  But I'm going to push back. Because I fundamentally believe that the internet--I'm very optimistic about the internet--but I don't want to overly, blithely dismiss some of the issues.  <b>Russ:</b> What worries you? <b>Guest:</b> Well, one of the primary things--well, two things. One is elitist. People who are educated and good at gathering knowledge.  Which are the sorts of people that you and I generally hang out with.  We are good at the internet.  Or so we believe. It's not as clear that people with less education, less training are going to resist the worst aspects of the echo chamber.  I think it's highly likely that those of us--when people say the Internet is making a stupider, it's very rare that they are including themselves in that. And I just did that. And I want to acknowledge that. <b>Russ:</b> There's a paternalistic aspect to it. <b>Guest:</b> And wondered, and acknowledged that it's very likely that the internet is in the same way, making highly educated people stupid as well.  Nevertheless.  So I do--I am interested in politics.  And it seems just hard to deny that we have gotten more polarized as culture in the United States, politically. The degree of polarization over the last four years. And you can think about that further. <b>Russ:</b> Twelve. Sure. <b>Guest:</b> It does not seem to be getting better.  It seems to be getting worse.  I don't have evidence for this except what I look at every day. <b>Russ:</b> It feels that way.  It does. <b>Guest:</b> And first of all, I think that's a bad thing. And second of all, it is coincident.  Not entirely, but it is coincident with the rise of the internet. Although I think that there are certainly factors off the rise of the internet that you can look at.  I wonder if one believes, as I do, that the internet is affecting so much of our culture, then you've got to wonder: Is the internet having this affect of polarizing us? As the echo chamber argument predicts. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">45:13</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Well, that's interesting.  Could be.  What would you possibly--my first thought is, could be. When people talk about this, I inevitably think of Thomas Jefferson running for President, and the incredible negative campaign that was run against him, which I think is part of the polarizing argument: appealing to people's worst instincts, negative campaigning.  So, again, I don't think there is anything new under the sun.  You can legitimately argue though that it's gotten worse--because of technology.  But let's say it's true.  Let's say it's gotten worse.  I'm agnostic. I'm skeptical a little bit, even.  But let's say it has gotten worse.  What would you do about it? It's an interesting point, may be true.  There's no doubt that to read left or right, the comment sections of prominent blogs is depressing, I think on either side.  I think it's extraordinarily depressing what people right.  But then I think: Well, they are just having fun. Maybe it's just a place to scream and shout and maybe I shouldn't put too much stock in it. But let's say I should get worried about it.  Let's say it's alarming. Let's say it reduces our ability to solve our problems, make progress, improve the human enterprise. What would you do about it? <b>Guest:</b> Well, another possibility is we are simply hearing the level of vituperation that otherwise we couldn't, because it couldn't make it onto the broadcast news. <b>Russ:</b> That's true. <b>Guest:</b> But, so what do you do about it? First of all, I wring my hands. That's a step forward. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, that's huge. <b>Guest:</b> Some of this is, um--I will overstate this--some of this determined by the technology.  By which I mean, we know empirically that small changes in the discussion for work, technology, or the policies can have huge effects on the tone. <b>Russ:</b> Absolutely. <b>Guest:</b> So, if you have a site that is generating these horrible, awful, pointless--then your conversational, your forum, is broken.  You need to fix it. That's what you want.  But generally we don't. So, we know there are things you can do.  One of those things, I don't know.  There's a lot of tinkering that's required, because it's very sensitive to very small changes.  I could tell you story; I will spare you. <b>Russ:</b> No, anonymity makes a difference versus identifying yourself.  There's lots of--which is seemingly small, but it's huge. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. Also, how threading works.  And tons of variables to play with. So, that's one thing we can do: We can fix broken social media. There are sort of explicit things people can do in order not to tolerate that level of discourse, and those are things to say, especially for people who are in positions that are respected.  And there's a set of stuff that can only be done through education. Including in public schools.  But we do need to learn how to engage in discourse and a new medium.  Whenever there is a new medium, we need to figure that out. Now we have a new medium that keeps inventing new media. The internet is not a medium, but it allows lots of different media to emerge.  And so we have to keep reinventing how to do it.  And global norms are now in play. <b>Russ:</b> It's an interesting point.  I watch my kids answer the telephone.  When they are younger, they pick it up and they go, "What?" The person on the other end doesn't know how to respond to that.  And eventually you socialize.  You teach them how to say, how to start a conversation.  And that will evolve.  That will emerge on the internet over time. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, and it already has, but it does so locally. So, at Huffington Post, you know the sort of things. A highly evolved set of norms and expectations, culture that's there.  And so in site after site after site after site, these various norms emerge--sometimes successfully, sometimes not. I don't know that--in fact if I had to guess, I'd say that there isn't going to be an overall internet norm. Because of the differences in what the sites are trying to do. Which means that we have to get better at sites in helping people to understand what the norms, policies, and affordances are for each site.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">50:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's shift gears. I want to talk about a theme in the book that we haven't touched on, which is, call it narrative.  You talk about how narrative argument in a book is different than the way we encounter knowledge typically now on the internet, and the difference between a more open web-like, connected set of links, which is what the internet gives us, to a book, which is fixed and somewhat linear.  Not all books are linear, but often are. Talk about what has changed there and what you think will change and how we think about how arguments and knowledge. So, I think this actually pulls together a couple of the things we've been talking about. Because if the world is in fact so fractally complex that any pathway through it connecting pieces is at best a brave attempt, and what we really need is lots of nerds arguing with lots of nerds, and if the truth is in fact in those disagreements and arguments, not in the resolution of them to a single one--because the world is too complex for that--then if we started with the internet as a medium rather than starting with paper and parchment knowledge, I don't think that we would have come up with the notion that we have in Western culture over the past few thousand years that the pinnacle of human knowledge is to write what is essentially a narrative argument that leads the reader from the beginning to the end of the argument, and at the end the reader believes something that she actually didn't believe and maybe would have resisted at the beginning of the argument.  But each step of the way you've constructed this argument.  That model, that long-form argument model, is just so wildly out of whack with the world as exposed on the net as an endlessly chaotic set of messy links.  That's how knowledge appears on the net. Because when your nerds argue with my nerds, they are not just doing it on the telephone.  They are putting up sites, responding to each other, doing it in social media, and it's the big stinkin' mess. <b>Russ:</b> And they are linking to other sites. <b>Guest:</b> 100%. Absolutely.  And that entire messy web, you don't even know where it begins or ends exactly, that <i>is</i> where the knowledge is, as knowledge in the old days which we think of as being in books and libraries. So, the sort of narrative that we've taken as being the highest construction of knowledge by humans, that we've put it together in these elegant narratives--which have a beauty, no doubt--don't make sense as the pinnacle of knowledge.  They may sense as a tour, sort of an idiosyncratic tour through an interesting set of links, but not as the way that the world is.  I think that the world is coming to look much more like the web than like a long, logical argument.  Or, put differently, we used to think that basically that God, the creator, thought in these long arguments, that God could see how all the pieces go together; and it was our job, with our feeble capabilities, to try to get as much of that straight as we could. It's beginning to look like God thinks in webs, not in long arguments. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">54:00</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Yeah, and that's a very rich idea.  And you reflect in the book on the irony of writing a book in which books are increasingly becoming obsolete.  It's interesting how few books are nonlinear.  You could write a nonlinear book--a book of interesting things that are to be sampled nonlinearly. There are books like that. Not too many. There aren't books like: Here's a bunch of interesting things I've thought about.  Which is what the web is.  That's what my blog is: here's a bunch of interesting things I think about. Any one post might be related to some other post, in which case I might link to it; but I don't attempt to lead the reader on a path. And that's true of these podcasts.  There's no plan, not even by me. It's just what I'm interested in and who I feel like talking to. And the reader/listener gains knowledge in a very different way from that experience than: Here are my insights on the financial crisis, A-G; read them in order; I've constructed them to teach you something.  <b>Guest:</b> And let me settle that for you. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, exactly. And when you are done-- <b>Guest:</b> And when you are done, you've got it. You don't need to read anything else. <b>Russ:</b> And, you're right. I mean, I think--this is the way the net is really making us smarter.  The idea that knowledge used to be in libraries is not true.  There was never knowledge until you tried to read those books and process it through your own life and experience.  You don't get wise or knowledgeable by consuming.  You get wise and knowledgeable by chewing and thinking and relating. And that's what the internet lets us do. <b>Guest:</b> So, if that was only the case--the internet lets you do it in public and leave the trails, the traces--well, the chewing thing doesn't work. <b>Russ:</b> It's a metaphor. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah. Your lines of thought. And so we now have a constantly, increasingly rich set of connections among pieces.  And furthermore--so this actually goes back to the question of facts, that there are an infinite number--I'll say an infinite number, but an indefinite number--including that I have never petted a plant dolphin.  But the facts that we care about are ones that we find interesting.  Those are the ones we think of as fact.  So, underneath knowledge has been human interest, all along.  Because that's inevitable.  Fundamental to us.  We are a creature that cares about what happens to us, and what happens to our world and with whom we share that world.  That's really fundamental to being a human being.  And this new medium, this linked medium, expresses human interest.  Often to despicable things; but there you have it.  This is a reflection of what we as humans find interesting. Every link is a pointer away from your site to somebody else's because you think somebody else will find that site interesting, because it shows the world, or a little bit of the world, and how that world matters to the person you are linking to.  Which is different from how it matters to you.  This is such a better reflection--from my point of view--of the nature of the world.  The world that we live in, that we experience, is infinitely complex, fractally complex all the way down to the details.  It doesn't resolve into simples.  And is focused around, based around, is understood through our interests as human beings.  That's just the way it is. <b>Russ:</b> I don't know if you've read it, but Hayek's Nobel Prize lecture is called "The Pretense of Knowledge." And what he says in there is that the complexity of human interactions called an economy cannot be boiled down to simple causal relationships.  Which is another way of saying partly what you just said.  I also think about the fact that--I joke with people; when I tell people, you ought to have a blog, especially older people who are not consumers of blogs; so I start telling them what the virtues of them are and the draw.  I say: One of the virtues is, when you have a blog, the editor really likes your stuff. The disadvantage is that he always likes your stuff, because you can say some things on the web you are ashamed of or regret later.  But it is a platform.  It's a little or a big megaphone, depending on how popular your blog is.  But the part I think is really--again, marrying your point--is that it's a place to think out loud.  Because you are the editor, you don't have to write your final word.  It can evolve.  You can learn new things.  You can change your mind.  Which, once that book's published, you can't.  You can write a book later that changes what you said, but there is that fixity of print and paper that the web somewhat erases. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah.  I got the date of the start of the Well, early internet startup--I got it wrong. Whoops.  I can't fix it.  It's printed. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah.  And everything else, on the web you just change it. Just fix it. Now it doesn't solve the problem.  People may have read the earlier web post where you got it wrong, and they didn't get to the later one; that's still an imperfection that can't be avoided. <b>Guest:</b> Yeah, well, if it's perfection you are looking for, you are in the wrong universe, buddy. <b>Russ:</b> Let's talk about education a little bit. Not so much what we know, but how we learn.  How do you think the internet is going to change things there? <b>Guest:</b> I look at the world that software developers have built for themselves, the educational environment, the ecology they've built, and wonder whether we are all going to be living in such a thing. Which would actually be okay with me.  If you are a software developer, and you have a question about how to do something or why your code isn't working, you can google it, get an answer, go to one of the popular sites; and will either find an answer--because there are very few questions that have gone unasked and unanswered at this point--or post it and you'll get a response. You'll get  a thread back at sites, like Stackoverflow.com, where people will improve each other's answers, and the best response gets flagged, and you have your answer; you probably have the code written for you; and then you'll post your own version of it so other people can benefit from it. So, not only is this an open, collaborative environment in which people are helping each other, it is an example of what public learning looks like.  As opposed to learning being a private act in which the individual soul is bettered and the culture is better because we have better people. Instead, this is a declaration that learning itself ought to be a public activity that improves the public.  So every time you learn in this new environment, you get an answer.  The environment gets better and richer.  Engineers are special in part because they could build the tools that they wanted. That's one reason why this environment has shown up for developers first.  It's an incredibly efficient and creative and collaborative environment for learning one's craft.  And I hope that we'll see that lots of different disciplines are going to learn from this. <b>Russ:</b> Yeah, I think it has tremendous potential in certain areas.  I think education is going to change radically in the next 5-10 years. I'm very excited about what Sebastian Thrun is doing with Udacity.com, providing online education to people around the world education for free, certainly in terms of monetary costs, and certifying their expertise in computer science, for example. In those areas, computer science, math, and others, that's going to dominate the way we teach these things now. For a bunch of reasons.  But for other areas, it might be a little harder to bring those tools to bear. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  So, the effect of the internet on knowledge overall is very discipline-dependent, for sure.
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Adam Davidson on Manufacturing</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/adam_davidson_o.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9549</id>

    <published>2012-02-20T11:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-02-20T13:48:26Z</updated>

    <summary> Adam Davidson of NPR&apos;s Planet Money talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about manufacturing. Based on an article Davidson wrote for The Atlantic, the conversation looks at the past, present, and future of manufacturing. Davidson visited an after-market auto...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Adam Davidson" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Education" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Labor" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Marketing, Management, Strategy, and Leadership" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="The Media" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/features/magazine/columns/its_the_economy/index.html?ref=magazine" target="new">Adam Davidson</a> of NPR's Planet Money talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about manufacturing. Based on an article Davidson wrote for <i>The Atlantic,</i> the conversation looks at the past, present, and future of manufacturing. Davidson visited an after-market auto parts factory in Greenville, South Carolina and talked with employees there as well as with executives at corporate headquarters. What is the future of factory work in America? Why are some manufacturing jobs in America while others are in China or elsewhere? The conversation looks at these questions as well as how well or poorly the U.S. education system prepares students for the world of work. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Davidsonmanufacturing.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('Adam Davidson on Manufacturing','Russ Roberts and Adam Davidson',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 1:11:49</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Davidsonmanufacturing.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 33.0 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/features/magazine/columns/its_the_economy/index.html?ref=magazine" target="new">Adam Davidson's bio page</a>. <i>New York Times Magazine,</i> "It's the Economy."

<li><a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/" target="new">Planet Money</a>, where Davidson is a correspondent and blogger.

</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/making-it-in-america/8844/" target="new">"Making It in America,"</a> by Adam Davidson. <i>The Atlantic,</i> January/February, 2012.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html" target="new">Creative Destruction</a>, by W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Education.html" target="new">Education</a>, by Linda Gorman. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Schumpeter.html" target="new">Joseph Schumpeter</a>. Biography. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
</ul>
<b>Web Pages:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.smpcorp.com/ROOT-Home/Content.aspx" target="new">Standard Motor Products</a>. Home page.

<li><a href="http://www.bimmerzone.com/category/Tip_and_Tricks_OEM.html" target="new">OE vs OEM vs Aftermarket</a>. Some definitions. Bimmerzone.com.

<li><a href="http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/stimulus_dollars_for_weatheriz.html" target="new" rel="nofollow">Stimulus dollars for weatherization create thousands of jobs in New York</a>. New York State government program. <a href="http://nysdhcr.gov/apps/profiles/profile_wapcnty.asp" target="new" rel="nofollow">Weatherization Assistance Providers</a>. New York State offers to consumers of its program.

</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/04/mike_munger_on.html" target="new">Mike Munger on the Division of Labor</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/01/hanson_on_the_t.html" target="new">Hanson on the Technological Singularity</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/12/tabarrok_on_inn.html" target="new">Tabarrok on Innovation</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/04/rodrik_on_globa.html" target="new">Rodrik on Globalization, Development, and Employment</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/09/rauch_on_the_vo.html" target="new">Rauch on the Volt, Risk, and Corporate Culture</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/08/odonohoe_on_pot.html" target="new">O'Donohoe on Potato Chips and Salty Snacks</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/07/leamer_on_outso.html" target="new">Leamer on Outsourcing and Globalization</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/02/bhide_on_outsou.html" target="new">Bhide on Outsourcing, Uncertainty, and the Venturesome Economy</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/10/avent_on_cities.html" target="new">Avent on Cities, Urban Regulations, and Growth</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: February 2, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> You recently wrote a fascinating article in <i>The Atlantic</i> on what is happening to the U.S. manufacturing sector and what might be happening in the future, and you used a factory in Greenville, SC, as emblematic of that story.  Start by talking about the factory.  What do they do there?  <b>Guest:</b> They are an auto parts manufacturer specifically.  They manufacture after-market auto parts.  And I specifically set out to find an aftermarket auto parts factory because auto parts are one product line that are made in the United States and in China.  So the competition is rather direct. There are so many types of things that China makes and we don't make any more, like t-shirts or computer assembly, or whatever; and other things that we do that China doesn't do, like high-end medical equipment or avionics, that kind of thing.  And I really wanted to find a factory on the front lines.  And auto parts seemed like the right way to go. And then the aftermarket--these are the Original Equipment [OE].  The original equipment manufacturers are the ones who make products directly for Ford or GM or Toyota, for the car that comes off the assembly line when it's new. The aftermarket are the folks who make replacement parts.  So, the OE world is its own universe and they are not really competing for shelf space in Autozone.com like the aftermarket is. <b>Russ:</b> And so this factory in SC makes fuel injectors, right? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. They make two major lines. Things to do with the electronic systems; and then fuel injectors.  And that's what I focus on, fuel injectors. <b>Russ:</b> So, interesting question, and a great choice of market: Why are some things made here and some things made in China or elsewhere? <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  And what interested me about this particular company, Standard Motor Products, is--I came to think of them as sort of, when you think of the company overall, of course it has many thousands of employees--but it's sort of like this machine constantly scanning every car in America to figure out what makes sense to be make in the United States and what makes sense to be made in China.  They also have a plant in Mexico, a plant in Poland.  I should say: they don't have a plant in China, but they do source a lot in China, and from other factories.  There's sort of a constant process where they are evaluating                                                                        all sorts of auto parts.  I think they have something like 20,000 different Stock Keeping Units [SKUs], different individual products that they sell. And about half of them they make, and about half of them they buy from other places.  So, they are constantly figuring out: Hey, this weird little part, I think we could do it better than China, we can do it cheaper than China; but this other part, China's going to always going to be able to make that cheaper, so we'll just buy it from China. We won't try to make it ourselves. <b>Russ:</b> But as you point out, cheaper is not so straightforward all the time.  There are things other than just the cost of the labor and materials. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, very much so. And that's something we probably can get into.  But from the perspective of Standard Motor, what they are trying to do is meet the needs of--basically, their commitment to their customer.  And their customer is not you and me.  Their customer is the big auto parts retailers like Autozone and NAPA and then big auto parts wholesalers.  And so their commitment to those folks is that whenever one of us walks in the door and we have some weird part on some weird car that nobody ever sees, Standard Motor will be able to get it to that location within 48 hours, and preferably much faster than 48 hours.  And so having a part in China, even if China made it beautifully and perfectly. <b>Russ:</b> And cheaply. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  It's useless.  It's a month away by ship.  So that's one big issue.  And the other issue is: auto parts are highly regulated.  Their commitment is to make parts as reliable, if not more reliable, than the original parts.  A fuel injector, for example, that's expected to run with 0 problems for at least a decade, if not longer.  And so there are parts that they just find--you can get China to make them cheaper, but you can't get a Chinese factory, at least not yet, to make them reliably with the level of quality that's required. <b>Russ:</b> Which is surprising.  Because I think what is surprising, at least to a novice like me, we have in the back of our mind this idea that all these factories are so mechanized, there's so much robotic help--a robot, that's as smart, as precise, as careful, as repeatable, replicable as you'd want. So, why is it that there are--how can there be a quality difference between what a factory stamps out here versus there?  <b>Guest:</b> That was one of the big lessons that I learned.  As the machinery that a factory uses gets more and more expensive, sophisticated, it requires more and more human intelligence to operate it.  It doesn't require more people.  It requires a lot fewer people.  But the people that these new machines require often have to have far more skill and be able to think through problems with much greater sophistication.  I have been to auto parts factories in China, and it's just much rarer.  Obviously they are incredibly bright.  Chinese engineers, and you could find someone in China who could do it.  It's just much less likely that any given factory is going to have enough of those people, a sort of pipeline. These are skilled blue-collar workers.  So, right now I am not talking about somebody with a Master's in engineering.  I am talking about someone with a high school degree and two years of technical college and maybe two years' of experience.  Somebody who understands metallurgy, a bit of chemistry, a bit of electronics; who understands computer programming, the very difficult and obscure computer programs that run these machines. And there are just not a lot of those people in China right now. So, the picture I have is--you picture a factory in the 1950s.  My Grandfather ran factories for Cincinnati Milacron, which is a big manufacturer of machine tools. And, you just picture hundreds of guys--of course back then it was mostly guys--each one doing one particular part, using their muscle more than their brains.  And maybe hundreds of those people are replaced by one or two machines that is operated by only one person.  So, you've lost a lot of man-hours,  a lot of workers; but that one person is more valuable, more crucial to the factory than any worker was 50-60 years ago. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">8:05</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let me just comment on that. A couple of things come to mind.  One is: when I think of that, I always think of Charlie Chaplin in <i>Modern Times,</i> relentlessly turning one bolt with the same wrench.  We didn't know to call it carpal tunnel syndrome then, but he's having a dreary life.  And that was what we thought of as manufacturing in the old days.  Now, when that machine comes along, first of all there's something really good about that because instead of a person having to do it, a machine does it.  A machine doesn't get bored, and that's nice.  A machine doesn't get carpal tunnel syndrome; that's nice.  It's true that jobs disappear, but other jobs are going to get created somewhere else, both making the machine--designing and making that machine--and also elsewhere now that that good is going to be cheaper because you don't have to have as many workers.  There are going to be resources freed up to create other stuff, new products that people can work on.  That's the whole idea behind creative destruction.  And then the  other point I want to make is: we often forget, and your factory story brings it to light--that one worker now running this very fancy, sophisticated machine that replaces all the workers, in some dimension that one worker is unbelievably productive, in the sense that the total output divided by people-hours, the way we measure it, is very high.  That person looks like he's making a lot of the good. But he's not really doing very much, often, in these factories; and you gave a delightful story that in a textile mill, which used to be very labor intensive, now very machine intensive, you said the joke in the textile world is that they only have two employees. <b>Guest:</b> Right, a man and a dog: the man's there to feed the dog and the dog is there to keep the man away from the machines. <b>Russ:</b> I just love that. <b>Guest:</b> It's a joke I think I heard in Alabama in a textile mill. <b>Russ:</b> It really captures what's happened to much of modern manufacturing, which is there are people in the plant--there aren't very many; in a sense they are very productive, what they oversee produces a lot of stuff; but most of the productivity, most of the skill is embedded in the machinery.  And as a result, that person doesn't earn a big salary.  Their main job is to make sure nothing breaks down, or to take care of it when it does break down. Most of the work is going on with the machinery.  We had a podcast this summer about the potato chip world--very mechanized.  I've been to a modern pencil factory; there's a handful of people in these plants.  They do very little except keep an eye on things.  But that's not what happens in that plant in SC that makes the fuel injectors. The answer is obvious that the plants that require a lot of people, many of them are gone, as you point out in the article.  So explain why the fuel injector plant still has so many people in it. <b>Guest:</b> Sure.  First, I want to respond about the skilled workers, and then we can talk about the unskilled workers. On the skilled side--I think there's no question, certainly for me, that you'd rather be a skilled worker now than an unskilled worker when there are lots of jobs.  It's much more interesting.  You are doing lots of different things every day, using your brain; you probably will not get carpal tunnel.  Instead of physically bending or cutting metal, you are typing into a keypad, taking samples, checking to make sure that the machine is operating on spec.  And the crucial thing is change-ups, setups for a new product.  So, if every fuel injector for every car was exactly the same, and you needed to set the machine up January 1st and it would just run till December 31st, you would not want to invest in a highly skilled worker who commands a better wage.  That's the kind of thing China can do perfectly well--you just let a machine run and throw some labor at it just in case it breaks down or restock the parts of whatever it is.  Certainly in China, and in the United States as we'll get into, robotics sometimes are more expensive than people, so you keep people around instead of robots. But one area where the United States still has a very strong competitive and comparative advantage is in areas that require frequent setup changes. So, if you think of the fuel injector, Ford has a different kind of fuel injector than GM does; and then this line of Ford cars has a different set than that line. And Toyota will have its own set.  So, Standard Motor Products--I forget the exact number--but there's hundreds of kinds of fuel injectors that they are supplying. <b>Russ:</b> And to quote Adam Smith, the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market: if that particular line of Ford was so large, that particular fuel injector, you could have a factory that just made those. But none of these are big enough to justify their own factory. So any one factory is going to have a little bit of diversity in it. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  Now on the original equipment side, it makes a lot of sense to have a factory really focused. In that case, Ford will call Bosch or one of the other big global manufacturers and say: We're making  a commitment to you for a year, or two, or three, that we are just going to buy millions of the exact same fuel injector. And those companies, it's almost like an annuity.  You just set your machines up and you just churn them out.  Now, because the auto industry is moving to Just In Time, and the Toyota production system, there's a lot of value to having that manufacturing done near the Ford plant in the United States. As far as I know, and I looked into this, there are no Chinese made fuel injectors sold in the United States OE or aftermarket. But for Standard, they don't know exactly who is going to walk through the door.  <b>Russ:</b> That's part of what they are selling, right? <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> The flexibility. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  So, something like the F-150 which might have tens of millions on the road, so you are pretty sure you are going to get a thousand F-150 fuel injector orders every month.  But there might be some old Subaru where there are only 15,000 on the road, and you never know for the need for that injector comes up.  They are able very quickly to change the machinery.  Now that means physically changing the mechanics inside the machine.  It means changing the program that tells the machine what to do.  Whenever you do a setup change, it requires just a host of really precise measurements that really a human has to do.  Computers, robots can't do that yet. The factory still has one of the really old turning machines, like basically a giant industrial size lathe from the pre-computerized world, where you actually move big chunks of metal and there are big gears that tell the lathe how fast to cut and how precise to cut.  And if they want to change that old-style, the style that existed here say into the 1980s, that's over a day to change that.  So, they only use that to make really standardized parts that they are going to make tons of all the time.  These new computers, it's about an hour and a half to change it. And believe me, they are working hard to get that hour and a half down to a few minutes. That's the goal.  But that requires paying a highly skilled person.  You need someone who really, who can trouble-shoot a very complicated system as it's being changed. Now, they might not change it every day.  They might not change it every week.  And so the rest of the time they are going to have a highly skilled worker doing that that probably a lower skilled worker could do, just the routine maintenance and such. But it's worth it to them.  These machines cost half a million dollars each; they have three of them.  There's millions of profits tied up in them.  So, it's worth it to pay twice as much or whatever it is for a highly skilled worker even if they are only using the fullness of that highly skilled worker's brain a few times a month. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">16:50</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, that person, I think, is called a machinist. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> What skills?  Obviously you have to be smart. You have to diligent, careful.  Those are all important skills. But there are some explicit skills that person has to have. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  And what struck me is: the successful machinists I met, there's not an endpoint.  They are learning all their lives. It's kind of like you and me.  You and I have chosen jobs where we can constantly be challenged by new intellectual challenges. <b>Russ:</b> Speak for yourself, Adam. <b>Guest:</b> You learned everything in grad school <b>Russ:</b> I'm done. <b>Guest:</b> You read Hayek. <b>Russ:</b> Just application.  No, I'm with you there. <b>Guest:</b> So, I focused on this guy, Luke Hutchins--so here's the specific skills he has.  He had a lot of math ability, which I did in high school; I was very good at math. I was thinking: Can I be this person?  And I'll tell you why I decided I cannot. There's no way I could be as successful as him in this field.  So he had a lot of math ability.  He said calculus is particularly helpful. <b>Russ:</b> That's so wild, though.  I've got to stop there.  Because I read that sentence, and part of me wanted the entire article to be about that.  My wife teaches high school math.  And we talk all the time about the value of various skills and who can use them.  And is it just good for  your brain to learn these skills in math or does it actually come in handy?  Certainly if you are going to be an engineer then it's good to know math.  But a machinist needs to know calculus?  Why? <b>Guest:</b> I was really surprised, too.  And this is where it gets beyond me.  I've got to be honest.  And I'm pretty good with computers; I'm a certified Mac tech--but please don't call me for Mac support. I know a tiny bit of programming.  And I've tried to learn this CNC, computer numeric programming language, and it's very confusing.  It's all about x axes, y axes, z axes; and this is not a graphical user interface.  You are controlling a physical process in three dimensions, but you are doing it through what looks like a DOS screen, just x,y,z and then the rotation of the motor.  And on these more complicated machines, they are called multi-access.  This is sort of the latest breakthrough.  They are operating on several different axes, so it almost feels like string theory--there are like 9 dimensions you'd have to keep in mind.  And the screen you are looking at is just numbers. <b>Russ:</b> So, for those of you listening at home or out in your car who are under the age of 30, DOS was a primitive computer interface of the previous century.  Is that what you are referring to, the green and gold, green and black screen?  <b>Guest:</b> Right. Now, I've got to say, it's weird, because they are more modern computer screens, so it's like you bought a modern computer screen and just used it for numbers and letters and no 3-dimensional imagery. <b>Russ:</b> But there's calculus in there.  <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  When you are trying to compute--and I'm way out of my depth--but there's one spinning surface and another spinning surface comes in contact with it and you want it to end up creating a particular shape.  I think it's algebra and calculus that you need. But that's not all. Then there's metallurgy.  Just any one fuel injector, which might cost you $5 at an auto center, is  made up of many different alloys, many different types of metal. Different types of aluminum, and others.  There are parts of the fuel injector you want to be highly magnetic, because the way a  fuel injector injects fuel is a little magnet opens and closes and forces the valves to open and close.  But there are other parts you don't want to be magnetic at all.  There are parts that you want to be able to conduct electricity and parts you don't. Parts that are going to have huge force on them for a decade, and parts that aren't going to have much force. There's parts where friction is a huge concern.  So, there's many different kinds of aluminum. <b>Russ:</b> But does the machinist need to understand all that?  Doesn't he just open the book and say--it's a recipe? You'd think.  But it's not.  <b>Guest:</b> I think if you were doing one then you could just set it up; you could have an engineer kind of create that book. But since they are doing so many, at so many different times; since they are doing it at such precise levels, there's just a level of chaos that you want the person doing it to have insight. It's not diamond, it's a certain kind of carbide, the  cutting tool that cuts the metal. Everything is done to enormous precision, but what the machinist told me is inevitably, every time, it just doesn't quite work right. It's just not quite on spec.  And when I say on spec, for a fuel injector there are parts that are machined to a half a micron.  A human hair is 70 microns. <b>Russ:</b> Ouch. <b>Guest:</b> Half a micron is smaller than a virus.  And if you are off by half a micron, that fuel injector will be useless.  It will either stay open permanently and fuel will spill out or it will stay closed and you won't get any fuel at all.  A fuel injector is basically like a high tech syringe, where it plunges back and forth, squirting a very precise amount of fuel into your engine block to spark and cause the explosion that moves your crank shaft that moves your car forward.  The entire movement is 70 microns. That's the opening and closing of the syringe.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">23:34</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I think you need to stop here because if you keep going I'm going to be anxious about getting home. I always sort of take it for granted that the car works; but maybe I'm overconfident.  Let me ask you a different question, though. How does the machinist decide if something is on or off spec? How does that measurement get made of half a micron? Does he eyeball it? <b>Guest:</b> No.  More of the machinist's job is at this table that looks more like a high school science lab.  There are microscopes, calipers, incredibly precise scales; different things have to be measured in different ways.  And then for the really tight stuff there are these amazing roundness testers, which are these massive machines. What's that spiral writing thing--kids have them? Spirograph? <b>Russ:</b> Yes.  It's like a Ouija Board. I know what you mean. <b>Guest:</b> So the roundness tester kind of works like that.  You put the round thing in this giant metal mesh thing and it spins around and somehow that figures out whether it's the right roundness, the right degree of perfect roundness. And so, when you make a changeup to a new product, basically you run the machine, you put the net metal in, you put the new cutting tool in, you put the new program in; you run it; you take a part out and it's wrong.  It just always is wrong.  So you bring it to your little science desk and you look at it through microscopes and you use the caliper and you weigh it. And then you do this really important thing--you make judgments; you use your brain to problem-solve.  You figure out: is this problem because the cutting tool is coming in too close; or is this because this particular type of cutting tool reacts with this particular type of metal in a way that's different from how we programmed the machine; or is there not enough of the lubricating fluid that's coming through; or is there a microscopic tear in the cutting tool that the human eye and the finger can't pick up but is wreaking havoc on the machine?  And that right there, that moment, a human brain with the proper knowledge, the proper experience, to look at a part that isn't quite right and figure out how to tell the machine how to make it right. <b>Russ:</b> That's an art. <b>Guest:</b> And that's a big part of U.S. competitiveness. That's a much, much more difficult process than China.  For a whole host of reasons. It's not just you don't have Luke Hutchins with years of calculus training and metallurgy training, etc. It's because you don't have an entire system that supports that one person making that one decision.  You have much cruder oversight, much cruder quality assurance; and it just doesn't allow you to react anywhere near as quickly or as reliably. <b>Russ:</b> For some reason, I think of my Grandfather, who had a set of false teeth, and if they weren't comfortable, he would take them out of his mouth and take a pocket knife and adjust them.  It's something like that. It's kind of a remarkable thing.  What I love about these kind of stories is it's a whole world you don't know anything about until you discover it. <b>Guest:</b> So, I was talking to this guy, Luke Hutchins, so he starts telling me about the cutting tools.  Which is its own world of advanced ceramics, incredibly complex.  And he's going on and on about these cutting tools and their properties and how  they are made.  And then he just points at this other guy and says: "Well, Ralph is really our cutting tool expert. I really want to take some courses on cutting tools. And I want to learn about cutting tool properties." And then we start talking about electronics.  He knows everything about electronics as far as I can tell; certainly more than anyone I know.  And he says: "Yeah, I've got to learn more about electronics. I just don't know enough about it."  It was exciting to see.  Here's a guy who many snobby college people in New York would just look at in his blue overalls and his thick southern twang, and he works in an auto parts factory, and not realize he's on an intellectual journey that is for him very thrilling and exciting. <b>Russ:</b> That's really beautiful.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">28:19</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> What kind of salary and benefits do people like that make in that world, for that level of skill? <b>Guest:</b> Here's a puzzle; and this is what I want to look into next.  I do want to talk about unskilled workers. <b>Russ:</b> We're going to get to that next. <b>Guest:</b> Unskilled is a loaded term. <b>Russ:</b> Less skilled than this person. <b>Guest:</b> The way Standard Motor defines unskilled is someone who can learn everything they need to know at their job in a day. And skilled is someone who needs a lot of knowledge before  you'll hire them, and then needs a lot of training on the job.  So, you can think of an unskilled worker as they are basically replaceable by any other unskilled worker.  Whereas a skilled worker, that's a special person. The wages for an unskilled worker at this plant are around $13.00 an hour. <b>Russ:</b> Any benefits? <b>Guest:</b> And benefits.  Decent health benefits; I forget how many vacation days. <b>Russ:</b> That's roughly $25,000-$26,000 a year plus some benefits. <b>Guest:</b> And Greenville, SC is not that bad. From a New York perspective it's horrifying. <b>Russ:</b> What does an unskilled person at that factory do?  We've just heard a very sophisticated, subtle ongoing learning, etc.  What gets done in the factory that you can learn in a day and do that job? <b>Guest:</b> And by the way, most of the jobs, it's not a day.  It's literally five minutes.  I watched a new worker get trained on one machine; I was recording it for the radio so I had an exact time; and it took 2 minutes to train this person.  This is the other side of computers and robotics--it is that computers are able to tell highly sophisticated machines how to do other tasks that require no judgment, no discretion on behalf of the worker.  So, generally these are assembly jobs.  So, the really precision stuff on a fuel injector is happening on the inner workings of the fuel injector. But then the fuel injector has to be put into a housing, and the housing has to be sealed and attached to another housing. <b>Russ:</b> And then put into a box. <b>Guest:</b> Or however it's packed.  And all the outside stuff that isn't where the action is, it's still done to precision but it requires nowhere near the half-a-micron, virus-sized precision that the inner workings need.  So there you have workers who are basically there to set up automatic machines that will do that, that will assemble and seal the outer housing.  One machine I looked at is called a laser welder.  But the laser is so tiny it emits this flame that's like a really out-of-gas cigarette lighter. It's a very cute little laser, not some big dramatic thing.  And so you put one part of the fuel injector outer housing in one place, in one clamp, and you put the other part in another clamp, and then you press a button and they come together and the laser welder seals them together; and then you grab them; you run a very rudimentary trouble-check. And then you send them on their way to the next stage of assembly, where someone shoves them into a rubber hose kind of thing that attaches to the fuel assembly system.  And the workers at those plants, they do have to have a high school degree, but that's almost more the signaling function. <b>Russ:</b> Reliability, that they are going to show  up and be diligent. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  And they can ask for a high school degree, so they do. But you don't really need to know anything.  I focused on one young woman who was clearly really bright, clearly really capable of a lot; by her own admission made some bad choices in high school, ended up as a single mother, with a high school degree but no further education and sort of stuck needing to work to support her two young kids without a lot  of support from her family--emotionally supportive but they don't have money to support her more than that.  And she knows nothing.  She doesn't know what metals are being used; she doesn't know much about how a fuel injector works; she doesn't know what a micron is, what tolerance is. She thought I was talking about racial tolerance. She didn't understand that tolerance is a word that's used in factories. <b>Russ:</b> But she's smart, and she has the potential to do other things, but for a variety of reasons she didn't get on a path that would let her do that. <b>Guest:</b> Right. Exactly. <b>Russ:</b> And as a result, she's making $25,000 a year; she's not starving; she has probably some decent material things in her life; but her future is limited both by the  fact that it's not going to get a lot better.  And there's a possibility her job is going to disappear. <b>Guest:</b> I would say there is a guarantee that her current position will disappear. <b>Russ:</b> It's just a question of time. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  There's a chance that she'll stay; I will say that Standard Motor Products, it's a publicly-traded firm but still run by the family that founded it 92 years ago. I deliberately set out to find--I didn't want a cutting edge. <b>Russ:</b> Good choice of words there. <b>Guest:</b> Right. I wanted a firm that wasn't trying to squeeze every penny of profit out, just because I thought it would make for a more interesting, compelling story.  All the stuff about Bain Capital and Mitt Romney--I didn't want to get into that debate.  I wanted a company almost anyone would look at and say those are decent people, they would love to hire more people, they would love to justify keeping everyone on and never laying everyone off--but they can't. Because the market won't let them. To do that would mean just going bankrupt.  And this is not a company that's making--a great year, an amazing year for them is a 5% margin, making a 5% profit. <b>Russ:</b> That's true of everyone in the business, I suspect, even who is trying to squeeze every penny out of it. It's a competitive business. It's tough. <b>Guest:</b> And 5% is a rare year; usually it's 2%, 3%. <b>Russ:</b> The amazing thing about it is they can't stand still, even if they wanted.  They're going to go out of business if they stand still. They've got to get the switch over down to an hour and a half, down to an hour and 17 minutes; price points that their suppliers expect are going to get tougher because their competitors are going to beat them to it if they don't match them. And they are going to replace that employee with a machine if they can.  Because they'll have to.  Otherwise they won't exist.  They'll go out of business.  No matter how nice they are, they are going to go out of business; they are not going to be able to cover their costs with their revenues if they don't stay on the cutting edge. <b>Guest:</b> And the big moment, Larry Sills, CEO, he's 72, he  grew up in the company, his grandfather founded it, his dad ran it, with his uncle; his son is now positioned to run it when Larry retires.  The company came close to bankruptcy a few years ago in large part because he was still manufacturing in Queens, NY, where nobody manufactures globally competitive products.  You can imagine the costs, the hassle.  The rent, everything.  He just waited way too long to make the shift away from Queens and to do some layoffs, and so they came pretty close to disappearing.  And so he says he wakes up every morning and says: I'm not going to lose this company. I'm not going to let it go bankrupt. But lose this company, to him, in part, one of the big threats is private equity, and he felt like. <b>Russ:</b> A set of investors might make him an offer that other stockholders won't refuse. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. His family runs the company, but they only own 10% of it, and so, he felt for a while there that he was really vulnerable; he was running the operation pretty fat, and some private equity person could make a pretty compelling case--hey, I can come in here, I can make products as well or better; and I can get rid of a lot of dead weight. And increase earnings. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">37:09</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> And that's happened all over the manufacturing sector in the last 25 years.  Often what's going on is that somebody who has got modern inventory control techniques and other ways of running a business comes into a business like this--who has not kept up with technique, because if they hadn't had to, they could get by with just a smaller margin.  Now, all of a sudden, that risk of being destroyed; and the outside investor can come in, apply some of those techniques, downsize perhaps, substitute machines for people, and make it a viable concern again. And that's been happening all over the Mid-West in the 1980s and 1990s. <b>Guest:</b> Larry is that guy. What he told me is the world he grew up in, the auto parts world--fascinating to learn about it--when his grandfather founded the company, I think in 1919, the 1920s, it was a  time when you were just beginning to have this expanded mass production of cars; but there was this hole where the auto companies were not creating replacement parts.  So you just had mechanics kind of making their own kind of replacement parts when people would bring their Model T or whatever it was. <b>Russ:</b> It's like Havana.  That's what they do now. They've got these old American cars and creative people are keeping them going by fiddling. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly.  And the aftermarket busy was sort of this shady world.  And it was a lot of immigrant families, Jewish immigrant families, Italian immigrant families, Irish immigrant families--they came to America and were looking for a shot and found this as a great opportunity.  Now you think--Standard, who would name a company Standard? It's the most boring name in the world.  But in 1919 it was the most exciting thing you could possibly be as an auto parts company. <b>Russ:</b> Comforting. <b>Guest:</b> And right through to the 1970s it was hundreds of hundreds of small family-run manufacturers selling to hundreds and thousands of small family-run distributors and repair shops.  In the 1970s and then increasingly, the  customer side, which for them is the big retailers, Autozone, sort of like the Walmart effect--these big people creating retail economies of scale and big wholesalers doing the same thing. What he said was in the early 1970s his biggest customer was 1% of his business.  Now he has like four customers that are like 60% of his business.  And if Autozone or NAPA calls him and says someone else is offering us that exact same fuel injector for 4 cents less, he's got to get $.04 out of that fuel injector or he loses one of those accounts. You are talking about closing down factories, laying off thousands of people.  On the cost side, his main cost is metal.  That's a bigger cost for him than labor, and metal is a globally traded commodity; he's not big enough to strike some deal with Alcoa to get preferential pricing.  So, labor isn't the only cost he can cut, but it's one of the main costs he can cut. <b>Russ:</b> If he can find a way to substitute machines. So, as you mention in the article, you don't replace all workers with machines because sometimes workers are cheaper.  Same issue of China versus the United States--sometimes you are going to have coexisting workers with the machines; but you are going to be looking for ways, when it's possible, to do it cheaper, and whichever way that is, which tends to be as labor gets more expensive over time, machinery is going to sometimes dominate.  <b>Guest:</b> Right.  In the case of Maddie, the young woman that I focused on, so she makes $26,000; with benefits and everything let's call it $30,000 a year. And they did the math, and a robotic arm could do what she does more quickly and more precisely. But it would cost $100,000.  And their metric is: Any capital investment needs to pay for itself within two years. And so Maddie makes $30,000; over two years $60,000, the net present value of which would be less; so an upfront expense of $100,000, it's clear Maddie gets to keep her job. <b>Russ:</b> But as the price of the machine comes down. <b>Guest:</b> Or if there is more demand for fuel injectors and they add a second or a third shift, the mathematics change. Quickly.  And there certainly are robotics manufacturers out there trying to cut their costs. And Maddie isn't in a position to cut her costs very much. This is a non-union plant by the way, but $13 seems to be about the floor for a manufacturer like this. <b>Russ:</b> It's double the minimum wage but it's still not a lot of money. But she knows this, right? She knows she might not keep her job for the next 25 years. <b>Guest:</b> She really knows--I think what she thinks is: This is the highest I'll get, be stuck here. I don't think she fully understands: No, no, this is the highest you'll get and it's higher than you might be for the rest of your life.  <b>Russ:</b> You might be stuck somewhere else. If you are lucky. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">42:55</td><td valign="top"><b>Guest:</b> So, the mystery that I want to look into: It strikes me the low skill, if you are talking about people who truly are replaceable--and Maddie really does nothing that you couldn't easily get Chinese or Mexican workers to do; it's very simple.  I could not learn how to do what Luke does.  I could learn how to do what Maddie does in 2 minutes. <b>Russ:</b> What does a machinist make? <b>Guest:</b> Machinists don't make as much more as I would think they would.  So, they make about 50% more. Now, making $42,000, maybe one experience, maybe $50,000--in Greenbelt that's pretty good. <b>Russ:</b> Nice lifestyle. <b>Guest:</b> You have a home, a car, can go on vacations. <b>Russ:</b> Your spouse might work. <b>Guest:</b> Water in the area; you can get a boat. That's one of the markers of true middle class life.  So, you are doing well. <b>Russ:</b> And if a machinist is married to an unskilled worker, they are making $75,000. And they might be able to save some money, have their own house.  That's an above-median lifestyle, I assume, in Greenville, SC. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. Greenville County is a very inexpensive place to live. If Maddie marries a skilled machinist, and you are bringing in $75,000-$80,000 a year, that's great. And there are, at the BMW plant, at some of the higher end plants in town, someone like Luke could make considerably more--$30 an hour. <b>Russ:</b> So that's $70,000 or so, with benefits.  That's a good lifestyle. <b>Guest:</b> Exactly. You are starting to talk about having a reasonable retirement at 65 if you put away for your 401K and everything.  But every manufacturer I talked to says: There's not enough skilled workers. We can't fill all the skilled slots we have.  And the National Association of Manufacturers, which is the big lobbying arm of American manufacturing, they have this big program trying to get community colleges to issue certificates and to promote this learning; and they are working I believe with the Department of Labor; and they say: Oh, this is because it's snobbery, and high school guidance counselors tell people that manufacturing is dead and nobody understands.  But to me--I mean, labor markets are obviously far from efficient and frictionless.  But if there really were a shortage, wouldn't wages just rise to fill that shortage? If they started paying $40 an hour, $45-$50 an hour, then wouldn't you start seeing high school kids start saying: I <i>am</i> interested in that career? <b>Russ:</b> Are you asking me? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> I think there are two things going on there.  One is: Talk is cheap. When they say "we can't find enough of these folks," I always wonder what that means. The obvious question, well you ask: Why don't you pay a little bit more? And I don't know what they would answer to that. It could be that it's not as easy as they'd like to find those people. So, I'm not sure what it means that there are not enough to go around in manufacturing of that semi-skilled, highly skilled, whatever you want to call it, specialized set of skills.  The other part is the fact that there's a reason that the cost of living is not so much in South Carolina--not as many people want to live there as want to live in Queens and Brooklyn and Manhattan. <b>Guest:</b> Although I've got to say, sometimes I wonder.  It's really beautiful.  <b>Russ:</b> Yes.  That's a whole separate issue. I always make the joke, it's a little farther to a Broadway show if you live in Greenville. But it's not <i>that</i> much farther, because you get touring companies.  It's not like it's a wasteland culturally. But there obviously are a whole set of cultural amenities and social opportunities and interactions that take place in American cities that are less active in smaller towns. And fundamentally that is the reason that land is cheaper and housing is cheaper in Greenville and so many other things are less expensive--it's just not in such high demand. So you don't really have to speculate what the reason is; that's a fact. Not as many people want to live there at the prices as people want to live in New York at that price.  So, it pushes up the price in NYC of all those things, whatever access is, and it's not the same for every person.  The other question is, like you say: How much would you have to raise wages to get people to move there? You wouldn't think it would be to $100 an hour, or $75. You would think if it's $40, if it's $30-something you'd think $40-something would get you there.  And part of it probably--I wouldn't call it snobbery.  Some of it's ignorance, a lack of knowledge that those jobs are out there.  And some of it is literally cultural, that people don't necessarily want to live in those cities.  But to have it in Queens, as you said, is out of the question.  Then it's way too expensive. Having said that, I think there are a lot of changes going on in the American labor force that are brought on by this recession, where people are opening their eyes to all kinds of things. Especially in what they study in school, and where they study it. If we could make our education market a little more flexible--which I think is coming--I think there are going to be a lot of changes in how these worlds work. I'm extremely excited about my job getting destroyed by technology.  I think there's a tremendous opportunity for the American college experience, the American high school experience, to be replaced by something that's different.  I'm not exactly sure yet what that will be, but it's going to involve technology and online learning. And different ways of learning.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">49:01</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> I want to turn at some point--now is not a bad time--to whether we have a policy crisis in this area of not.  I think it's going to be a big issue in the coming political debate in the election season.  But I think we have a crisis in education.  A lot of people look at foreign countries and say they do it differently and better.  And rather than us trying to figure out from the top down what we ought to be doing, I think we ought to get a little more chaos in the education industry.  I think we ought to get government out of it and let private entrepreneurs come up with things that would make the Maddies of the world better prepared for the future. She clearly is not well-prepared for the future. And she's not alone. There are a lot of lousy high school, and some bad college experiences that people choose for themselves and make mistakes and get stuck in.  Flexibility is really the key here. <b>Guest:</b> And Maddie is really to my mind the low-hanging fruit of educational opportunity. <b>Russ:</b> Because she's smart! <b>Guest:</b> She's smart, she's eager, she's disciplined.  She's ready to go.  She's just in a situation, which I'm fairly sure millions of Americans are in, where she has the ability, she has the eagerness; but she has family obligations that require her to work a fulltime job. And for me, that was one of the big learnings.  The reason I chose Greenville specifically is I wanted a place where this shift from lots and lots of jobs for low-skilled workers, to jobs for low-skilled workers but better jobs for high-skilled workers.  And Greenville is a great place to look, because right through the 1990s it had a textile economy, where anybody who wanted to could go and get a job at a textile plant. You didn't need a high school degree.  I mean, earlier in the century, you didn't need to be age 7 yet.  The child labor went away.  And what I learned, and it didn't get into the article but it was a fascinating process, is the kind of bad side of textile mills--the company store, you are completely in hock to this evil textile manager--that has largely disappeared by the 1920s.  The labor market was competitive enough and textile workers were able to leave <i>en masse</i> from one plant to work at another plant--I'm not saying it was the greatest life in the world, but you made, certainly by the standards of the day, a decent living and you had some bargaining power with your employer, because even without unions, they were able to create group dynamics that allowed them to pressure their wages for better wages or better conditions, whatever that might be.  And that world is completely gone.  And one of the things that is lost is on-the-job training.  I don't mean completely lost, but is less available. If you think of a textile plant in the 1980s or 1950s or 1920s, there are people who don't know much; they have a pretty rote job.  And then there are people who know a lot; they know how to set up every machine in the place.  But nobody went to college for it.  Nobody went to technical school for it. Everyone learned on the job.  And so you never faced this moment where you needed to decide: Do I need to remove myself from the workforce for a period of years to invest in education so that I can have opportunity down the road?  It came to you.  It just came to you on the job.  And I think that's a real loss for someone like Maddie.  Standard Motor is not in a position--it's a huge investment to take someone like Maddie, who has promise, but as the factory manager told me: there's nothing she does in her current job that tells me she'd be good in the other job, other than the most basic stuff. I know she'll show up on time; I know she's a pleasant person; I know she's willing to work hard. <b>Russ:</b> Those are important. <b>Guest:</b> I have no information about her math skills, her mechanical thinking, her ability to solve difficult problems under pressure.  I just don't know.  And the only way I am going to find out is to pay for her to go to school for two years or three years and then put her on the machine. <b>Russ:</b> And then she's very competitive at other places. And you'd lose her. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  You spend all that money and time, and if it's bad, she's gone; and if it's good, she's going to want to bid up her wages and her opportunities are broader.  And he told me he did, a previous job, they did try worker training programs; about half the people don't make it.  And that's what I realize. I feel like I'm pretty bright, I'm pretty well-educated, I'm pretty good at math and computers; and I'm fairly sure I could never develop that 3-dimensional thinking that you need, or 9-dimensional thinking that you need to be able to troubleshoot an incredibly dynamic physical process, just looking at numbers on a screen.  I just feel pretty confident that with 10 years of schooling I still would not get it. <b>Russ:</b> In other words, you are grossly overpaid. Let's move along. <b>Guest:</b> So that last mile of training is a real problem. And this is all stuff that I didn't get into in the article, but we have this really weird system in America, the government policy.  We have something called Workforce Development Offices, and I would guess every county and many towns have a Workforce Development Office, which often is funded by the Department of Labor, which is out there trying to train the workforce for jobs.  Then we separately have an economic development process--is that out of the Department of Commerce, I forget, or it will be the local Chamber of Commerce or something--which is out there trying to recruit new factories and new businesses. And the workforce development folks are not really in touch as much as you'd like--I'm sure there are exceptions, but as a general rule--with the Human Resource (HR) managers of manufacturers. They are not deeply in touch with what are the in-demand market needs right now. <b>Russ:</b> Well, the incentives aren't really there.  That whole strategy for preparing the workforce of tomorrow is not likely to bear a lot of fruit. <b>Guest:</b> I saw a very depressing version of this in Rochester, NY.  I did some reporting on this.  The Department of Labor has this program, Pathways Out of Poverty.  And I sort of joke that the acronym, or someone told me that the acronym was POOP. It's a little indicative of their success.  And I don't know the whole program. But what I saw--you had a training program that cost several million dollars to train people to retrofit homes; but the homes were only being retrofitted with another government short-term Stimulus spending program. <b>Russ:</b> The Weatherizing. <b>Guest:</b> The Weatherizing.  So, you had all these people go through training programs. This was targeting not the Maddies of the world, but people who dropped out of high school, often had a prison record--really the least employable people in our society.  People who had never had a job, people where basic hygiene and just showing up on time were real issues.  And they had a huge attrition rate. I forget the exact number, but a tiny fraction of the people who went through the training would graduate.  And then the people who graduated--and I met some of them--were so excited.  These are people who never had a job, and suddenly they have a paying job.  And even a decent paying job. <b>Russ:</b> And a skill. <b>Guest:</b> A skill.  Well, they would get a job, because they would have this government Weatherizing contract. <b>Russ:</b> Didn't last for very long. <b>Guest:</b> It was a fake demand.  It disappeared a year later.  There isn't a natural demand for those skills, and then they are back to nothing.  And when I met a lot of those people, many of them, especially the older ones--I mean, this was the ninth, tenth government training program they had been through--and this the first one that actually offered them <i>any job</i>, so at least they got <i>a</i> job, if only a short-term stimulus-based job.  So, training--we have lots of training programs.  But it's somehow not training people for the jobs that they might actually want to have.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">57:32</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's think creatively for a minute. Let's be imaginative. As you are talking about this, it makes me think of the following.  And maybe we are wasting our time here.  But let's talk briefly; I'm going to have a little thought experiment, and then we'll close with some other policy issues. Let's talk about the factory. We are at the Standard factory, they are making the fuel injectors; and if you haven't been listening carefully, Standard is the name of the company, not a description of what it produces.  So you've got these people in the company who are bright, but either through choices they've made, or bad luck, or unawareness of what's going on outside--because you talked about the fact that she's kind of stuck there, but it could be she just doesn't know about some opportunities for enrichment or training.  You'd think there would be an opportunity to do the following: You'd think the factory could bring in some training into the factory that the workers would pay for. Not the factory. The workers might pay for it not out of pocket, but in the form of lower wages.  So, if you offer $10/hour or $11/hour, you don't get those workers to do your job. But you might if you said: Look, I'm only paying $10/hour; my competitor I know is offering you $13/hour or $12; but if you come to work for me for $10 your life is going to be tough for a while but I've got this program where you are going to take this break for an hour or two or maybe you stay late a couple of hours, and your kid stays a little longer in daycare.  And we're going to help you get the skills that you might be able to use elsewhere in our factory--because we decided a few minutes ago that they may be scarce in the marketplace generally.  And I realize that maybe many of the workers who would like to have those skills aren't going to have the capability of acquiring them, and I am uneasy about bearing that risk, so I'll let the worker bear the risk, in the form of lower wages; and we'll have an in-house training program as one of our fringe benefits.  We'll bring in a local community college to teach a class on site, or we'll partner with them to make it easy for you to get off work at certain times.  You'd think those kind of things, or maybe they are happening, would be desperately helpful to folks who are either eager to get ahead or worried about the fact that they are not going to stay where they are--they are going to fall behind. Do you see anything like that going on?  What would Larry, the CEO of this company say about that? <b>Guest:</b> So, I actually had dinner with him the other night. And he said that one big outcome of the article is he wants to begin the process of really taking training much more seriously. I wasn't interviewing him.  I think like he was being very honest. So my first blush, I like what you are saying.  I think Maddie would like that herself.  It's kind of a self-selection process. There are a bunch of German companies in Greenville, like BMW, and they have this tradition of apprenticeship that they brought over from Germany.  And I was talking to Maddie's sister's boyfriend, who works at one of them, and he said the first few years he learned really valuable workplace skills. But now, it's more fun to spend a couple of hours in a class than at work. So, maybe just learning stuff to get out of work. <b>Russ:</b> But it may be helping him in other ways.  You don't know.  That's the way he describes it.  But who knows?  It's not as practical; I understand. <b>Guest:</b> You've got to say to some degree it shows an advantage to the employer.  It shows, probably creates a feeling of comfort and commitment, allows them to pay a little less, compensate them in other ways.  I will say, Greenville Tech, local community college--it's not exactly that. But they'll work with the bigger multinationals, like the BMW or Bosch or Michelin, who will say: Okay, we need 50 people who can do "blank"--this skill. And the school will take care of teaching those people.  And the school is guaranteed, the students, if you finish this course, you will get a job at Michelin. Which sounds great. And I'm sure Greenville Tech would love to do what you just described as well.  A criticism of that I heard is that it's in the company's interest to train people more narrowly than it might be in their interest. <b>Russ:</b> Obviously.  But that's then again a question of how to you get the people to--who is going to pay for it?  Can you find a way to either implicitly or explicitly have the employee pay for it?  When I was talking about a class for the lower-skilled workers, I'm thinking: Maybe you'd have a class in calculus. You know?  It might take a while to get people up to speed. The main value isn't to be a machinist.  It's got other applications, obviously.  But maybe that would be cool.  But maybe you are too tired at the end of the day, too. Because you've got to do homework.  It's not an easy thing.  Training and education are not easy; you can't take a pill. So it's a little complicated. <b>Guest:</b> I also--Larry wants to do it, and I hope he does do it--but if we think of a corporation just as a profit-maximizing entity, I mean don't you just have a host of free rider problems? <b>Russ:</b> Not if you pay lower wages. Right? One of the advantages of paying lower wages and offering that "free training"--it wouldn't literally be free; you'd be paying in form of lower wages--is you would attract the intellectually curious people who see that as a benefit rather than as a waste.  If you don't have any interest in education--which would be other people--or maybe you have two tracks. You'd get the education track and other people who don't.  The education track pays lower wages but you get the class. I don't know.  I'm just thinking out loud. <b>Guest:</b> I like it; the only thing that makes me nervous is would those classes be broad-based, highly portable skills like calculus or broad machining technology or metallurgy, or would they be very narrow, less portable skills that are, that more kind of marry you to that employer.  <b>Russ:</b> That's a good question. <b>Guest:</b> But what I really like is the creative thinking.  Thinking that the only way to advance does not need to be you have to leave the workforce or you have to go to night school and go to a two-year technical college and spend money while you are not earning money. I do like that proposal, to think more creatively. <b>Russ:</b> And I think people will. And I'm sure there are a thousand problems with what I suggested. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:04:37</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let me close with a very open-ended challenge and get your reaction. A lot of people say in America, in 1950, if you didn't finish high school, you still could get a good job in a manufacturing plant. And as you detail very clearly in your article, what's happened since 1950 is that manufacturing has been tremendously healthy.  Unbelievable increases in manufacturing output.  It's manufacturing employment that is a crisis, if anything.  It's not manufacturing that's in crisis.  It's employment. Now, my reaction to those stories has always been in 1920 or 1925, if you look back on the recent past of 20 years before or 40 years before, people would say: You know, used to be you could graduate with a third grade education, get a good job as a blacksmith.  And those jobs are gone.  And the answer isn't to bring back the blacksmith. That's a good thing that a good education doesn't prepare you for the workforce in 1925 the way it did in 1885, say.  That was great. And we are in that same world today, where 60, 70 years ago, 50 years ago, even 40 years ago, you only had to go to high school.  And you'd get a good "middle class job," with a chance for improving your life as you went forward. That's not true any more.  In general. There are exceptions, of course. But if just graduate from high school, life is a lot harder than it used to be. Now, part of that is just that a lot more people go to college, and the people who are left who don't go to college differ from the people who go to college.  And their lives are more challenging. But it seems to me--here's the challenge--two things we have to do about that.  Rather than say put up barriers to Chinese manufacturing imports or special training programs, what we need to do is let people educate themselves in ways that are more connected to the workplace they are about to have.  In the standard K-12 model that we've imposed on the government for the last 100 years or so is not very good.  And it's not very good for certain people.  Then, the other part of it is, and this is the mystery to me--my challenge--you've got people who, yes, they go on to college, but they study things that are totally impractical.  Yes, that is fine; I love liberal arts education; I think it makes you more interesting a person, a parent, and all that. But somebody who goes on to high school and studies, say, art history or French or psychology even, compared to somebody who studies, say, engineering, has a very different set of prospects.  But even that person who studies psychology or something that's less practical, does a lot better than the people who drop out, who don't finish high school--at least historically. So, it seems to me that that may not last.  Both of those worlds may need to change.  Are going to change, through market forces. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  I had a talk with David Autor, the labor economist at MIT. What he said is everyone in America--I forget the exact words he used, but they are going to have to compete based on what they know how to do. The signaling properties of just having a Bachelor of Arts (BA) are weakened.  Even the signaling properties of having a high school degree are weakened. I will say, unfortunately, the signaling properties of being a high school dropout are very strong. <b>Russ:</b> Yes. Very strong.  It's horrible.  Very tough. <b>Guest:</b> And I do think this is a challenge. I do not have much fear for the long-term growth of the United States.  I think GDP growth will eventually get on a healthy growth path; there will be plenty of Americans whose lives will continue to be richer and richer.  I do think we have a potential compositional crisis that we've never faced before, which is that some large segment of Americans seem poorly positioned to take advantage of that growth. Clearly getting as many of those people as possible to acquire the skills and education that's needed is the first best solution.  I'm pretty much lost myself about that.  I ask everyone I can.  I had a very good talk with Jeffrey Immelt who runs Obama's job strategy, and he basically said: I've got nothing; what have you got? <b>Russ:</b> An honest man. I think he spends a lot of time--that's his day job. Doesn't he moonlight as the head of GE? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, they make some kind of product as well. I forget. <b>Russ:</b> So he probably didn't spend so much time on that. Kind of a masthead figure more than anything else. But at least he's honest, though. <b>Guest:</b> I think--how do we create an educational system that allows people to pursue the skills that they both want, that are marketable.  That's crucial. Another thing David Autor told me, not the exact words and don't get mad at me for not quoting me, so I'll say it: Having a BA from any school in 1972 meant you were going to have a middle class life.  Having a poetry degree from a second-tier school today, I don't know who hires you.  There are only so many jobs in publishing. <b>Russ:</b> They are not going to hire you for your poetry.  Although it's nice.  I love poetry. I have nothing against it. <b>Guest:</b> Yes; I have a degree in history of religion. <b>Russ:</b> Well, I think that's the point. You are bright.  You don't use the "skills"--I'm putting skills in quotes--you learned in college, although you used some of them.  They are intangible. They are things about how to write well and how to think analytically, perhaps.  Those are useful in your job, obviously. But there aren't an infinite number of those kinds of jobs going around.  There are people who struggle to apply those intangible skills.  And they'd like some tangible ones.  And rather than trying to create that educational system, I'd like to let it emerge.  We need a lot more creativity in how we let that system run.  But that's another topic. <b>Guest:</b> Absolutely. 
</td></tr>



</tbody>
</table>

                                               
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>David Owen on the Environment, Unintended Consequences, and The Conundrum</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/david_owen_on_t.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9517</id>

    <published>2012-02-13T11:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-02-13T13:35:38Z</updated>

    <summary> David Owen of the New Yorker and author of The Conundrum talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in his book. Owen argues that innovation and energy innovation have increased energy use rather than reduced it and...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="David Owen" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Family" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Information and Technology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Regulation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="The Media" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://davidowen.typepad.com/david_owen/biography.html" target="new">David Owen</a> of the <i>New Yorker</i> and author of <i>The Conundrum</i> talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about the ideas in his book. Owen argues that innovation and energy innovation have increased energy use rather than reduced it and similarly, other seemingly green changes do little to help the reduce humanity's carbon footprint or are actually counter-productive. Only large reductions in consumption are likely to matter and that prescription is unappealing to most people. Owen points out that New York City, ironically perhaps, is one of the greenest places to live because of the efficiencies of density. The conversation concludes with a discussion of how to best approach global warming given these seeming realities. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Owenenvironment.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('David Owen on the Environment, Unintended Consequences, and The Conundrum','Russ Roberts and David Owen',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 01:10:50</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Owenenvironment.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 32.5 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://davidowen.typepad.com/david_owen/biography.html" target="new">David Owen's Home page</a>
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Conundrum-David-Owen/dp/1594485615/" target="new"><i>The Conundrum: How Scientific Innovation, Increased Efficiency, and Good Intentions Can Make Our Energy and Climate Problems Worse</i></a>, by David Owen at Amazon.com.

</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2011/LuskNorwoodlocavore.html" target="new">"The Locavore's Dilemma: Why Pineapples Shouldn't Be Grown in North Dakota",</a> by Jayson L. Lusk and F. Bailey Norwood. Jan. 3, 2011. Library of Economics and Liberty.
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html" target="new">Unintended Consequences</a>, by Rob Norton. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>
<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/EnvironmentalQuality.html" target="new">Environmental Quality</a>, by Terry L. Anderson. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GlobalWarmingABalanceSheet.html" target="new">Global Warming: A Balance Sheet</a>, by Thomas Gale Moore. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Energy.html" target="new">Energy</a>, by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

</ul>

<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/02/easterly_on_gro.html" target="new">Easterly on Growth, Poverty, and Aid</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/11/kelly_on_techno.html" target="new">Kelly on Technology and What Technology Wants</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/04/boudreaux_on_th.html" target="new">Boudreaux on the Economics of "Buy Local"</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/08/laughlin_on_the.html" target="new">Laughlin on the Future of Carbon and Climate</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/06/don_boudreaux_o_1.html" target="new">Don Boudreaux on Energy Prices</a>. EconTalk podcast.
<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/09/grab_bag_munger.html" target="new">Grab Bag: Munger and Roberts on Recycling, Peak Oil and Steroids</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/03/dyson_on_heresy.html" target="new">Dyson on Heresy, Climate Change, and Science</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/09/rauch_on_the_vo.html" target="new">Rauch on the Volt, Risk, and Corporate Culture</a>. EconTalk podcast.


<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: February 1, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> This is a fascinating, short, engaging book on the topic of saving the planet and the environment generally; and you've called your book <i>The Conundrum</i>.  What is the conundrum? <b>Guest:</b> The conundrum--the book is about unintended consequences; and the conundrum is that even when we are acting with the very best of intentions, the results are very often at cross purposes with our goals.  The subtitles of the book is "How Scientific Innovation, Increased Efficiency, and Good Intentions Can Make Our Energy and Climate Problems Worse." And the book is really a collection of that--of how easy thinking about these very difficult problems not only doesn't make things better but in many cases, I think, arguably makes things worse. <b>Russ:</b> Now, you write for <i>The New Yorker</i>, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. <b>Russ:</b> When does the book come out? <b>Guest:</b> The book comes out very soon, in a week or two. <b>Russ:</b> So, that will be around the first or second week of February.  Are you worried you are going to lose your job? <b>Guest:</b> I'm always worried that I'm going to lose my job. <b>Russ:</b> This is an unpopular position to hold, that you've staked out in the book--that good intentions don't always turn out well.  What kind of reaction do you get from people when you tell them that? In a minute we'll go into some of the details obviously. <b>Guest:</b> I think that it's mixed.  I think that it's hard to put an ideological label on it.  I've been accused of being both a conservative and climate-denier, and a liberal and socialist. <b>Russ:</b> You don't strike me as a climate denier. <b>Guest:</b> No. But, when I gave a talk to a group of efficiency experts, they were quite angry; that was the accusation.  I think, as in any field, there's lots of comfortable thinking.  And sometimes comfortable thinking is accurate. But sometimes it's not. And the conventional wisdom is often not a good guide to the truth. <b>Russ:</b> But it's very depressing to people to be told that their good deeds don't have good consequences.  That's one of the most--there are many interesting factual stories and facts; and there are also a lot of contrarian perspectives on things that everybody takes for granted.  And that's why I think it's such an interesting book. Let's start with the energy efficiency case.  There's a big debate, which as an economist I was unaware of--I think it's a little more straightforward from an economist's perspective, but there's a big debate in environmental circles about whether energy efficiency is a good thing or not. It seems obvious that making your car more fuel efficient or making your refrigerator more energy efficient or your house more energy efficient--that would seem to be a good thing. That reduces the amount of energy; and if you are only--we're going to ignore the material prosperity aspect of this--if you are only caring about the environment--certainly it would seem obvious that that's a good thing. But that's not so simple.  So, explain why. <b>Guest:</b> Well, you are exactly right. It seems obvious, to the point that energy efficiency has been spoken of as the fifth fuel, as the most widely distributed and equitably distributed energy source in the world. What we waste, simply by making our machines work better, we could eliminate the need for nuclear power, for example--has always been Amory Lovins's [?] argument. The difficulty with energy efficiency is that it's not something we just thought of.  It's something we've been doing for as long as there has been civilization. The history of civilization is making machines do more with less fuel.  Doing more with less energy.  And that hasn't caused global energy consumption to fall. It's the source of our astonishing prosperity, the wonderful way we live. The question is whether, why now, now that energy is a problem to us, why we think the thing we've been doing all along will cause our energy consumption to fall. The question first came into my mind was when--pretty much received wisdom in the United States is that energy is too expensive, too cheap. Gasoline is the--you go to a gas station and gasoline is probably the cheapest manufactured liquid that is for sale there. You go inside there and milk costs more.  Bottled water costs more. <b>Russ:</b> A fascinating fact that's often not noted. It's extraordinary. <b>Guest:</b> Often not noted.  In Europe; gas is two or three times as expensive.  And yet, and an environmentalist will point this out, at the same time, we need cars that get more cars to the gallon. When you increase the miles per gallon in the car, you are doing the same thing as decreasing the cost of the fuel.  You are just making a mile less expensive to drive.  And so I wondered why is this in one direction a good thing and a bad thing in the other.  And when you begin thinking about it, it doesn't seem quite as simple.  It doesn't seem like the sort of one input-one output linear problem that it's usually portrayed to be.  Typically when efficiency mavens talk about efficiency they'll say: If you cut energy efficiency by this much; or if you increase energy efficiency by this much, then consumption will fall--by roughly similar amount, with some wiggle room. <b>Russ:</b> It's just arithmetic. <b>Guest:</b> It seems like just arithmetic. But it's very complicated, and it reminds me of many of the things that you yourself have said about macroeconomics, which is that as you sort of draw back from your own life, from your own washing machine and refrigerator, and you pull back and take a look not only at the whole economy, but the whole economy over a period of time, it doesn't seem to be true. <b>Russ:</b> It's not true. <b>Guest:</b> There was just an article in the newspaper recently about airplanes, new airplanes coming, much more efficient than current ones. It's certainly the direction that research is going in aviation. Air travel is a very hungry energy-user and a major contributor to atmospheric carbon. <b>Russ:</b> But the people who are working to make airplanes more efficient are mainly doing it--there are a bunch of motivations, obviously possible political motivation, might be a good deed motivation--but money. It's expensive.  Examples--as human beings we try to find more from less. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  And when things become cheaper we tend to do more of them. Airplanes today are something like 70% more fuel efficient than they were when I first started flying.  I'm 56. And yet we don't fly less. We don't consume less fuel. To the point where, as I said in the book, the main impediment to traveling 10,000 miles for a week's vacation is not the cost of the ticket, which is in many cases trivial, but the perceived unpleasantness of spending a whole day sitting in a cushioned, reclining seat and watching movies. So, I think that as you look at the way we consume, in all categories--as you draw back and look at the world--you don't see this relationship between increased efficiency and decreased energy consumption. In fact, you see the opposite. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">9:21</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, of course, correlation is not causation. You point out in the book that many critics of your concern point out: Well, it's not the energy savings that causes the increase in use.  It's population, it's prosperity. And one of your points, of course, is that prosperity is being driven by these energy savings.  That's a feedback loop that's real, and it's not as straightforward as the critics are saying. But I think the right point is that it's an empirical question, and it's certainly true that if we can find cars that get better mileage, if we can innovate--I shouldn't say we; if other people, thoughtful engineers can think of ways to get higher miles per gallon--that lowers the price of driving.  That's undeniable.  That means there's going to be more driving. That's your point. Now, the critics have a point, which is: Well, it's true there is going to be more driving, but some of that driving could lead to less energy use because every mile driven now will require less fuel than it did before.  So, the empirical question is--in economics, it's called elasticity--the percentage increase in one direction and percentage increase in the other direction.  So, it's an empirical question.  You'd want to hold constant other things that are changing--population growth, etc.  And I think you make--it's not a persuasive case, but a thoughtful case--that a lot of the savings that seem obviously to overwhelm everything else aren't going to overwhelm everything else necessarily. I think the best example you give is when clothes dryers get more efficient, you don't dry your clothes for two hours.  So, the critics are right there, that you as an individual are certainly going to use less energy with a fuel efficient, energy efficient dryer than an older one.  But more people are going to be able to afford dryers now. So, that's one way that some of those savings are going to be offset. And there are a lot of things that aren't like dryers.  A refrigerator--who needs two refrigerators? Well, I have two.  I think you have two.  I have one in the basement--when we throw a party.  It's just sitting there humming along.  It could have four things in it sometimes.  I don't even bother unplugging it, by the way; that's a whole separate issue, when it's relatively empty.  But we're relatively prosperous as a country, incredibly prosperous by historical standards; having a refrigerator is an enormously great thing; having two is, it's not just for really rich people.  A lot of everyday people have them. <b>Guest:</b> It's become global. And you also see when you check into a hotel room, the room has a refrigerator.  It's running; there's nothing in it. <b>Russ:</b> All the time.  Sometimes there is--there's a little chilled water in case you have an urge to have one. <b>Guest:</b> Or some candy. Or the gas station that you stop at today has more refrigerator capacity than the grocery stores of my youth.  And that has consequences, too, not only in energy consumption but also in our own consumption.  The whole 20-ounce soda, the beverage, in many ways a product of this vastly increased refrigerator capacity.  Now you can get anything refrigerated anywhere.  This has improved our lives in innumerable ways.  Things don't go bad the way they used to.  But at the same time, what we waste has increased dramatically. The amount of food that is wasted by American consumers has grown right along with the increased refrigeration capacity. Once again, it's a correlation.  It doesn't prove anything. But I think you become suspicious after a while when all the correlations seem to run in one direction. And it's not enough for an economist to say correlation doesn't prove causation, because you also have to say that lack of correlation doesn't prove causation, either. <b>Russ:</b> But there is causation. So, my point is that you are certainly right that there is a causal connection between lower energy use per item and the desire to use more of the item.  And the book lays out some of the--I think the technical term in economics is intensive versus extensive margin, a phrase I never use. So the intensive margin is that when something gets a little cheaper, I use a little bit more of it. The extensive margin is that the bottles get bigger, more plastic is demanded; that's more petroleum used.  There's all these, you might call them spillover effects in general usage that are going to change that.  There's no denying that you are right--although I'm sure that people do deny it. There's no denying that this tends toward more energy use. There's an empirical question of how much it offsets--if it totally offsets and then some, which it appears to do; or whether the energy efficiencies merely overstated dramatically the gains.  But I think there is no doubt that the behavioral impact of those efficiency gains is to encourage more energy use. <b>Guest:</b> Especially if your focus is global rather than in your house. In my house, everything I do, I'm trying to become more efficient at--for the purpose of pushing down my energy consumption to save money. Which I'm then not going to burn up. I'm not going to put that money on my compost heap.  I'm going to use it for something else.  So, probably at the individual level, if there's no price constraint pushing down on your energy use you increase these efficiencies even in your own life you are probably increasing things too.  But certainly when you pull back to the global level, when the cumulative effects of all these efficiencies is to push down the cost of what were once luxury goods and bring them to  the level affordable all over the world, you get these other consequences. It's so complicated that you can't reduce it to a formula, plug it in and make it come out the other end with a neat prediction as I can in my own house.  But if you look at the world's energy meter, energy use per capita is climbing.  It's not falling. Energy use overall is climbing; climbing faster than population.  It's expected to double by mid-century.  Who knows what will really happen; but it's a big number now and it's expected to be a really big number then.  Population is not expected to grow at the same rate. The basic idea is as we become better at doing things, we do more things.  And that's been true since the beginning.  I was trying to think of any example of--when Amory Lovins and others talk about this, they talk about it at the end use, the individual end use level. <b>Russ:</b> They don't agree with you. <b>Guest:</b> No, they don't. And when I argue that the real world isn't like that, I always say that you could peel back the real world to the point where it was like that and think about early in human history when the only energy input was food.  And imagine that the only way of moving that food around is to drag it or carry it.  Now invent the wheel.  Suddenly you don't need as much energy to move things from one place to another.  But we do not expect in this thought experiment for the human population to cut back its food gathering now that it needs less. We expect the wheel to act as an amplifier of consumption.  Now, it's easy to extend agriculture or to hunt farther away or to gather food over a broader area.  And with that food, that energy, now that it's not going into inefficiently dragging things around, it's available for other uses.  And the feedback loops multiply and extend. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">18:08</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> It's a classic example of: people respond to incentives, and if you think you can just hold everything else constant, including things like: Well, since we consumed a certain amount of food before the wheel, we'll consume the same amount as before; it just won't be as hard to move it around.  That's just not how people behave. <b>Guest:</b> No.  But it is almost the way--when we look at the world right now and we imagine the effect of some change, we assume that everything will stay pretty much the way it is. <b>Russ:</b> That's not an economist's statement.  We economists, that's kind of our specialty, letting things change.  <b>Guest:</b> Well, good.  But I think if you wind things back to the 1940s, the world of the vacuum tube--it requires a lot of energy, a lot to build it; it takes up a lot of space; if we had something more efficient we could cut down our energy use, because this uses a lot of energy; and we could make things smaller.  And then you invent the transistor--in the late 1940s. Which does all those things.  But the effect of that is not that huge television sets can now sit on smaller tables; we can take these computers and put them into smaller rooms but they perform the same functions; we can make our radios smaller.  It changes the world.  And now in my house today there are billions of transistors. They are so small I don't even know where they are.  But they are everywhere. So, the effect was not the effect you might intuitively might think might happen when you made a change that requires less physical material, consumes less energy, and is smaller. It wasn't that consumption fell.  On the contrary--it exploded.  And those two trends are not unrelated.  And I think that the sort of counterfactual argument that the efficiency mavens make, which is: Well, you don't know what energy consumption would have been otherwise.  What you are doing then is asking me to imagine a world in which I have all the same electronic gadgets that I have right now, my telephone headset, my telephone, the webcam on my computer, my computer--but they are all running on 1940s technology; they all have vacuum tubes--and so I need a house that's many times the size of my current house to fill all this stuff in, my billions of transistors. And yes, if that were what my house looked like in 2012, I would be consuming an extraordinary amount of energy, much more than I am today. But that's not the way that kind of innovation works. <b>Russ:</b> It's a meaningless thought experiment, that particular one.  Again, to use an example I often think about: you found an antique can, an old beer can from the 1940s and you note in the book that it uses five times the--it weighs 5 times as much? Or it has 5 times the aluminum? I don't know what it was made of. <b>Guest:</b> Probably steel. <b>Russ:</b> But I think back to my youth, and I'm 57, so we have roughly the same youth--when I was a kid, you showed off by crushing a can with your hand.  And now you can take a finger and press down and you can crush a can. And that's a miracle of human innovation, that a soda can can be stacked with that level of thinness; and it comes from an ability to machine the top in a different way, with a little--it's an extraordinary human success story. So, we need less aluminum per can; but we have more cans than we had in 1960 when I was six years old. And one of the reasons is: they are cheap.  <b>Guest:</b> Right.  We got better at making them. <b>Russ:</b> The only comment I would make about that, and then I want to move on to some other technology fixes that you are also pessimistic about, is that when I hear your story about these spillover effects, cascades of change that take place after these innovations, most of it is really great. And you can see this in the book. Most of our human history, it's not just energy use--it's everything--we try to find ways to produce more from less; and every year our knowledge gets a little bit bigger on how to do that.  And that's what allows us to have the extraordinary standard of living that we have, even in a recession.  And mostly that's great.  The human enterprise, the ability to travel with your food, to keep your food cold, to throw a party on the weekend because you've got a second refrigerator, that you couldn't otherwise do--these are great things, mostly.  The only downside of this story is that it increases the amount of carbon that goes in the air, and that appears to be bad for climate; and that appears to make the earth warmer, at least.  I'm more agnostic than you are, than most environmentalists are about whether that's catastrophic or not; maybe we'll come back to that.  But I think it's important to at least say, as you do in the book: most of these things are good. <b>Guest:</b> They're great.  And I think you wouldn't willingly give up almost anything.  I think there's more downside than the carbon issue.  I think there are also old-fashioned air and water pollution, which we almost don't even talk about any more.  I think water is a very fragile resource that reaches a crisis point--we can't expect that we are going to find something to replace water.  So, there's another difficulty there.  There's also another one, an economic  one, which is that--the point at which our increased affluence ceases to increase our wellbeing, and in some ways can reduce our sense of wellbeing.  It's very hard to dial back any of these technologies, and yet we can find ourselves with houses that are too big, with commutes that are too long--which are improvements in our economic profile, our economic activities but that don't lead to what are genuine improvements in our quality of life. You can see it in health care, too--extraordinary increase in investment in health care without probably a corresponding increase in our actual health. So, I don't think it's only the climate issue.  There are other issues that are linked to thinking of increasing economic activity as the only possible source of doing good.  <b>Russ:</b> I agree with you on the health care.  We've subsidized health care unbelievably in the United States and most of the world, and as a result we waste a lot of resources.  I think the other and more subtle and interesting question is this relationship between consumption and wellbeing, health, mental wellbeing, happiness.  Obviously there's a big debate on it.  I have no doubt that there are many technological improvements and many aspects of material prosperity that are illusory in their attractiveness and don't lead to better outcomes of happiness, satisfaction, meaning.  But I don't want anybody mandating alternatives from on high. <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> So, I limit my kids' computer time for game playing, which they love to do. I limit it a lot. And they don't like it. When they come in the house it's often the first thing that they want to do.  I see that as a compulsive addiction and it would be a good thing to learn how to cope with that. And I say that as I compulsively check my email telling them not to get on that machine.  So we all have frailties and things that seem like fun that afterwards we realize why did I spend two hours playing that game; but I did it anyway and I'll do it again. And I consider that an area for religion and growing up; and it's just not something I want public policy to deal with. But I think it's an interesting question. <b>Guest:</b> It is an interesting question. I think also--we pretty much exactly the same age--I think that your kids today--you and I experienced boredom in a way a modern child can't. The whole concept of late 1950s, early 1960s boredom just doesn't exist any more. <b>Russ:</b> But the way it's fixed is not necessarily the-- <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> Losing the ability to gaze off into the distance and be pensive is not a good thing; but who knows? <b>Guest:</b> Maybe it's made us the wonderful people we are today. <b>Russ:</b> I hope somehow our children will have some of those advantages.  We'll see.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">27:37</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's move on to a set of issues which really were fascinating.  Talk about New York City and why it is a green place relative to the Vermont countryside.  I really enjoyed that. <b>Guest:</b> Well, this is something that  occurred to me. My wife and I lived in NYC for 7 years back in the late 1970s, early 1980s. Then when our daughter was 1 year old we decided we had to get out of the city. Our apartment, someone said, was decorated like a yacht--you had to sort of, everything was stowed and you had to walk sideways to get around. We desperately yearned for more room, so we moved to the country, 100 miles north of the city, into a big 18th century house across a dirt road from a multi-thousand acre nature preserve; and it felt as though we had stepped into Arcadia.  And yet I noticed over the period of a couple of years that even though our lives felt as though we had taken on a time of environmental purity, we had actually become much more wasteful consumers. In every sense. Now we had this large house that we had to fill with stuff; and it required constant maintenance. In NYC we lived without a car. We immediately got a car, which was a huge change; and we realized, almost overnight, that one car wasn't enough, because if you have only one car, how do you get to the mechanic to pick up your car when it's being repaired? So suddenly we had two cars. And then later I had a sort of mild mid-life crisis and we ended up with a third car, which became a necessity as soon as our kids could drive. And our electricity consumption went from about $1/day to huge, a huge multiple of that--it's an old house that you could virtually put the furnace in the yard for all the insulation that we had. And I realized that even though our life looked greener, it was actually much less so, and began to think about that, and realized that even though, when most people look at a place like NYC they just see concrete and fumes and garbage and an environmental disaster, but what you really have is a large number of people living on a very small energy footprint. New Yorkers use the smallest amount of energy per capita of any Americans.  New York State has the lowest energy use per capita of any state, because of NYC. <b>Russ:</b> Not because of the raised consciousness of the average New Yorker. It's a very large city. <b>Guest:</b> No one is more surprised than a New Yorker when you mention this. New Yorkers are the only real consumers of public transit in the United States. Half of all subway stops in the United States are in NYC; almost a third of all public service passenger transit miles are in the NYC metropolitan area; and the reason--it's all the same reason, which is that when you move people closer together, driving becomes more difficult, an impossibility. <b>Russ:</b> Also, it's not as necessary. You can walk to stuff. <b>Guest:</b> Although I think the lure of the car is so huge that if every apartment came with a garage space, people might have them anyway. But they don't have the same kind of utility. In the United States today we have more registered automobiles than we have licensed drivers.  In Manhattan, 77% of households don't own even one car.  That's not even on the chart. <b>Russ:</b> It's not American! <b>Guest:</b> And they don't drive them the  way the rest of us do.  They drive basically only to escape New York.  Obviously there are many downsides to urban life.  My wife and I fled urban life.  But in terms of organizing human beings in a way that constrains energy use, water use, resource use, density has tremendous value.  Not all density is equal. I've seen studies that talk about the limits of density in terms of encouraging things like public transit use; and they say, yes, as you move people closer together, transit use rises, but then it levels off.  And that's true.  But the reason is, once you move people together Manhattan style, even transit begins to seem inconvenient; and the fact is people simply walk. <b>Russ:</b> I walk everywhere in NYC--miles. <b>Guest:</b> That's why New Yorkers live longer than other Americans, probably it's one of the reasons.  NYC is one of the very last places in the country where walking is a primary form of transportation. It's almost inconceivable anywhere else. <b>Russ:</b> There's a nice quote from the book I want to read that relates to this, and relates to another issue, which is buying local as an environmental statement. So, here's the quote: "A recent documentary about Portland's Green consciousness shows a concerned resident driving her minivan 25 miles to buy two bags of fresh produce from a farmer on the other side of the city's urban boundary. And it shows the same farmer in a pickup truck transporting a very small selection of produce into the city to sell it in an urban farmer's market. Both trips are presented as virtuous acts, but neither makes environmental sense.... Locavorism is appealing because like many of the most popular green strategies, it feels enlightened, yet entails no actual sacrifice even if you don't grant yourself exemptions for coffee and out-of-season fruit." So, that was a spectacularly insightful paragraph. <b>Guest:</b> Oh, good; thank you. Locavorism is a tough one.  My wife, who has written cookbooks, points out food is an extremely emotional topic. People, she says, can identify themselves by what they refuse to eat.  And these are powerful personal, spiritual issues for people.  I think you can say it a little more easily if you move to non-food agricultural products and think about, say, cotton. It wouldn't make any sense at all to demand that my cotton clothing come from a cotton field within 25 or 100 miles of where I live. It would be ridiculous to grow cotton in most of the places where people live.  It doesn't make any sense.  And if you had to grow cotton that inefficiently, you'd be using up land that shouldn't be producing that.  My anti-locavore argument doesn't address the industrial food argument. <b>Russ:</b> Separate issue, I agree. <b>Guest:</b> But it means that it's yet again an issue where there is not an easy answer that won't force you to think more than one step through a problem. It's a complicated problem, especially when you start to think of it on a global basis and how all these things play out over a world of 7, 8, 9, or 10 billion people. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">35:48</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, in terms of cities and the issue of--I guess we could think of three parts of urban life, or semi-urban life.  We have a dense city.  We have a suburb.  And then we have country living that's sort of near a city. You are arguing that if we really want to make an impact on America's energy use and carbon footprint, we ought to be encouraging people to live in denser, more urban areas, and that the in-betweens, the lack of density in these other areas are not effective.  Is that true? <b>Guest:</b> All the incentives push the other way. The incentives we give to people to buy homes, the incentives in the form of the transportation network to make it easy to get to those places; the cheapness of the fuel that moves the vehicles possible to live in those places.  All these things--zoning regulations.  I was the chairman of my local zoning commission until very recently.  All our zoning regulations encourage what we call sprawl, suburban sprawl.  They are all framed in terms of creating distance between uses rather than shrinking it. And they are basically saying, if you look at it--they grew up with the history of the automobile, and their main focus is on making sure that everybody will always have a place to park.  All these push us outward and make it less likely that we will organize ourselves in a way that actually has some long-term environmental value, which is by moving people closer together.  And I think that environmentalist groups have been guilty, too, by having, really from the beginning, from the time of Henry David Thoreau and John Muir, really impressing on us the idea that urban life is evil. <b>Russ:</b> Tawdry. <b>Guest:</b> And harmful. And for a long time it was.  I mean, read Charles Dickens. <b>Russ:</b> Sewage running in the streets. <b>Guest:</b> There's a lot of bad things about cities. The plague, the Black Death. <b>Russ:</b> Malaria. Not malaria--cholera--sorry. <b>Guest:</b> Everything.  But on the other side, I think that groups like the Sierra Club that I pick on in the book have done a disservice to the environment by making us feel what my wife and I felt--that we need to be authentic, that we need this personal contact with the green world, which we now have, but at great cost in terms of our personal environmental damage and energy consumption. And really, there's a tradeoff in our wellbeing. We haven't exactly been clamoring to move away from this paradise.  But it requires a significant investment in automobiles and fuel and heating fuel and paint and everything else to maintain it. <b>Russ:</b> That's interesting. I live a suburban life, and I happen to have been in NYC yesterday. NYC doesn't have a lot of green.  The green it does have is very concentrated; obviously--Central Park; I was in Manhattan.  But it has a lot of a natural thing, which is people.  I love so-called nature; I love mountains and hiking and being outdoors. But being outdoors in NYC is an extraordinarily interesting and visually stimulating thing, in a way that natural landscape isn't. It's still natural. We just don't have romantic books about it. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  I think it's a mistake.  It's the wrong way to protect the unspoiled places by trying to throw fences around them rather than by trying to turn the problem inside out and thinking about how do we organize people in a way that puts these resources at less risk? I think that you don't do it is by suggesting that the best way to live is with your own personal relationship with these things.  Because if you believe that, then when the next person follows your example and moves next door to you, you have to move another step further along. And you see that.  That's the history of our settlement across our  continent.  And once again, the thing you talked about earlier--it's had tremendous value for us.  But also it reaches a point where our tolerance for the automobile commute has risen.  One of the consequences you see is, any city. I was just in Orlando, FL, and you see, where am I in this metropolitan area? Because everywhere I go looks exactly the same. Many lanes, bypasses, Interstates; this time I spending in my car to go from one identical place to another is not really enhancing. <b>Russ:</b> There's something Kafkaesque about Orlando.  I know exactly what you mean. <b>Guest:</b> It's an alarming place. <b>Russ:</b> Not that I haven't had some very good times there.  <b>Guest:</b> There is a good example, too, of how we don't necessarily think clearly about environmental impacts.  You look at the automobile, and people will talk about traffic congestion, for example. Example given of an environmental problem.  Traffic congestion is not an environmental problem. It's a driving problem.  Driving is the environmental problem.  So, if you think of congestion as the problem, then almost everything you do actually makes the real problem worse, the driving problem worse: Let's make traffic move more smoothly, but use computers, add more lanes, use computers to organize the traffic better, let's give cars a little computer thing that will tell you where the empty parking space is so that driving will be more convenient. Give me books on tape so that I am not bored when I am stuck in traffic. <b>Russ:</b> Podcasts. <b>Guest:</b> The famous National Public Radio (NPR) moment, everyone is familiar with it, where you are listening to something either on the radio or a podcast or a book that you are not ready with or not finished with when you pull into your driveway, so you take a couple more laps around the block to listen to it. These all make being in the car more pleasant.  They solve the congestion problem but they make the driving problem worse.  I was thinking, what would an actual green car look like, a truly green car? I was thinking it would probably look something more like a golf cart.  It wouldn't have doors on it. It wouldn't have a heater. It would have a very low top speed.  You would be able to get your child to the hospital. But you would not just go jump in it and spend the day tooling around the country.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">43:25</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Unpleasant.  What you want is like a WWII jeep where the springs are shot and the seats are uncomfortable.  And I think that's the challenge of your book.  It's that it naturally points to making life worse as a way to solving some of these problems.  And as you recognize in the book, that doesn't sell so well. <b>Guest:</b> I think the difficulty is I don't think it's necessarily pointing to making life worse. It's making life's impact, imprint, smaller, and finding different ways to think about what makes life better.  Would I rather live in a different way that gave me benefits in other ways rather than just my income? If I weren't burning up my income in this house that's twice the size of the average house or the house in which I was born, or driving thousands of miles more a year than my father did--are those really gains in my well-being? And I don't think all of them are. Many of them are.  I certainly wouldn't give up  email.  Or online bridge.  Or my new golf club.  But I don't think it necessarily--thinking about less doesn't necessarily mean thinking about worse, in many categories.  I think it means thinking about better. <b>Russ:</b> You don't spend much time in the book on that.  It's a short book. <b>Guest:</b> It is a short book. I was thinking at the end I should just write "Time" across the last page, like a blue book in college--just when I get to the solution.  Because I think that they are very difficult.  When you talk about global problems, the reason we focus on things like the cans we set out at the curb--what you do as an individual is not enough; every individual bit doesn't count because it's a huge problem.  Even at a national level it's not sufficient.  When you talk about global problems it requires a kind of global action, and across a huge range of affluence levels.  And it seems discouragingly inconceivable when you think about it. I think in fact  you see that--someone said to me: Why do you think that the, could I account for the low and in fact declining level of a sense of emergency about climate change? I don't think that among educated people it's because people haven't thought about it or because they reject science, the scientific method.  I think it's because people have consciously thought about it and decided the potential downside is not worth the potential upside. <b>Russ:</b> I think that's true.  Obviously there are a lot  of different motivations and ways people feel about it.  But one way to summarize your book is that what your book says is that the things many of us do to feel green--putting cans out at the curb, paper instead of plastic, better yet bringing your own tote-bag as we are encouraged to do here where I live in Maryland where there is now a nickel charge for them to allow me to use their paper and plastic bags; my electric car that's really a coal-powered car if it were widely adopted because electricity is generally generated by coal--we have all these symbolic statements that we make.  There is a piece of us inside that says if everybody did it, we'd save the planet.  What you are really saying is that it's not true.  It would take a lot more than that.  And what it would really require at current, the way the world works now, is a significant reduction in our consumption of stuff across the board.  No one really wants to do that.  And as a result we are living in a bit of a fantasy world where our green gestures are not much more than gestures. In fact, we didn't talk about it yet but you talk about other so-called fixes--solar, wind--that are just not practical.  It's an illusion.  Is that an accurate summary? <b>Guest:</b> Well, yes.  I think that they are not economically rational in the way we think about economics. And the idea that the will suddenly become that way if you think about it hard enough-- <b>Russ:</b> or force people to use them. <b>Guest:</b> Yes, and as I say in the book, and we don't often think that way, is that problems innovate, too. You tend to think, you identify a problem, you just imagine the problem sitting still while we offer a solution to it.  But in fact the problem is innovating as well; and it often has better funding than the solution does.  The sudden abundance of natural gas is an example of that.  Here's a technological innovation that has vastly increased our estimates of our reserves, U.S. reserves, global reserves, of gas.  As well as pushing down the price.  I was at a conference in Washington where an expert referred to natural gas as great for the environment. <b>Russ:</b> One of the cleanest. <b>Guest:</b> Amazing for rebranding success stories of modern time.  Natural gas is a fossil fuel.  It's a good fossil fuel. The other white meat. And what it has done is completely taken the wind out of wind. It's made--that was a hard sell to begin with.  Essentially an impossible one. And so, for anybody who is hoping that--people refer to it as a bridge fuel. This is what will carry us, give us the time we need to develop renewables.  If natural gas is a bridge to anything, it is a bridge to coal. Because when we get to the end of it, if we ever do, then we'll say: What was it we didn't like about coal? And go on to burning it.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">50:29</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, what would you like to see happen?  I'll give you an alternative, but I want to hear what you say first. Given these realities, which are that people like comfort, they like being able to drive their cars, they like having a big house, they like having a big yard, they like to water it and mow it and all these cultural aspects of our lives--how, what might, if there is a problem, what might be done about it? <b>Guest:</b> I don't know.  I don't know.  The annoyingly honest answer to that question. <b>Russ:</b> One of my favorites, I love that answer. <b>Guest:</b>  I don't necessarily appear often enough. <b>Russ:</b> No, you don't.  You know why?  It doesn't sell that well.  I think anybody can say it.  My 10-year-old, my 12-year-old can say it. So, why would I pay you to say it?  I pay you for something better than that.  I can get that from--you know.  Truth is good. <b>Guest:</b> What you don't know, you don't know for the wrong reasons.  But I think what we saw in 2008, we saw an actual reduction globally in energy use and carbon output.  The reason wasn't that everybody suddenly became green.  It was the price of oil went way high, and the global economy tanked. <b>Russ:</b> Hey, hey! <b>Guest:</b> So, we know how to push down global energy use.  We know how to push down carbon output, through price. When people feel threatened in their livelihood they hunker down and consume less.  They do that in a benign way; and we certainly don't know how to do it in a way that limits the disproportionate consumption of those of us who are fortunate enough to be the world's consumers of everything, without also making life impossible for people at the other end of the global scale.  Hundreds of millions of people in the world who have no access whatsoever to electricity.  And there are millions more coming.  <b>Russ:</b> And when they get it, they like it. <b>Guest:</b> And when they get it, they like it. And it's great.  And they should.  And it brings the benefits that we know: health care, education, longevity. <b>Russ:</b> Movies. <b>Guest:</b> At the same time, though, it compounds these other problems, because when you  have an electric light, your workday doesn't end when the sun goes down.  Your energy consumption rises in other categories.  And when it rises in one category, it rises in all, eventually.  You want a car.  You see these.  I think it's why--it's an easy explanation of why we think it's why I'm going to stop eating raspberries from California, and that's going to be my contribution.  <b>Russ:</b> Well, your book reminded me--it probably doesn't remind very many people of this but it reminded me of a book I learned a great deal from, which is by William Easterly. He wrote a book called <i>The Illusive Quest for Growth</i>. And in that book he gives the history of how economists and policy experts have tried to figure out how to make poor people richer, how to make poor countries richer.  And each chapter has a new solution to the problem that concludes by saying: Well, we thought it was this, but it turns out it's not.  We thought it was investment, but it turns out investing doesn't always lead to growth.  So, I'm reading the book, and I'm waiting for--well, when he gets to the education chapter, well, that's the answer! It's education.  But no, it turns out, that too--we can pay for more schools in poor countries, and we can even pay for children to sit in classrooms longer, but they don't necessarily have a better standard of living when that's done. So, that book in a way is a very depressing book.  That last chapter never gets written, about what that real silver bullet is to help poor countries get richer.  And the conclusion, of William Easterly, is: We don't know how to do it very well.  And that's just the reality.  Your book reminded me of it as well.  I get to the chapter that energy efficiency is a bit of a, doesn't really lead to what you think it does--and then solar; well, not quite; wind, nope; buying local, no--and you keep waiting for that chapter, and it doesn't come.  So, let me give you an optimistic and pessimistic reading of your book, and then you can tell me what you prefer, or either of your own. The optimistic reading is that these are hard problems; the essence of economics is that there are no solutions, only tradeoffs, and in this case the tradeoffs push in one direction, people choose a particular set of choices and activities that lead to more consumption and that's built into our humanity.  So, the way to change that, if you want to change it, the optimistic story is that the best you can do is that you've got to preach. You've got to change people's cultural and spiritual outlook towards smaller and less impactful. And that's hard to do. We don't know how to do it very well. It's not a technological problem, not an engineering problem, etc.  The pessimistic story is that there's not much we can do about it and you should just go on living your life and enjoy it, and don't fool yourself into thinking there's something to be done about it.  And for me, I'd go--actually, I'm going to pick a third choice, which is: Why don't we spend our time and energy dealing with what the world would look like with more consumption, because that's where we are going?   Unless we want to live under some kind of tyranny.  Obviously a world authority of environmentalists could impose regulations.  I think they would do other things as well, so I'm not real big on concentrating power in the hands of people who would save the Earth.  They tend to save themselves in that situation, and hurt other people. So, my view, which is very eclectic, is that--this is a little bit pessimistic; but I'm a little more optimistic maybe than you are about how we will cope with these changes.  But I don't think we can stop them. And having said that, that would make a lot of people angry, which is another reason I suspect the reaction to your book is somewhat hostile from your environmental friends, who you basically agree with.  <b>Guest:</b> I might agree with all three of your [?] there.  I think one thing I've been very interested in--I've written for the <i>New Yorker</i> a profile of a chemist at MIT named Daniel Nocera. It hasn't run yet.  But anyway, he's a chemist; he's been working on energy his entire career.  He's our age exactly.  He is most famous for inventing what he calls the artificial leaf--it basically uses sunlight to split water into hydrogen and oxygen.  His goal is not to do with what we have done with research in this country, which is how do we provide alternative energy sources that meet our current needs; but to look from the bottom of the global scale, the [?] force, people who have no access to electricity now.  And he says: When you look at the problem from that end, when you are not thinking about how do we power a car to make it go 100 miles on one charge or go from 0 to 60 mph on one charge, but how do we provide some power, 100 watts, an average rate of 100 watts through the day to someone who currently has no electricity, because the energy problem is [?].  And his utopian idea, his long term idea, is that if you approach the energy problem from that end, you end up improving the lives of hundreds of millions of people who need a significant improvement.  And in the course of doing that, you create the technologies that eventually enable people at the other end of the income scale to live in adequate comfort but at a smaller impact.  It's plausible.  You always come back to, or at least in my sort of frame of thinking, what are the unintended consequences? All consequences are unintended consequences.  And if you look back through the history of science, there is support for that position. But I think it's a very hopeful one, and I think it comes from sort of turning the problem upside down and trying to think of it in a different way.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">59:55</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Explain that again. Why does that turn the world upside down?  Why does thinking about getting some electricity to really poor people help so much relative to a different perspective? <b>Guest:</b> His [Nocera's] line is if you think of the renewable energy problem as how to power a car, it's a huge engineering problem, because storage is a problem; if you try to recharge a car for example with solar panels on its roof, you have to leave it in a parking lot for weeks in order to be able to drive to work. It's just not--solar energy is too dispersed.  You need a huge storage; it's extremely expensive.  You need to be able to deliver that power in a hurry, from a stop to highway speed; and you need to be able to hold enough of it in that car to move you along the highway for most of the day.  And there's no way, he says, there is no level of technological ingenuity that will make that affordable for somebody, for, say $1 a day.  But, he says, if you flip it upside down, you think: How do I provide a minimum level of electricity to someone at the very, at the cheapest possible way, the crudest possible way but cheap; then all the chemistry and physics and engineering look different, and you approach the problem from that way.  And his belief then, is, for example in India, by providing a minimal level of electricity through his method--which is basically turning water into a fuel and then burning the fuel, turbines to generate a very modest amount of electricity--you make a dramatic improvement in the lives of those people.  And then eventually through the spread of this large number of people, the technology improves to the point where it actually could have an impact on people at the level of consumption of you and I.  As I say, it's a very idealistic view; but it's another way of looking at global energy use that's different from the way we usually look at it. <b>Russ:</b> I wonder, though, if there's a way--I mean, if we thought about the amount of resources we currently spend--there's a huge amount we currently spend on trying to find out a way to make a car have a little bit better mileage or have the battery weigh a little bit less, the materials weigh a little bit less, or make the can a little bit thinner.  Right? There are engineers all over the world working on those problems right now. A lot.  But there are also people who are trying to just reduce energy use for its own sake.  And the professor you are talking about--who view this as not doing it for the monetary benefit but doing it because he thinks he might make the world a better place.  He's going to be famous as a result, which doesn't hurt; but he's not doing it just for profit.  He's got an ulterior motive as well.  Another motive.  There's a lot of people in that group, people who are doing things, some of which are counterproductive, as you point out.  I wonder if it's possible, if we took those resources--and again, I'm not saying we should steer them this way, but people would voluntarily do it if they thought it was more effective--into thinking about how to cope with climate change, rather than how to prevent it or mitigate it.  And I think ultimately there is a deep spiritual, religious, non-rational--I don't want to call it irrational.  It's not a technology or engineering problem.  There's so much more going on there.  And I think that tapping into that is one way to improve things that is part of my possibly optimistic story.  And the other is, though, that if we could change the way people look at these things, maybe they would cope with change rather than try to prevent it. <b>Guest:</b> I think there is merit to that. Especially since we don't have any confidence that the steps we are taking to prevent it are likely to be effective.  I think, I was  at recently, of a conference in Washington, D.C. about energy and security; and there were a number of people there from the Pentagon, from the Defense Department who were retired, people from various military branches.  And the U.S. military has a very sort of unemotional, straightforward, forward-thinking view about the environment, climate; and there was someone, an admiral, saying: The climate is changing, we have to change.  And his view was very simple.  If there is no ice on the North Pole then ships can cross; the navies of other countries can travel through the Northwest Passage.  And this is an issue for the U.S. Navy.  There is something bracing about this non-emotional, straightforward thinking about something like that.  And there is also, you see in the military--they are tremendous energy users. They've been in an environment where they haven't had to think about energy consumption.  The interesting thing I learned which was from someone in the Energy Department, Defense, said something like they had 300,000 American buildings and until very recently none of them had metering of any kind. Electricity or water. There's no incentive.  And now, if we are actually going to shrink the military budget some, there is an incentive to think about these things.  There is also a human incentive: the American military, if you think about it as a single entity, is probably the single largest consumer of energy in the world.  Jet fuel is measured not in miles per gallon but in gallons per mile.  It's staggering. And also, in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, many casualties have taken place in this tremendous logistical problem of moving fuel to the soldiers.  Our fuel conveys are easy targets, and many casualties have been suffered by soldiers who were accompanying those shipments. So, the military is thinking about these things I think in a sort of, kind of clear, non-emotional way that you are talking about. Not an ideological way. And in some ways they have the luxury of being almost kind of extra-democratic--they haven't really, their budget items aren't voted on individually by Congress to any great extent.  They have sort of been a group apart.  But at the same time you could also say the American military has been responsible for more energy consumption and resource destruction than any other comparably sized group on Earth in the history of the human race.  So, it sort of works both ways.  But there was something that I found that was refreshing in the same way.  Kind of taking this less fraught and heated approach to this problem. I was thinking if an asteroid were bearing down on the Earth, people would be much less emotional about deciding whether we were going to do something about it, because we wouldn't feel that there was this sort of implicit criticism of yourself in the fact that something potentially extremely dangerous was possibly going to happen.  We'd look at it much more clearly.
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">1:08:21</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> There wouldn't be a lot of baggage.  It would just be, as Samuel Johnson said: The knowledge that you would be hung in a fortnight concentrates the mind. <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> And that's what would happen.  But I was thinking of something a little starker, which is: the Earth is going to get warmer, and maybe we ought to be figuring out something about how to make that the most pleasant world it could be rather than figuring out how to keep it from happening. If it's true.  I'm relatively agnostic about the science.  I don't think it's settled.  But let's say it is settled.  Let's say it's unavoidable that if we get richer, there is going to be a warmer Earth. I'm not quite sure of the consequences of that.  I'm not sure they are as catastrophic as people say they are. But if they are, maybe we should be trying to cope with that rather than saying we have to stop it. <b>Guest:</b> Right. Well, even if you believe we have to try to stop it, you still should be thinking about the adaptation question, too, because nobody who talks about stopping it thinks that anything we can do will cause the effects to disappear.  It's still something we'll have to cope with and adapt to.  And you are right.  Once again, the Pentagon is saying: If you are in the Navy, our bases are at sea level, and we have to be thinking about what it means potentially.  A meter rise in sea level over the course of the next half century or century--and the Admiral who said this, said: It's not just the base itself. It's the community that surrounds it and both supports it and is supported by the base.  And so even if you are Bill McKibben you have to be thinking about adaptation in addition to circumvention. 
</td></tr>


</tbody>
</table>
]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>William Black on Financial Fraud</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/02/william_black_o.html" />
    <id>tag:www.econtalk.org,2012://2.9488</id>

    <published>2012-02-06T11:30:00Z</published>
    <updated>2012-02-09T13:39:22Z</updated>

    <summary> William Black of University of Missouri-Kansas City and author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about financial fraud, starting with the Savings and Loan debacle up through...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Russell Roberts</name>
        <uri>http://www.econtalk.org</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Books" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Finance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Financial Crisis of 2008" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="History" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Marketing, Management, Strategy, and Leadership" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="William Black" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.econtalk.org/">
        <![CDATA[<p class="columns">
 <a href="http://www.neweconomicperspectives.org/search/label/William%20K.%20Black" target="new">William Black</a> of University of Missouri-Kansas City and author of <i>The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One,</i> talks with EconTalk host <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#roberts">Russ Roberts</a> about financial fraud, starting with the Savings and Loan debacle up through the current financial crisis. Black explains how bank executives can use fraudulent loans to inflate the size of their bank in order to justify large compensation packages. He argues that "liar loans" were a major part of the crisis and that policy changes made it easy to generate such loans without criminal repercussions. 
</p>

<div class="p">
    <div class="columns">
        <div class="half1">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Blackfinancialfraud.mp3" target="_blank" onclick="javascript:PlayerOpen('William Black on Financial Fraud','Russ Roberts and William Black',this.href); return false">Play</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Time:</span> 1:22:27</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption"><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/EconTalk.html#listen">How do I listen to a podcast?</a></div>                                
        </div>

        <div class="half2">
            <div class="control_field">
                <div class="control">
                    <div class="button"><a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2012/Blackfinancialfraud.mp3" target="new">Download</a></div>
                    <div class="label"><span class="bold-gray">Size:</span> 37.9 MB</div>
                </div>
            </div>
            <div class="control_field_caption">Right-click or Option-click, and select "Save Link/Target As MP3.</div>                                
        </div>
    </div>
</div> 
]]>
        <![CDATA[<a name="readmore"></a>
<h3>Readings and Links related to this podcast</h3>
<table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <thead><tr><th>
              <div class="floats">
                  <div class="left">Podcast Readings</div>
                  <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideReadings(this,'readings')">HIDE READINGS</div></div>
              </div>
</th></tr></thead>
  <tbody id="readings">
<tr><td>
<b>About this week's guest:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.neweconomicperspectives.org/search/label/William%20K.%20Black" target="new">William Black's Home page</a> and blog at New Economic Perspectives.
</ul>
<b>About ideas and people mentioned in this podcast:</b>
<ul>
<b>Books:</b>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Best-Way-Rob-Bank-Own/dp/0292721390/ref=tmm_pap_title_0/" target="new"><i>The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One: How Corporate Executives and Politicians Looted the S&L Industry</i></a>, by William Black at Amazon.com.
</ul>
<b>Articles:</b>
<ul>

<li><a href="http://ideas.repec.org/a/bin/bpeajo/v24y1993i1993-2p1-74.html" target="new">"Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit,"</a> by <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Akerlof.html" target="new">George A. Akerlof</a> and Paul M. Romer. 1993. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 1-74.

<li><a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1879431" target="new">"The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,"</a> by George A. Akerlof. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, Vol. 84, No. 3, Aug., 1970. JStor.

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html" target="new">Savings and Loan Crisis</a>, by Bert Ely. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Bankruptcy.html" target="new">Bankruptcy</a>, by Todd J. Zywicki. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BankRuns.html" target="new">Bank Runs</a>, by George G. Kaufman. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

<li><a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/DepositInsurance.html" target="new">Deposit Insurance</a>, by George G. Kaufman. <i>Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.</i>

</ul>
<b>Podcasts and Blogs:</b>
<ul>


<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html" target="new">Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2008/09/kling_on_freddi.html" target="new">Kling on Freddie and Fannie and the Recent History of the U.S. Housing Market</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/07/kling_on_the_un.html" target="new">Kling on the Unseen World of Banking, Mortgages, and Government</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/calomiris_on_th.html" target="new">Calomiris on the the Financial Crisis</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/01/bruce_yandle_on.html" target="new">Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists</a>. EconTalk podcast.

<li><a href="http://www.econtalk.org/archives/financial_crisi/" target="new">Other EconTalk episodes on the crisis</a>. EconTalk podcasts.



<br/>
</ul></ul>
</td>
                                            </tr>
                                        </tbody>
                                    </table>

<a name="highlights"></a>
<h3>Highlights</h3>
 <!-- table and first column has fixed width so table doesn't collapse when body is not displayed -->
 <table class="ts2" style="width:100%; "cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
   <thead>
       <tr>
           <th class="time">Time</th>
           <th>
               <div class="floats">
                   <div class="left">Podcast Highlights</div>
                   <div class="right"><div class="hide" onmouseover="overHideShow(this);" onmouseout="offHideShow(this);" onclick="hideHighlights(this,'unique')">HIDE HIGHLIGHTS</div></div>
               </div>
           </th>
       </tr>
   </thead>
   <tbody id="unique">
<tr><td valign="top">0:36</td><td valign="top">Intro. [Recording date: January 24, 2012.] <b>Russ:</b> Bank fraud and what it can tell us about the crisis and what we might learn from it.  Tell us to begin with about your background in detecting bank fraud. <b>Guest:</b> It happened, of course, accidentally, like most things in life.  I went over to the Home Loan Bank Board, April 2, 1984, as their Litigation Director. <b>Russ:</b> What is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it is two agencies ago.  It was the primary Federal regulator of Savings & Loans, agency, the office of Thrift Supervision, which was recently killed by the Dodd-Frank Bill. <b>Russ:</b> And what did you do there? <b>Guest:</b> I did what the title suggested. I was Litigation Director, and we had independent litigation authority.  So we didn't use the Justice Department.  And so at a very young age I had a docket of 10,000 cases, and then a budget for outside counsel of $100 million dollars, which back in the day was a big deal.  But pretty quickly I became heavily involved in two other things--again accidentally.  We had a massive run on the largest Savings and Loan (S&L) in America, American Savings; and it was a $6 billion-dollar run.  This was not long after Continental Illinois had been brought down by a $6 billion-dollar run. And I ended up on the emergency task force; and so I was working with the business types, and with the field folks; and supervision was really done in the field, not out of Washington, D.C.  So, I started learning a great deal about these institutions.  And the head of the agency had undergone a remarkable transformation.  He was a reasonably close friend of both of the Reagans--appointed head of the agency because of that personal relationship.  Very strongly pro-deregulation.  But he had changed by this point and had decided to engage in significant re-regulation.  And because of the chain of random facts, I ended up being the staff leader of that effort. It's the combination of those things that led me into the anti-fraud efforts. <b>Russ:</b> Going back a little bit to that case you just mentioned, American--what was it? <b>Guest:</b> American Savings, also known as FCA Financial Corporation of America. So, it was a holding company. <b>Russ:</b> And how was that, after that run?  It was shut down--is that correct? <b>Guest:</b> No. And indeed that is part of this interesting story of fraud.  It was a bit like Lehman Brothers, in that as your listeners may know, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) had people in Lehman, in its final months of distress; and the Fed folks were from the credit side of operations.  In other words, the potential lenders.  Presumably looking at collateral. And the Fed, knowing that Lehman was in desperate shape, sent two people. The SEC did this as well, by the way. We, from our Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sent 45 people. <b>Russ:</b> To look at American Savings. <b>Guest:</b> American Savings; and they worked around the clock, in shifts, going through collateral and made emergency lines available on the basis of reasonable collateral; and actually survived a $6 billion run. But used that leverage to force out [Charles] Charlie Knapp. And in this era the folks were known as the "high flyers"--that was the phrase within the trade--who were doing what was perceived as riskier things.  And the perception about Knapp was that he was taking severe interest rate risk.  In other words growing very rapidly with a tremendous mismatch, investing very long term, in 30-year fixed-rate mortgages held in portfolio, and financing them with very short-term deposits. <b>Russ:</b> That sounds familiar. <b>Guest:</b> Right. So the key difference is that the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco used its leverage as a lender to force Knapp out and to bring in a new person.  And that new person should--you would have thought--have saved the place, because he immediately stopped the interest rate gamble, went to adjustable rate mortgages.  Not the modern kind in this crisis, but sort of the good, old-fashioned fully amortizing adjustable rate mortgages.  And so he minimized interest rate risk.  And they had virtually no defaults on these loans.  So, you are thinking: This is great. Right? <b>Russ:</b> Getting back to health. <b>Guest:</b> Right. Wonderful intervention, brought in new folks, saved the place.  And what turned out is: Every quarter, the place lost money. And so this made no sense.  And what we discovered eventually, when employees started coming forward, was that they had missed entirely the major operation, which is what we call "cash for trash." And when I say "we" call it, as regulators that's the phrase the industry used to describe it; and we simply adopted their phrase. 
</td></tr>

<tr><td valign="top">7:41</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Now, when you say "they discovered," when you said "they missed"--who was "they"? <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  In this case it was everybody. So the SEC had prompted the run.  I'm not blaming them, mind you--this is a good thing.  But they prompted the run by finding a case of accounting fraud by American Savings and forcing it to restate its earnings.  But they didn't find the underlying larger fraud.  They, the SEC. Nor did the investors.  Nor did the regulators. <b>Russ:</b> And what was that fraud? <b>Guest:</b> And that fraud, as I said was called cash for trash.  And cash for trash works this way: So, Charlie Knapp didn't simply grow rapidly.  He made extremely high-yield, high risk loans. Particularly commercial real estate.  And of course, as you might expect with a guy like this, these loans were frequently bad.  And that would have caused tremendous loss recognition. So, you come into American Savings, and you've never developed anything; you say: I'd like to borrow a million dollars to create a strip development, put up a 7-11.  And the American Savings person would respond, the lender, a loan officer type: Sorry, we won't make you a million dollar loan. But we will make you an $80 million dollar loan. <b>Russ:</b> To a person who has perhaps never developed anything substantial. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  And that would be the norm, and it would be the norm for good economic reasons, because if you are a real developer, even if you have no financial stake in the project--it's a non-recourse loan with no down payment--you still have a reputational interest that can get in the way of what I'm about to describe. <b>Russ:</b> So, this, by the way, is going to be symptomatic of a much larger problem.  So, for those of you listening, if you think we are delving into this particular case of American Savings in this peculiar kind of weird transaction, this turns out to be kind of, unfortunately, a template for a wider kind of behavior.  So, carry on. <b>Guest:</b> That's exactly right. <b>Russ:</b> So, I'm walking in, I've never built anything in my life; I come to you, American Savings, I say I want to build this development; and I know and you know it's a loser.  It's overbuilt already; I don't have much of a track record.  And your point was that if I did have such a track record, I wouldn't be so eager to build a lousy development that would hold me back because I want to keep doing this.  But if I'm a one-time kind of guy, I walk in and want to borrow a million; you say, no, no--we're going to lend you 80 million.  Why wouldn't that be a good idea? <b>Guest:</b> Because I would have previously made a loan for $60 million to somebody else.  And they would actually meet your description even more, of deliberately putting up a building that made no sense. And of course it would have gotten into trouble.  And so the pesky examiners might either have come in or you fear they are about to come in and say that the $60 million dollar acquisition of development and construction, what's called an ADC loan, is really only worth $30 million, and you have to recognize a $30 million dollar loss.  And again, foreshadowing many things we'll talk about, all of these entities have virtually no capital in reality; so a $30 million dollar loss is any amazingly big deal.  A few of those and you are gone.  So, I don't want to recognize that loss.  So, when I do this with a class, I ask: So, what do you do? And after a lot of prompting, they'll say: Well, I loan this new guy, the one who wants to come in that wants to build the 7-11, $60 million dollars.  And he buys it for $60 million.  And that's the C- answer. Because what you are really going to do, of course, is buy it for $78 million. <b>Russ:</b> So, I'm lost. I got confused there.  You've got to prod your bank.  You've got one project that went sour. You didn't plan for that one to go sour; it just didn't turn out. <b>Guest:</b> You didn't care. You were fairly indifferent to it going sour. <b>Russ:</b> So, all of a sudden this stream of payments that you might have gotten is now not going to show up. And you are going to end up with a major loss on your hands.  You are going to have to grab the property in this half-built building maybe, or building that's been built but it's empty; and the guy says: Sorry, I can't pay the loan, but I guess you'll take my land and my building.  Right? <b>Guest:</b> Except that there has never been a stream of earnings. <b>Russ:</b> Right, you've never rented a single office in the building.  And now I come in, I'm the second guy, and I say: I want to build a 7-11; I want to borrow a million dollars.  And what do you do? <b>Guest:</b> I loan you $80 million. You'll keep $2 million as walking-away money. <b>Russ:</b> So, you are going to give me $80 million dollars.  I am going to take $2 million of it to  pay my salary of it as developer. <b>Guest:</b> Right, for the risk exposure of  committing this fraud. <b>Russ:</b> Yes. And what am I going to do with the other $78 million? <b>Guest:</b> I'm going to purchase the building. <b>Russ:</b> I meaning you or me? <b>Guest:</b> I, the 7-11 developer. <b>Russ:</b> That's me. Sorry. <b>Guest:</b> You are going to purchase the big office building. <b>Russ:</b> Oh!  I'm going to use my $78 million that's left over to overpay for the bad thing you already built? <b>Guest:</b> That's right.  And I transform, in my hypothetical--which is not a hypothetical--a true $30 million dollar loss--you have an original book value of $60 million. <b>Russ:</b> And now you've got an $18 million dollar profit. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  And you would frequently have what was known as you, the lender, American Savings, would frequently have what was known as an equity kicker. An equity kicker would  mean you would get 50% of the net profits if there was a successful sale. <b>Russ:</b> That's really ugly fraught, right, because I'm supposed to take the $78 million you gave me and build the 7-11. You are saying I'm not going to do that? <b>Guest:</b> No, you are coming in for a 7-11; I tell you to forget the 7-11 project. That's not what we are going to do.  You are going to get an $80 million dollar loan. You keep $2 million of it as walking around money. <b>Russ:</b> And I take the other $78 million, overpay for your lousy project, and you then, to the regulators on your books, say: We made profit on that first project because we sold it. We sold it to a guy we lent the money to, actually.  And of  course, I'm going to default on the $80 million dollar loan now. <b>Guest:</b> Eventually, but I'll refinance it three more times. <b>Russ:</b> So, what you've done there is you've pushed the day of reckoning down the road with no hope of ever having it be positive.  And in the meanwhile, I've made $2 million; you've made the equity kicker--you pocketed some bonuses maybe and compensation for a good quarter because you say you had a big profit.  Is that the idea? <b>Guest:</b> Yes; and I have transmuted a real economic loss into a fictional gain. Remember the pesky examiner who was about to force me to recognize the $30 million dollar loss. He's threatened my ability to survive.  Now, when these frauds are done, they don't make lemonade.  They make Dom Perignon. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">16:00</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> It's a Ponzi scheme. <b>Guest:</b> Right. <b>Russ:</b> Essentially. So it falls apart either--I was going to say when you run out of people to participate, but there's always someone. Does the person who takes the $80 million dollar loan and pockets the $2 million, does he go to jail? <b>Guest:</b> Eventually in the old days, yes. In the current system, no. <b>Russ:</b> And he goes to jail because he has willingly participated in a sham transaction?  What's the illegality of what he did--what I get in that story? <b>Guest:</b> Excellent question.  What you did, because back in the era I'm describing, we had actual rules. And the actual key rule that helped make these prosecutions was very simple. And it was one of those rules that economists could love.  Libertarian economists could love. <b>Russ:</b> That's me, Bill. You know that. <b>Guest:</b> It said three things. 1. You must underwrite a loan before you make it. <b>Russ:</b> What does that mean? <b>Guest:</b> Well, it doesn't do  you much good if you underwrite it after you've already dispersed the money. <b>Russ:</b> But what does it mean, technically, to underwrite the loan? <b>Guest:</b> Underwriting is the process in this context of determining the risks of the loan, whether it should be made under your risk views, as managers, and what the necessary yield is--the required return in our jargon. <b>Russ:</b> So this is like an assessment.  It's the due diligence before you make the loan that complies with the regulatory framework.  Is that correct? <b>Guest:</b> No, this is the due diligence that we would do if regulators had never existed. <b>Russ:</b> Oh.  Just the idea that you'd want to know what's going on. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  In other words, so to back up, if you don't do due diligence or underwriting in the lending process, we have known for centuries that you create acute adverse selection. And in the context of a mortgage loan, where the money goes out at the beginning, as opposed to credit cards where it goes out in tiny slugs, to engage in significant adverse selection in the mortgage context is to create as a lender an intensely negative expected value. <b>Russ:</b> And by adverse selection, you mean you are going to draw people who are bad credit risks, who are just going to be happy to live in the house for a while and then lose it. <b>Guest:</b> Yes.  In this context. You get the worst possible borrowers and because you do not know the risks, because you have not looked, you will underprice. <b>Russ:</b> Okay, so let's get back to your sequence. <b>Guest:</b> You have to underwrite the loan before you make it. Second thing is, through the underwriting process you have to establish that the person has the apparent ability to repay the loan. And third, you have to keep a written record of this process. <b>Russ:</b> Those are pretty simple.  Now, the puzzle of course--and we're going to talk about this when we come to the current crisis--the puzzle is: So, why would anyone lend that money? Why would ever I want to create a set of loans that are never going to pay off? That I know in advance are likely to not pay off? <b>Guest:</b> Because, as Akerlof and Romer put it, aptly in the title of their key article in 1993, looting the economic underworld of bankruptcy for profit, accounting control fraud is a "sure thing." <b>Russ:</b> And the sure thing there is the sure thing that's with the Ponzi scheme, right? If I have a bunch of sham investments that I finance by continuing to roll over and attract new investors under a promise of  a particular rate of return, say, it's a sure thing until it's not a sure thing.  Until I can't find those people any more, in the case of a Ponzi scheme; and then I lose all my money and I go  to jail.  In the case of a bank, this works for a while; I live a good life in the meanwhile because I've got a lot of cash to play with that I can pay myself with--you've got to be attracting money somewhere along the way so I'm attracting deposits, say, which I'm using to finance these sham transactions and skimming off chunks for myself and other people I lend the money to. But eventually there's a day of reckoning.  So, it's not a very attractive sure thing.  It's a sure thing until you get caught; and then you go to jail. <b>Guest:</b> Only if you go to jail. And as many economists aptly said,  again, it's like all things in risk: You have to make forward-looking views.  At the time people were doing this, nobody was going to prison for these things. <b>Russ:</b> In the 1980s, you are saying. <b>Guest:</b> In the 1980s, and of course now, they most assuredly, if they are the elite managers, don't go to prison. They don't even get investigated in the modern era, much less prosecuted. <b>Russ:</b> So, let's go deeper into looting. You just gave a scenario. <b>Guest:</b> Right, you asked me to explain what the crime typically was, and that's why I was explaining the underwriting process.  We are back to you, where you are the straw purchaser. <b>Russ:</b> Right; I'm the straw developer. <b>Guest:</b> And the crime is that for an $80 million dollar loan, you are almost certainly going to overstate your income. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, I  see. There's going to be a literal fraud.  It's not just that I'm faking it and pretending to be a developer.  I'm going to have to have filled out some paperwork that shows I'm not who I said I was. <b>Guest:</b> And that's because in that era we had rules, requiring this underwriting. And again, the key on those rules is we didn't go to best practices.  We went to minimal practices that any entity that was going to survive as a lender would use.  So, there were pretty close to zero economic costs to this regulation. But it created  a problem for you if you were to engage in fraud, and so what you would typically do is either put false information in the files or remove honest information from the files that would demonstrate to the examiners that you <i>knew</i> you were making a bad loan. <b>Russ:</b> And that would clearly be the case on my side, as the borrower.  And on your side as the lender, you would go to jail for knowingly accepting false documents or removing those things from the file? <b>Guest:</b> You would have been the person, just as in the current crisis who had been encouraging and made basis preparing the  false financial statements.  You are not going to leave it up to the unsophisticated person who has never been a developer. <b>Russ:</b> To figure out what he needs to lie about.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">23:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So let's take a brief digression here on ethics, a topic that rarely rears its attractive head.  You said that in the profession, in the industry, this was known as cash for trash. At that point, people didn't foresee--many of them, some of them--would go to jail for this procedure.  It's not a very nice thing. When you went home at night and talked to your spouse, you'd kind of feel--How was your day?  Well, I made another lousy loan, doing great; we're going to Tahiti this summer for a month.  How did this become the norm? And it <i>was</i> the norm--we're talking about one particular example, but there were many, many banks in the Akerlof and Romer paper, I remember, very important paper. This wasn't like an isolated thing where someone said: Hey, maybe I could get away with this.  It was widespread, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes. The inevitable national commission to investigate the causes of the Savings and Loan crisis, the famous phrase is: As the typical large failure, fraud was invariably present. Now, that's the norm within the large failures.  It doesn't mean it was the norm within Savings and Loans.  There were 3000 Savings & Loans, roughly, depending on the exact date, and we are talking about one tenth of the industry.  But 1/10th of the industry is enough to cause catastrophic losses. <b>Russ:</b> And of course, those losses continued to mount.  Let me see if I can get the chain correctly. So, I'm a Savings and Loan; I am attracting deposits by offering nice rates of interest.  I am taking the money, lending it out along the lines of what we just talked about, aggressively; having good quarter after quarter, by what again seems like a Ponzi scheme; and the people who are ultimately financing it, although they look like the depositors, are not really the depositors.  It was the taxpayer. Because the S&Ls were FDIC-insured, the taxpayers were ultimately the funders of this fraud.  Is that a correct way to describe it? <b>Guest:</b> Well, first, there was a separate insurance fund in those days, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), as a technical matter.  But  yes, the government was behind most of it.  But don't forget, in terms of key stuff about moral hazard: the government wasn't the only entity.  There were shareholders at most of the worst places.  And there was subordinated debt at many of the most fraudulent places.  And of course in economic theory, it was supposed to be subordinated debt that was the perfect form of private-market discipline. You had the right incentives; you had the sophistication; and you should have done something.  But there were zero cases of effective private market discipline by either shareholders or sub-debt holders in the Savings and Loan crisis. <b>Russ:</b> So, let me just review that, because we've talked about this in passing in many different podcasts, many episodes of this show.  The debt holders have a fixed upside.  They cannot make more than they are promised.  Their downside is being wiped out. So in general, they are going to be the watchdogs of risk taking and the enforcers of prudence on the part of the people who they've lent money to through this debt.  And what I have been worrying about for a long time, and it's a worry I've learned from Gary Stern's work, is: Well, that's true, that under a market system the debt holders are supposed to be the disciplinarians of risk taking, the watchdogs, but if the bond holders think that they might get their money back even when the firm goes out of business, which happened with Continental Illinois in 1984, you might start to not worry so much about that and be willing to accept a fixed rate of return even when there is a chance that the investment will amount to nothing, because you might get your money anyway.  Correct? <b>Guest:</b> True, but not basic enough.  In other words, you are quite right that Continental Illinois did a terrible thing and it bailed out sub-debt holders. We never did that in the Savings and Loan.  We always wiped out the sub-debt holders. And of course they are supposed to be wiped out.  That's the concept of risk capital. Despite that, there was never effective private market discipline; indeed there was no even effort at private market discipline. It failed, by sub-debt holders during that entire crisis. And what I'm explaining with this  sure thing and the creation of this record reported income hit the Achilles heel of the private market discipline. So, in the real world, if you are the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Enron, and you are reporting record profits, your problem isn't private market discipline.  Your problem is that bankers are almost literally trying to break down your office door to get in to you to lend you money. So, as long as you are reporting record earnings, it turns out private market discipline is  an oxymoron. The primary entity that loses money, as you aptly pointed out in the Savings and Loan, is not the shareholders--because of the very thin equity.  It's the creditors. Now in the Savings and Loan case, yes, the ultimate creditor was the government, in most cases.  But that's not true of the Enrons of the world.  That wasn't true of the Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch--in other words, the entities that fund the accounting control frauds are overwhelming the creditors who in theory are supposed to be the ones providing discipline.  Instead, what they mostly do is provide cash. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">30:36</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Right, so again, the puzzle is: Why?  And the answer, it seems to me--there's two answers.  One is: they looked at the record profits, the good times, and they were lulled into thinking that they would persist.  I find that explanation unpalatable and probably false.  Of course it's possible.  It's possible that there's this animal spirits of exuberance that gets out of control.  But these are savvy people; they've seen a little bit of the world; they do know that prices can go down and assets do fall in value from time to time.  And in fact each of these firms has people in them, and that was their sole job--tap the other people on the shoulder and say: Don't forget!  And yet they persisted; they continued to fund those investments and eventually when they turned out badly, they should have been wiped out.  But they weren't.  They got 100 cents on the dollar. They were totally insulated from the market discipline that should have been in place. <b>Guest:</b> Well, it depends on what you are describing.  That's certainly not true in the Savings and Loan. <b>Russ:</b> Correct. I'm talking about the current crisis.  I'm talking about the Bear Stearns creditors; I'm talking about AIG's, Merrill Lynch--everybody except Lehman.  The people who had funded the daily operations that provided the liquidity that let them make the bets they made were insulated from the failure. <b>Guest:</b> Well, again, if you go a little farther back--because again, this theory says: What do I anticipate? We had <i>not</i> been bailing out investment banks.  And investment banks had been failing; and by the  way they failed primarily because of fraud--and there had been no bailouts.  So, if you go on what people supposedly would have anticipated coming into this crisis, I don't buy the argument that they would have been very sure that they would have been bailed out.  The banks that facilitated Enron's fraud suffered significant losses. <b>Russ:</b> But the banks that funded the escapades of the Mexican government in the mid-1990s suffered no losses, because the U.S. government stepped in, using the same argument that they would use in this crisis--that there was risk of global instability; that Mexico could not default; no one needs to take a haircut; the U.S. government will guarantee the bonds that the Mexican government would issue to cover its past promises; and it turned out they didn't lose a  penny.  So it turned out great according to the defenders of that policy. But the investment banks that had bought those Mexican bonds that had issued those, had underwritten those bonds, part of the stream of income that they generated--they were made whole.  And I think that's part of the problem. <b>Guest:</b> I agree that that is part of the problem. I would again say they weren't really made whole, except in a very nominal accounting sense.  In other words, there were real losses suffered; and Citicorp was next to death's door a number of times.  But I think where we'll all end up agreeing is the treatment of systemically dangerous institutions that allows them to hold our economy  hostage and produce these bailouts is completely destructive of almost any view of  how and economic system should run. <b>Russ:</b> Yes, we're going to agree on that. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">34:26</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let's get to how the story you just told me about American savings in that era of the Savings and Loan crisis, when banks realized that--Well, let me ask you a different question before we get to the present.  How do you get to a world--wouldn't you rather make good loans?  Why would you run around trying to make bad loans? Why then?  You'd think if this is a good trick, you should always do it.  If it's not a good trick, don't do it, if there's a better alternative.  Why was it prevalent then? What kicked that looting off? <b>Guest:</b> Well, what kicked it off was almost certainly the first phase of the Savings and Loan crisis, which had nothing to do with fraud. The interest rate crisis.  The entire industry ran on a system that exposed it to massive interest rate risk.  Paul Volker decided to break the back of inflationary expectations; created the double-digit interest rates; and every Savings and Loan in America was insolvent on a market-value basis; and collectively by mid-1982--of course this wasn't realized for accounting purposes--but in real economic terms, the industry was insolvent to the tune of roughly $150 billion.  <b>Russ:</b> So, at this point I'm running a bank and I have made a bunch of loans--basically the  idea is to attract new money, which I need, I have to offer a large interest premium. But the money that's coming in from my old loans is very low. This is the mismatch problem, correct? <b>Guest:</b> Yes, although this is where the conventional economic wisdom turns out to be highly incorrect.  But it does create lots of pressures; and it creates a unique political opportunity. So, the head of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, at that point, is Dick Pratt; an academic, very conservative, very libertarian economist/finance expert. And he creates the key deregulatory bill; indeed it was known as the Pratt Bill, informally.  It becomes the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. And being a good economist, he tries to do it exactly right.  And so he asked his economists at the agency, which of the states has the best results? Right? So this is Brandeis-like laboratory experimentation.  And they come back and they say: Texas. Texas is the place where the Savings and Loans are reporting the best returns.  And so he uses Texas as his  model for deregulation--what becomes the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. The problem of course that he and his economists didn't understand is that the Texas Savings and Loans were doing what we've been describing in this podcast. <b>Russ:</b> They were the market leaders. <b>Guest:</b> Yes. And as a result they produced over 40% of the total losses in the entire Savings and Loans crisis.  And this is the fundamental problem of relying on econometrics during the expansion phase of an epidemic of accounting control fraud. Because you will inherently get not just the wrong answer in terms of public policy--you will get the worst feasible answer.   <b>Russ:</b> Yes, it's a destabilizing feedback loop.  So, what is--trying to answer my earlier question: This kind of looting or control fraud occurs when I realize that my bank is dead, that my assets are worth less than I had thought, or less than I expected; my liabilities are greater than I expected and it turns out they are much greater than those assets; I realize that my bank is shot.  And if an earnest and diligent set of evaluators came in they'd realize this also and I'd be shut down. Instead, I cover up that bad situation with the kind of behavior we talked about earlier, which allows me to sustain a personal lifestyle and package of compensation that's very attractive. <b>Guest:</b> And it's a sure thing and nobody's getting prosecuted.  But here's the kicker to what you've just said: That describes 100 shops out of 3000.  So, that's your point about ethics. And sociology, mores. If you had been a CEO--these things come from the C-suite--and you had worked at the Savings and Loans for 30 years and you'd risen through the ranks, and you'd hired pretty much everybody who had worked at your shop, this is a much less attractive strategy. <b>Russ:</b> Yes; you've got friends, you are in the community; you don't really want to have people pointing to that grotesque, bad development and say: He did that. <b>Guest:</b> That's right. And you are proud of your  place, and you identify with it. And so in fact it was extremely unusual for these folks even though it appeared to be a sure thing. <b>Russ:</b> So most people didn't do that. <b>Guest:</b> And so, Larry White--this is the NYU Larry White, as opposed to your colleague--famously writes about this episode.  And he was one of the Presidential employees running the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for several years--saying: The mystery for an economist is why there is so little fraud. Not why there was such extensive fraud. <b>Russ:</b> I understand. <b>Guest:</b> So, the key is entry. <b>Russ:</b> Is 10% half empty or half full? <b>Guest:</b> But the key is entry, which is a wonderfully fine economic concept forgotten by economists in discussing this crisis.  So, the fraudsters grossly disproportionately are new entrants. And they are overwhelmingly real estate developers, who have intense conflicts of interest. <b>Russ:</b> Yes, funding themselves. <b>Guest:</b> And they are frequently crummy real estate developers, for the reasons we've discussed. <b>Russ:</b> So, they put out a shingle, start a bank, start collecting some deposits, start lending themselves money for projects that aren't going to make it. And their depositors of course are going to get their money back so long as they are not too large, and sometimes they do anyway. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">42:12</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> Let's move to the present. Or the semi-present--let's get up to 2008 and go forward. And I want to talk about, if we can, Fannie and Freddie and the  investment banks.  All of them were doing something similar, sometimes on their own--in the case of investment banks they were origination shops; in the case of Fannie and Freddie, they couldn't originate loans, they could only finance them and fund them and buy them.  But both of these groups were grabbing up mortgages, packaging them into securities, and selling those securities, often to each other, often to pension funds and people all around the world.  What's the parallel between that period, which is really roughly 2003-2008 when it totally fell apart, between that period of financial activity and the stories we've been telling? <b>Guest:</b> So, what we hadn't finished with the logical link is: Deregulation in the Savings and Loan crisis, the key event that is so fraud-friendly in terms of creating a criminogenic environment, occurs in 1982; and reregulation begins in 1983. So, it begins very quickly and therefore it's done in the face of unbelievably intense political pressure from both parties. So, that's a completely distinct pattern.  Now, to understand the current crisis, you actually have to go to 1990, 1991, because that's when liar's loans become significant. And with all good fraud schemes in America, it begins in Orange County, CA. And it begins in large part at Long Beach Savings. And we are the regional regulators by that point. <b>Russ:</b> You? Who is "we"? <b>Guest:</b> We are the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco; and then it becomes the Office of Thrift Supervision, West Region. And we go and we look at we say: Wait a minute. You are not going to do underwriting and that's going to produce immense adverse selection.  You are going to have a negative expected value. You have to lose money doing this. This is insane. This can only make sense as a fraud scheme. You can't do it. And so we used normal supervisory means to wipe out liar's loans among Savings and Loans in Orange County in this era. Whereupon, they of course--they being Long Beach Savings--give up their Federal Charter. Give up Federal Deposit Insurance. And become a mortgage banker--for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction. And they changed their name; and they become Ameriquest. And your listeners who are familiar with the story will recognize that name, because it is the first big and infamous maker of liar's loans and other nonprime loans. And on top of that it's a predatory lender that aims at minorities.  Whereupon--and by the way, their leading competitor are two people, a husband-wife CEO team at Guardian Savings that we have removed and prohibited from the Savings and Loan industry, so they simply went to mortgage banking. Which is essentially unregulated. <b>Russ:</b> At the time. <b>Guest:</b> So that's where--so you have this era in 1990, 1991 in which you get hundreds of millions of dollars of losses from these loans, but they are pushed out of the regulated industry. There are two more crackdowns involving 49 state attorneys general, plus the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suing Ameriquest. They settle for $400 million, which at that time was a large amount of money; and we promptly make the CEO of Ameriquest our Ambassador to the Netherlands. <b>Russ:</b> What year was that? <b>Guest:</b> Because, of course, he's the leading political contributor to the President of the United States. <b>Russ:</b> Strangely enough he had a lot of friends. <b>Guest:</b> He had friends again in both party. <b>Russ:</b> Yes, just like Countrywide did, and Fannie and Freddie. <b>Guest:</b> Anyway, so that's what happens: Overwhelmingly this stuff gets pushed, at first, out of the regulated entity.  And so it becomes the mortgage bankers; and the mortgage bankers almost exclusively, for the first 8 years, are dealing with the investment banking firms. The Big Five. 
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">47:39</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But I'm confused now. So, in early 1990s, there are some firms who are lending money to people who are not accurately representing their ability to repay the loans. Right? <b>Guest:</b> No. <b>Russ:</b> What's a liar loan? <b>Guest:</b> A liar's loan is--you are correct--involves false statements about income; but it is not the borrowers.  It is overwhelmingly the lenders, for the same reasons as in the Savings and Loan crisis. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that's what I don't understand.  So, I'm Long Beach Savings, to start with.  And I am lending money.  We're reversing roles here, Bill. Let's see if you and I can handle it and the listeners can handle it.  I'm Long Beach; you have a modest income and you come to me and you want to buy a house. And I say: No, no, no, you don't want to buy that house.  Here's a bigger house.  And you say to me: Oh, no, but my income.  I can't afford it. And you say: Don't worry. I'm going to lend you the money anyway, as if you had the income of 4 times what you actually have. Is that a liar's loan? <b>Guest:</b> That is a liar's loan, but that's not the most typical way that it's going to occur. The typical way it's going to occur, first, is through a broker.  So, yet another party has to be introduced to this. So, to skip through: there's testimony in front of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that it was common for the prior job of the mortgage broker to have been literally flipping burgers.  So, you are the lender--you are Long Beach. You make the following deal and of course you don't have to have a discussion.  You just send out your daily term sheet, starting out with hundreds but eventually tens of thousands of brokers. Communications--it got cheaper. And the term sheets creates an optimization thing that has three components. 1. Higher yield, good. You get a higher yield as a broker; I give you a higher fee. 2. Lower loan-to-value ratio, very good. I give you a higher fee. <b>Russ:</b> So, again, I'm the lender.  I'm telling my brokers: Don't ask for much money down; charge them a high interest rate. And is there a third piece? <b>Guest:</b> No, no, no--you missed.  It's actually the opposite. A <i>lower</i> loan-to-value ratio. <b>Russ:</b> Oh, sorry, sorry. <b>Guest:</b> You've done a lot.  And also 3. A lower debt-to-income ratio. So, those are the three things that we are optimizing as a loan broker. And to skip forward to the current crisis, as you know, home prices in California are often very high. And so what we call a jumbo--a $600-$800 thousand dollar range--you could get as a mortgage broker, a $20,000 fee.  For one jumbo.  <b>Russ:</b> To bring me the loan that--the borrower that you are going to make the loan to.  You are going to get $20,000. <b>Guest:</b> Correct. So you want to incent people to bring you these loans in extraordinary volume with the ultra-high yield; and then these two ratios gimmicked to make it look like the loan is safer. So, the reason, of course, is you are going to resell this loan. <b>Russ:</b> Who am I going to sell it to in 1991? That's what I'm wondering about. <b>Guest:</b> Oh. We're going to sell it to Lehman and--see, all of the investment banks had non-prime entities, at least one non-prime affiliate. <b>Russ:</b> Well, they had their own mortgage originators, too, in the non-prime world. <b>Guest:</b> Well, sometimes. <b>Russ:</b> Bear Stearns did. <b>Guest:</b> They most frequently did exactly what I've described here.  So, Lehman Brothers, Aurora, actually had very few loans it made itself, but it made hundreds of thousands of these loans through brokers. <b>Russ:</b> But this is the puzzle. This is what I'm confused about.  This is not 2003.  You are saying this is 1992. How does Long Beach Savings make any money at this?  You say because they are selling them to investment banks? Why would they buy them?  They are lousy?  <b>Guest:</b> Of course.  It's a sure thing. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that's what I don't get.  How does this relate to the earlier story where there was a Ponzi-like scheme that let me sustain an unsustainable situation for a while? Why is this a good business model in 1992? <b>Guest:</b> Okay.  So, let me tell you the fraud recipe.  And for both a lender and a purchaser of these.  So, for a lender, it's got four ingredients: grow like crazy, by making really crappy loans but at a premium yield--and those first two things are related--with extreme leverage, and virtually no meaningful allowances for the future losses being recognized currently. <b>Russ:</b> So, how does Long Beach do that? <b>Guest:</b> Through this loan brokerage process that I'm describing. So, I told you the first two elements; the first two ingredients are related. I would, of course, love to grow exceptionally rapidly by making really high-quality loans. <b>Russ:</b> There aren't enough to go around. <b>Guest:</b> Yes; not only that.  This is a). not a mature market, this is like iPads, and b). it's a very competitive market. And so what happens--let's do the thought exercise.  I want to grow 50% a year, which by the way is what was the average of the accounting control frauds by Savings and Loans until reregulation.  That's exceptional growth, as you know.  All right.  So, if I'm going to grow 50% a year by making extremely good quality loans, what do I have to do? I have to buy market share.  How do I buy market share? I have to cut my yield.  But in a relatively competitive marketplace, what are my competitors going to do? <b>Russ:</b> Same thing. <b>Guest:</b> They are going to chop their yield. So at the end of the day, is this a good way to create nominal income? No, it's a terrible way. You obviously destroy nominal income through that process.   But there are tens of millions of people that cannot afford homes. <b>Russ:</b> They don't have the down-payment, they don't have the credit record, they don't have enough income. <b>Guest:</b> That is correct.  I have a huge number of folks that I can lend to.  And here's what's even better. As you know, we often have to spend a lot of our time with students explaining the fallacy of composition--that a strategy that's good for one entity can't work typically for an industry.  If we all try to sell at the same time, the classic example, of portfolio insurance, it doesn't work really well. <b>Russ:</b> So, go ahead. <b>Guest:</b> But the fallacy of composition works the opposite way; when a bunch of us make bad loans.  Because it turns out there are better places to make these loans.  And that's going to be a combination of ease of entry, which assets are better for inflating values and hiding real losses, where is the risk of prosecution the smallest, etc. And therefore you get clustering.  And you get emulation--what Akerlof and Romer talk about--the mimicking process. It's an easy strategy to emulate, right? Grow rapidly by sending these term sheets out to brokers. Anybody can do it with no brains.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">56:22</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> But I'm Long Beach, now, and I realize that if I want to have a big institution, I can't just compete like everybody else. I can't just go to the good credit risks.  I have to start lowering my standards, lend to people who are not normally going to get a loan, who don't have the income, don't have the credit rating; and I start offering them loans that normally wouldn't get made.  So I have two questions. One is: Why do I do that? And is the answer: Because I'm going to look like I'm generating--how do I, why is that good for me as the executive of the bank? Where's the looting? <b>Guest:</b> Sure. So, I create three sure things--again, adapt Akerlof and Romer's phrase. The first sure thing is if I follow this recipe I am mathematically guaranteed in the near term to report not just good profits, but record profits, off-the-chart profits.  Two, with modern executive compensation, I <i>will</i> become wealthy. And three, again, if you think about that recipe, I'm actually maximizing real losses, real economic losses. <b>Russ:</b> So, where do I get the money from, to fund this escapade?  This is not quite like the earlier story, right?  I've got to give money to people who are going to use it to buy houses. <b>Guest:</b> Without deposit insurance, it is harder to hold it in portfolio.  You should not assume the impossible. And Ireland should be your cautionary tale, where there was essentially no secondary market and they did very similar things. Because it turns out you can expand, even in the Irish context. Okay, so, but back to your point. How do they get the money?  They had an originate-for-sale model. Now, as you've said, they are selling overwhelmingly to surely-private parties. And neoclassical theory says: It's impossible. They will exert private-market discipline. <b>Russ:</b> In theory. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  But we ran a real-world test of the theory, and it turns out folks not only will buy it, but they will eagerly buy it.  And they will expand.  So, what's the formula for accounting control fraud by a purchaser of these entities?  Well, it's essentially the same thing.  Instead of the first ingredient--sorry, second ingredient--make really crappy loans, I purchase really crappy loans. And I report really nice yields.  Now, can this keep going forever?  Of course not.  Can I keep going for a significant period, as in 8-10 years? Yes. Yes.  If these things cluster and we hyperinflate the bubble. Because the saying in the trade is "a rolling loan gathers no loss." <b>Russ:</b> Right. <b>Guest:</b> So, I can refinance the bad loans, and I can hide the delinquencies for a decade.  And again, we ran a real world test of that, which showed that's precisely what you could do. <b>Russ:</b> My only defense of neoclassical theory is, again, I think there was the potential expectation that this would not turn out as bad as it looked.  But let me just again restate the idea.  You are saying that Bear Stearns, Lehman, Citi, etc.--let's forget all the complexities of derivatives and CDOs and all this--I have a temptation to buy up really bad loans, put on my books an expected stream of earnings that probably and almost certainly will not materialize--but that's not known yet.  So, I put on my books that I have 30 years of wonderful payments coming in because the historic default rate is a fraction of what it will ultimately be, because that historic rate is predicated on a different set of people borrowing than are actually borrowing now.  And, in the short run, which could be a few years, I make really great paper profits; but I'm not really standing over a viable institution. <b>Guest:</b> Right.  And to quote someone who has been on your podcast, you also create plausible deniability.  <b>Russ:</b> Who are you quoting? <b>Guest:</b> Charles Calomiris. [N.B. quote is not from the podcast but appears in various forms in other material by Calomiris, exact source unknown--Econlib Ed.] "Asset managers were placing someone else's money at risk, and earning huge salaries, bonuses, and management fees for being willing to pretend that these were reasonable investments. They may have reasoned that other competitors were behaving similarly and that they would be able to blame the collapse when it inevitably came on an unexpected shock." And then he says, derisively, "Who knew?" <b>Russ:</b> Sarcasm. <b>Guest:</b> So, Charles is, say from a pretty opposite side of the spectrum from me, and of course has also run a bank; and was perhaps the leading economist in the world, urging internationally that you deregulate banks coming into this crisis.  Bo [?] McCallister, who was at Pinkus Warburg, here's what he said: "By 2006 and early 2007, everyone thought we were headed to a cliff.  The capital market experts I was listening to all thought the banks were going crazy and that the terms of major loans being offered by the banks were nuttiness of epic proportions." And here are the numbers: After the FBI warned, in September 2004, that there was an epidemic of mortgage fraud and predicted that it would cause a financial crisis if it were not contained, and after the industry--the mortgage, lending industry's own anti-fraud experts issued the following five warnings, in writing, in 2006, to essentially every mortgage lender in the United States: 1. Have you morons forgotten that we've done this before, in 1990 and 1991 and it caused hundreds of millions of dollars in losses? 2. Stated income loans, and I quote, an open invitation to fraudsters. 3. The incidence of fraud in liar's loans is 90%--nine, zero. 4. These loans deserve the phrase that the industry uses behind closed doors to describe them. They are liar's loans. And 5. The banking regulatory agencies--and this is under Bush--are warning against making these loans. The industry massively expanded the number of liar's loans it made, such that by 2006, the best estimates are that 1/3 of all the loans made in that year were liar's loans. And remember, liar's loans and subprime are not mutually exclusive categories. So, by 2006, half of all the loans called subprime were also liar's loans.  And now, what is the key difference?  I explained to you we used to have rules on underwriting.  In 1993. So, this goes way back. Under Clinton.  They got rid of that as part of reinventing government.  And examiners were instructed to refer to bankers as their clients.  And rules were bad, and guidelines were in. So there's now a guideline on underwriting.  And a guideline is unenforceable.  And so the absolute perfect thing for not creating a perfect paper trail and no longer creating the dilemma about should I put false information in the loan file or should I take out honest information that shows I knew it was a bad loan--the absolute perfect device for fraud, is the liar's loan. Because you don't document.  You don't verify. And so the paper trail is much easier for fraud in the current crisis.  And then the other key is we eventually developed an incredibly effective means of dealing with the frauds, in the form of criminal prosecutions, administrative enforcement actions, and civil cases. And convicted over 1000 elites--these are not the little cases. <b>Russ:</b> This is in the 1980s. <b>Guest:</b> In the 1980s.  And made well over--just our agency--made well over 10,000 criminal referrals.  I mean well over 10,000 criminal referrals. <b>Russ:</b> Well, that was unpleasant for those people. <b>Guest:</b> It was. <b>Russ:</b> So, now they found a new way to live. <b>Guest:</b> So, our agency, our same agency in this crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision, made 0 criminal referrals.  And the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), depending on who you believe at the OCC, made either 0 or 3. For which you say: [?]. <b>Russ:</b> Which means? <b>Guest:</b> Three is none.  
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:07:45</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> This is so interesting.  Let's try to finish with a conversation about what we agree on and what we don't agree on. So, you and I might disagree about the behavior and the incentives that were in place.  We might disagree about the moral hazard.  Where we agree is that by failing to prosecute actual fraud and by reducing the incentives for creditors to police risk-taking, we have certainly created an environment right now that is an unbelievably unhealthy situation.  And I have to say, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, that when I'm watching a football game, and I do from time to time, and I see an ad for a credit card that offers this glorious rate of interest and all these special, wonderful things that come with it, and all kinds of prizes and rewards, I'm thinking: You know, that reminds me of a S&L situation, where you offer a really high rate of return to your depositors, and then you just take the money and you do some really dumb things with it; and it doesn't really matter.  What have we done in the last 4 years other than make this problem worse? And, what should we have done?  I'm giving you 5-10 minutes for this, Bill; I know you'd like another hour and a half; maybe we'll revisit it in another podcast.  But what do you think we have done to fraud incentives in the last 3-4 years, and what should we have done? <b>Guest:</b> Well, I agree with you fundamentally that we have made the world much more criminogenic.  So, I have a doctorate in criminology, and this is what I primarily research--why do you have recurrent intensifying financial crises brought on by these kinds of frauds?  And it's a lot of the usual--the unintended consequences.  But here are the unintended consequences of doing things like deregulation and modern executive compensation.  And of course, I'm not unusual in this.  Michael Jensen, the intellectual godfather of modern executive compensation, says that he's created a Frankenstein monster of creating perverse incentives.  So, first, deal with the systemically dangerous institutions.  And here, the Administration can't even be honest.  It calls them systemically important, like they deserve a gold star.  But they are vastly beyond any efficiencies of scale.  They are inefficient; we would make the world more efficient and we would dramatically reduce systemic risk if we shrunk them to the size that they pose no systemic risk of global collapse. As long as they are this big, they are going to get away with murder. And worse, they will create a Gresham's dynamic.  And this is something Akerlof warned about in his famous 1970 article on lemons markets, where cheaters prosper.  Bad ethics can drive good ethics out of the marketplace.  So, that fundamental task, as financial regulators, is to <i>make</i> market discipline more effective by getting good information out and by removing the cheaters, who create the perverse incentives to match what I'm doing or die.  So, that's what we want.  We want, a). stop the systemic institutions from growing, because we are making it worse now by making them bigger; 2. We don't tell them how to shrink, but we give them 5 years to shrink.  They can use their managerial judgment about how to do that.  And 3. is, in the interim, you regulate them much more intensively.  Executive compensation is broken.  Everybody knows it's broken.  Everybody knows that what really happens with executive compensation has nothing to do with what we teach about how to align the interests. In fact, it further misaligns it.  And if you want the expert, it's Frank Raines, Fannie Mae, who said famously: If you wave enough money in front of folks, good people will do bad things. And that's exactly what happens.  We can't, if you are Enron--think about how Enron works.  You can't send a memo to 3000 Enron employees saying: You know what we'd like to do? We'd like to engage in pervasive accounting fraud because then we'll get rich in the interim and we'll walk away from the husk. <b>Russ:</b> Because you could go to jail. <b>Guest:</b> But you could send the same message through your executive compensation, through what GE made famous: rank and yank [?] <b>Russ:</b> Which is? <b>Guest:</b> All you had to do was add one message.  And that message will get around the firm within seconds.  The message is this: We don't care whether your reported income is real or not. If you create fictional reported income--and Enron did that pervasively--then we will make you rich.  So, you've got to fix executive compensation.  You've got to restore the criminal referral process--which was essentially eliminated in the regulatory agencies. You have to stop this proposed settlement, at least as it's publicly reported, under which the Justice Department, purportedly, is going to give immunity from criminal prosecution for frauds in the process of making the loans--which is overwhelmingly where the fraud occurred, in vast dollar amounts. So, those things you need to do.  You need to reinstate the underwriting rule.  Guidelines are the most useless regulatory activity in existence.  They are the nattering state. The people that need the rules will utterly ignore at all times your guidelines.
</td></tr>


<tr><td valign="top">1:14:43</td><td valign="top"><b>Russ:</b> So, let me give a political economy take on what you've said.  I'm going to add a piece to it, and then I'll let you have the last word. Somewhere in the late 1980s or early 1990s, there was a feeling among politicians that America's home ownership rate was not doing what it should be doing.  It actually started in the early 1980s.  And there was political pressure--and good intentions--to try to get the home ownership rate up.  There was of course also political pressure to allow people to expand their businesses in the financial sector; and this is what Bruce Yandle has called a bootlegger and baptist situation, where you have good motives mingling with really pecuniary and not-so-good motives. But I think a lot of politicians managed to convince themselves, in both Parties, that if they could loosen the spigot on money going into the housing sector, they would be able to increase the home ownership rate.  And so, the kind of things that you've been talking about, and that we've been talking about in this program for a long time--changes in underwriting, changes in requirements for Fannie and Freddie to purchase loans, changes in how investment banks structure themselves--all these things came together to allow an enormous sum of money to go into housing rather than elsewhere. A lot of people managed to convince themselves that was a good thing, either because they were getting extremely rich--and that includes the builders along with the financial sector that was the greaser of the wheels--or because it was good for America to have more people owning homes than renting. And it blew up.  It was an unsustainable strategy. It has created a hideous set of political and economic results.  And it seems to me we've barely learned these lessons. What's your take? <b>Guest:</b> I agree with most of the things you say except I think it had almost nothing to do with the crisis. So, it's, I think, really naive to believe that any lender made loans because they thought it made politicians happy. Lenders made loans because it made individual lenders--I don't mean companies, I mean people--much, much wealthier.  And they created those incentive structures not because they could care less about people.  In fact, of course, the leading victims--and I would guess we both agree on this--have been the working class people, particularly minorities, who after all were put in vastly overpriced houses at the peak of the world's largest bubble, and have had a devastating loss of their net worth. <b>Russ:</b> I've got to interrupt you there.  I think there are a lot of tragic individual stories.  But many of the people who lost their homes never had any equity in them to start with.  So, their wealth was not wiped out.  Their credit rating has been wiped out.  Many of them didn't have much of a credit rating before. And it's a horrible thing to have to lose your house--of course, there's an enormous emotional toll on folks.  But it's not quite as bleak as you are making it out to be. <b>Guest:</b> Actually, I think evidence will show that it <i>is</i>. You are quite right that how much you put into a house matters.  But I think you will  find even with folks with no down payment--which is sort of the extreme case. <b>Russ:</b> There were a lot of those during this period. <b>Guest:</b> There were many.  That they actually make very substantial investments.  And you know as a homeowner.  It ain't just your down payment, in terms of your exposure. So, these folks--many of them are in states that allow deficiency judgments as well, and we have changed the bankruptcy laws to be much less consumer-friendly, particularly on first homes as opposed to second homes.  But let me come back to the more fundamental point.  Like you, we are always looking for natural experiments, for what they can teach us.  Liar's loans is something where no governmental entity encouraged them. In fact, even the Bush Administration banking regulators, who were not fond of regulating, consistently disparaged those kinds of loans.  And nobody ever required Fannie and Freddie to purchase a liar's loan. They chose to do so, and they increased it massively; from 2003-2006 the number of liar's loans increased by over 500%.  So, we think this actually <i>is</i> a story, driven overwhelmingly by what we call accounting control fraud; and we think no one much doubts that about the Enron era. And we think there is pretty good consensus on the Savings and Loan crisis as well, because of all the factual record.  We had to go up against the best criminal defense lawyers in the world, and we got a 90% conviction rate.  Plus, we satisfied the economists that looked.  I quoted from the National Commission, which was run by economists, that concluded that at the typical large failure, fraud was invariably present. But if you go and read the economic literature on this crisis, you will find that Akerlof and Romer are cited for example in maybe, generously, 1 out of 100 articles that purport to discuss the causes of the crisis.  And you will see that fraud is virtually never discussed as even a potential major contributor. And that is poor; and that is really the tribal taboo that still exists in economics against any serious consideration of the word fraud.
</td></tr>

</tbody>
</table>


]]>
    </content>
</entry>

</feed>

